Petitioner made a televised political speech in the course of
which he read questions which he had put to a union member, Albin,
and Albin's answers; the answers falsely charged respondent, a
public official, with criminal conduct. Respondent sued petitioner
for defamation, and was awarded damages by the trial judge. The
trial judge, having considered
New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254
(1964), decided after the trial, denied a motion for a new trial.
An intermediate appellate court reversed the trial court's
judgment, having found that petitioner had not acted with actual
malice within the meaning of the
New York Times rule,
i.e., with knowledge that petitioner's statements were
false or with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not.
The State Supreme Court reversed, finding that there had been
sufficient evidence that petitioner had acted in "reckless
disregard" in that petitioner had no personal knowledge of
respondent's activities; relied solely on Albin's affidavit though
there was no evidence as to Albin's veracity; failed to verify the
information with others who might know the facts; did not consider
whether the statements were defamatory, and mistakenly believed
that he had no responsibility for the broadcast because he was
merely quoting Albin.
Held: In order that it can be found that a defendant,
within the meaning of
New York Times, acted in "reckless
disregard" of whether a defamatory statement which he made about a
public official is false or not, there must be sufficient evidence
to permit the conclusion that the defendant had serious doubts as
to the truth of his publication. Pp.
390 U. S.
730-733.
(a) In a defamation action by a public official, reckless
conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would
have published the statement or would have investigated before
publishing. P.
390 U. S.
731.
(b) The people's stake in the conduct of public officials is so
great that neither the defense of truth nor the standard of
ordinary care would adequately implement First Amendment policies.
Pp.
390 U. S.
731-732.
(c) A defendant's testimony that he acted in good faith is not
conclusive as to that issue, since the factfinder, in the light of
all
Page 390 U. S. 728
the surrounding circumstances. must determine whether the
publication was indeed made in good faith. P.
390 U. S.
732.
(d) The evidence in this case is not sufficient to permit the
conclusion that petitioner acted in reckless disregard of whether
the statements about respondent were false or not. Pp.
390 U. S.
732-73. .
250 La. 405,
196
So. 2d 255, reversed and remanded.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented by this case is whether the Louisiana
Supreme Court, in sustaining a judgment for damages in a public
official's defamation action, correctly interpreted and applied the
rule of
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.
S. 254 (1964), that the plaintiff in such an action must
prove that the defamatory publication "was made with
actual
malice' -- that is, with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." 376 U.S. at
376 U. S.
279-280.
On June 27, 1962, petitioner St. Amant, a candidate for public
office, made a televised speech in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. In the
course of this speech, St. Amant read a series of questions which
he had put to J. D. Albin, a member of a Teamsters Union local, and
Albin's answers to those questions. The exchange concerned the
allegedly nefarious activities of E. G. Partin, the president of
the local, and the alleged relationship between Partin and St.
Amant's political opponent. One of Albin's answers concerned his
efforts to prevent Partin from secreting union records; in this
answer, Albin referred to Herman A. Thompson, an East Baton Rouge
Parish deputy sheriff and respondent here:
"Now, we knew that this safe was gonna be moved that night, but
imagine our predicament, knowing
Page 390 U. S. 729
of Ed's connections with the Sheriff's office through Herman
Thompson, who made recent visits to the Hall to see Ed. We also
knew of money that had passed hands between Ed and Herman Thompson
. . . from Ed to Herman. We also knew of his connections with State
Trooper Lieutenant Joe Green. We knew we couldn't get any help from
there, and we didn't know how far that he was involved in the
Sheriff's office or the State Police office through that, and it
was out of the jurisdiction of the City Police. [
Footnote 1]"
Thompson promptly brought suit for defamation, claiming that the
publication had "impute[d] . . . gross misconduct" and "infer[red]
conduct of the most nefarious nature." The case was tried prior to
the decision in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra. The
trial judge ruled in Thompson's favor and awarded $5,000 in
damages. Thereafter, in the course of entertaining and denying a
motion for a new trial, the Court considered the ruling in
New
York Times, finding that rule no barrier to the judgment
already entered. The Louisiana Court of Appeal reversed because the
record failed to show that St. Amant had acted with actual malice,
as required by
New York Times. 184 So. 2d 314 (1966). The
Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed the intermediate appellate
court. 250 La. 405,
196 So. 2d
255 (1967). In its view, there was sufficient evidence that St.
