A union which had begun organizing respondent company's
employees charged the company with unfair labor practices. The
General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) issued
a complaint, which a Trial Examiner sustained, recommending that
respondent be ordered to cease and desist from such practices.
Before the NLRB acted, the union picketed respondent's stores and
respondent, contending that the union's action violated state law,
sought and obtained an injunction from a state court limiting the
union's picketing activities. Subsequently the NLRB issued an order
accepting the Trial Examiner's recommendations and then brought
this action in District Court to restrain enforcement of the state
court injunction on the ground that it regulated conduct governed
exclusively by the National Labor Relations Act. The District Court
held that it was precluded from granting relief by 28 U.S.C. §
2283, which prohibits a federal court from enjoining state court
proceedings except as authorized by Act of Congress "or where
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate
its judgments." The court rejected the contention that the NLRB was
within the exception recognized in
Leiter Minerals, Inc. v.
United States, 352 U. S. 220, for
suits brought by the United States. The Court of Appeals affirmed,
holding that, for purposes of § 2283, the NLRB is "an
administrative agency of the United States, and is not the United
States."
Held:
1. Since the action here does not seek to restrain unfair labor
practices against which the NLRB had issued its complaint, but is
based on the general doctrine of preemption, the exception in
§ 2283 for matters "necessary in aid of its jurisdiction" is
inapplicable.
Capital Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 347 U.
S. 501, distinguished. Pp.
404 U. S.
141-142.
2. For the purpose of preventing frustration of the National
Labor Relations Act, the NLRB has an implied authority to obtain a
federal injunction against state court action preempted by the
Page 404 U. S. 139
Act; such an injunction falls within the exception to §
2283 recognized in
Leiter Minerals, Inc., supra, for suits
brought by the United States, and the fact that the party moving
for an injunction is a federal agency, and not the Attorney
General, is irrelevant.
Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.
S. 503. Pp.
404 U. S.
142-148.
434 F.2d 971, revered and remanded.
DOUGLAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined.
WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
post, p.
404 U. S. 148,
in Part I of which BRENNAN, J., joined,
post, p.
404 U. S.
156.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2283 provides:
"A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to
stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by
Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or
to protect or effectuate its judgments."
The question is whether the National Labor Relations Board may,
through proceedings in a federal court, enjoin
Page 404 U. S. 140
a state court order which regulates peaceful picketing governed
by the federal agency. The District Court rejected the Board's
contention that it is within the exception to § 2283,
[
Footnote 1] recognized in
Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.
S. 220, as respects suits brought by the United States.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. 434 F.2d 971. The case is here on a
petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted, 402 U.S.
928.
When a union began organizing employees of certain stores in
Grand Island, Nebraska, the union filed unfair labor practice
charges against the company. The General Counsel issued a
complaint. A hearing was held, and a Trial Examiner sustained the
complaint and recommended that the company cease and desist.
Shortly thereafter and before the Board had acted, the union
picketed the stores. The company thereupon petitioned the Nebraska
state court for an injunction. The state court issued a restraining
order, limiting the pickets to two at each store, enjoining them
from blocking or picketing entrances or exits and from distributing
literature pertaining to the dispute which would halt or slow
traffic, from instigating conversations with customers in any
manner relating to the dispute, from mass picketing, from acts of
physical coercion against persons driving to work, and from doing
any act in violation of Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-812, which makes
unlawful "loitering about, picketing or patrolling the place of
work . . . against the will of such person." The injunction also
bans anyone other than a
bona fide union member from
picketing unless he becomes a defendant in the state proceedings.
Finally, the injunction bars anyone, other than pickets and named
defendants, from picketing, distributing handbills, or otherwise
"caus[ing] to be published
Page 404 U. S. 141
or broadcast any information pertaining to the dispute . . .
between the parties."
Later, the Board entered its decision and order accepting in
part the Trial Examiner's recommendations and rejecting parts not
material to the present controversy.
