TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. (TMT), the debtor in this protracted
reorganization proceeding, was incorporated in 1954, and engages in
transporting loaded truck trailers and other freight between
Florida and Puerto Rico on sea-going barges. TMT incurred
substantial debts and losses from the unsuccessful conversion of a
Navy LSD by a drydock and repair company (M-S). Between 1954 and
1957, TMT issued more than 4,000,000 shares of common stock, many
of which were acquired by insiders at low prices and disposed of to
the public in alleged violation of the Securities Act of 1933 at
relatively high prices. As a result of these and other
transactions, TMT became unable to meet its obligations, and a
reorganization proceeding was started by an involuntary petition
filed against TMT in June, 1957. In 1959, the District Court,
solely on the basis of documents and records and without a hearing,
declared TMT insolvent. It held that the original stockholders had
no further interest in the reorganized company, and confirmed a
reorganization plan which would have given control of TMT to the
holders of preferred ship mortgages on TMT's vessels (the "Caplan
mortgage") even though the District Court had questioned, and the
trustee (respondent Anderson) had objected to, the validity of the
claims. A successor trustee thereafter petitioned, in effect, that
the order confirming the plan be vacated because of an allegedly
illegal agreement between the Caplan mortgage holders and M-S. The
petitioner Committee appealed, objecting to the trial court's
failure to make an investigation and to conduct a hearing on
insolvency. The SEC then petitioned the trial court to investigate
its claims that the plan was unfair. The parties agreed on an
investigation, which respondent Anderson as reinstated trustee
conducted. Anderson's investigation concluded that TMT's business
had been "wrecked by gross mismanagement" and "unsound expansion,"
that TMT
Page 390 U. S. 415
had substantial causes of action against the principal Caplan
mortgage holders for diverting corporate opportunities through
flagrant abuse of their control and inside positions, and that the
mortgage was "a fraudulent transfer not given for fair
consideration." Thereafter, the trial court vacated its order
confirming the 1959 plan, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. After
the trial court set aside the 1959 plan, no hearings were held on
the trustee's and the SEC's objections to the Caplan mortgage
claim. The mortgage was not set aside as a fraudulent transfer, nor
was it decided to use the claims against the Caplan mortgage
holders as setoffs. The SEC, which contended after its own
investigation that there were grounds for disallowing the M-S
claims, filed detailed specifications of its objections to those
claims based upon M-S' alleged negligence and other factors. The
SEC and trustee sought reference of the M-S claims to a master, but
later the trustee moved for the allowance of the claims on the
ground that there was only a "remote" possibility of materially
reducing them. Despite his own doubts, and without further
investigation, the trial judge ultimately confirmed the M-S claims
in full as unsecured claims. In 1962, two new reorganization plans
were proposed: the "internal plan," recommended by Anderson,
involving issuance of new common stock to creditors and
"compromises" of (1) the Caplan mortgage, whereby the mortgage
holders were to receive in cash what they had put up for the
mortgage, plus interest on the principal from the original due
date, and (2) the M-S claims, whereby they were also allowed in
their full amount as unsecured claims, under an arrangement whereby
M-S would receive 40% of the reorganized company's common stock,
and the "cash plan" involving similar "compromises" and selling the
debtor's assets for cash to persons unconnected with the company,
the cash to be distributed to creditors. The Committee and the SEC
objected,
inter alia, that TMT's stockholders were
excluded from both plans. Following valuation hearings which did
not include full testimony about the company's future prospects,
the District Court concluded that its going concern value, based on
current earnings, was $2,780,000. Since creditors' claims were
almost twice that much, the court found the debtor to be insolvent,
and excluded TMT's stockholders from participation in the
reorganized company. The District Court approved both plans,
observing in connection with "compromising" the Caplan mortgage and
M-S claims that successful litigation against the claimants "would
take possibly years to conclude," and holding the compromises
Page 390 U. S. 416
"fair and equitable" under the circumstances. A majority of all
classes of creditors accepted the internal plan, which that court
confirmed in February, 1963. The Court of Appeals remanded the case
to the District Court to determine the feasibility of the plan if
the Government's nontax claims were given priority, which it held
was required. The District Court, after hearings, approved the plan
as amended to include an immediate cash payment to the Government,
and assumed that the Court of Appeals had, in effect, affirmed its
other orders, and, refusing to reconsider the Committee's and SEC's
contentions with regard to the Caplan mortgage and M-S claims,
affirmed the plan, which the creditors had accepted. The Committee
again appealed. The Court of Appeals ruled that its earlier
decision left open all issues not previously discussed or decided,
but, finding no abuse of discretion or clear error, refused to
remand the case, and affirmed all judgments and orders of the
District Court, stating that "[t]his . . . litigation must at long
last be brought to an end." Dealing with the District Court's
approval of the compromises in five sentences, the Court of Appeals
noted that "not a single creditor has ever complained of either
compromise."
