Respondents, 17 black and two white residents of Cairo,
Illinois, brought a civil rights class action against petitioners,
a magistrate and a circuit court judge, who allegedly engaged under
color of state law, in a continuing pattern and practice of conduct
consisting of illegal bond-setting, sentencing, and jury fee
practices in criminal cases, which assertedly deprived respondents
and members of their class of their rights under the Constitution
and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983, 1985. The District Court
dismissed the action for want of jurisdiction to issue the
injunctive relief sought and on the ground of judicial immunity.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that issuance of injunctions
against judicial officers was not forbidden if their conduct was
intentionally racially discriminatory against a cognizable class of
persons. Absent sufficient remedy at law, it was held that, if
respondents proved their allegations, the District Court should
fashion appropriate relief to enjoin petitioners from depriving
others of their constitutional rights while carrying out their
judicial duties in the future.
Held:
1. The complaint fails to satisfy the threshold requirement of
Art. III of the Constitution that those who seek to invoke the
power of federal courts must allege an actual case or controversy
where none of the named plaintiffs is identified as himself having
suffered any injury in the manner specified, the claim alleging
injury is in only the most general terms, and there are no
allegations that any relevant state criminal statute is
unconstitutional on its face or as applied or that plaintiffs have
been or will be improperly charged with violating criminal law. Pp.
414 U. S.
493-499.
(a) If none of the named plaintiffs purporting to represent a
class meets the case or controversy requirement, none may seek
relief on behalf of himself or any other member of the class. Pp.
414 U. S.
494-495.
Page 414 U. S. 489
(b) That requirement is not satisfied by general assertions or
inferences that, in the course of their activities, respondents
will be prosecuted for violating valid criminal laws. P.
414 U. S.
497.
(c) Where it can only be speculated whether respondents will be
arrested for violating an ordinance or state statute, particularly
in the absence of allegations that unconstitutional criminal
statutes are being employed to deter constitutionally protected
conduct, and respondents have not pointed to any imminent
prosecutions contemplated against them so that they do not claim
any constitutional right to engage in conduct proscribed by
therefore presumably permissible state laws, or that it is
otherwise their intention to so conduct themselves, the threat of
injury from the alleged course of conduct they attack is too remote
to satisfy the case or controversy requirement and permit
adjudication by a federal court. Pp.
414 U. S.
497-498.
2. Even if the complaint were considered to present an existing
case or controversy, no adequate basis for equitable relief has
been stated. Pp.
414 U. S.
499-504.
(a) The injunctive relief sought by respondents would constitute
a ma, or continuing intrusion of the equitable power of the federal
courts into the daily conduct of state criminal proceedings, and
would sharply conflict with recognized principles of equitable
restraint,
Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S.
37. Pp.
414 U. S.
499-502.
(b) Respondents also failed to establish the basic requisites of
the issuance of equitable relief -- the likelihood of substantial
and immediate irreparable injury, and the inadequacy of remedies at
law -- in view of the conjectural nature of the threatened injury
to which respondents are allegedly subjected, and where there are
available other procedures, both state and federal, which could
provide relief. Pp.
414 U. S.
502-504.
468 F.2d 389, reversed.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER,
C.J., and STEWART, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN,
J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment and in Part I of
the Court's opinion,
post, p.
414 U. S. 504.
DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and
MARSHALL, JJ., joined,
post, p.
414 U. S.
505.
Page 414 U. S. 490
MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The respondents are 19 named individuals who commenced this
civil rights action, individually and on behalf of a class of
citizens of the city of Cairo, Illinois, against the State's
Attorney for Alexander County, Illinois, his investigator, the
Police Commissioner of Cairo, and the petitioners here, Michael
O'Shea and Dorothy Spomer, Magistrate and Associate Judge of the
Alexander County Circuit Court, respectively, alleging that they
have intentionally engaged in, and are continuing to engage in,
various patterns and practices of conduct in the administration of
the criminal justice system in Alexander County that deprive
respondents of rights secured by the First, Sixth, Eighth,
Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and by 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1985. The complaint, as amended,
alleges that, since the early 1960's, black citizens of Cairo,
together with a small number of white persons on their behalf, have
been actively, peaceably and lawfully seeking equality of
opportunity and treatment in employment, housing, education,
participation
Page 414 U. S. 491
in governmental decisionmaking and in ordinary day-to-day
relations with white citizens and officials of Cairo, and have, as
an important part of their protest, participated in and encouraged
others to participate in an economic boycott of city merchants who
respondents consider have engaged in racial discrimination.
Allegedly, there had resulted a great deal of tension and
antagonism among the white citizens and officials of Cairo.