The Board then filed this suit in the Federal District Court
seeking to restrain the enforcement of the state court injunction
on the ground that it regulated conduct which was governed
exclusively by the National Labor Relations Act. As noted, both the
District Court and the Court of Appeals denied the Board relief.
The Court of Appeals held that, for the purposes of § 2283,
the Board is "an administrative agency of the United States, and is
not the United States." 434 F.2d at 975. Congress, from the
beginning, has restricted the authority of the federal judiciary to
interfere with state court actions.
See Younger v. Harris,
401 U. S. 37,
401 U. S. 434.
The present § 2283 is a revision of earlier provisions of
federal statutes which were construed to allow within limits such
federal injunctions in favor of
federal agencies.
Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503,
321 U. S. 510.
Any exception in favor of federal agencies must, however, be
"implied,"
ibid., unless it comes within the exceptions
stated in § 2283.
It is suggested that this federal injunction was "in aid" of the
jurisdiction of the federal court, since the suit is in the
District Court by reason of 28 U.S.C. § 1337, which grants
jurisdiction over "any civil action or proceeding arising under any
Act of Congress regulating commerce." In
Capital Service, Inc.
v. NLRB, 347 U. S. 501, an
employer invoked the aid both of a state court and of the federal
Board against picketing. The Board sought a federal court
injunction under § 10(
l) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §
160(
l), which specifically allows it wherever an unfair
labor practice respecting a secondary boycott or picketing
violative of § 8(b)(4) or § 8(b)(7)
Page 404 U. S. 142
of the Act is involved. We ruled that the state injunction
"restrains conduct which the District Court was asked to enjoin in
the § 10(
l) proceeding."
Id. at
347 U. S. 505.
We held that, under those circumstances, an injunction by the
federal court was "necessary in aid of its jurisdiction" over
commerce, because the federal court, to exercise its jurisdiction
"freely and fully," must "first remove the state decree."
Id. at
347 U. S.
506.
In the instant case, the company did not file any charges with
the Board which claimed that the union's picketing violated §
8(b)(4) or § 8(b)(7) of the Act, 73 Stat. 542 and 544, 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) and § 158(b)(7)
Section 10(j) gives the District Court similar authority in
respect of an unfair labor practice of the employer under §
8(a)(1) of the Act, which protects the right of employees to
organize. But a resort to court action, the Board has held, does
not violate § 8(a)(1).
See Clyde Taylor Co., 127
N.L.R.B. 103, 109.
The action in the instant case does not seek an injunction to
restrain specific activities upon which the Board has issued a
complaint, but is based upon the general doctrine of preemption. We
therefore do not believe this case falls within the narrow
exception contained in § 2283 for matters "necessary in aid of
its jurisdiction." There is in the Act no express authority for the
Board to seek injunctive relief against preempted state action. The
question remains whether there is implied authority to do so.
It has long been held that the Board, though not granted express
statutory remedies, may obtain appropriate and traditional ones to
prevent frustration of the purposes of the Act. We held in
In
re National Labor Relations Board, 304 U.
S. 486,
304 U. S. 496,
that, even in the absence of an express statutory remedy, the Board
might petition for writ of prohibition against premature
invocation
Page 404 U. S. 143
of the review jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. In
Amalgamated Workers v. Edison Co., 309 U.
S. 261, we held that the Board had implied authority to
institute contempt proceedings for violation of court decrees
enforcing orders of the Board. In
Nathanson v. NLRB,
344 U. S. 25, we
found an implied authority of the Board to file claims in
bankruptcy covering the sums included in its back-pay awards. The
claims were not given priority under § 64(a)(5) of the
Bankruptcy Act, but this was because "the United States [was]
collecting for the benefit of a private party,"
id. at
344 U. S. 28,
not as suggested,
post at
404 U. S. 149,
because the Board's juridical status was something less than that
of the United States. [
Footnote
2]
Page 404 U. S. 144
We conclude that there is also an implied authority of the
Board, in spite of the command of § 2283, to enjoin state
action where its federal power preempts the field. Our starting
point is contained in the observation of Mr. Chief Justice Hughes
in
Amalgamated Workers v. Edison Co., supra, at
309 U. S.
265.
