Appellants, the National Democratic Party of Alabama (NDPA) and
some of its officers and candidates (mostly Negroes) in the
November, 1968, general election, brought suit against respondents,
state officials, seeking to enjoin enforcement of certain Alabama
election laws which appellants claimed were unconstitutional on
their face and had been discriminatorily used by appellees to keep
various NDPA candidates from being on the ballot in that election.
These laws included (1) Ala.Code, Tit. 17, § 274 (1958), which
required a candidate within five days after the announcement of his
candidacy to file a statement designating his finance committee and
(2) the "Garrett Act" of 1967, which required independent
candidates, who, prior to that law, could file declarations of
intent after nomination by mass meeting in May, to do so by March
1, when primary candidates had to file. A three-judge District
Court entered a temporary restraining order enjoining the
appropriate Alabama officials from using ballots at the 1968
general election which did not include the names of the NDPA
candidates. Appellees' answer challenged the qualifications of
those candidates for failure to comply with the Alabama laws. After
a hearing, the District Court dissolved the temporary injunction
and upheld the Alabama statutes on their face and as applied. This
Court, on appellants' application and after oral argument, ordered
the District Court's temporary restraining order continued pending
action on the jurisdictional statement. The NDPA candidates were
elected to various offices in Etowah, Marengo, and Sumter Counties,
and apparently would have been elected in Greene County had their
names appeared on the ballot. There, Probate Judge Herndon, who was
responsible for preparing the ballot, omitted the names of the NDPA
candidates on the ground that they had not filed a second §
274 designation after the Democratic primary of May 7, 1968, in
which they had been candidates (although the successful white
candidates filed no second designation after that date), and that,
"to the best of his knowledge and belief," the NDPA had held no
mass meeting to choose candidates for the general election on that
date, as they claimed to have done (in
Page 394 U. S. 359
accordance with an Alabama law that local candidates not
selected in primaries be nominated by mass meeting the first
Tuesday in ay of the election year). Herndon later admitted knowing
that the NDPA candidates had made the § 274 designation in
February, 1968, before they entered the primary, and that the NDPA
mass meeting might have been held without his having known about
it. After the election, appellants filed in this Court a motion to
show cause why Judge Herndon should not be held in contempt and why
the Greene County election should not be set aside and a new
election held. The District Court (in response to a motion by the
United States) issued a rule to show cause why the Greene County
election should not be enjoined, and the court stayed giving effect
to that election.
Held:
1. The disqualification in the 1968 election of the NDPA
candidates on the ground that they failed to meet requirements
under the Alabama Corrupt Practices Act which their opponents did
not have to meet constituted, on the record here, an unequal
application of the law in violation of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp.
394 U. S.
361-364.
2. Disqualification of the NDPA candidates for failure to comply
with the Garrett Act was unlawful since that Act, which imposed
increased barriers on independent candidates, was inoperative
because the Alabama officials had failed to meet the approval
requirements of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
Whitley v. Williams, 393 U. S. 544. Pp.
394 U. S.
365-366.
3. The case is remanded to the District Court with directions
(1) to order the prevailing NDPA candidates in Etowah, Marengo, and
Sumter Counties to be treated as elected and (2) to require the
officials to hold a new election in Greene County for the offices
contested by NDPA candidates, whose names shall appear on the
ballots. P.
394 U. S.
367.
295 F.
Supp. 1003, reversed and remanded. [NOTE: For Court's action on
motion to show cause why Judge Herndon should not be held in
contempt,
see post, p.
394 U. S.
399.]
Page 394 U. S. 360
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This suit is a class action brought by the National Democratic
Party of Alabama (NDPA) and some of its officers and candidates in
the 1968 general election against Alabama state officials who had
refused to include various NDPA candidates on the ballot for
various county and state-wide offices. As the complaint sought an
injunction against enforcement of Alabama statutes on federal
constitutional grounds, a three-judge federal court was impaneled.
28 U.S.C. § 2281.
The District Court entered a temporary restraining order.
Thereafter appellees filed their answer challenging,
inter
alia, the qualifications of NDPA candidates because of their
failure to satisfy certain specified requirements of Alabama law.
On October 11, 1968, after a hearing on the merits, the three-judge
court, by a divided vote, dissolved the temporary injunction and
upheld on their face and as applied all the challenged Alabama
statutes.