Amant recklessly disregarded whether the statements about Thompson
were true or false. We granted a writ of certiorari. 389 U.S. 1033
(1968).
Page 390 U. S. 730
For purposes of this case, we accept the determinations of the
Louisiana courts that the material published by St. Amant charged
Thompson with criminal conduct, that the charge was false, and that
Thompson was a public official, [
Footnote 2] and so had the burden of proving that the
false statements about Thompson were made with actual malice as
defined in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and later cases.
We cannot, however, agree with either the Supreme Court of
Louisiana or the trial court that Thompson sustained this
burden.
Purporting to apply the
New York Times malice standard,
the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled that St. Amant had broadcast
false information about Thompson recklessly, though not knowingly.
Several reasons were given for this conclusion. St. Amant had no
personal knowledge of Thompson's activities; he relied solely on
Albin's affidavit, although the record was silent as to Albin's
reputation for veracity; he failed to verify the information with
those in the union office who might have known the facts; he gave
no consideration to whether or not the statements defamed Thompson,
and went ahead heedless of the consequences, and he mistakenly
believed he had no responsibility for the broadcast because he was
merely quoting Albin's words.
These considerations fall short of proving St. Amant's reckless
disregard for the accuracy of his statements about Thompson.
"Reckless disregard," it is true, cannot be fully encompassed in
one infallible definition. Inevitably its outer limits will be
marked out through case-by-case adjudication, as is true with so
many legal standards
Page 390 U. S. 731
for judging concrete cases, whether the standard is provided by
the Constitution, statutes, or case law. Our cases, however, have
furnished meaningful guidance for the further definition of a
reckless publication. In
New York Times, supra, the
plaintiff did not satisfy his burden because the record failed to
show that the publisher was aware of the likelihood that he was
circulating false information. In
Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U. S. 64
(1964), also decided before the decision of the Louisiana Supreme
Court in this case, the opinion emphasized the necessity for a
showing that a false publication was made with a "high degree of
awareness of . . . probable falsity." 379 U.S. at
379 U. S. 74.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN's opinion in
Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 388 U. S. 130,
388 U. S. 153
(1967), stated that evidence of either deliberate falsification or
reckless publication "despite the publisher's awareness of probable
falsity" was essential to recovery by public officials in
defamation actions. These cases are clear that reckless conduct is
not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have
published, or would have investigated before publishing. There must
be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant,
in fact, entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his
publication. Publishing with such doubts shows reckless disregard
for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice.
It may be said that such a test puts a premium on ignorance,
encourages the irresponsible publisher not to inquire, and permits
the issue to be determined by the defendant's testimony that he
published the statement in good faith and unaware of its probable
falsity. Concededly the reckless disregard standard may permit
recovery in fewer situations than would a rule that publishers must
satisfy the standard of the reasonable man or the prudent
publisher. But
New York Times and succeeding cases have
emphasized that the stake of the
Page 390 U. S. 732
people in public business and the conduct of public officials is
so great that neither the defense of truth nor the standard of
ordinary care would protect against self-censorship, and thus
adequately implement First Amendment policies. Neither lies nor
false communications serve the ends of the First Amendment, and no
one suggests their desirability or further proliferation. But to
insure the ascertainment and publication of the truth about public
affairs, it is essential that the First Amendment protect some
erroneous publications, as well as true ones. We adhere to this
view, and to the line which our cases have drawn between false
communications which are protected and those which are not.
The defendant in a defamation action brought by a public
official cannot, however, automatically insure a favorable verdict
by testifying that he published with a belief that the statements
were true. The finder of fact must determine whether the
publication was indeed made in good faith. Professions of good
faith will be unlikely to prove persuasive, for example, where a
story is fabricated by the defendant, is the product of his
imagination, or is based wholly on an unverified anonymous
telephone call. Nor will they be likely to prevail when the
publisher's allegations are so inherently improbable that only a
reckless man would have put them in circulation. Likewise,
recklessness may be found where there are obvious reasons to doubt
the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports.
