On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The petition for a writ of
certiorari is denied.
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, dissenting.
It seems incredible that under our federalism a State can deny a
student education in its public school system unless his hair style
comports with the standards of the school board. Some institutions
in Asia require their enrollees to shave their heads. Would we
sustain that regulation if imposed by a public school? Would we
sustain a public school regulation requiring male students to have
crew cuts? The present regulation-to some at least-seems as extreme
as the examples given. It provides:
'Hair shall be trim and clean. A
boy's hair shall not fall below the eyes in front and shall not
cover the ears, and it shall not extend below the collar in
back.'
Robert Olff, a 15-year-old boy speaking through his mother, has
a full panoply of constitutional rights, though he is a minor. We
said in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,
393 U.S.
503, 511, 739: 'Students in school as well as out of school are
'persons' under our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental
rights which the State must respect, just as they themselves must
respect their obligations to the State.' Moreover, a parent's
control over the child, though not absolute as witness our
decisions placing sanctions against child labor, is pervasive. We
said in Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S.
158, 166, 442: 'It is cardinal with us that the custody, care
and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose
Page 404 U.S.
1042 , 1043
primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations
the state can neither supply nor hinder. . . . And it is in
recognition of this that these decisions have respected the private
realm of family life which the state cannot enter.'
Hair style is highly personal,1 an idiosyncracy which I had
assumed was left to family or individual control and was of no
legitimate concern to the State. It seems to me to be as much a
purely private choice as was the family-student decision, sustained
against a State's prohibition, to study the German language in a
public school. Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390. That
family-student right, the Court held, was included within 'liberty'
as the word is used in the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., at 400.
Opposed there-as in the present case-is the authoritarian
philosophy favoring regimentation. The Court said:
'In order to submerge the individual
and develop ideal citizens, Sparta assembled the males at seven
into barracks and intrusted their subsequent education and training
to official guardians. Although such measures have been
deliberately approved by men of great genius, their ideas touching
the rela-
Page 404 U.S.
1042 , 1044
tion between individual and State were wholly different from
those upon which our institutions rest; and it hardly will be
affirmed that any legislature could impose such restrictions upon
the people of a State without doing violence to both letter and
spirit of the Constitution.' Id., at 402.
The word 'liberty' is not defined in the Constitution. But as we
held in Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, it includes
at least the fundamental rights 'retained by the people' under the
Ninth Amendment. Id., at 484. One's hair style, like one's taste
for food, or one's liking for certain kinds of music, art, reading,
recreation, is certainly fundamental in our constitutional scheme-
a scheme designed to keep government off the backs of people.
[
Footnote 2] That is not to say
that the police power of the state is powerless to deal with known
evils. An epidemic of lice might conceivably authorize a shearing
of locks. Other like crises might be imagined. But I see no way of
allowing a State to set hair styles for patrons of its schools, any
more than it could establish a welfare system only for men with
crew cuts and women with bobbed
Page 404 U.S.
1042 , 1045
hair. [
Footnote 3] Once
these lines are drawn, a serious question of equal protection of
the law is raised. [
Footnote
4]
The federal courts are in conflict and the decisions in
disarray. [
Footnote 5] We have
denied certiorari where the lower
Page 404 U.S.
1042 , 1046
court has sustained the school board6 and also where it has
overruled them. 7 The question tendered is of great personal
concern to many and of unusual constitutional importance which we
should resolve. I would grant this petition and set the case for
argument.
Footnotes
Footnote 1 Feelings run high
among people concerning hair styles. Yet as Professor Chaffee
said:
'This breach of the peace theory is
peculiarly liable to abuse when applied against unpopular
expressions and practices. It makes a man a criminal simply because
his neighbors have no self-control and cannot refrain from
violence. The reductio ad absurdum of this theory was the
imprisonment of Joseph Palmer, one of Bronson Alcott's
fellow-settlers at 'Fruitlands,' not because he was a communist,
but because he persisted in wearing such a long beard that people
kept mobbing him, until law and order were maintained by shutting
him up. A man does not become a criminal because some one else
assaults him, unless his own conduct is in itself illegal or may be
reasonably considered a direct provocation to violence.' Free
Speech in the United States, pp. 151-152 (1942).
Footnote 2 'This Court takes
judicial notice that hairstyles have altered from time to time
throughout the ages. Sampson's locks symbolically signified his
virility. Many of the Founding Fathers of this country wore wigs.
President Lincoln grew a beard at the suggestion of a juvenile
female admirer. Chief Justice Hughes' beard furnished the model for
the frieze over the portico of the Supreme Court of the United
States proclaiming 'equal justice under law.' Today many of both
the younger and older generations have avoided the increased cost
of barbering by allowing their locks or burnsides to grow to
greater lengths than when a haircut cost a quarter of a dollar.