"The Board, as a public agency acting in the public interest,
not any private person or group, not any employee or group of
employees, is chosen as the instrument to assure protection from
the described unfair conduct in order to remove obstructions to
interstate commerce."
The purpose of the Act was to obtain "uniform application" of
its substantive rules and to avoid the "diversities and conflicts
likely to result from a variety of local procedures and attitudes
toward labor controversies."
Garner v. Teamsters Union,
346 U. S. 485,
346 U. S. 490.
The federal regulatory scheme (1) protects some activities, though
not violence (
see United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,
383 U. S. 715,
383 U. S.
729-731), (2) prohibits some practices, and (3) leaves
others to be controlled by the free play of economic forces. We
said in
Garner v. Teamsters Union, supra, at
346 U. S.
500:
"For a state to impinge on the area of labor combat designed to
be free is quite as much an obstruction of federal policy as if the
state were to declare picketing free for purposes or by methods
which the federal Act prohibits."
In
Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.
S. 220, a state suit over mineral rights in public lands
was pending, the parties being private persons. The United States
brought suit in the federal court to quiet title to the mineral
rights and sought and obtained a federal injunction
Page 404 U. S. 145
against prosecution of the state proceedings. In holding that
§ 2283 impliedly allowed such an exception, we said:
"The statute is designed to prevent conflict between federal and
state courts. This policy is much more compelling when it is the
litigation of private parties which threatens to draw the two
judicial systems into conflict than when it is the United States
which seeks a stay to prevent threatened irreparable injury to a
national interest. The frustration of superior federal interests
that would ensue from precluding the Federal Government from
obtaining a stay of state court proceedings except under the severe
restrictions of 28 U.S.C. § 2283 would be so great that we
cannot reasonably impute such a purpose to Congress from the
general language of 28 U.S.C. § 2283 alone."
Id. at
352 U. S.
225-226. In
Leiter, the United States brought
suit under the authority of the Attorney General. Here it is the
Board that moved to prevent "irreparable injury to a national
interest." The Board is the sole protector of the "national
interest" [
Footnote 3] defined
with particularity in the Act.
Leiter, of course, was
initiated by the Attorney General, but underlying the controversy
were federal agencies in the Department of the Interior responsible
for administration of the public lands. The fact that the moving
party was a federal agency, not the Attorney General, was
Page 404 U. S. 146
considered irrelevant in
Bowles v. Willingham, supra,
where the Administrator of the Emergency Price Control Act sued to
enjoin a state court from interfering with orders of the federal
agency. An exception from the general ban on federal injunctions
against state court action was implied by reason of the fact that
the method of review of the orders of the federal agency was in the
Emergency Court of Appeals. But there was no suggestion that suit
by or against the Administrator was not a suit of the United
States. [
Footnote 4] The
purpose of § 2283 was to avoid unseemly conflict between the
state and the federal courts where the litigants were private
persons, not to hamstring the Federal Government and its agencies
in the use of federal courts to protect federal rights. We can no
more conclude here than in
Leiter that a general statute,
limiting the power of federal courts to issue injunctions, had as
its purpose the frustration of federal systems of regulation.
See Brown v. Wright, 137 F.2d 484, 488. The frustration of
superior federal interests by the general language of § 2283
cannot reasonably be imputed.
See NLRB v. Sunshine Mining
Co., 125 F.2d 757, 762;
NLRB v. New York State Board,
106 F.Supp.
Page 404 U. S. 147
749, 752;
NLRB v. Industrial Commission, 84 F. Supp.
593,
aff'd, 172 F.2d 389.