The individual respondents are 17 black and two white residents
of Cairo. The class, or classes, which they purport to represent
are alleged to include
"all those who, on account of their race or creed and because of
their exercise of First Amendment rights, have [been] in the past
and continue to be subjected to the unconstitutional and
selectively discriminatory enforcement and administration of
criminal justice in Alexander County,"
as well as financially poor persons "who, on account of their
poverty, are unable to afford bail, or are unable to afford counsel
and jury trials in city ordinance violation cases." The complaint
charges the State's Attorney, his investigator, and the Police
Commissioner with a pattern and practice of intentional racial
discrimination in the performance of their duties, by which the
state criminal laws and procedures are deliberately applied more
harshly to black residents of Cairo and inadequately applied to
white persons who victimize blacks, to deter respondents from
engaging in their lawful attempt to achieve equality. Specific
supporting examples of such conduct involving some of the
individual respondents are detailed in the complaint as to the
State's Attorney and his investigator.
With respect to the petitioners, the county magistrate and
judge, a continuing pattern and practice of conduct, under color of
law, is alleged to have denied and to continue to deny the
constitutional rights of respondents and members of their class in
three respects:
Page 414 U. S. 492
(1) petitioners set bond in criminal cases according to an
unofficial bond schedule without regard to the facts of a case or
circumstances of an individual defendant in violation of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) "on information and belief," they
set sentences higher and impose harsher conditions for respondents
and members of their class than for white persons, and (3) they
require respondents and members of their class when charged with
violations of city ordinances which carry fines and possible jail
penalties if the fine cannot be paid, to pay for a trial by jury in
violation of the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Each of
these continuing practices is alleged to have been carried out
intentionally to deprive respondents and their class of the
protections of the county criminal justice system and to deter them
from engaging in their boycott and similar activities. The
complaint further alleges that there is no adequate remedy at law
and requests that the practices be enjoined. No damages were sought
against the petitioners in this case, nor were any specific
instances involving the individually named respondents set forth in
the claim against these judicial officers.
The District Court dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction
to issue the injunctive relief prayed for and on the ground that
petitioners were immune from suit with respect to acts done in the
course of their judicial duties. The Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.
S. 547,
386 U. S. 554
(1967), on which the District Court relied, did not forbid the
issuance of injunctions against judicial officers if it is alleged
and proved that they have knowingly engaged in conduct intended to
discriminate against a cognizable class of persons on the basis of
race. Absent sufficient remedy at law, the Court of Appeals ruled
that, in the event respondents proved their allegations, the
District Court should proceed to fashion appropriate injunctive
relief
Page 414 U. S. 493
to prevent petitioners from depriving others of their
constitutional rights in the course of carrying out their judicial
duties in the future. [
Footnote
1] We granted certiorari. 411 U.S. 915 (1973).
I
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The complaint
failed to satisfy the threshold requirement imposed by Art. III of
the Constitution that those who seek to invoke the power of federal
courts must allege an actual case or controversy.
Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U. S. 83,
392 U. S. 94-101
(1968);
Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.
S. 411,
395 U. S.
421-425 (1969) (opinion of MARSHALL, J.). Plaintiffs in
the federal courts "must allege some threatened or actual injury
resulting from the putatively illegal action before a federal court
may assume jurisdiction."
Linda R.S. v. Richard D.,
410 U. S. 614,
410 U. S. 617
(1973). [
Footnote 2] There
Page 414 U. S. 494
must be a "personal stake in the outcome" such as to
"assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions."
Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186,
369 U. S. 204
(1962). Nor is the principle different where statutory issues are
raised.
Cf. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.
S. 669,
412 U. S. 687
(1973). Abstract injury is not enough. It must be alleged that the
plaintiff "has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining
some direct injury" as the result of the challenged statute or
official conduct.
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.
S. 447,
262 U. S. 488
(1923). The injury or threat of injury must be both "real and
immediate," not "conjectural" or "hypothetical."
Golden v.
Zwickler, 394 U. S. 103,
394 U. S.
109-110 (1969);
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific
Coal & Oil Co., 312 U. S. 270,
312 U. S. 273
(1941);
United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S.
75,
330 U.S.
89-91 (1947). Moreover, if none of the named plaintiffs
purporting to represent a class establishes the requisite of a case
or controversy with the defendants, none may seek relief on behalf
of himself or any other member of the class. [
Footnote 3]
Bailey v. Patterson,
369 U. S. 31,
369 U. S.
32-33
Page 414 U. S. 495
(1962);
Indiana Employment Division v. Burney,
409 U. S. 540
(1973).
See 3B J. Moore, Federal Practice, �
23.10-1, n. 8 (2d ed.1971).
In the complaint that began this action, the sole allegations of
injury are that petitioners
"have engaged in and continue to engage in a pattern and
practice of conduct . . . all of which has deprived and continues
to deprive plaintiffs and members of their class of their"
constitutional rights and, again, that petitioners "have denied
and continue to deny to plaintiffs and members of their class their
constitutional rights" by illegal bond-setting, sentencing, and
jury fee practices. None of the named plaintiffs is identified as
himself having suffered any injury in the manner specified. In
sharp contrast to the claim for relief against the State's
Attorney, where specific instances of misconduct with respect to
particular individuals are alleged, the claim against petitioners
alleges injury in only the most general terms. At oral argument,
respondents' counsel stated that some of the named plaintiffs
respondents, who could be identified by name if necessary, had
actually been defendants in proceedings before petitioners, and had
suffered from the alleged unconstitutional practices. [
Footnote 4] Past exposure to illegal
conduct does not, in itself, show a present case or controversy
regarding injunctive relief, however, if
Page 414 U. S. 496
unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.
