At petitioner's trial for murder in 1934, several witnesses
testified that petitioner was in another city when the crime was
committed. In accordance with Iowa law, the trial judge instructed
the jury that the defendant had the burden of proof on an alibi
defense. Petitioner was convicted, and his conviction was upheld by
the Iowa Supreme Court. Contending that it violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to place on him the burden of
proving an alibi defense, petitioner sought a writ of habeas
corpus. The District Court denied the writ, and the Court of
Appeals affirmed. After this Court granted certiorari, the Court of
Appeals, sitting en banc in another case, held that to place on the
defendant the burden of proving an alibi defense violated due
process.
Held: This case is vacated and remanded for
reconsideration in the light of that holding.
386 F.2d 677, vacated and remanded.
PER CURIAM.
In 1934, petitioner was indicted for murdering a policeman in
Burlington, Iowa. Petitioner claimed that he was innocent, and that
he had not been present at the scene of the crime. At the trial,
several witnesses testified that petitioner had been in Des Moines,
165 miles away from Burlington, on the day that the crime was
committed. The trial judge instructed the jury that, for the
petitioner to be entitled to an acquittal on the ground
Page 393 U. S. 254
that he was not present at the scene of the crime, the
petitioner must have shown by a preponderance of the evidence that
he was not present. [
Footnote
1] The jury found petitioner guilty of second-degree murder,
and petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment. His conviction
was affirmed by the Iowa Supreme Court.
State v. Johnson,
221 Iowa 8, 264 N.W. 596 (1936). [
Footnote 2]
In this habeas corpus proceeding, petitioner argued, among other
points, that the State had denied him due process of law by placing
on him the burden of proving the alibi defense. The United States
District Court for the Southern District of Iowa rejected this
argument and denied the petition. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 386 F.2d 677 (1967). We
granted certiorari to consider the constitutionality of the alibi
instruction, along with other issues. 390 U.S. 1002 (1968).
[
Footnote 3] After we granted
certiorari, the
Page 393 U. S. 255
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, held
in another case that the Iowa rule shifting to the defendant the
burden of proving an alibi defense violates the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Stump v. Bennett, 398 F.2d
111 (1968). [
Footnote 4] In
view of that holding, we vacate the decision in this case and
remand to that court for reconsideration. [
Footnote 5]
MR. JUSTICE BLACK dissents.
[
Footnote 1]
The instruction was as follows:
"The burden is upon the defendant to prove [the] defense [of
alibi] by a preponderance of the evidence, that is, by the greater
weight or superior evidence. The defense of alibi, to be entitled
to be considered as established, must show that, at the very time
of the commission of the crime, the accused was at another place so
far away, or under such circumstances, that he could not, with
ordinary exertion, have reached the place where the crime was
committed so as to have committed the same. If, by a preponderance
of the evidence, the defendant has so shown, the defense must be
considered established and the defendant would be entitled to an
acquittal. But if the proof of alibi has failed so to show, you
will not consider it established or proved. The evidence upon that
point is to he considered by the jury, and if, upon the whole case,
including the evidence of an alibi, there is a reasonable doubt of
defendant's guilt, you should acquit him."
[
Footnote 2]
See also State v. Johnson, 221 Iowa , 21, 27 N.W. 91
(1936), in which the Iowa Supreme Court corrected certain errors
made in its original opinion.
[
Footnote 3]
The other issues were whether the State had suppressed evidence
favorable to petitioner and intentionally used false evidence at
petitioner's trial, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
[
Footnote 4]
The instruction in
Stump was similar to the one in the
present case. The Court of Appeals rejected the State's contention
that any error was harmless because the jury was also instructed
that the State had the burden of proving "the crime as a whole"
beyond a reasonable doubt. The court pointed out that, in view of
the instruction's inconsistency, reasonable minds could infer that
the defendant retained the burden of proving nonpresence. 398 F.2d
at 116, 121-122.
[
Footnote 5]
In
Stump, the Court of Appeals said:
"[W]e are not directly faced with issues of retroactivity. We
recognize that a panel of this court in
Johnson v.
Bennett, also a habeas corpus proceeding by an Iowa state
prisoner, refused relief as to a number of matters, including the
alibi instruction. The
Johnson case concededly has some
factual distinctions from the present one. Also significant is the
fact that, in the
Stump case, unlike
Johnson,
counsel has carefully preserved by objections throughout the trial
and appellate procedures his argument as to the unconstitutionality
of the instruction."
(Citations omitted.) 398 F.2d at 122-123. We express no opinion
as to the validity of the distinctions suggested by the Court of
Appeals. Instead, we deem it appropriate to remand to that court
for a definite ruling on the issue.