'Whether hair styles be regarded as
evidence of conformity or of individuality, they are one of the
most visible examples of personality. This is what every woman has
always known. And so have many men, without the aid of an
anthropologist, behavioral scientist, psychiatrist, or practitioner
of any of the fine arts or black arts.' Richards v. Thurston, D.C.,
304 F.
Supp. 449, 451.
Footnote 3 In the 1920's the
fad turned to short hair: 'To conservatives, short-haired women
were as much 'radicals and freaks of society' as long-haired
musicians, artists, and anarchists. Some saw in bobbed hair a
symbol of all the ills of the age, ranging from jazz, short skirts,
sexy movies, the automobile, and prohibition to such threats as
'Freudian psychology' and the 'growing cult of the so-called free
woman.' The boyish bob, followed by the shingle and bingle which
shaved the nape of the neck, and then by the curly bob and spit
curls, were all part of what the older generation denounced as
'Flaming Youth.' 'Preachers took to pulpits to warn that 'a bobbed
woman is a disgraced woman.' In a Missouri courtroom, a mother
pleading for the return of her six children who have been living
with a guardian heard the oldest of them testify to the judge: 'We
don't believe mother is a Christian woman. She bobs her hair.' Men
divorced their wives over bobbed hair. Other males banded together
with vows to give up shaving until wives agreed to let their hair
grow out again. A large department store fired all bobbed haired
employees and a hospital discharged bobbed haired nurses.' Severn,
The Long And Short of It, p. 122 (1971).
Footnote 4 In Ho Ah Kow v.
Nunan, 12 Fed.Cas. p. 252, No. 6,546, an alien Chinese was allowed
to recover damages under the Civil Rights Act against the sheriff
of San Francisco for cutting his hair 'to a uniform length of one
inch from the scalp' on entering a prison to serve a five-day
sentence for a petty offense. The Circuit Court, speaking through
Mr. Justice Field, held that the ordinance made an invidious
discrimination against the Chinese ('only the dread of the loss of
his queue will induce a Chinaman to pay his fine.' Id., at 255) and
was a cruel and unusual punishment. Ibid.
Footnote 5 'Long-hair' cases
have occasioned a deep division in the Circuits. There is a
conflict as to the extent that a student's interest in his hair
style enjoys constitutional protection compare Breen v. Kahl,
419 F.2d
1034 (CA7 1969), and Richards v. Thurston,
424 F.2d
1281 (CA1 1970), with Ferrell v. Dallas Ind. School Dist.,
392 F.2d
697 (CA5 1968), and Jackson v. Dorrier,
424
F.2d 213 (CA6 1970). Where it has been found to exist, there is
a split as to the constitutional basis for such protection. Compare
Breen, supra, with Richards, supra. And there is a conflict as to
the showing necessary by the school board to justify a hair
regulation even among those circuits permitting such a
justification. Compare the decision of the Ninth Circuit in the
present case, and its companion, King v. Saddleback Jr. College,
445 F.2d
932 (CA9 1971), with Griffin v. Tatum,
425
F.2d 201 (CA5 1970). Not only is the conflict deep and
irreconcilable, but the issue is a recurrent one. There are well
over 50 reported cases squarely presenting the issue, students
having won in about half of them. In addition to the 37 cases cited
in Note, 84 Harv.L.Rev. 1702, 1703 n. 4 (1971), see, e. g., Gfell
v. Rickelman,
441 F.2d
444 (CA6 1971); King v. Saddleback Jr. College Dist.,
445 F.2d
932 (CA9 1971); Valdes v. Monroe County Bd. of Public
Instruction,
325 F.
Supp. 572 (S.D.Fla.1971); Axtell v. LaPenna,
323 F.
Supp. 1077 (W.D.Pa.1971); Parker v. Fry,
323 F.
Supp. 728 (E.D.Ark.1970); Alberda v. Noell,
322 F.
Supp. 1379 (E.D.Mich.1971); Lambert v. Marushi,
322 F.
Supp. 326 (S.D.W.Va.1971); Martin v. Davison,
322 F.
Supp. 318 (W.D. Pa.1971); Dawson v. Hillsborough County,
Florida School Board,
322 F.
Supp. 286 (M.D.Fla.1971); Watson v. Thompson,
321 F.
Supp. 394 (E.D.Tex.1971); Karr v. Schmidt,
320 F.
Supp. 728 (W.D.Tex.1970); Freeman v. Flake,
320 F.
Supp. 531 (D.Utah 1970); Lansdale v. Tyler Jr. College,
318 F.
Supp. 529 (E. D.Tex.1970); Alexander v. Thompson,
313 F.
Supp. 1389 (C.D.Cal.1970).
Footnote 6 See, e. g.,
Jackson v. Dorrier,
424 F.2d
213 (CA6 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850.
Footnote 7 See, e. g., Breen
v. Kahl,
419 F.2d
1034 (CA7 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937.