Neither the complaint nor respondents' counsel suggested that any
of the named plaintiffs at the time the complaint was filed were
themselves serving an allegedly illegal sentence or were on trial
or awaiting trial before petitioners. Indeed, if any of the
respondents were then serving an assertedly unlawful sentence, the
complaint would inappropriately be seeking relief from or
modification of current, existing custody.
See Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475
(1973). Furthermore, if any were then on trial or awaiting trial in
state proceedings, the complaint would be seeking injunctive relief
that a federal court should not provide.
Younger v.
Harris, 401 U. S. 37
(1971);
see also 414 U. S.
infra. We thus do not strain to read inappropriate meaning
into the conclusory allegations of this complaint.
Of course, past wrongs are evidence bearing on whether there is
a real and immediate threat of repeated injury. But here the
prospect of future injury rests on the likelihood that respondents
will again be arrested for and charged with violations of the
criminal law and will again be subjected to bond proceedings,
trial, or sentencing before petitioners. Important to this
assessment is the absence of allegations that any relevant criminal
statute of the State of Illinois is unconstitutional on its face or
as applied, or that respondents have been or will be improperly
charged with violating criminal law. If the statutes that might
possibly be enforced against respondents are valid laws, and if
charges under these statutes are not improvidently made or pressed,
the question becomes whether any perceived threat to respondents is
sufficiently real and immediate to show an existing controversy
simply because they anticipate violating lawful criminal statutes
and being tried for their offenses, in which event they may appear
before petitioners and, if they do, will be affected by the
Page 414 U. S. 497
allegedly illegal conduct charged. Apparently, the proposition
is that, if respondents proceed to violate an unchallenged law and
if they are charged, held to answer, and tried in any proceedings
before petitioners, they will be subjected to the discriminatory
practices that petitioners are alleged to have followed. But it
seems to us that attempting to anticipate whether and when these
respondents will be charged with crime and will be made to appear
before either petitioner takes us into the area of speculation and
conjecture.
See Younger v. Harris, supra, at
401 U. S. 41-42.
The nature of respondents' activities is not described in detail,
and no specific threats are alleged to have been made against them.
Accepting that they are deeply involved in a program to eliminate
racial discrimination in Cairo and that tensions are high, we are
nonetheless unable to conclude that the "case or controversy"
requirement is satisfied by general assertions or inferences that,
in the course of their activities, respondents will be prosecuted
for violating valid criminal laws. We assume that respondents will
conduct their activities within the law and so avoid prosecution
and conviction as well as exposure to the challenged course of
conduct said to be followed by petitioners.
As in
Golden v. Zwickler, we doubt that there is
"
sufficient immediacy and reality'" to respondents' allegations
of future injury to warrant invocation of the jurisdiction of the
District Court. There,
"it was wholly conjectural that another occasion might arise
when Zwickler might be prosecuted for distributing the handbills
referred to in the complaint."
394 U.S. at
394 U. S. 109.
Here we can only speculate whether respondents will be arrested,
either again or for the first time, for violating a municipal
ordinance or a state statute, particularly in the absence of any
allegations that unconstitutional criminal statutes are being
employed to deter constitutionally protected conduct.
Cf. Perez
v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82,
401 U. S.
101-102
Page 414 U. S. 498
(1971) (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). Even though Zwickler attacked a
specific statute under which he had previously been prosecuted, the
threat of a new prosecution was not sufficiently imminent to
satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of the federal courts.
Similarly, respondents here have not pointed to any imminent
prosecutions contemplated against any of their number, and they
naturally do not suggest that any one of them expects to violate
valid criminal laws. Yet their vulnerability to the alleged
threatened injury from which relief is sought is necessarily
contingent upon the bringing of prosecutions against one or more of
them. Under these circumstances, where respondents do not claim any
constitutional right to engage in conduct proscribed by therefore
presumably permissible state laws, or indicate that it is otherwise
their intention to so conduct themselves, the threat of injury from
the alleged course of conduct they attack is simply too remote to
satisfy the case or controversy requirement and permit adjudication
by a federal court.
In
Boyle v. Landry, 401 U. S. 77,
401 U. S. 81
(1971), the Court ordered a complaint dismissed for insufficiency
of its allegations where there was no basis for inferring
"that any one or more of the citizens who brought this suit is
in any jeopardy of suffering irreparable injury if the State is
left free to prosecute under the intimidation statute in the normal
manner."
The Court expressed the view that
"the normal course of state criminal prosecutions cannot be
disrupted or blocked on the basis of charges which in the last
analysis amount to nothing more than speculation about the
future."