The fact that the Board is given express authority to seek
enforcement of its orders in some sections of the Act [
Footnote 5] is not persuasive that the
Act expresses a policy to bar the Board from enforcing the national
interests on other matters. The instances where the Board is given
explicit authority to seek the aid of federal courts are not
exclusive examples, as we have already shown. They are only
particularized instances of specific enforcement devices relating
to specified orders, not a denial by implication that the Act and
the Board would not be entitled to federal aid or protection in
other instances, as illustrated by
In re National Labor
Relations Board, supra; Amalgamated Workers v. Edison Co.,
supra; and
Nathanson v. NLRB, supra. The
exclusiveness of the federal domain is clear; and, where it is a
public authority that seeks protection of that domain, the way
seems clear. For the Federal Government and its agencies, the
federal courts are the forum of choice. For them, as
Leiter indicates, access to the federal courts is
"preferable in the context of healthy federal state relations." 352
U.S. at
352 U. S.
226.
Whether there are parts of the state court injunction
Page 404 U. S. 148
that should survive our reversal of the judgment below is a
question we do not reach. It will be open on the remand of the
cause.
Reversed and remanded.
[
Footnote 1]
For the history of present § 2283
see H.R,Rep. No.
308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., A181.
[
Footnote 2]
The basis of our decision in
Nathanson was that
"[t]he priority granted by [§ 64(a)(5), 11 U.S.C. §
104(a)(5)] . . . was designed 'to secure an adequate revenue to
sustain the public burthens and discharge the public debts.'"
344 U.S. at
344 U. S. 27-28.
Because there was "no function . . . of assuring the public
revenue" and "[t]he beneficiaries of the claims [were] private
persons,"
id. at
344 U. S. 28, we
found it inappropriate to apply the priority for claims owing the
United States and, instead, gave the claims the same "treatment
tha[t] other wage claims enjoy[ed]."
Id. at
344 U. S. 29.
The suggestion that
Nathanson is a stronger case for
equating the status of the Board to that of the United States
disregards both the policies of the Bankruptcy Act upon which we
relied in that decision and the federal preemption which inheres in
the present case.
Cases such as
Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. J. G. Menihan
Corp., 312 U. S. 81, do
not support a miserly interpretation of the Board's powers. There,
we held that costs of litigation could be assessed against a
corporation which Congress had launched into the commercial world
with the power to "sue and be sued." Contrary to the dissent's
assertion that the case turned on the failure of Congress to
manifest an intent "to bestow the privileges and immunities of the
United States on a federal agency,"
post at
404 U. S. 150,
our decision there was based upon the grant of
"the unqualified authority to sue and be sued [which] placed
petitioner upon an equal footing with private parties as to the
usual incidents of suits in relation to the payment of costs and
allowances."
312 U.S. at
312 U. S.
85-86.
[
Footnote 3]
Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros. Co.,
348 U. S. 511,
held that a private party under the protection of the Board's order
could not obtain injunctive relief in a federal court against a
anti-picketing order issued by a state court.
And see Atlantic
Coast Line R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers,
398 U. S. 281.
[
Footnote 4]
Actions against the National Labor Relations Board are dismissed
on the ground that they are against a federal agency exercising a
governmental regulatory function, and so are suits against the
United States, which cannot be sued without the consent of
Congress.
Clover Fork Coal Co. v. NLRB, 107 F.2d 1009. The
same holds for the Atomic Energy Commission,
Cotter Corp. v.
Seaborg, 370 F.2d 686; the Civil Service Commission,
Soderman v. U.S. Civil Service Commission, 313 F.2d 694;
the Veterans Administration,
Evans v. U.S. Veterans Admin.
Hospital, 391 F.2d 261; and the Securities and Exchange
Commission,
Holmes v. Eddy, 341 F.2d 477. Similarly, an
action by the Director General of Railroads was held to be on
behalf of the United States, and thus was not barred by the
relevant statute of limitations.
Davis v. Corona Coal Co.,
265 U. S. 219.
[
Footnote 5]
Congress has vested the Board with broad powers to seek
injunctive relief in the district courts. Section 10(1), 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(
l), for example, gives the Board power to
obtain an injunction where an investigation produces reasonable
cause to believe that a charge of secondary boycott or illegal
picketing activity is true. Section 10(j), 29 U.S.C. § 160(j),
provides a similar basis of power for other unfair labor practices.