Held:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the District Court's
approval of compromises involving substantial recognition of the
claims against the debtor filed by the Caplan group and M-S in view
of the inadequacy of the record for assessing the fairness of the
proposed compromises. Pp.
390 U. S.
424-441.
(a) A bankruptcy judge has the duty of determining that a
proposed compromise forming part of a reorganization plan is fair
and equitable; he must ascertain all facts necessary to determine
the probabilities of success should claims be litigated. P.
390 U. S.
424.
(b) The record here provides a reviewing court with no basis for
distinguishing between well reasoned conclusions of the trial court
and mere conclusory language unsupported by evaluation of the facts
or analysis of law. P.
390 U. S.
434.
(c) An unfair reorganization plan may not be approved by a
bankruptcy court even though the vast majority of creditors have
approved it. P.
390 U. S.
435.
(d) Approval of compromises is more questionable when the
available facts indicate the inadvisability of compromise than when
there are no facts pointing either way. P.
390 U. S.
436.
(e) The facts in the record indicate the probable existence of
valid and valuable causes of action, and since there were no
Page 390 U. S. 417
facts permitting a reasoned judgment that these claims should be
compromised as the plan provides, approval of the compromises was
not justified. Pp.
390 U. S.
438-441.
2. The District Court erred in relying upon only the debtor's
past earnings in determining its value as a going concern. Without
having evidence relating to the debtor's future prospects, the
court could not assess its going concern value or properly
determine that the debtor was insolvent. Pp.
390 U. S.
441-453.
(a) Whether a reorganization plan excluding junior interests
(here stockholders) meets the statutory requirement that the plan
be "fair and equitable" depends upon the value of the reorganized
company. Since the District Court did not apply the proper
valuation standards, its determination of insolvency was improper,
and the reorganization plan cannot stand. P.
390 U. S.
441.
(b) The valuation of a company undergoing reorganization must
include an estimate based on an informed judgment embracing all
facts relevant to future earning capacity. P.
390 U.S. 442.
(c) The value of the debtor's business depended "not on the
inherent value of its assets, but primarily on maintaining a high
level of earnings." P.
390 U. S.
443.
(d) The trial judge's steadfast refusal to consider the
company's value once it was out of the reorganization proceedings
constituted an error which infected his conclusion that the debtor
was insolvent. P.
390 U. S.
444.
(e) In the circumstances of this case, which involve a company
which had established and increased its share of a highly
competitive market despite intense competition and major internal
crises, an adequate notion of its going concern value required
looking to the future, as well as the past. P.
390 U. S.
446.
(f) The information introduced at the two insolvency hearings
was inadequate for even a rough evaluation of TMT's future
prospects, a situation which resulted from the trial judge's
hostility to evidence concerning the company's future. Pp.
390 U. S.
447-451.
364 F.2d 936, reversed and remanded.
Page 390 U. S. 418
MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case involves a corporate reorganization under Chapter X of
the Bankruptcy Act, 52 Stat. 883, 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676.
In the most recent proceedings, [
Footnote 1] the District Court approved an amended plan of
reorganization and discharged the petitioner Committee. [
Footnote 2] The Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit affirmed, 364 F.2d 936 (1966). We granted
certiorari, 387 U.S. 929 (1967), because this case presents
important questions under the bankruptcy laws. Since we believe the
Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the District
Court, we reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings
consistent with the views expressed below.
Page 390 U. S. 419
I
The debtor, TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc., was incorporated in 1954.
Its principal business is transporting freight between Florida and
Puerto Rico. It pioneered "fishyback" transport, the ocean-going
equivalent of "piggyback" transport. Freight loaded into highway
trailers is rolled on and off sea-going barges without rehandling.
In its original operations, TMT used rented tugs to tow converted
Navy LST's loaded with such trailers and other freight. Later it
undertook to convert a self-propelled Navy LSD for use in its
business. Substantial debts and losses arose from the unsuccessful
conversion and consequent failure in service of this ship, dubbed
the
Carib Queen.
In addition, between 1954 and 1957, more than 4,000,000 shares
of TMT common stock were issued, many of them acquired at low
prices by persons close to the company and disposed of to the
public at relatively high prices. As a result of these transactions
and others, TMT became unable to meet its obligations, and a
reorganization proceeding was initiated against it by involuntary
petition in June, 1957. The debtor consented to reorganization, and
C. Gordon Anderson was appointed trustee. The motion of the holders
of preferred ship mortgages on the debtor's vessels (the Caplan
mortgage) to foreclose their liens was denied by the trial court.
On appeal from this order, it was pointed out that no plan of
reorganization had yet been proposed, that the possibility of
successful reorganization had not been explored, and that no
evidence had been received to support any of the court's orders.