Ibid. A similar element of uncertainty about whether
the alleged injury will be likely to occur is present in this case,
and a similar reluctance to interfere with the normal operation of
state administration of its criminal laws in the manner sought by
respondents, strengthen the conclusion
Page 414 U. S. 499
that the allegations in this complaint are too insubstantial to
warrant federal adjudication of the merits of respondents'
claim
The foregoing considerations obviously shade into those
determining whether the complaint states a sound basis for
equitable relief, and even if we were inclined to consider the
complaint as presenting an existing case or controversy, we would
firmly disagree with the Court of Appeals that an adequate basis
for equitable relief against petitioners had been stated. The Court
has recently reaffirmed the
"basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence that courts of equity
should not act, and particularly should not act to restrain a
criminal prosecution, when the moving party has an adequate remedy
at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable
relief."
Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37,
401 U. S. 43-44
(1971). Additionally, recognition of the need for a proper balance
in the concurrent operation of federal and state courts counsels
restraint against the issuance of injunctions against state
officers engaged in the administration of the State's criminal laws
in the absence of a showing of irreparable injury which is
"
both great and immediate.'" Id. at 401 U.S. 46. See, e.g., Fenner v.
Boykin, 271 U. S. 240
(1926); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.
S. 157 (1943). In holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is
an Act of Congress that falls within the "expressly authorized"
exception to the absolute bar against federal injunctions directed
at state court proceedings provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2283, the
Court expressly observed that it did not intend to
"question or qualify in any way the principles of equity,
comity, and federalism that must restrain a federal court when
asked to enjoin a state court proceeding."
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225,
407 U. S. 243
(1972). Those principles preclude equitable intervention in the
circumstances present here.
Page 414 U. S. 500
Respondents do not seek to strike down a single state statute,
either on its face or as applied; nor do they seek to enjoin any
criminal prosecutions that might be brought under a challenged
criminal law. In fact, respondents apparently contemplate that
prosecutions will be brought under seemingly valid state laws. What
they seek is an injunction aimed at controlling or preventing the
occurrence of specific events that might take place in the course
of future state criminal trials. The order the Court of Appeals
thought should be available if respondents proved their allegations
would be operative only where permissible state prosecutions are
pending against one or more of the beneficiaries of the injunction.
Apparently the order would contemplate interruption of state
proceedings to adjudicate assertions of noncompliance by
petitioners. This seems to us nothing less than an ongoing federal
audit of state criminal proceedings which would indirectly
accomplish the kind of interference that
Younger v. Harris,
supra, and related cases sought to prevent.
A federal court should not intervene to establish the basis for
future intervention that would be so intrusive and unworkable. In
concluding that injunctive relief would be available in this case
because it would not interfere with prosecutions to be commenced
under challenged statutes, the Court of Appeals misconceived the
underlying basis for withholding federal equitable relief when the
normal course of criminal proceedings in the state courts would
otherwise be disrupted. The objection is to unwarranted
anticipatory interference in the state criminal process by means of
continuous or piecemeal interruptions of the state proceedings by
litigation in the federal courts; the object is to sustain "[t]he
special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between federal
equitable power and State administration of its own law."
Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U. S. 117,
Page 414 U. S. 501
371 U. S. 120
(1951). [
Footnote 5]
See
also Cleary v. Bolger, 371 U. S. 392
(1963);
Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.
S. 381 (1961);
Pugach v. Dollinger,
365 U. S. 458
(1961);
cf. Rea v. United States, 350 U.
S. 214 (1956). An injunction of the type contemplated by
respondents and the Court of Appeals would disrupt the normal
course of proceedings in the state courts via resort to the federal
suit for determination of the claim
ab initio, just as
would the request for injunctive relief from an ongoing state
prosecution against the federal plaintiff which was found to be
unwarranted in
Younger. Moreover, it would require for its
enforcement the continuous supervision by the federal court over
the conduct of the petitioners in the course of future criminal
trial proceedings involving any of the members of the respondents'
broadly defined class. [
Footnote
6] The Court of Appeals disclaimed any intention of requiring
the District Court to sit in constant day-to-day supervision of
these judicial officers, but the "periodic reporting" system it
thought might be warranted [
Footnote 7] would constitute a form of monitoring of the
operation of state court functions that is antipathetic to
established principles of comity.
Cf. Greenwood v.
Peacock, 384 U. S. 808
(1966). Moreover, because an injunction against acts which might
occur in the course of future criminal proceedings would
necessarily impose continuing obligations of compliance, the
question arises of how compliance might be enforced if the
beneficiaries of the injunction were to charge that it had been
disobeyed. Presumably, any member of respondents' class who
appeared as an
Page 414 U. S. 502
accused before petitioners could allege and have adjudicated a
claim that petitioners were in contempt of the federal court's
injunction order, with review of adverse decisions in the Court of
Appeals and, perhaps, in this Court. Apart from the inherent
difficulties in defining the proper standards against which such
claims might be measured, and the significant problems of proving
noncompliance in individual cases, such a major continuing
intrusion of the equitable power of the federal courts into the
daily conduct of state criminal proceedings is in sharp conflict
with the principles of equitable restraint which this Court has
recognized in the decisions previously noted.