"In case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued to any
person" during "hearings and investigations, which, in the opinion
of the Board, are necessary and proper for the exercise of [its]
powers" under §§ 9 and 10, 29 U.S.C. §§ 159 and
160, the Board may seek injunctive relief from a district court
requiring compliance. 29 U.S.C. § 161(2).
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting.
I
The National Labor Relations Board here sues in federal court to
enjoin the enforcement of a state court injunction against
picketing. [
Footnote 2/1] Title 28
U.S.C. § 2283 bars such injunctions except in specified
situations. One exception permits injunctions by a federal court
which are "necessary in aid of its jurisdiction." The majority
rightfully concedes that this exception is inapplicable
Page 404 U. S. 149
here. A state court injunction in no way interferes with the
Board's admitted power to prevent unfair labor practices or to
secure federal injunctions in those situations specifically
identified by Congress.
Capital Service, Inc. v. NLRB,
347 U. S. 501
(1954), amply protects the Board's power to enjoin state court
proceedings where an unfair labor practice is in progress and the
jurisdiction of a federal court might later be invoked, but no such
Board adjudication was occurring here concerning the picketing.
Capital Service is not controlling.
Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.
S. 220 (1957), held that the restrictions of § 2283
do not apply to the Federal Government. The Board identifies itself
with the United States, and therefore asserts that § 2283 is
inapplicable to it. I cannot agree. The juridical status of the
Board is not perfectly congruent with that of the United States.
For example, although it may file claims for back pay in bankruptcy
proceedings, it does not enjoy the priority accorded to debts owing
to the United States.
Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U. S.
25 (1952). [
Footnote
2/2]
Leiter Minerals had nothing to do with the
circumstances
Page 404 U. S. 150
in which an agency such as the NLRB should be treated as the
United States; nor does that case purport to modify the rule of
Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. J. G. Menihan Corp.,
312 U. S. 81,
312 U. S. 85
(1941), that the intention of Congress to bestow the privileges and
immunities of the United States on a federal agency must be clearly
manifest. [
Footnote 2/3] The
authority of the Federal Government to secure an injunction in
Leiter Minerals was implied under the judicial rule that a
statute that divests preexisting rights or privileges will not be
applied to the sovereign in the absence of explicit language. 352
U.S. at
352 U. S. 224.
In the instant case, however, we deal with a statutorily defined
agency created after the passage of § 2283 and possessing
certain specified injunctive powers. The Board can claim no
residual sovereignty such as that which was held in
United
States
Page 404 U. S. 151
v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.
S. 258,
330 U. S.
272-273 (1947), to exempt the United States Government
from the restrictions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and, by a
familiar rule of statutory construction, the enumeration of its
injunctive powers should be held to preclude the existence of other
powers. [
Footnote 2/4] In light of
the congressional disinclination to authorize anything more than
extremely limited interferences with state court proceedings by
federal courts, and in view of this Court's reluctance to approve
such interference by way of the equitable powers of federal courts,
Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37,
401 U. S. 445
(1971);
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers, 398 U. S. 281,
398 U. S. 286
(1970), implicit exceptions from § 2283 are, at best,
suspect.
Section 2283 clearly permits injunctions against state court
proceedings if "expressly authorized by Act of Congress." There is
no claim here that the injunction sought by the Board is expressly
authorized by any statute. Indeed, it is admitted that express
authorization is lacking, and we are asked to imply such power. The
Court does so, but its holding ignores both the language and the
traditional interpretation of § 2283, and is inconsistent with
the regulatory scheme of the LMRA.
Section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the
Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, specifies unfair labor
practices by employers and union. Section 9 provides for Board
determination of bargaining units and employee representatives.