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded with instructions that
the holders of the Caplan mortgage be permitted to foreclose unless
adequate provision was made to protect their interests or unless
they would not be prejudiced by further delay.
Page 390 U. S. 420
Upon remand, the trial court held appropriate hearings. It was
determined that the debtor was being operated in a manner which
would produce substantial profits. A plan of reorganization was
proposed which would have given the Caplan mortgage group all the
common stock in the reorganized company, a substantial portion of
the preferred stock, and control of the board of directors. In
February, 1959, without a hearing called for that purpose and
solely on the basis of documents and records, the trial court
declared the debtor insolvent and held that the original
stockholders had no further interest in the reorganized
corporation. In March, 1959, the plan of reorganization was
confirmed, and Anderson resigned as trustee to become president of
the reorganized company. A new trustee was appointed, and he sought
in effect to vacate the order confirming the plan. His petition
alleged that the holders of the Caplan mortgage and Merrill-Stevens
Dry Dock & Repair Co. (M-S), another substantial creditor, had
entered into an undisclosed agreement in violation of § 221 of
Chapter X, 52 Stat. 897, 11 U.S.C. § 621, an agreement
according to which the Caplan mortgage group would pay M-S in order
to procure its consent to the plan of reorganization. This petition
was denied, the successor trustee was removed, and Anderson was
reinstated as trustee.
The petitioner Committee appealed from the order confirming the
reorganization plan. Objection was made to the failure of the trial
court to order an investigation into the claims of certain
creditors and to the failure to conduct a hearing on insolvency.
While that appeal was pending, the Caplan group, supported by
Anderson, petitioned the trial court to consummate the confirmed
plan. The Securities and Exchange Commission, however, filed a
petition in the trial court seeking an investigation. [
Footnote 3] It
Page 390 U. S. 421
alleged that an investigation would disclose that the plan was
unfair because it turned the corporation over to persons who had
dealt extensively in the stock of the debtor in transactions which
were probably illegal. It was agreed among the parties that an
investigation should be made.
Anderson, in his reestablished role as trustee, conducted the
investigation. Fourteen days of hearings were held, 2,200 pages of
testimony transcribed, and some 60 exhibits collected. Anderson's
report from this investigation covers 40 pages in the original
record. He concluded that the debtor's business had been
"wrecked by gross mismanagement, by unwise and unsound expansion
financed primarily through the sale of securities in disregard of
the protective provisions of the Securities Act of 1933,"
and that the debtor had substantial causes of action against
holders of the Caplan mortgage. Upon the recommendation of
Anderson, the trial court vacated its order confirming the 1959
plan, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. [
Footnote 4]
Early in 1962, two new plans of reorganization were proposed.
The "internal plan," recommended by Anderson, provided for
reorganizing the debtor by issuing new common stock to creditors,
and involved "compromises" of the Caplan mortgage and M-S claims.
The "cash plan" entailed similar "compromises," as well as selling
the debtor's assets for cash to persons unconnected with the
company and distributing the cash
Page 390 U. S. 422
to creditors. Neither plan provided for any participation by
stockholders. The Committee, supported by the SEC, objected to the
exclusion of stockholders from both plans, and opposed the internal
plan because it contemplated that Anderson would become president
of the reorganized company. After hearings on valuation, the
District Court found the debtor insolvent and approved both plans
as fair, equitable, and feasible. A majority of all classes of
creditors other than the United States accepted the internal plan,
and the District Court confirmed it in February, 1963. The
Committee appealed, supported by the SEC, arguing that the plan
wrongly excluded stockholders and improperly contemplated that
Anderson would become president. The Court of Appeals ruled,
without reaching the other contentions, that it was permissible for
the plan to contemplate that Anderson would become president,
[
Footnote 5] but it held in a
separate appeal that the plan was defective for not giving priority
to the Government's nontax claims. [
Footnote 6] The case was accordingly remanded to the
District Court for determination of whether the plan would be
feasible if the Government's claims were given full priority.
On remand, further hearings were held, the District Court found
that, if the Government's nontax claims were given priority, the
plan would be feasible, and amendments were authorized which
provided for immediate cash payment to the Government. The court
regarded the failure of the Court of Appeals to reverse its other
orders as, in effect, an affirmance of them, and it refused to
consider again the contentions of the Committee and the SEC. The
creditors accepted the amended plan and, over the objections of the
Committee and the SEC that the plan was not fair or equitable, the
District
Page 390 U. S. 423
Court affirmed it. The Committee again appealed, and the Court
of Appeals ruled that its earlier decision had left open all issues
not in terms discussed and decided. [
Footnote 7] Passing over the fact that the District Court
had considered the case in erroneous legal perspective, and
emphasizing that its obligation was to determine whether the trial
judge had "abused his discretion" or reached conclusions which were
"clearly erroneous," the Court of Appeals refused to remand the
case. Stating that "[t]his . . . litigation must at long last be
brought to an end," the Court of Appeals affirmed all judgments and
orders of the District Court. The Committee, again supported by the
SEC, has presented a number of questions on certiorari to this
Court. [
Footnote 8] Because of
the view we take of this case, it is necessary to consider only the
questions of whether it was error to affirm the District Court's
approval of compromises of substantial claims against the debtor,
and whether it was error to affirm the District Court's judgment
that the debtor was insolvent, when that judgment was rendered
without considering the future estimated earnings of the
reorganized company.
