Applicants, the Socialist Workers Party, its youth organization
(YSA), and various individuals, brought an action against various
Government officials for alleged interference in their political
activities and sought an injunction, which the District Court
granted, barring FBI agents and informants from attending or
otherwise monitoring the YSA national convention. Except for
upholding a bar against the FBI's transmitting to the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) the names of persons attending the convention, the
Court of Appeals vacated the injunction, noting that the convention
was open to anyone under age 29 and that the only investigative
method would be the use of informants who would attend meetings as
the public would and that any "chilling effect" on applicants'
rights was not sufficient to outweigh prejudice to the Government
that compromising its informants would entail. Applicants apply for
a stay of the Court of Appeals' order and reinstatement of the
District Court's injunction.
Held: Although, unlike the situation in
Laird v.
Tatum, 408 U. S. 1,
applicants' allegations of a "chilling effect" are sufficiently
specific to satisfy Art. III's jurisdictional requirements,
nevertheless a stay would be improper, since the FBI has
represented that it plans no disruptive activity at the convention
and will not transmit information to nongovernmental entities, and
since interim relief against disclosure of delegates' names to the
CSC has been granted.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, Circuit Justice.
This case is before me on an application to stay an order
entered by a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
vacating in part an order of the District Court for the Southern
District of New York . The District Court had granted a preliminary
injunction against the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and
Page 419 U. S. 1315
others, barring Government agents and informants from attending
or otherwise monitoring the national convention of the Young
Socialist Alliance (YSA), to be held in St. Louis, Mo., between
December 28, 1972, and January 1, 1975. Applicants also seek to
have the injunction of the District Court reinstated in full.
Applicants, the Socialist Workers Party, the YSA -- the party's
youth organization -- and several individuals, originally brought
this action against various Government officials, seeking
injunctive and monetary relief for alleged governmental
interference in the political activities of the two organizations.
In the course of preparing for trial on the merits, the applicants
apparently learned that the FBI planned to monitor the YSA national
convention and to use confidential informants to gain information
about convention activities. They sought to enjoin the FBI, its
agents, and its informants from "attending, surveilling
[
sic], listening to, watching, or otherwise monitoring,"
the convention. After several hearings, the District Court granted
the injunction in the form requested by the plaintiffs. On an
expedited appeal, [
Footnote 1]
the Court of Appeals vacated the District Court's injunction in all
respects except one: it barred the FBI from transmitting the names
of persons attending the convention to the Civil Service Commission
pending final determination of the action. For the reasons stated
below, I have concluded that, on the facts of this case, the
extraordinary relief of a stay is not warranted.
Page 419 U. S. 1316
I
The applicants argue that a stay is necessary to protect the
First Amendment speech and association rights of those planning to
attend the YSA convention. Surveillance and other forms of
monitoring, they claim, will chill free participation and debate,
and may even discourage some from attending the convention
altogether. Beyond this, the applicants allege that the FBI has
admitted that its agents or informants "intend to participate in
the convention debate posing as
bona fide YSA members."
[
Footnote 2] This "double
agent" activity, the applicants claim, will result in "corruption
of the democratic process," and consequent irreparable harm to the
applicants and others who would participate in the convention.
The applicants further assert that granting the relief requested
here will not result in injury to the FBI. The fact that the FBI
has a duty to keep itself informed concerning the possible
commission of crimes, applicants say, does not justify its
permitting informants and agents to participate in the convention,
since the YSA has not been shown to have engaged in illegal
activities. They further claim that the risk that FBI informants
will become identifiable by their nonattendance at the convention
is not sufficient to support the Court of Appeals'
Page 419 U. S. 1317
order. While the applicants' allegations evoke an unsavory
picture of deceit and political sabotage, the facts as
characterized by the Court of Appeals suggest a less sinister view
of the Government's planned activities at the convention. The court
noted that the convention would be open to anyone under the age of
29; that anyone could register; that even the "delegated" sessions
would be open to anyone registered at the convention; that the
Government planned no electronic surveillance or disruptive
activity; and that the only investigative method would be the use
of informants who would attend the meetings just as any member of
the public would be permitted to do.
The Court of Appeals held that, on the facts of this case, the
chilling effect on attendance and participation at the convention
was not sufficient to outweigh the serious prejudice to the
Government of permanently compromising some or all of its
informants. The 11th-hour grant or denial of injunctive relief
would not be likely to have a significant effect on attendance at
the convention, the court stated, and since the convention is to be
open to the public and the press, the use of informants to gather
information would not appear to increase appreciably the "chill" on
free debate at the convention. In weighing the nature of the
planned investigative activity, the justification for that
activity, and the claimed First Amendment infringement in this
case, the Court of Appeals determined that the balance of the
equities tipped in favor of the Government, and that a preliminary
injunction was therefore improper.
II
This case presents a difficult threshold question -- whether the
applicants have raised a justiciable controversy under this Court's
decision in Laird v.