Section 10 specifies the procedures to be employed in preventing
unfair labor practice prohibited by § 8. Two aspects of §
10 are critical here. First, the Board is not granted unqualified
powers to enforce the Act. The statute conditions Board
Page 404 U. S. 152
action against unfair labor practices upon the filing of a
charge; it may not act on its own motion. The requirement is
jurisdictional.
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 385
F.2d 760, 763 (CA8 1967);
Tea Industries, Inc. v. NLRB,
336 F.2d 128, 132 (CA5 1964);
Int'l Union of Electrical, Radio
& Machine Workers v. NLRB, 110 U.S.App.D.C. 91, 94, 289
F.2d 757, 760 (1960);
Consumers Power Co. v. NLRB, 113
F.2d 38, 41-43 (CA6 1940);
NLRB v. Hopwood Retinning Co.,
98 F.2d 97, 101 (CA2 1938);
NLRB v. National Licorice Co.,
104 F.2d 655, 658 (CA2 1939),
modified on other grounds,
309 U. S. 309 U.S.
350 (1940);
Douds v. Int'l Longshoremen's
Assn., 147 F.
Supp. 103, 108 (SDNY 1956),
aff'd, 241 F.2d 278 (CA2
1957).
See also National Licorice Co. v. NLRB,
309 U. S. 350,
309 U. S. 369
(1940). The Board has no roving, unqualified power to prevent
unfair labor practices or to enforce the provisions of § 7
declaring that employees shall have the right to organize, bargain
collectively, and otherwise engage in concerted activities. In the
case before us, no unfair labor practice charge arising out of the
union's picketing has been filed, either by the union or by the
employer. Yet the Board appeared in a federal court seeking an
injunction seemingly aimed at protecting employee rights guaranteed
by § 7. Second, after a charge has been filed and an unfair
labor practice complaint has been issued, the Act grants the Board
the power to seek "appropriate temporary relief or restraining
order" from the courts. § 10(j). Further, §
10(
l) specifies in even greater detail the circumstances
under which temporary injunctions may be secured when charges under
§§ 8(b)(4)(A), 8(b)(4)(B), 8(b)(4)(C), 8(e), or 8(b)(7)
have been filed with the Board. Sections 10(e) and 10(f) define the
powers of the Board and the courts to issue injunctions in
connection with enforcement of Board orders after unfair labor
practice have been adjudicated
Page 404 U. S. 153
by the Board. Nowhere in the statute is there a provision
authorizing the Board to seek injunctions prior to the filing of
unfair labor practices or the issuance of a complaint. Nowhere is
the Board authorized to use the injunctive power to enforce §
7 rights, except in connection with adjudicating unfair practices.
Congress specified the powers of the Board with some care,
particularly its powers to seek injunctions. Manifestly, Congress
was aware of its longstanding policy against indiscriminate
injunctions in labor disputes, for, in § 10(h), it exempted
from the Norris-LaGuardia Act only those situations where the
courts are
"granting appropriate temporary relief or a restraining order,
or making and entering a decree enforcing, modifying, and enforcing
as so modified or setting aside in whole or in part an order of the
Board,
as provided in this section. . . ."
(Emphasis added.) On the floor of the Senate, Senator Smith
answered the contention that the passage of § 10(
l)
would weaken the Norris-LaGuardia Act:
"The only comment I can make on that statement is that we were
very careful in this bill to protect the injunctive process as it
is protected in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, except in exceptional
cases where the Government has to step in. In national paralysis
cases, we permit the Attorney General to step in, and in the
boycott and jurisdictional strike cases, we permit the National
Labor Relations Board to step in;
and there is no other
approach to the courts for injunction except in those two
situations."
93 Cong.Rec. 4283. (Emphasis added.)
In such a context, today's decision is improvident. As a
statutory matter under the Labor Management Relations Act, the
Board has no power to seek the injunction it now demands even
absent the barriers established by § 2283. And under that
section, it is error to clothe the
Page 404 U. S. 154
agency with the exception applicable to the United States. When
an agency of the United States, rather than the United States
itself, is plaintiff in an injunction action, the specific
exceptions to § 2283 should be deemed controlling,
particularly that exception directing inquiry to whether the
injunction is "expressly authorized by Act of Congress." Here, it
is plain to me that the Board has no such power as it now claims to
have, and I would affirm the judgment below.
