SPENCER v. KUGLER, 404 U.S. 1027 (1972)
Syllabus
U.S. Supreme Court
SPENCER v. KUGLER , 404 U.S. 1027 (1972)404 U.S. 1027
Vivian SPENCER et al.
v.
George F. KUGLER et al.
No. 71-519.
Supreme Court of the United States
January 17, 1972
The judgment is affirmed.
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, dissenting.
The Black students in this case want nothing more than to receive the same quality of education from our public schools as is enjoyed by the Whites. To deny them that equality is to sanction the dispensation of public benefits according to the invidious classification of race.
Appellants sought to convene a three-judge District Court in order to challenge the constitutionality of New Jersey's statutory scheme establishing the boundaries of school districts. They argue that by establishing school district lines to coincide with the boundaries of the State's political subdivisions, cf. N.J.Stat. 18A:8-1, the State imposed upon the public schools patterns of racial imbalance in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. 1983. It is said in reply that New Jersey only prescribes school district boundaries in conformity with municipal boundaries. There is, however, a showing that at times a Black has to walk further to his school than the White school in his neighborhood. The remedy is redistricting. We have sponsored that process to protect the right to vote. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533. The right to education in the environment of a multi- racial community seems equally fundamental.
The result, according to appellants, is an inferior education for students of minority races-something this Court has long condemned. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637; Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629; Sipuel v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631; Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337. See also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356. Appellants sought either a redistricting or an appropriate racial balance in the public schools so that educational opportunity would not be determined by race, cf. Gomperts v. Chase, 404 1237, 1240, 18 (1971), or compensatory educational programs to correct for the inferior schooling given minority students. The District Court rejected this approach, however, and dismissed the complaint, finding refuge in de facto segregation. 326 F. Supp. 1235.
If any form of state-imposed segregation is proved, then the
racially homogeneous residential neighborhoods [404 U.S. 1027 , 1029]
Opinions
v.
George F. KUGLER et al.
No. 71-519. Supreme Court of the United States January 17, 1972 The judgment is affirmed. Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, dissenting. The Black students in this case want nothing more than to receive the same quality of education from our public schools as is enjoyed by the Whites. To deny them that equality is to sanction the dispensation of public benefits according to the invidious classification of race. Page 404 U.S. 1027 , 1028 Appellants sought to convene a three-judge District Court in order to challenge the constitutionality of New Jersey's statutory scheme establishing the boundaries of school districts. They argue that by establishing school district lines to coincide with the boundaries of the State's political subdivisions, cf. N.J.Stat. 18A:8-1, the State imposed upon the public schools patterns of racial imbalance in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. 1983. It is said in reply that New Jersey only prescribes school district boundaries in conformity with municipal boundaries. There is, however, a showing that at times a Black has to walk further to his school than the White school in his neighborhood. The remedy is redistricting. We have sponsored that process to protect the right to vote. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533. The right to education in the environment of a multi- racial community seems equally fundamental. The result, according to appellants, is an inferior education for students of minority races-something this Court has long condemned. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637; Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629; Sipuel v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631; Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337. See also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356. Appellants sought either a redistricting or an appropriate racial balance in the public schools so that educational opportunity would not be determined by race, cf. Gomperts v. Chase, 404 1237, 1240, 18 (1971), or compensatory educational programs to correct for the inferior schooling given minority students. The District Court rejected this approach, however, and dismissed the complaint, finding refuge in de facto segregation. 326 F. Supp. 1235. If any form of state-imposed segregation is proved, then the racially homogeneous residential neighborhoods Page 404 U.S. 1027 , 1029 and the consequent racial imbalance in schools would seem to be the result of state action. [Footnote 1] "It is a question of the power of the State as a whole," Justice Brandeis Page 404 U.S. 1027 , 1030 said. '[T]he powers of the several state officials must be treated as if merged in a single officer.' Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239, 244-245, 135 (1931). The Constitution condemns 'discrimination, whether accomplished ingeniously or ingenuously,' Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 132, 166 (1940), and where there has been any such discrimination our 'objective [is] . . . to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation.' Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 15, 1275 (1971) (emphasis added). There is, moreover, an ancient American doctrine that as, if, and when public facilities are separate for the races, Page 404 U.S. 1027 , 1031 they must be equal. Plessy v. Ferguson,supra, held that a State could maintain separate facilities for different races providing the facilities were equal. We have long since repudiated the notion that a State may maintain racially distinct facilities for the races because classifications based upon race are invidious and thus violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. But there can be de facto segregation without the State's being implicated in the creation of the dual system and it is in such situations that Plessy's mandate that separate facilities be equal has continuing force. Our conclusion in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495, 692, that '[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal,' has been convincingly borne out by scholarly studies. E. g., J. Coleman, Equality of Educational Opportunity ( 1966); Harvard Educational Review, Equal Educational Opportunity (1969); Alexander & Campbell, Peer Influences on Adolescent Educational Aspirations and Attainments, 29 Am.Socio.Rev. 568 (1964). This inequality led Senator Mondale to conclude:
U.S. Supreme Court
SPENCER v. KUGLER , 404 U.S. 1027 (1972) 404 U.S. 1027 Vivian SPENCER et al.v.