Page 390 U. S. 424
II
Compromises are "a normal part of the process of
reorganization."
Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co.,
308 U. S. 106,
308 U. S. 130
(1939). In administering reorganization proceedings in an
economical and practical manner, it will often be wise to arrange
the settlement of claims as to which there are substantial and
reasonable doubts. At the same time, however, it is essential that
every important determination in reorganization proceedings receive
the "informed, independent judgment" of the bankruptcy court.
National Surety Co. v. Coriell, 289 U.
S. 426,
289 U. S. 436
(1933). The requirements of §§ 174 and 221(2) of Chapter
X, 52 Stat. 891, 897, 11 U.S.C. §§ 574, 621(2), that
plans of reorganization be both "fair and equitable," apply to
compromises just as to other aspects of reorganizations.
Ashbach v. Kirtley, 289 F.2d 159 (C.A. 8th Cir.1961);
Conway v. Silesian-American Corp., 186 F.2d 201 (C.A.2d
Cir.1950). The fact that courts do not ordinarily scrutinize the
merits of compromises involved in suits between individual
litigants cannot affect the duty of a bankruptcy court to determine
that a proposed compromise forming part of a reorganization plan is
fair and equitable.
In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 196
F.2d 484 (C.A. 7th Cir.1952). There can be no informed and
independent judgment as to whether a proposed compromise is fair
and equitable until the bankruptcy judge has apprised himself of
all facts necessary for an intelligent and objective opinion of the
probabilities of ultimate success should the claim be litigated.
Further, the judge should form an educated estimate of the
complexity, expense, and likely duration of such litigation, the
possible difficulties of collecting on any judgment which might be
obtained, and all other factors relevant to a full and fair
assessment of the wisdom of the proposed compromise. Basic to this
process in every
Page 390 U. S. 425
instance, of course, is the need to compare the terms of the
compromise with the likely rewards of litigation. It is here that
we must start in the present case.
The Caplan mortgage, consisting of preferred ship mortgages on
the debtor's vessels, bears a face amount of $330,000. The holders
paid $280,500 for it. Under the proposed compromise, the holders
would receive $280,500 paid in five annual cash installments, plus
interest from the original due date. [
Footnote 9] The claims filed against the debtor's estate
by M-S totaled $1,628,284, of which $574,580 was said to be secured
by maritime liens on the debtor's vessels. Under the terms of the
compromise, these claims are to be allowed in full, after reducing
them all to the status of unsecured claims. As with other unsecured
claims, they would be paid for by issuing common stock in the
reorganized company. M-S would wind up holding approximately 40% of
the stock in the new company. [
Footnote 10] A glance at these terms makes it clear that
the compromises involve substantial recognition of the claims filed
by the Caplan group and M-S against the debtor. Whether
compromising on these terms was fair and equitable to the debtor,
the other creditors, and the stockholders depends upon the proper
assessment of the claims which the debtor allegedly had against
both the Caplan group and M-S.
The Caplan mortgage was the focal point of the 1960
investigation conducted by the trustee, Anderson. The
Page 390 U. S. 426
mortgage was entered into shortly before the petition in
bankruptcy was filed. It was needed to raise cash to meet payments
due on the
Carib Queen. After an extensive investigation,
Anderson concluded that the mortgage was a fraudulent transfer not
given for fair consideration. Anderson's report succinctly stated
the unfairness of the terms of the mortgage:
"The Caplan Group paid $280,500 cash for the mortgage to TMT,
which paid all of the expenses of the transaction. The mortgage was
for $330,000, payable in seven months, and is convertible into
common stock at the option of the holders, one share of common for
each $1.25 of principal amount of the mortgage. This gave the
Caplan Group an effective interest rate of 30% per annum prior to
maturity, and an opportunity to straddle because of the conversion
feature. If TMT prospered, they could convert the mortgage into
common stock for which they would have paid little more than $1.00
per share; if TMT did not, the Caplan Mortgage was in a senior
position and constituted a lien on TMT's prime assets, absolutely
necessary to the Company's operation. Since the
Carib
Queen had broken down, the vessels encumbered by the mortgage
were the main producers of income for the company."