II
A few additional words are appropriate. Even if, contrary to my
view, the Board has power to seek an injunction to prevent
interference with § 7 rights absent an unfair labor practice
charge, it should not be able to obtain equitable relief by the
mere conclusory allegation that such rights are "arguably"
protected under the LMRA. Although § 7 rights must be
interpreted according to federal law, "Congress has not federalized
the entire law of labor relations,"
Motor Coach Employees v.
Lockridge, 403 U. S. 274,
403 U. S. 309
(1971) (WHITE, J., dissenting), nor has it wholly displaced state
and federal courts in the administration of federal labor
policy.
The employer in this case was subjected to picketing that it
thought illegal and unprotected. It sought and was granted a state
court injunction over protests that state judicial power was
preempted by federal law and the exclusive jurisdiction of the
NLRB. Rather than allowing the union to appeal the injunction
through the state court system, and to this Court, if necessary, as
the union would ordinarily have to do,
Atlantic Coast Line R.
Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, supra, the Court
today permits the Board to short-circuit that process by securing a
federal injunction solely upon allegations that the conduct of the
union was arguably protected under federal law and was within
the
Page 404 U. S. 155
exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. The Board does not, however,
intimate what provisions of the LMRA the union was violating in
picketing this employer. It does not assert the existence or
imminence of an unfair labor practice by either side in connection
with the picketing. It suggests no way in which the employer could
secure an adjudication of whether the union's conduct was protected
under federal law. It does not indicate what "superior federal
interests" the state decree frustrated. Absent an unfair labor
practice charge and complaint, the Board itself has no jurisdiction
at all, let alone exclusive jurisdiction, to hold hearings and
issue cease and desist orders to prevent interference with § 7
rights in situations like this.
Congress' swift overruling of the Court's decision in
Guss
v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U. S. 1 (1957),
by passage of NLRA § 14(c), 73 Stat. 541, 29 U.S.C. §
164(c), should make the Court approach with great caution the
creation of another "vast no-man's land, subject to regulation by
no agency or court."
Id. at
353 U. S. 10. The
NLRA was not enacted in a void and its strictures presuppose a
certain degree of state authority and regulation:
"A holding that the States were precluded from acting [to
enforce their trespass laws against invasions of private property]
would remove the backdrop of state law that provided the basis of
congressional action, but would leave intact the narrower restraint
present in federal law through § 7 and would thereby
artificially
create a no-law area."
Taggart v. Weinacker's, Inc., 397 U.
S. 223,
397 U. S. 228
(1970) (BURGER, C.J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
The Board should not, therefore, be able to obtain an injunction
by merely alleging that conduct is "arguably
Page 404 U. S. 156
protected" by the LMRA. This rationale for preempting the
applicability of state law and the authority of state courts
developed to protect the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board.
Int'l Longshoremen' Assn., Local 116 v. Ariadne Shipping
Co., 397 U. S. 195,
397 U. S. 201
(1970) (WHITE, J., concurring);
