PER CURIAM AND DECREE.
The Special Master, as directed in
Nebraska v. Iowa,
406 U. S. 117,
406 U. S. 127
(1972), has submitted a proposed Decree. Nebraska accepts it, but
Iowa filed five Exceptions, to which Nebraska replied. Upon
consideration of the Exceptions in light of our opinion and the
Report of the Special Master, Iowa's Exceptions II and III are
overruled and Exceptions I, IV, and V are sustained insofar as
paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Proposed Decree are revised in the
following Decree, the entry of which is directed:
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED THAT:
1. The Missouri River was the boundary between the States of
Iowa and Nebraska which was subject to the general rules of
accretion and avulsion until 1943, when the states determined to
agree by compact upon a permanent location of the boundary
line.
2. By 1943, the shifts of the Missouri River channel had been so
numerous and intricate, both in its natural state and as a result
of the work of the Corps of Engineers, that it was practically
impossible to locate the original boundary line between the
states.
3. The Compact between the states effective July 12, 1943,
provides in Section 3 as adopted by Iowa:
"Titles, mortgages and other liens good in Nebraska shall be
good in Iowa as to any lands Nebraska may cede to Iowa and any
pending suits or actions concerning said lands may be prosecuted to
final judgment
Page 409 U. S. 286
in Nebraska and such judgment shall be accorded full force and
effect in Iowa."
4. Under Section 2 of the Compact, each state "cedes" to the
other state "and relinquishes jurisdiction over" all such lands
then located within the compact boundary of the other.
The word "cedes" in Section 2 was meant by the states to
describe all areas formed before July 12, 1943, regardless of their
location with reference to the original boundary, whose "titles,
mortgages and other liens" were, at the date of the Compact, "good
in" the ceding state. Under Section 3, the state is bound to
recognize such "titles, mortgages and other liens" to be "good in"
its state, and not to claim ownership in itself.
5. Sections 2 and and 3 are not to be construed as relating only
to areas formed before July 12, 1943, that can be proved by clear,
satisfactory, and convincing evidence to have been on the Nebraska
side of the original boundary before the Compact fixed the
permanent boundary. Such a construction would require the claimant
who proves title "good in Nebraska" also to shoulder the burden of
proving the location of the original boundary before 1943, as well
as proving that the lands were on the Nebraska side of that
boundary which would be placing a burden upon the land owner which
the states themselves refused to undertake in 1943 and agreed would
not be necessary.
6. The State of Iowa does not own Nottleman Island and Schemmel
Island. The proofs sufficed to establish title "good in Nebraska"
to Nottleman Island, which was the land involved in the case of
State of Iowa, Plaintiff, v. Darwin Merritt Babbitt, et
al., Equity No. 17433 in the District Court for Mills County,
Iowa, and to Schemmel Island which was the land involved in the
case of
State of Iowa, Plaintiff v. Henry E. Schemmel, et al.,
Defendants, Equity No. 19765 filed in the District
Page 409 U. S. 287
Court of Fremont County, Iowa, on March 26, 1963, and that
Nottleman Island and Schemmel Island formed before July 12,
1943.
7. Under Section 3 of the Compact, titles "good in Nebraska"
include private titles to riparian lands that, under Nebraska law,
differing from Iowa law, run to the thread of the contiguous
stream.
8. Titles "good in Nebraska" are found to include and embrace
titles obtained by ten years' open, notorious and adverse
possession under claim of right without any requirement of a record
title or of "color of title."
9. As to areas formed before July 12, 1943, Sections 2 and 3 of
the Compact limit the State of Iowa to contesting with private
litigants in State or Federal Courts the question whether the
private claimants can prove title "good in Nebraska" and, when
private litigants prove such title, Iowa cannot interpose Iowa's
doctrine of state ownership as defeating such title.
10. In the presently pending cases of
State of Iowa,
Plaintiff v. Darwin Merritt Babbitt, et al., Equity No. 17433,
(District Court of Mills County, Iowa), and
State of Iowa,
Plaintiff v. Henry E. Schemmel, et al., Equity No. 19765,
(District Court of Fremont County, Iowa), it having been proved
that there are titles "good in Nebraska" as to those islands, there
is no reason for an injunction against Iowa, its officers, agents
and servants, at this stage, unless it be shown that the State of
Iowa will not abide by this determination of the issues as embodied
in our opinion of April 24, 1972.
11. Generally, ownership of the twenty-one areas and part of the
twenty-second area north of Omaha -- claimed by Iowa to be
state-owned by Iowa because allegedly formed wholly on the Iowa
side of the Compact boundary after the Compact date -- shall be
determined by the law of the state in which they are found to have
formed, the Compact boundary being the line which shall
determine
Page 409 U. S. 288
in which state they formed. Claimants of title to these areas as
against Iowa may have the opportunity to show title "good in
Nebraska" on the Compact date.
12. Although, under the Nebraska law of accretion, private
titles to riparian lands run to the thread of the contiguous
stream, whether a Nebraska riparian owner has title to the
accretions that cross the boundary into Iowa is determined by Iowa
law.
13. The counterclaim of Iowa is dismissed.
14. The parties having paid their own costs and having
contributed equally to a fund for expenses of the Special Master,
any amounts remaining in said fund after deduction of all expenses
by the Special Master shall be divided equally and returned to each
state by the Special Master.
It is so ordered.