Respondents have failed, moreover, to establish the basic
requisites of the issuance of equitable relief in these
circumstances -- the likelihood of substantial and immediate
irreparable injury, and the inadequacy of remedies at law. We have
already canvassed the necessarily conjectural nature of the
threatened injury to which respondents are allegedly subjected. And
if any of the respondents are ever prosecuted and face trial, or if
they are illegally sentenced, there are available state and federal
procedures which could provide relief from the wrongful conduct
alleged. Open to a victim of the discriminatory practices asserted
under state law are the right to a substitution of judge or a
change of venue, Ill.Rev.Stat., c. 38, §§ 115, 116
(1971), review on direct appeal or on post-conviction collateral
review, and the opportunity to demonstrate that the conduct of
these judicial officers is so prejudicial to the administration of
justice that available disciplinary proceedings, including the
possibility of suspension or removal, are warranted. Ill.Const.,
Art. VI, § 15(e). In appropriate circumstances, moreover,
federal habeas relief would undoubtedly be available.
Page 414 U. S. 503
Nor is it true that, unless the injunction sought is available,
federal law will exercise no deterrent effect in these
circumstances. Judges who would willfully discriminate on the
ground of race or otherwise would willfully deprive the citizen of
his constitutional rights, as this complaint alleges, must take
account of 18 U.S.C. § 242.
See Greenwood v. Peacock,
supra, at
384 U. S. 830;
United States v. Price, 383 U. S. 787,
383 U. S.
793-794 (1966);
United States v. Guest,
383 U. S. 745,
383 U. S.
753-754 (1966);
Screws v. United States,
325 U. S. 91,
325 U. S.
101-106 (1945);
United States v. Classic,
313 U. S. 299
(1941).
Cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.
S. 167,
365 U. S. 187
(1961). That section provides:
"Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any inhabitant of any
State . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the
United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on
account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his
color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens,
shall be fined . . . or imprisoned. . . ."
Whatever may be the case with respect to civil liability
generally,
see Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.
S. 547 (1967), or civil liability for willful
corruption,
see Alzua v. Johnson, 231 U.
S. 106,
231 U. S.
110-111 (1913);
Bradley v.
Fisher, 13 Wall. 335,
80 U. S. 347,
80 U. S. 350,
80 U. S. 354
(1872), we have never held that the performance of the duties of
judicial, legislative, or executive officers, requires or
contemplates the immunization of otherwise criminal deprivations of
constitutional rights.
Cf. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.
S. 339 (1880). On the contrary, the judicially fashioned
doctrine of official immunity does not reach "so far as to immunize
criminal conduct proscribed by an Act of Congress. . . ."
Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606,
408 U. S. 627
(1972).
Page 414 U. S. 504
Considering the availability of other avenues of relief open to
respondents for the serious conduct they assert, and the abrasive
and unmanageable intercession which the injunctive relief they seek
would represent, we conclude that, apart from the absence of an
existing case or controversy presented by respondents for
adjudication, the Court of Appeals erred in deciding that the
District Court should entertain respondents' claim.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
While the Court of Appeals did not attempt to specify exactly
what type of injunctive relief might be justified, it at least
suggested that it might include a requirement of "periodic reports
of various types of aggregate data on actions on bail and
sentencing." 468 F.2d at 415. The dissenting judge urged that a
federal district court has no power to supervise and regulate by
mandatory injunction the discretion which state court judges may
exercise within the limits of the powers vested in them by law, and
that any relief contemplated by the majority holding which might be
applicable to the pattern and practice alleged, if proven, would
subject the petitioners to the continuing supervision of the
District Court, the necessity of defending their motivations in
each instance when the fixing of bail or sentence was challenged by
a Negro defendant as inconsistent with the equitable relief
granted, and the possibility of a contempt citation for failure to
comply with the relief awarded.
Id. at
414 U. S.
415-417.
[
Footnote 2]
We have previously noted that
"Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights the invasion
of which creates standing, even though no injury would exist
without the statute.
See, e.g., Trafficante v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 409 U. S. 205,
409 U. S.
212 (1972) (WHITE, J., concurring);
Harding v.
Kentucky Utilities Co., 390 U. S. 1,
390 U. S.
6 (1968)."
Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.
S. 614,
410 U. S. 617
n. 3 (1973). But such statutes do not purport to bestow the right
to sue in the absence of any indication that invasion of the
statutory right has occurred or is likely to occur. Title 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, in particular, provides for liability to the "party
injured" in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress. Perforce, the constitutional requirement of
an actual case or controversy remains. Respondents still must show
actual or threatened injury of some kind to establish standing in
the constitutional sense.
[
Footnote 3]
There was no class determination in this case as the complaint
was dismissed on grounds which did not require that determination
to be made. Petitioners assert that the lack of standing of the
named respondents to raise the class claim is buttressed by the
incongruous nature of the class respondents seek to represent. The
class is variously and incompatibly defined in the complaint as
those residents of Cairo, both Negro and white, who have boycotted
certain businesses in that city and engaged in similar activities
for the purpose of combatting racial discrimination, as a class of
all Negro citizens suffering racial discrimination in the
application of the criminal justice system in Alexander County
(though two white persons are named respondents), and as all poor
persons unable to afford bail, counsel, or jury trials in city
ordinance cases. The absence of specific claims of injury as a
result of any of the wrongful practices charged, in light of the
ambiguous and contradictory class definition proffered, bolsters
our conclusion that these respondents cannot invoke federal
jurisdiction to hear the claims they present in support of their
request for injunctive relief.