George F. KUGLER et al.
No. 71-519. Supreme Court of the United States January 17, 1972 The judgment is affirmed. Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, dissenting. The Black students in this case want nothing more than to receive the same quality of education from our public schools as is enjoyed by the Whites. To deny them that equality is to sanction the dispensation of public benefits according to the invidious classification of race. Page 404 U.S. 1027 , 1028 Appellants sought to convene a three-judge District Court in order to challenge the constitutionality of New Jersey's statutory scheme establishing the boundaries of school districts. They argue that by establishing school district lines to coincide with the boundaries of the State's political subdivisions, cf. N.J.Stat. 18A:8-1, the State imposed upon the public schools patterns of racial imbalance in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. 1983. It is said in reply that New Jersey only prescribes school district boundaries in conformity with municipal boundaries. There is, however, a showing that at times a Black has to walk further to his school than the White school in his neighborhood. The remedy is redistricting. We have sponsored that process to protect the right to vote. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533. The right to education in the environment of a multi- racial community seems equally fundamental. The result, according to appellants, is an inferior education for students of minority races-something this Court has long condemned. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637; Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629; Sipuel v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631; Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337. See also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356. Appellants sought either a redistricting or an appropriate racial balance in the public schools so that educational opportunity would not be determined by race, cf. Gomperts v. Chase, 404 1237, 1240, 18 (1971), or compensatory educational programs to correct for the inferior schooling given minority students. The District Court rejected this approach, however, and dismissed the complaint, finding refuge in de facto segregation. 326 F. Supp. 1235. If any form of state-imposed segregation is proved, then the racially homogeneous residential neighborhoods Page 404 U.S. 1027 , 1029 and the consequent racial imbalance in schools would seem to be the result of state action. [Footnote 1] "It is a question of the power of the State as a whole," Justice Brandeis Page 404 U.S. 1027 , 1030 said. '[T]he powers of the several state officials must be treated as if merged in a single officer.' Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239, 244-245, 135 (1931). The Constitution condemns 'discrimination, whether accomplished ingeniously or ingenuously,' Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 132, 166 (1940), and where there has been any such discrimination our 'objective [is] . . . to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation.' Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 15, 1275 (1971) (emphasis added). There is, moreover, an ancient American doctrine that as, if, and when public facilities are separate for the races, Page 404 U.S. 1027 , 1031 they must be equal. Plessy v. Ferguson,supra, held that a State could maintain separate facilities for different races providing the facilities were equal. We have long since repudiated the notion that a State may maintain racially distinct facilities for the races because classifications based upon race are invidious and thus violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. But there can be de facto segregation without the State's being implicated in the creation of the dual system and it is in such situations that Plessy's mandate that separate facilities be equal has continuing force. Our conclusion in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495, 692, that '[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal,' has been convincingly borne out by scholarly studies. E. g., J. Coleman, Equality of Educational Opportunity ( 1966); Harvard Educational Review, Equal Educational Opportunity (1969); Alexander & Campbell, Peer Influences on Adolescent Educational Aspirations and Attainments, 29 Am.Socio.Rev. 568 (1964). This inequality led Senator Mondale to conclude:
'In 1968, there were more than 43
million children in our public elementary and secondary schools. 9
million were from minority groups: 6.3 million were black; 2
million were of Spanish origin; 194,000 were from Oriental
backgrounds; 178,000 were American Indian.
