The second objection is that if the grant is proved, it is not
in conformity to the royal order of 29 March 1815, by virtue of
which it is declared the grant was made. That royal order has been
under the consideration of this Court in
Percheman's
Case, 7 Pet. 96. In that case, it will be seen,
that the petitioner refers in his memorial to the order of 29
March, 1815, and that the governor, in the grant for the land,
says: "In consideration of the provisions of the royal order, under
date 29 March last, which is referred to, I do grant to him in
absolute property," &c., but the Court (referring to
certificates which were annexed to the memorial for the grant,
which the grant refers to as certificates annexed) said
"military service is the foundation of the grant, and the royal
order is referred to only as showing that the favorable attention
of the King had been directed to the petitioner."
32 U. S. 7 Pet.
96. The Court sustained the grant in that case notwithstanding it
was said to have been made in consideration of the royal order of
1815, which limits grants to one hundred acres, and to persons of a
particular regiment. The power in the governor to make a larger
grant of land was not thought to be restrained in making a grant to
one who was not of the regiment designated in the order and who
applied for it on the ground of services. The reasoning in that
decision cannot be shaken. It applies with full force to the grant
now under consideration, the decree of the governor being alike in
both cases. But this has an additional consideration recited in the
memorial. The surrender of another grant previously made for
services, recognized by the governor in his acceptance of the
retrocession offered by the memorialist. This is a grant in
absolute property. Though it recites the order of 29 March, 1815,
the inducements for making it are considerations which plainly show
it was not intended by the governor to be restrained to the number
of acres limited by that order.
Page 40 U. S. 232
The judgment of the court below will be affirmed, but as the
survey given in evidence in this case was rejected by the court, as
it should have been, this Court will direct a survey to be made at
the place designated in the decree of the court below, for the
number of acres decreed, without prejudice to the rights of third
parties.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
from the Superior Court for the District of East Florida and was
argued by counsel, on consideration whereof it is adjudged and
decreed by this Court that the decree of the said superior court in
this cause, so far as it declares the claim of the petitioners to
be valid, be and the same is hereby affirmed in all respects, and
that a survey be made of the lands contained in the said concession
according to the terms thereof for the number of acres, and at the
place therein designated, provided it does not interfere with the
rights of third parties, and it is further ordered by the Court
that a mandate be issued to the surveyor of public lands directing
him to do and cause to be done all the acts and things enjoined on
him by law and as required by the decree and opinion of this Court
in this case, and that this case be remanded to the said superior
court for further proceedings to be had therein in conformity to
this decree and the opinion of this Court, which must be annexed to
the mandate.