[
Footnote 3]
By no proper test of reckless disregard was St. Amant's
broadcast a reckless publication about a public officer. Nothing
referred to by the Louisiana courts indicates an awareness by St.
Amant of the probable falsity of Albin's
Page 390 U. S. 733
statement about Thompson. Failure to investigate does not, in
itself, establish bad faith.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
supra, at
376 U. S.
287-288. St. Amant's mistake about his probable legal
liability does not evidence a doubtful mind on his part. That he
failed to realize the import of what he broadcast -- and was thus
"heedless" of the consequences for Thompson -- is similarly
colorless. Closer to the mark are considerations of Albin's
reliability. However, the most the state court could say was that
there was no evidence in the record of Albin's reputation for
veracity, and this fact merely underlines the failure of Thompson's
evidence to demonstrate a low community assessment of Albin's
trustworthiness or unsatisfactory experience with him by St.
Amant.
Other facts in this record support our view. St. Amant made his
broadcast in June, 1962. He had known Albin since October, 1961,
when he first met with members of the dissident Teamsters faction.
St. Amant testified that he had verified other aspects of Albin's
information, and that he had affidavits from others. Moreover,
Albin swore to his answers, first in writing and later in the
presence of newsmen. According to Albin, he was prepared to
substantiate his charges. St. Amant knew that Albin was engaged in
an internal struggle in the union; Albin seemed to St. Amant to be
placing himself in personal danger by publicly airing the details
of the dispute.
Because the state court misunderstood and misapplied the actual
malice standard which must be observed in a public official's
defamation action, the judgment is reversed and the case remanded
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS concur in the judgment
of the Court for the reasons set out in
Page 390 U. S. 734
their concurring opinions in
New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254,
376 U. S. 293
(1964), and
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S.
64,
379 U. S. 79, 80
(1964).
[
Footnote 1]
St. Amant had preceded this question and answer with other
answers by Albin asserting that Partin, on learning that a union
member had written to the Secretary of Labor charging that Partin
had been stealing union funds, had become "pretty riled up," and
had decided to "get rid of the safe" containing the union
records.
[
Footnote 2]
The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded, after considering state
law, that a deputy sheriff has "substantial responsibility for or
control over the conduct of governmental affairs," the test
established by
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U. S.
75,
383 U. S. 85
(1966), "at least where law enforcement and police functions are
concerned." 250 La. at 422, 196 So. 2d at 261.
[
Footnote 3]
See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.
S. 130,
388 U. S.
169-170 (WARREN, C.J., concurring in the result), and
388 U. S. 172
(BRENNAN, J., dissenting) (1967).
MR JUSTICE FORTAS, dissenting.
I do not believe that petitioner satisfied the minimal standards
of care specified by
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U. S. 254
(1964). The affidavit that petitioner broadcast contained a
seriously libelous statement directed against respondent.
Respondent was a public official. He was not petitioner's adversary
in the political contest. Petitioner's casual, careless, callous
use of the libel cannot he rationalized as resulting from the heat
of a campaign. Under
New York Times, this libel was
broadcast by petitioner with "actual malice" -- with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not. The principle of
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.
S. 130 (1967), in my opinion, should lead us to
affirmance here.
The First Amendment is not so fragile that it requires us to
immunize this kind of reckless, destructive invasion of the life,
even of public officials, heedless of their interests and
sensitivities. The First Amendment is not a shelter for the
character assassinator, whether his action is heedless and reckless
or deliberate. The First Amendment does not require that we license
shotgun attacks on public officials in virtually unlimited open
season. The occupation of public officeholder does not forfeit
one's membership in the human race. The public official should be
subject to severe scrutiny and to free and open criticism. But if
he is needlessly, heedlessly, falsely accused of crime, he should
have a remedy in law.
New York Times does not preclude
this minimal standard of civilized living.
Petitioner had a duty here to check the reliability of the
libelous statement about respondent. If he had made a good faith
check, I would agree that he should be protected
Page 390 U. S. 735
even if the statement were false, because the interest of public
officials in their reputation must endure this degree of assault.
But since he made no check, I agree with the Supreme Court of
Louisiana that
New York Times does not prohibit recovery.
I would affirm.