[
Footnote 4]
Tr. of Oral Arg. 21, 23, 26.
[
Footnote 5]
It was noted in
Stefanelli that, in suits brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1983,
"we have withheld relief in equity even when recognizing that
comparable facts would create a cause of action for damages.
Compare Giles v. Harris, 189 U. S. 475,
with Lane v.
Wilson, 307 U. S. 268."
342 U.S. at
342 U. S.
122.
[
Footnote 6]
See n 3,
supra.
[
Footnote 7]
See n 1,
supra.
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in part.
I join the judgment of the Court and Part I of the Court's
opinion, which holds that the complaint
"failed to satisfy the threshold requirement imposed by Art. III
of the Constitution that those who seek to invoke the power of
federal courts must allege an actual case or controversy."
Ante at
414 U. S.
493.
When we arrive at that conclusion, it follows, it seems to me,
that we are precluded from considering any other issue presented
for review. Thus, the Court's additional discussion of the question
whether a case for equitable relief was stated amounts to an
advisory opinion that we are powerless to render.
Hayburn's
Case, 2 Dall. 409 (1792);
United States v.
Evans, 213 U. S. 297,
213 U. S. 301
(1909); Muskrat v. United States,
219 U. S. 346,
219 U. S.
360-361 (1911);
Stearns v. Wood, 236 U. S.
75 (1915);
Coffman v. Breeze Corps.,
323 U. S. 316
(1945);
United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S.
75 (1947);
Paschall v. Christie-Stewart, Inc.,
ante at
414 U. S.
101-102.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated the applicable principle in
speaking for the Court in
International Longshoremen's &
Warehousemen's Union v. Boyd, 347 U.
S. 222,
347 U. S. 223
(1954)
"On this appeal, appellee contends that the District Court
should not have reached the statutory and constitutional questions
-- that it should have
Page 414 U. S. 505
dismissed the suit for want of a 'case or controversy,' for lack
of standing on the union's part to bring this action,. . . . Since
the first objection is conclusive, there is an end of the
matter."
I would adhere to that principle. Either there is no case or
controversy, and that is the end of the matter, or there is a case
or controversy, and the Court may go on to a decision on the
merits. In my view, the Court may not have it both ways.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR.
JUSTICE MARSHALL concur, dissenting.
The respondents in this case are black and indigent citizens of
Cairo, Illinois. Suing in federal court, they alleged that, since
the early 1960's, black citizens of Cairo have been actively
seeking equal opportunity and treatment in employment, housing,
education, and ordinary day-to-day relations with the white
citizens and officials of Cairo. In this quest, blacks have engaged
in a boycott of local merchants deemed to have engaged in racial
discrimination.
Alleging that this quest for equality has generated substantial
antagonism from white governmental officials, respondents brought a
class action under 42 U.S.C. § § 1981, 1982, 1983, and
1985, seeking to represent citizens of Cairo who have been
subjected in the past, and continue to be subjected, to the
allegedly discriminatory and unconstitutional administration of
criminal justice in Alexander County, Illinois, which includes
Cairo. Among their other claims, respondents alleged that
petitioners Michael O'Shea and Dorothy Spomer, both now judges in
Alexander County, [
Footnote 2/1]
engage in acts which deprive them and
Page 414 U. S. 506
members of their class of their constitutional rights. These
judges allegedly set bond in criminal cases without regard to the
facts of individual cases and as punishment, and not merely to
assure the appearance of defendants at trial; impose higher
sentences and harsher conditions of sentencing on black than on
white citizens; and require respondents and members of their class,
when charged with violations of city ordinances which carry fines
and possible jail penalties, to pay for a trial by jury if the fine
cannot be paid.
I
An injunction was sought against this conduct. The District
Court referred obliquely to want of jurisdiction, but, focusing on
the fact that the complaint sought review of matters of judicial
discretion, concluded that the action should be dismissed because
judges and magistrates are immune from liability for acts done in
performance of their duties. In reversing and remanding the case to
the District Court, the Court of Appeals held that the action was
not barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity. The Court of
Appeals also held that the complaint contained sufficiently
specific factual averments to satisfy Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 8(a). 468
F.2d 389.
This Court now decides for the first time in the course of this
litigation that the complaint is deficient because it does not
state a "case or controversy" within the meaning of Art. III.
The fact that no party has raised that issue in this closely
contested case is no barrier, of course, to our consideration of
it. But the reasoning and result reached by the Court are, to say
the least, a
tour de force, and quite inconsistent with
the allegations in the complaint, which are within constitutional
requirements.