Anderson found that there was "ample evidence" to support this
view of the mortgage, and that, therefore, the mortgage should be
treated as null and void. So treating it would not release TMT from
the obligation to repay the money received, but, in claiming that
amount, the holders of the mortgage would have no higher status
than general unsecured creditors. [
Footnote 11]
Page 390 U. S. 427
In addition, Anderson's report concluded that the principal
holders of the Caplan mortgage, Abrams, Shaffer, and Erdman, had
diverted corporate opportunities through the flagrant abuse of
their control, fiduciary or inside positions, and should be made to
account for the profits they had made. Nearly half of the roughly
4,000,000 shares of outstanding TMT common stock reached the public
via purported private offerings through Abrams and Shaffer. These
two men exercised a high degree of control over the affairs of the
company, and Erdman went along with them and participated in many
of their transactions. Anderson found that these three occupied a
fiduciary relationship with TMT, at least insofar as issuance of
capital stock to them was concerned.
"They took advantage of their inside position to obtain stock
for less than the market price which they sold to the public
without any registration under the Securities Act and in apparent
violation of the private offering exemption under which all of the
stock was issued."
The activities of these three men substantially lessened TMT's
chances of obtaining financing from reputable financial
institutions, "and, by the time the Caplan mortgage was executed,
they were in a position to dictate terms which TMT would be forced
to accept." Anderson's report continued:
"It is the opinion of the trustee that persons such as Abrams,
Shaffer and Erdman, who come in as creditors of TMT under the
Caplan Mortgage . . . , should be barred in this equity proceeding
from profiting at TMT's expense. Their claims should be reduced by
the profits they have made on sales of TMT stock which they
acquired for private investment
Page 390 U. S. 428
purposes, but which they sold in violation of the law at great
profit to themselves. These profits are either admitted or readily
ascertainable, and should be returned to the company."
Characterizing the conduct of Abrams, Shaffer, and Erdman in
acquiring unregistered TMT stock with no intention of holding it
for investment as a "fraud," Anderson indicated the possibility of
liability under the SEC's Rule 10b-5. [
Footnote 12] Anderson said that, at a minimum, their
claims should be subordinated to those of innocent creditors.
[
Footnote 13]
As a result of the report filed by trustee Anderson, the order
confirming the 1959 plan of reorganization was vacated. Both the
trustee and the SEC filed objections to the Caplan mortgage claim,
grounded on the reasons presented in the report of the
investigation. The District Court never held hearings on these
objections. The mortgage was not set aside as a fraudulent
transfer, nor was it decided to use the claims against Abrams,
Shaffer, and Erdman as setoffs or as a means of subordinating the
mortgage claims. Rather, the internal plan of reorganization was
approved by the District Court, providing for a "compromise" of the
Caplan mortgage along the lines already indicated. The holders of
the mortgage were to receive in cash what they had put up for the
mortgage, plus interest on the principal from the original due
date. [
Footnote 14]
Separate from the Caplan mortgage claims were the claims filed
by M-S, the company in charge of converting
Page 390 U. S. 429
the Navy LSD into the self-propelled trailership which TMT
christened the
Carib Queen. These claims totaled
$1,628,284, of which over $1,000,000 was for the unpaid balance due
for converting the
Carib Queen. Maritime liens on other
vessels owned by TMT allegedly secured $574,580 worth of these
claims. The United States, in its position as a substantial
creditor of TMT, filed objections to M-S claims, stating that none
of them were entitled to status as secured claims "for the reason
that they arose more than one year prior to the commencement of the
reorganization proceedings herein." It also contended that the
claims had no status as secured lien claims, for
"it is a recognized principle of Admiralty and Maritime law that
claims for the construction or reconstruction of vessels do not
give rise to Maritime liens."
Whether the portion of the claims for which M-S asserts secured
status is actually entitled to that status has never been
determined. The "compromise" of the M-S claims amounted to allowing
them in their entirety as unsecured claims.
On the maiden voyage of the
Carib Queen, a series of
boiler failures caused the vessel to break down and necessitated
extensive repairs. In November, 1958, the petitioner Committee
notified the District Court that, in its opinion, the "series of
catastrophes" which had befallen the
Carib Queen was due
to
"faulty design, inadequate inspection, defective work on the
remodeling and later repair of the ship, hasty and improper
preparations for a hazardous sea voyage, and utilization of the
ship in a service for which she was not fitted and in an
unseaworthy condition."
The Committee thought that TMT had causes of action which could
lead to the recovery of substantial sums of money. Although
Anderson's report on his subsequent investigation of the affairs of
TMT dealt with causes of action other than those associated
Page 390 U. S. 430
with the Caplan mortgage, it made no mention of any claims TMT
might have against M-S. The SEC objected to the M-S claims, stating
that there were grounds for disallowing them and that the matter
should be referred to a special master for investigation. Trustee
Anderson also sought reference of these claims to a special master.