Appellants appealed to this Court (28 U.S.C. § 1253) and on
October 14 we restored the District Court's temporary restraining
order, saying:
"The application for restoration of temporary relief is granted
pending oral argument on the application, which is set for Friday,
October 18, 1968, at 9:00 a.m. The case is placed on the summary
calendar. "
Page 394 U. S. 361
And on October 10, 1968, we entered an additional order
providing in part:
"The order entered October 14, 1968, restoring temporary relief
is continued pending action upon the jurisdictional statement which
has been filed."
NDPA candidates, mostly Negroes, were elected to various local
offices in Etowah, Marengo, and Sumter Counties. But in Greene
County the NDPA candidates for local office were left off the
ballot except for absentee voters. In Greene County the only
candidates appearing on the ballot were the regular Democratic
Party nominees for local offices and they received between 1,699
and 1,709 votes each. It appears that NDPA candidates in Greene
County would have won had they been on the ballot [
Footnote 1] for 1,938 ballots were marked for
the NDPA "straight ticket."
On November 15, appellants filed in this Court a motion to show
cause why James D. Herndon, Probate Judge, Greene County, [
Footnote 2] should not be held in
contempt and why the election in Greene County should not be set
aside and a new one held. Later the United States moved in the
District Court for relief and that court issued a rule to show
cause why the results of the November election in Greene County
should not be enjoined. The District Court stayed giving effect to
the Greene County election.
We have heard argument on the jurisdictional statement and on
the motion to hold Judge Herndon in contempt. On the merits of the
appeal, we reverse.
First. The Alabama Corrupt Practices Act requires each
candidate within five days "after the announcement
Page 394 U. S. 362
of his candidacy for any office" to file a statement showing
"the name of not less than one nor more than five persons" chosen
to receive, expend, audit, and disburse funds for his
election.Ala.Code, Tit. 17, § 274 (1958).
The disqualification of the NDPA candidates for their alleged
failure to satisfy this provision of the Alabama Act implicates
Probate Judge Herndon, who was responsible for the preparation of
the Greene County ballot which omitted their names.
In this case, the black candidates for Greene County offices
designated finance committees in February, 1968, prior to their
entry in the Democratic primary. Appellees contend that it was
sufficient to justify Judge Herndon's omission of the names that
the NDPA candidates did not file a second designation of financial
committee after May 7, the date of the primary, and the date on
which those candidates were nominated by the NDPA. Appellants
contend that disqualification for that reason constituted
discriminatory enforcement of the Corrupt Practices Act in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Since the names of the
white candidates who won the May 7 primary were placed on the
ballot, although they also did not file a second designation after
that date, appellees clearly have the burden of justifying the
denial of ballot places to the black NDPA candidates. Appellees
have failed to satisfy that burden. [
Footnote 3]
Alabama law requires all candidates for local office, not
selected in primaries, to be nominated by mass meeting on the first
Tuesday in May of the election year. Ala.Code, Tit. 17,
§§ 413, 414 (1958). The certificate of nomination sent to
Judge Herndon, probate judge for
Page 394 U. S. 363
Greene County, on September 4, stated that NDPA nominees had
been selected pursuant to a mass meeting.
On September 18, the District Court temporarily restrained the
omission from the ballot of NDPA candidates for state and local
office. That restraint was dissolved on October 11. Meanwhile,
counsel for the white Greene County candidates, who was the county
solicitor, prompted Judge Herndon to file an affidavit in which he
stated that, to the "best of [his] knowledge and belief," the NDPA
held no local mass meeting on May 7 at which nominations were made,
and further that none of the six NDPA candidates "filed or offered
to file in [his] office" the designation of financial committee
required by the Corrupt Practices Act. Yet, when his deposition was
taken on December 27, the judge conceded that the mass meeting
might have been held without his hearing about, it and admitted
knowledge that the black candidates had filed designations of
financial committee in February. He did not say why, in these
circumstances, the February filing did not suffice for the general
election; the designations refer to candidacies for the general
election as well as the primary election. [
Footnote 4] Nor did he offer any explanation why, if
the February filings by the white
Page 394 U. S. 364
candidates sufficed for the general election, the filings of the
black candidates should be treated differently. The record is
therefore utterly devoid of any explanation adequate to satisfy
appellees' burden. It is true that, at oral argument in this Court
counsel for appellees suggested that the Alabama courts might
construe the statutory words --
"[w]ithin five days after the announcement of his candidacy . .