Tatum, 408
Page 419 U. S. 1318
U.S. 1 (1972). In
Laird, the plaintiffs protested
surveillance activities by the Army that were in many ways similar
to those planned by the FBI in this case. The Court held, however,
that the plaintiffs' claim that the Army's surveillance activities
had a general chilling effect on them was not sufficient to
establish a case or controversy under Art. III of the
Constitution.
The Government has contended that, under
Laird, a
"chilling effect" will not give rise to a justiciable controversy
unless the challenged exercise of governmental power is
"regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature," and the
complainant is either presently or prospectively subject to the
regulations, proscriptions, or compulsions that he is challenging.
Id. at
403 U. S. 11. In
my view, the Government reads
Laird too broadly. In the
passage relied upon by the Government, the Court was merely
distinguishing earlier cases, not setting out a rule for
determining whether an action is justiciable or not. More apposite
is the Court's observation in
Laird that the respondents'
claim was
"that they disagree with the judgments made by the Executive
Branch with respect to the type and amount of information the Army
needs and that the very existence of the Army's data-gathering
system produces a constitutionally impermissible chilling effect
upon the exercise of their First Amendment rights."
Id. at
403 U. S. 13.
Because the "chilling effect" alleged by respondents in
Laird arose from their distaste for the Army's assumption
of a role in civilian affairs or from their apprehension that the
Army might at some future date "misuse the information in some way
that would cause direct harm to [them] ,"
ibid., the Court
held the "chilling effect" allegations insufficient to establish a
case or controversy.
Page 419 U. S. 1319
In this case, the allegations are much more specific: the
applicants have complained that the challenged investigative
activity will have the concrete effects of dissuading some YSA
delegates from participating actively in the convention and leading
to possible loss of employment for those who are identified as
being in attendance. Whether the claimed "chill" is substantial or
not is still subject to question, but that is a matter to be
reached on the merits, not as a threshold jurisdictional question.
The specificity of the injury claimed by the applicants is
sufficient, under
Laird, to satisfy the requirements of
Art. III.
III
Although the applicants have established jurisdiction, they have
not, in my view, made out a compelling case on the merits. I cannot
agree that the Government's proposed conduct in this case calls for
a stay, which, given the short life remaining to this controversy,
would amount to an outright reversal of the Court of Appeals.
It is true that governmental surveillance and infiltration
cannot in any context be taken lightly. The dangers inherent in
undercover investigation are even more pronounced when the
investigative activity threatens to dampen the exercise of First
Amendment rights.
See DeGregory v. New Hamp. Atty. Gen.,
383 U. S. 825
(1966);
Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., 372 U.
S. 539 (1963);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.
S. 449 (1958). But our abhorrence for abuses of
governmental investigative authority cannot be permitted to lead to
an indiscriminate willingness to enjoin undercover investigation of
any nature, whenever a countervailing First Amendment claim is
raised.
In this case, the Court of Appeals has analyzed the competing
interests at some length, and its analysis seems to me to compel
denial of relief. As the court
Page 419 U. S. 1320
pointed out, the nature of the proposed monitoring is limited,
the conduct is entirely legal, and if relief were granted, the
potential injury to the FBI's continuing investigative efforts
would be apparent. Moreover, as to the threat of disclosure of
names to the Civil Service Commission, the Court of Appeals has
already granted interim relief. On these facts, I am reluctant to
upset the judgment of the Court of Appeals. [
Footnote 3]
As noted above, the Government has stated that it has not
authorized any disruptive activity at the convention. In addition,
the Government has represented that it has no intention of
transmitting any information obtained at the convention to
nongovernmental entities such as schools or employers. I shall hold
the Government to both representations as a condition of this
order. Accordingly, the application to stay the order of the Court
of Appeals and to reinstate the injunction entered by the District
Court is
Denied.
[
Footnote 1]
Applicants object to the Court of Appeals' treatment of the case
as an appeal, after initially setting it as a motion for a stay.
When the time is as short as it was in this case, of course, the
difference between the two is very slight. The court's
determination that the District Court abused its discretion in
ordering the injunction would appear to meet the standard of review
for either a stay or the reversal of a preliminary injunction.
[
Footnote 2]
Applicants argue that this admission, made after the District
Court's decision, significantly alters the balance of the equities
in this case. However, the Government has represented that no FBI
agents will attend the convention and that the informants who are
members of the YSA will participate in the convention only in a
manner consistent with their previous roles in the organization.
The Government assured both the Court of Appeals and me that the
FBI has authorized no disruptive activity at the YSA convention. To
require informants who may be active members of the organization to
remain silent throughout the convention would render them as
readily identifiable in some cases as an order excluding them.
[
Footnote 3]
This is especially true where, as here, the matter before me
involves a preliminary injunction granted without a full hearing on
the merits. Much of the information before me is in dispute. The
denial of the stay in this case in no way affects the outcome of
the case on the merits, which was filed in 1973 and is still
pending in the District Court.