On September 1, 1961, the SEC filed detailed specifications of its
objections to the M-S claims, based on its own investigation into
them. The SEC stated that the debtor
"has meritorious defenses and an offset or counterclaim because
M-S (a) did not properly convert the vessel; (b) did not comply
with the terms of the contract; (c) did not properly repair the
vessel, and (d) performed certain work for and furnished certain
materials to TMT, with no agreement as to price; M-S has failed to
establish the value of such work and materials."
The SEC described with some particularity the facts which had
led it to this conclusion. The most important of these related to
the boiler failure which occurred shortly after M-S delivered the
Carib Queen for its maiden voyage. Within 48 hours of
sailing from Jacksonville, Florida, bound for San Juan, Puerto
Rico, it was discovered that a boiler and several tubes were
leaking. Tubes overheated, ruptured, and were distorted as a result
of scale which had formed on their inner surfaces. The SEC
attributed the scale to M-S' negligence in running the boilers with
raw water. The SEC also stated that the improper priming of the
boilers that occurred on the first trip was due to installation of
incorrect baffles by M-S. M-S had undertaken to make the required
repairs, and the SEC stated that this repair work was performed
negligently, leading to further tube failures.
Page 390 U. S. 431
Part of the M-S claims was for unpaid charges for this repair
work. M-S filed an answer on September 1 which admitted that, when
the
Carib Queen was delivered, it was suffering from
"certain construction deficiencies," but denied any liability. It
contended that its asserted lien claims were secured, and that it
had performed the repair work in a proper manner.
Although the SEC and the trustee had sought reference of the M-S
claims to a special master for a hearing, no such hearing was ever
held. Instead, the trustee subsequently moved for the summary
allowance of the claims on the ground that there was only a
"remote" possibility of materially reducing them by litigating the
objections filed against them, and that such litigation would cause
"unnecessary delay." [
Footnote
15] At the hearing during which the trustee presented his
motion for allowing the M-S claims in full, no further explanation
of this recommendation was provided. Counsel for the Committee
protested that "this is not a report, this is a bare statement of
conclusion." The trial judge himself recognized the importance of
the question. He said:
"I am concerned myself. I do know that whoever turned that
vessel [the
Carib Queen] loose with the
Page 390 U. S. 432
boilers in it, somebody made a bad mistake. I don't know who it
was."
The matter was put over, and subsequently the Committee,
supported by the Commission, the Department of Justice, and the
Caplan mortgage group, filed objections. Notwithstanding these
objections, and the doubts that he had earlier expressed, the trial
judge confirmed the claims in full as unsecured claims without
further investigation of them. M-S, under the confirmed plan, is to
receive 40% of the common stock of the reorganized company.
On July 11, 1962, the trial court filed its opinion and order
approving both the internal and the cash plans of reorganization.
The internal plan contained the provisions for "compromising" the
Caplan mortgage and M-S claims. With regard to these sets of
claims, the trial court stated that "it was apparent" that
successful litigation of the claims TMT had against the holders of
these claims "would take possibly years to conclude. . . ." The
court continued:
"It is the opinion of the court that these compromises are fair
and equitable under the circumstances, and they are hereby approved
for inclusion in the Internal Plan. The court approves the opinion
expressed by the attorney for the trustee that no better
compromises can be obtained for the debtor, that the prospect of
material reduction in the amount of these claims does not warrant
the extensive litigation that would otherwise be required, and that
the prospect of recoveries beyond the amount of the claims as urged
by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Stockholders'
Committee is too remote for serious consideration. . . . The
alternative to approval of these compromises is extensive
litigation at heavy expense to the debtor and unnecessary
Page 390 U. S. 414
delay in reorganization contrary to the intent and purpose of
Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act."
This statement constitutes the only, and the last [
Footnote 16] word that the trial
court said on the merits of the compromises of the Caplan mortgage
and M-S claims. Without reference to any of the objections that had
been filed or to the substantial facts in the record tending to
cast doubt upon the Caplan mortgage and M-S claims, the court
accepted the bald conclusions of the trustee. This despite the fact
that the trustee had once concluded that the Caplan mortgage was
null and void and that TMT had sizeable setoffs against its
holders. This despite the fact that the trustee had once sought
reference of the M-S claims to a special master for investigation.
This despite the fact that the trustee had never placed on the
record any of the facts of his subsequent investigation
Page 390 U. S. 434
and had never provided any explanation of why he had completely
reversed his field on these claims. Although, at this point in the
proceedings, it was clear that Anderson was to become president of
the reorganized company, and though the trial court was
understandably eager to wind up these protracted proceedings, there
nowhere appears an adequate explanation for the trustee's cursory,
conclusory recommendation of these "compromises," or the
perfunctory, almost off-hand, manner in which the court accepted
that recommendation.