Page 414 U. S. 507
We know from the record and oral argument that Cairo, Illinois,
is boiling with racial conflicts. This class action brought under
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1985 is to remedy vast
invasions of civil rights. The Court, however, says that it is not
a "case or controversy" because none of the named plaintiffs has
alleged infringement of his rights, and the fact that other members
of the class may have been injured is not enough. As to the latter,
Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U. S. 31,
369 U. S. 32-33,
is cited in support. But in
Bailey, the named persons were
given standing to sue, the statement that "[t]hey cannot represent
a class of whom they are not a part,"
id. at
369 U. S. 32-33,
being dictum and its only authority being
McCabe v. Atchison,
T. & S.F. R. Co., 235 U. S. 151,
235 U. S.
162-163, which was not a class action. Nor was the
question on which the case is made to turn resolved in
Indiana
Employment Division v. Burney, 409 U.
S. 540. For we only held that, where the named plaintiff
had received relief and nothing appeared as to the relief, if any,
granted to members of the class, the possible question of mootness
should be resolved by the District Court. Even so, there were
dissents. The upshot is that one crucial issue on which the Court
makes this case turn has not been decided by the Court, and was
never argued here. At the very least we should have a full-dress
argument on that point. .
But I do not press the point, for the amended complaint is
sufficiently specific to warrant a trial.
As respects O'Shea, the Magistrate, and Spomer, the Circuit
Judge, the charges concerning named plaintiffs are as follows:
(1) that excessive bonds have been required in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because petitioners follow an
unofficial bond schedule without regard to the facts of individual
cases;
Page 414 U. S. 508
(2) on information and belief, that petitioners set higher
sentences and impose harsher conditions for respondents and members
of their class than for white persons;
(3) that, where the named plaintiffs have been fined and at
times sentenced to jail and cannot pay the fines, these judges have
required them to pay for a trial by jury.
Moreover, the amended complaint alleges that O'Shea and Spomer
"continue to engage in a pattern and practice" which "has deprived
and continues to deprive" the named plaintiffs and members of their
class of their constitutional rights. Moreover, it is alleged that,
since early in the 1960's, the blacks of Cairo and some whites have
been actively and peaceably seeking to end discrimination in Cairo,
and that those activities have generated and continue to generate
tension and antagonism in Cairo.
It is also alleged that the police commissioner in Cairo
"has denied and continues to deny to plaintiffs and members of
their class their constitutional rights in the following ways:"
"(a) Defendant has made or caused to be made or cooperated in
the making of arrests and the filing of charges against plaintiffs
and members of their class where such charges are not warranted and
are merely for the purpose of harassment and to discourage and
prevent plaintiffs and their class from exercising their
constitutional rights."
"(b) Defendant has made or caused to be made or cooperated in
the making of arrests and the filing of charges against plaintiffs
and members of their class where there may be some colorable basis
to the arrest or charge, but the crime defined in the charge is
much harsher than is warranted by the
Page 414 U. S. 509
facts, and is far more severe than like charges would be against
a white person."
These allegations support the likelihood that the named
plaintiffs as well as members of their class will be arrested in
the future, and therefore will be brought before O'Shea and Spomer
and be subjected to the alleged discriminatory practices in the
administration of justice.
These allegations of past and continuing wrongdoings clearly
state a case or controversy in the Art. III sense. They are as
specific as those alleged in
Jenkins v. McKeithen,
395 U. S. 411, and
in
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179,
where we held that cases or controversies were presented.
Specificity of proof may not be forthcoming, but specificity of
charges is clear.
What has been alleged here is not only wrongs done to named
plaintiffs, but a recurring pattern of wrongs which establishes, if
proved, that the legal regime under control of the whites in Cairo,
Illinois, is used over and over again to keep the blacks from
exercising First Amendment rights, to discriminate against them, to
keep from the blacks the protection of the law in their lawful
activities, to weight the scales of justice repeatedly on the side
of white prejudices and against black protests, fears, and
suffering. This is a more pervasive scheme for suppression of
blacks and their civil rights than I have ever seen. It may not
survive a trial. But if this case does not present a "case or
controversy" involving the named plaintiffs, then that concept has
been so watered down as to be no longer recognizable. This will
please the white superstructure, but it does violence to the
conception of even-handed justice envisioned by the
Constitution.
Suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are exceptions to the absolute
bar against federal injunctions directed at state
Page 414 U. S. 510
court proceedings provided in 28 U.S.C. § 2283. [
Footnote 2/2]
See Mitchum v.
Foster, 407 U. S. 225. It
will be much more appropriate to pass on the nature of any
equitable relief to be granted after the case has been tried. It
may be that, when the case is ended, no injunction against any
state proceeding will be asked for or will seem appropriate. Or the
injunctive relief, in final analysis, may come down to very narrow
and discrete orders prohibiting precise practices. The Court labels
this an "ongoing federal audit of state criminal proceedings."
That, of course, is a regime that we do not foster. But the Federal
Constitution is supreme, and if the power of the white power
structure in Cairo, Illinois, is so great as to disregard it,
extraordinary relief is demanded. I would cross the bridge of
remedies only when the precise contours of the problem have been
established after a trial.