Taggart v. Weinacker's, Inc.,
supra, at
397 U. S.
227-228 (BURGER, C.J., concurring). Where the Board is
itself not only unwilling, but apparently powerless, to move
against the challenged conduct, this rationale is a species of
federal overkill, preempting the field to protect nothing. Of
course, federal law remains paramount in it own arena, but if the
Board has power to enforce it in this situation, it should be
required to prove its case before obtaining an injunction, and
should demonstrate that federal law has been violated and that
equitable relief is necessary to prevent its frustration. An
unwarranted and illogical
lacuna in the legal regulation
of labor-management relations should not be extended. The Board
should not be entitled to an injunction against state court
proceedings unless it persuades a federal court that the state
decree is actually interfering with rights protected by federal
law.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN would affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals for the reasons stated in Part I of the dissenting opinion
of MR. JUSTICE WHITE.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Although the Board had held an unfair labor practice hearing and
had found the employer guilty of certain unfair labor practices
while exonerating it of others, this proceeding is not relevant to
the issues in the present case, because it did not concern the
union's picketing. The union had originally filed a complaint and
an election petition with the Board, charging the employer with a
refusal to bargain and with interfering with the employees' rights
to organize. A complaint was issued, and a hearing held. The trial
examiner, on April 28, 1969, found the employer guilty of certain
§ 8(a)(1) and § 8(a)(5) unfair labor practices and
entered a cease and desist order against certain activities of the
employer. A month after the trial examiner's decision, the union
began its picketing, and the employer then secured the state court
injunction limiting the picketing that is at issue in this case. On
August 29, 1969, the Board filed a complaint in federal district
court seeking to restrain the employer from enforcing the state
court injunction. On September 17, 1969, the Board reversed the
decision of the trial examiner and held that the employer was not
guilty of a § 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain nor of certain of the
§ 8(a)(1) violations the trial examiner had found, but it
found the employer guilty of certain other § 8(a)(1)
infractions and entered a limited cease and desist order. Although
the picketing occurred contemporaneously with the § 8(a)(1)
and § 8(a)(5) unfair labor practice proceeding, it was never
an issue before the Board.
[
Footnote 2/2]
In
Nathanson, as here, the Board was attempting to
protect the § 7 rights of private parties. If anything, the
situation in
Nathanson was a much stronger one for
equating the status of the Board to that of the United States,
since there, the Board was seeking to enforce a back pay award (by
filing a proof of claim against the employer, who had become a
bankrupt, and asserting that its back pay order was entitled to the
priority of a debt owing the United States under § 64(a)(5) of
the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(5)) which it had
assessed after adjudicating the employer guilty of a § 8
unfair labor practice. The Board was thus clearly discharging a
designated statutory function, as distinguished from the instant
case, where the Board's jurisdiction to evaluate the disputed
picketing in an unfair labor practice proceeding is totally
unclear. The Court held, however, that "[i]t does not follow that,
because the Board is an agency of the United States, any debt owed
it is a debt owing the United States" under the Bankruptcy Act, 344
U.S. at
344 U. S. 27,
and it disallowed the asserted priority on the ground that the
function of the precedence given the United States under the
Bankruptcy Act was to insure the collection of claims that had
accrued to the fisc. The majority's attempt to distinguish
Nathanson is less than convincing.
[
Footnote 2/3]
Both
Menihan and the present case present the question
of whether a Governmental agency is clothed with a particular
attribute of sovereignty: in
Menihan, an exemption from
payment of costs after unsuccessful litigation under Fed.Rule
Civ.Proc. 54(d) which was afforded to "the United States, its
officers, and agencies . . . to the extent permitted by law," in
the present case, an implicit exemption from § 2283. The Court
emphasized that, because the doctrine of sovereign immunity gives
the Government a privileged position, it has been "appropriately
confined," 312 U.S. at
312 U. S. 84,
and noted that
"the government does not become the conduit of its immunity in
suits against its agents or instrumentalities merely because they
do its work."
"
Ibid., quoting
Keifer & Keifer v.
Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U. S.
381,
306 U. S. 388 (1939). Since
'there is no presumption that the agent is clothed with sovereign
immunity,' 312 U.S. at
312 U. S. 85, the Court
examined the statute establishing the RFC and concluded that there
was no affirmative indication by Congress that it had meant to
exempt the RFC from paying costs after it had lost a lawsuit."
[
Footnote 2/4]
This rule has been frequently recognized by the Court,
United States v. De la Maza
Arredondo, 6 Pet. 691,
31 U. S. 724
(1832);
Kendall v. United States, 107 U.
S. 123,
107 U. S. 125
(1883);
Newberger v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
311 U. S. 83,
311 U. S. 88
(1940).