If the quoted statement of the trial court had been the result
of an adequate and intelligent consideration of the merits of the
claims, the difficulties of pursuing them, the potential harm to
the debtor's estate caused by delay, and the fairness of the terms
of settlement, then it would without question have been justifiable
to approve the proposed compromises. It is essential, however, that
a reviewing court have some basis for distinguishing between well
reasoned conclusions, arrived at after a comprehensive
consideration of all relevant factors, and mere boiler-plate
approval phrased in appropriate language but unsupported by
evaluation of the facts or analysis of the law. Here there is no
explanation of how the strengths and weaknesses of the debtor's
causes of action were evaluated or upon what grounds it was
concluded that a settlement which allowed the creditor's claims in
major part was "fair and equitable." Although we are told that the
alternative to settlement was "extensive litigation at heavy
expense" and "unnecessary delay," there is no evidence that this
conclusion was based upon an educated estimate of the complexity,
expense, and likely duration of the litigation. Litigation and
delay are always the alternative to settlement, and whether that
alternative is worth pursuing necessarily depends upon a reasoned
judgment as to the probable outcome of litigation. The complaint
voiced by
Page 390 U. S. 435
counsel for the petitioner Committee to the trustee's report on
the compromises, that "this is a bare statement of conclusion,"
seems equally applicable to the trial court's statement approving
those compromises. In these circumstances, it was error to affirm
that aspect of the District Court's judgment approving inclusion of
the proposed compromises in the internal plan of
reorganization.
The Court of Appeals dealt with the District Court's approval of
the compromises in five sentences. Noting that it was only the
Committee and the SEC that were complaining, and remarking that it
was unlikely that disallowance of the compromises would result in
solvency, it felt that it was "significant that not a single
creditor has ever complained of either compromise." 364 F.2d 936,
941. The question of insolvency will be returned to shortly. The
argument that the compromises were properly approved because no
creditors objected to them seems doubly dubious. When a bankruptcy
court either fails adequately to investigate potential legal claims
held by the debtor or refuses to provide an adequate explanation of
the basis for approving compromises, it is scarcely surprising that
creditors fail to come forward with objections to the compromises.
Moreover, this Court has held that a plan of reorganization which
is unfair to some persons may not be approved by the court even
though the vast majority of creditors have approved it. [
Footnote 17]
Page 390 U. S. 436
The principal argument of the respondent supporting affirmance
of the order approving the compromises is that
"the district court had before it a thorough record concerning
the facts and issues with respect to the compromises of these two
claims."
Respondent's Brief 38. With regard to the Caplan mortgage claim,
respondent points out that the facts and circumstances surrounding
it were thoroughly documented in Anderson's report of his
investigation. It is difficult to see how this strengthens
respondent's position, however, for the report carefully documented
the conclusion that the Caplan mortgage was a fraudulent transfer,
and that claims against the individual holders of the mortgage
could be used as setoffs. The District Court's approval of the
proposed compromise in the face of the facts and conclusions
contained in the trustee's report is more difficult to understand
than would be approval entered on a blank slate. Respondent also
points out that the trial court had before it an answer to
Anderson's report, the various objections filed to the mortgage
claim, the claim itself, and the recommendations of the Creditors'
Committee, the trustee and the trustee's counsel favoring the
proposed settlement. The objections filed to the claim militate
against the advisability of compromise, however, and the other
matters referred to consist either of conclusory denials of
liability or conclusory statements that the claims should be
compromised. There is nothing in all these documents which could
provide a sound basis for concluding that the claims against the
mortgage and its holders were unmeritorious. [
Footnote 18] If the
Page 390 U. S. 437
trial court ever had before it facts which showed the claims
against the Caplan mortgage and its holders to be without merit, or
if the court ever discovered sound grounds for thinking that the
delay incident to litigation or the unlikelihood of obtaining an
adequate recovery, made compromise advisable, nothing in this
record indicates it.