'Most of these children are from
families living in poverty. The vast majority are deprived of a
decent education throughout their lives. They go to schools which
are inferior-educationally, financially, and physically. They are
years behind in achievement. Few go do to higher education.' Cong.
Rec. S. 5067 (April 19, 1971).
Senator Javits recently summarized the problem: 'Whatever you
call it, 'de facto segregation,' 'racial un-
Page 404 U.S.
1027 , 1032
balance,' or 'the absence of intergroup activity,' it is a
serious block to effective education for children of minority
groups anywhere in the country, especially in the north and central
part of the country where you don't have the established social
order of segregation.' Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Education of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess., at 21 (1970).
I would note probable jurisdiction and set the case for oral
argument.
Footnotes
Footnote 1 In this case the
white exodus to the suburbs and the resultant surrender of the
inner-city to the blacks is evident. 'In 1910, 73 per cent of the
Negro population of the United States were rural; in 1960, 73 per
cent were urban.' K. Taeuber & A. Taeuber, Negroes in Cities 1
(1965). That shift in residential patterns has been both encouraged
and facilitated by federal, state, and local actions. In a recent
statement to the Senate Subcommittee on Education, the United
States Commission on Civil Rights indicated how pervasive this
governmental influence is:
'Even in those instances where school
segregation is a result of housing patterns with no apparent
complicity of school officials, government at all levels-local,
State, or Federal-invariably is heavily implicated. Historically,
racial zoning ordinances imposed by local law were a formidable
factor in creating and maintaining racially exclusive
neighborhoods. Although such ordinances were held unconstitutional
as early as 1917, some communities continued to enforce them, even
as late as the 1950s.
'Judicial enforcement by State courts
of racially restrictive covenants has been another important
factor. Although these covenants were private agreements to exclude
members of designated minority groups, the fact that they were
enforceable by the courts gave them maximum effectiveness. Not
until 1948 was the judicial enforcement of such covenants held
unconstitutional, and not until 1953 was their enforcement by way
of money damages held unlawful. Racially restrictive covenants no
longer are judicially enforceable, but they still appear in deeds
and the residential patterns they helped to create still
persist.
'Various exercises of local
governmental authority, such as decisions on building permits, the
location of sewer and water facilities, building inspection
standards, zoning and land use requirements, and the power of
eminent domain have been used to exclude minority group members
from designated neighborhoods and even from entire
communities.
'The Federal Government, principally
through its public housing and FHA mortgage insurance programs, has
been all too often a willing partner in the creation and
perpetuation of racially segregated neighborhoods, even to the
point of insisting upon them. Until the
late 1940's, for example, FHA insisted on recially restrictive
covenants to insure against integrated housing developments. Until
1962 when the Executive Order on Equal Opportunity on Housing was
issued, the agency continued willingly to do business with
discriminatory builders and developers. The Public Housing
Administration permitted its funds to be used for the creation and
perpetuation of segregated housing projects well after the courts
had made it clear that such practices were in violation of the
Constitution. Other Federal programs, such as the highway and urban
renewal programs, which involve massive displacement and
relocation, also have had the effect of intensifying residential
segregation.
'The point we are making is that the
current situation we face, in which most minority group children
attend school in isolation from children of the majority group, is
not accidental or purely de facto. In many cases, it has resulted
in whole or in substantial part from an accumulation of
governmental actions. Thus the categorical distinction between de
jure and de facto segregation is not as clear-cut as it would
appear. Upon closer examination, there is probably little legal
substance to the concept of de facto school segregation. Further,
in the Commission's view, the Government has a moral as well as
legal responsibility to undo the segregation it has helped to
create and maintain. There is no statute of limitations by which
government in its many forms can be exonerated from its past
misdeeds or relieved of its current obligations.' Hearings before
the Subcommittee on Education of the Senate Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 352- 354 (1970).
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