. each candidate for a county office . . . shall file [the
designation statement] with the judge of probate"
-- to require a second filing by losers in a primary who stand
at the general election as candidates of another party. But it was
not urged, nor could it be on this record, that appellees'
distinction between the black and white candidates was rested on
that construction.
We deal here with Fifteenth Amendment rights which guarantee the
right of people regardless of their race, color, or previous
condition of servitude to cast their votes effectively and with
First Amendment rights which include the right to band together for
the advancement of political beliefs.
Williams v. Rhodes,
393 U. S. 23. While
the regulation of corrupt practices in state and federal elections
is an important governmental function, we refuse to accept a
reading of an Act which gives such a loose meaning to words and
such discretionary authority to election officials as to cause
Fifteenth and First Amendment rights to be subject to disparate
treatment. That risk is compounded here where the penalty is the
irrevocable striking of candidates from the ballot without notice
or an opportunity for contest and correction.
When the Alabama Act is construed as appellants' opponents were
allowed to construe it without suffering disqualification, we
conclude that appellants met the same requirements. Unequal
application of the same law to different racial groups has an
especially invidious connotation.
Page 394 U. S. 365
Second. In 1967, Alabama passed the Garrett Act
(L.1967, Act 243) barring from the ballot in a general election a
candidate for a state, district, or federal office
"who does not file a declaration of intention to become a
candidate for such office with the secretary of state on or before
the first day of March of the year in which such general election
is held."
The Garrett Act also requires a declaration of the political
party whose nomination the candidate seeks; or if he is not a party
candidate that he will run as an independent. A like provision bars
probate judges from printing on ballots the names of candidates for
county offices unless they have filed a declaration of intention on
or before the prior March 1. Accordingly, appellees justify their
disqualification of NDPA candidates in Etowah, Marengo, and Sumter
Counties, and Judge Herndon justifies his omission of those
candidates from the Greene County ballot, on the ground that they
did not comply with the Garrett Act.
Prior to the Garrett Act, every candidate desiring to run in a
primary was required to file a declaration of candidacy by March 1.
Ala.Code, Tit. 17, § 348 (1958). Independents were exempt from
this requirement, and they were able to get on the ballot after
nomination by a mass meeting held on the first Tuesday in May.
Id. §§ 413, 414. As a result of the Garrett Act,
an independent candidate had to decide whether to run at the same
time as candidates in the primary made their determination.
The question is whether the Garrett Act is affected by § 5
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, 42 U.S.C. §
1973c (1964 ed., Supp. III), which provides that, whenever States
like Alabama seek to administer
"any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or
standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different
from that, in force or effect on November 1, 1964,"
the
Page 394 U. S. 366
State may institute an action in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment
that
"such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or
procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or
color."
It is further provided in § 5 that, unless and until the
District of Columbia court enters such judgment
"no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to
comply with such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice,
or procedure. [
Footnote 5]"
The Garrett Act is in respects material here on all fours with
Whitley v. Williams, 393 U. S. 544, in
which we held that a like provision added to the Mississippi Code
could not be applied until it had been approved in one of the two
ways provided in § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
In the
Whitley case, we dealt with a new Mississippi
law which,
inter alia, changed the time for filing a
petition as an independent candidate from 40 days before the
general election to 60 days before the
primary
election.
We held that this new provision was subject to § 5 of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 as it was aimed "at increasing the
difficulty for an independent candidate to gain a position on the
general election ballot."
Id. at
393 U. S. 570.
And we added that that change "might also undermine the
effectiveness of voters who wish to elect independent candidates."
Ibid. The increased barriers placed on independent
candidates by Alabama's Garrett Act likewise bring it within the
purview of § 5 of the Federal Act. The Alabama officials,
therefore, acted unlawfully in disqualifying independent candidates
in the 1968 election for failure to comply with the Garrett
Act.