To repeat, in the instant case, there are allegations that state
lower court judges are willfully discriminating in their sentencing
determinations and are imposing excessive bail. The effects of such
results may well persist quite aside from the disposition of the
underlying substantive charges at trial or on appeal, and may well
be functionally unreviewable. The Court of Appeals observed, 468
F.2d at 408, that the individual defendant in a criminal case will
find it difficult, if not impossible, to obtain review of a
sentence within statutory limits unless it is manifestly harsh or
unjustified, citing the Illinois rule that
"imposition of sentence is a matter of judicial discretion, and,
in the absence of a manifest abuse of that discretion, it will not
be altered
Page 414 U. S. 511
by a reviewing court."
People v. Bonner, 37 Ill. 2d
553, 563,
229 N.E.2d
527, 533 (1967),
cert. denied, 392 U.S. 910
(1968).
Furthermore, the respondents do not primarily allege individual
instances of excessively harsh treatment, on an absolute scale, of
black and indigent defendants, but rather a pattern of
discriminatory treatment, especially in favor of prosperous white
defendants. Such allegations would amount to denials of equal
protection even if blacks and poor whites were not subject to
sentences which were so excessive that they constituted manifest
abuses of discretion, as long as wealthy whites were at the same
time receiving relatively lenient sentences from the same judges. A
single instance of sentencing, by itself, might not strike the
conscience of a reviewing court, but, when coupled with a pattern
of discriminatory treatment, could well justify the equitable
intervention of a federal court. A class suit where evidence could
be developed showing a pattern of discriminatory bail and
sentencing decisions by the petitioners would be the one
appropriate vehicle in which these claims could be developed.
Whether respondents could come forward with such evidence, and
whether the Federal District Court, in the exercise of its
equitable discretion, could frame suitable relief are, of course,
questions which can be answered only after a trial on the merits.
The resolution of those issues would then be properly reviewable.
But the principles of abstention and comity should not bar this
suit
ab initio.
II
Because I believe that the complaint is sufficient to state an
actual "case or controversy," I would reach the further question,
on the merits, whether equitable relief may be warranted in the
circumstances of this case. I agree, nonetheless, with my Brother
BLACKMUN that the
Page 414 U. S. 512
Court's discussion in Part II of its opinion, whether a case for
equitable relief was stated, is an advisory opinion, since the
Court has determined that there is no "case or controversy" in the
Article III sense.
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF DOUGLAS, J., DISSENTING
There are seven statutes in addition to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
which the Court has recognized constitute "express exceptions" to
the policy of nonintervention in state proceedings enunciated by
the anti-injunction statute: (1) The Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.
§ 1
et seq., specifically recognized by Congress as
an exception to 28 U.S.C. § 2283.
See Mitchum v.
Foster, 407 U. S. 225,
407 U. S. 233.
(2) The Interpleader Act of 1936, 28 U.S.C. § 2361, allowing
federal courts to restrain prosecution of state court suits
involving property involved in federal interpleader actions.
See Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U. S.
66,
308 U. S. 74.
(3) The 1851 Act limiting the liability of shipowners by providing
for the cessation of proceedings against them when they have made a
deposit equal to the value of their ships with a federal court, 46
U.S.C. § 185.
See Providence & N.Y. S.S. Co. v. Hill
Mfg. Co., 109 U. S. 578,
109 U. S.
599-600. (4) The Frazier-Lemke Farm Mortgage Act, 11
U.S.C. § 203(s)(2) (1958 ed.).
See Kalb v.
Feuerstein, 308 U. S. 433. (5)
The Federal Habeas Corpus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2251, permitting a
stay of state court proceedings when a federal habeas action is
pending.
See Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.
S. 241,
117 U. S.
248-249. (6) Section 205(a) of the Emergency Price
Control Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 33.
See Porter v. Dicken,
328 U. S. 252,
328 U. S. 255.
(7) Legislation providing for the removal of litigation to federal
courts and the simultaneous cessation of state court proceedings,
28 U.S.C. § 1446(e).
See French v. Hay,
22 Wall. 250.
Page 414 U. S. 513
This Court has also recognized the power of a federal court to
stay proceedings in a state court to prevent relitigation of an
issue already decided in a federal proceeding.
See Supreme
Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U. S. 356;
Julian v. Central Trust Co., 193 U. S.
93,
193 U. S. 112.
It has recognized the power of a federal court to enjoin state
court proceedings to protect the jurisdiction which a federal court
has already acquired over a
res. See Kline v. Burke
Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226;
Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.
S. 118,
314 U. S.
135-136. And we have found it proper for a federal court
to directly enjoin state proceedings when the injunction was sought
by either the United States,
Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United
States, 352 U. S. 220, or
by a federal agency asserting superior federal interests,
see
NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U. S. 138.
[
Footnote 2/1]
O'Shea, Magistrate of Alexander County Circuit Court when this
suit was instituted, became an Associate Judge in the county on
July 1, 1971.
[
Footnote 2/2]
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2283 provides that:
"A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to
stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by
Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or
to protect or effectuate its judgments."