Page 394 U. S. 367
On the merits, we reverse the District Court and remand the
cause with directions (1) to issue an appropriate order requiring
the prevailing NDPA candidates in Etowah, Marengo, and Sumter
Counties to be treated as duly elected to the offices for which
they ran, and (2) to require the state and local officials promptly
to conduct a new election in Greene County for the various county
offices contested by NDPA candidates, [
Footnote 6] at which election the NDPA candidates for
those respective positions shall appear on the ballot.
The motion to hold Judge Herndon in contempt will be disposed of
in a separate opinion.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK took no part in the consideration or decision
of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
NDPA ran mostly Negro candidates -- 60 out of 67. In Greene
County, Negroes of voting age are in a numerical majority -- 5,001
Negro, 1,649 white, according to the 1960 census.
[
Footnote 2]
Under Alabama law the probate judges have responsibility for
preparing ballots to be used in each of the State's counties.
[
Footnote 3]
After first notifying the NDPA of its failure to file a
certified list of its candidates with her office, the Secretary of
State then notified the party of her willingness to accept such
nominations filed by September 5. According to the Secretary of
State, the NDPA complied with her condition by filing on time.
[
Footnote 4]
The form itself and the instructions on the back of the form
make clear that filing of the form fulfills the requirements of the
Alabama Corrupt Practices Act for "nomination or election." In the
typical form filed, as printed in the dissenting opinion, the
committee designated is named "for the purpose of aiding or
promoting my
nomination or election." (Emphasis supplied.)
Moreover, printed instructions on the backside to both "candidates
for State offices" and "candidates for County offices" state:
"A copy of this announcement of candidacy filed with the
Secretary of State and Probate Judge[s] will meet the requirements
of Section 274 of Title 17, Alabama Code of 1940, as amended
[Corrupt Practices Act], where the candidate himself (rather than a
committee) intends to receive, disburse and report on
all
monies used in promoting his nomination or election."
(Emphasis supplied.)
[
Footnote 5]
Section 5 contains an alternative procedure of submitting the
changed provisions to the Attorney General, in which case they
become enforceable upon failure of the Attorney General to
object.
[
Footnote 6]
These are the offices of County Commissioner for Districts 1, 2,
3, and 4, and Places 1 and 2 on the County Board of Education.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JUSTICE STEWART joins,
dissenting in part.
As I understand the arguments in this case, appellees suggest
that whatever reasons state officials may have given for excluding
appellants from the ballot, the exclusion and the judgment below
are sustainable on independent grounds, at least as to the Greene
County NDPA candidates. The Corrupt Practices Act, it is said,
required the filing of committee designations not only when
appellants became Democratic Party candidates
* and entered the
primary but when, after losing
Page 394 U. S. 368
the primary, they announced their candidacy under the banner of
another party. If the Alabama courts so construed the statute, I
would not think the Court would reverse this case unless it held
the Corrupt Practices Act unconstitutional. Of course, the Alabama
courts have not passed on this question to date. But the issue is
not frivolous, and I would not construe the statute here in the
first instance, which the Court in effect does, but would remand
the matter to the three-judge court for its interpretation of
Alabama law. On the other issues in the case, I agree with the
Court.
* At that time, they filed designations which were, as the
Solicitor General concedes, "in terms directed to the Democratic
Primary, rather than the general election." A typical designation
read in the relevant part as follows:
eas"
"I hereby declare myself to be
a candidate for the
Democratic nomination (or election)
in the Primary
Elections to be held on Tuesday, the 7th day of May, 1968, and
on Tuesday, the 4th day of June, 1968, for the office of County
Commissioner for"
"Greene #1"
"-------------------------------
--------------------------------"
"(District, Circuit or
County, (Place Number, if
applicable)"
"if applicable)"
"
* * * *"
"If I am
a candidate for the Democratic nomination for
Judge of a Court of Record, I do further certify that, at the time
of filing this Declaration of Candidacy I am not under disbarment
or suspension."
"I hereby certify and declare that I appoint myself (and hereby
accept the appointment) as the sole and only person or committee to
receive, expend, audit and disburse all monies contributed,
donated, subscribed, or in any way furnished or raised for the
purpose of aiding or promoting my nomination or election as
such candidate for said office in accordance with Sections
274 and 275 of Title 17 of the Code of Alabama of 1950, as amended
(Corrupt Practices Act). [Emphasis added.]"
"Vassie Knott"
"-------------------------"
"(Signature of Candidate)."