With regard to the M-S claims, respondent contends that the
record contains "an abundance of pleadings and allegations"
respecting them. Respondent's Brief 33. To make an informed and
independent judgment, however, the court needs facts, not
allegations. Respondent also contends that there were sufficient
facts in the record, and provides a long list of references to the
places in the record where these facts can be found. If, indeed,
the record contained adequate facts to support the decision of the
trial court to approve the proposed compromises, a reviewing court
would be properly reluctant to attack that action solely because
the court failed adequately to set forth its reasons or the
evidence on which they were based. The deficiency in this case,
however, is not a merely formal one. The evidence referred to by
respondent is analyzed at greater length in the margin. [
Footnote 19]
Page 390 U. S. 438
Here it is enough to say that, to the extent that the record
contains solid facts of the sort necessary for appraising the
merits of the claims against M-S, virtually all of them point to
the probable existence of valid
Page 390 U. S. 439
and valuable causes of action. Balancing these facts are nothing
but bald assertions to the contrary and general conclusions for
which foundations nowhere appear. Particularly noteworthy is the
fact that, despite frequent
Page 390 U. S. 440
requests for an investigation, and notwithstanding the fact that
the available evidence pointed to probably valid claims against
M-S, no investigation of these matters was ever undertaken or
ordered by the trial court. It is difficult to imagine how an
informed and independent decision in favor of compromising the M-S
claims in the full amount as unsecured claims could have been
reached on the present state of the record.
The record before us leaves us completely uninformed as to
whether the trial court ever evaluated the merits of the causes of
actions held by the debtor, the prospects and problems of
litigating those claims, or the fairness of the terms of
compromise. More than this, the record is devoid of facts which
would have permitted a reasoned
Page 390 U. S. 441
judgment that the claims of actions should be settled in this
fashion. In reaching this conclusion, however, it is necessary to
emphasize that we intimate no opinion as to the merits of the
debtor's causes of action or as to the actual fairness of the
proposed compromises. To the contrary, it is clear that the present
record is inadequate for assessing either, and that a remand is
necessary to permit further hearings to be held. Only after further
investigation can it be determined whether, and on what terms,
these claims should be compromised.
III
Under §§ 174, 221(2), of Chapter X, 52 Stat. 891, 897,
11 U.S.C. §§ 574, 621(2), a bankruptcy court is not to
approve or confirm a plan of reorganization unless it is found to
be "fair and equitable." This standard incorporates the absolute
priority doctrine under which creditors and stockholders may
participate only in accordance with their respective priorities
and, "in any plan of corporate reorganization, unsecured creditors
are entitled to priority over stockholders to the full extent of
their debts. . . ."
SEC v. United States Realty Improvement
Co., 310 U. S. 434,
310 U. S. 452
(1940). Since participation by junior interests depends upon the
claims of senior interests being fully satisfied, whether a plan of
reorganization excluding junior interests is fair and equitable
depends upon the value of the reorganized company. In the present
case, the District Court excluded the stockholders from
participation because of its finding that the debtor was insolvent.
Since the determination of insolvency was not made in accordance
with the proper standards of valuation, neither the approval nor
the confirmation of the plan can stand.
The appropriate standard for valuing a company undergoing
reorganization was set out at length in
Consolidated
Page 390 U. S. 442
Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.
S. 510,
312 U. S. 526
(1941):
"As Mr. Justice Holmes said in
Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry.
Co. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217,
210 U. S.
226, 'the commercial value of property consists in the
expectation of income from it.' . . . Such criterion is the
appropriate one here, since we are dealing with the issue of
solvency arising in connection with reorganization plans involving
productive properties. . . . The criterion of earning capacity is
the essential one if the enterprise is to be freed from the heavy
hand of past errors, miscalculations or disaster, and if the
allocation of securities among the various claimants is to be fair
and equitable. . . . Since its application requires a prediction as
to what will occur in the future, an estimate, as distinguished
from mathematical certitude, is all that can be made. But that
estimate must be based on an informed judgment which embraces all
facts relevant to future earning capacity, and hence to present
worth, including, of course, the nature and condition of the
properties, the past earnings record, and all circumstances which
indicate whether or not that record is a reliable criterion of
future performance. [
Footnote
20]"
In the present case, the book value of the debtor's assets on
May 31, 1962, was $1,887,185.77. Claims against the
Page 390 U. S. 443
debtor totaled $5,477,370.05. The actual fair value of the
debtor's total assets was $2,238,387.62, and their net value was
$1,978,481.73. Although these figures show that liabilities far
exceeded assets, they are not of controlling importance. The
District Court recognized that going concern value, not book or
appraisal value, must govern determination of the fairness of the
plans of reorganization, and respondent concedes that the value of
TMT's business depended "not on the inherent value of its assets,
but primarily on maintaining a high level of earnings." Brief for
Respondent 42.
At the valuation hearings, the trustee stated that his analysis
of the financial structure and business of the debtor resulted in a
going concern value of $2,031,403.72. A valuation expert presented
by the trustee estimated the going concern value at between
$1,607,692 and $1,800,000. He arrived at his conclusion by
multiplying his estimate of the future earnings of the company by
7.7, a figure based on the assumption that earnings would be 13% of
value. The valuation expert presented by the Committee concluded
that estimated future earnings after taxes would be $327,500, and,
multiplying this by a price-earnings ratio of 13.8, arrived at the
conclusion that TMT had a value of $4,519,500. The trial judge took
an intermediate position. By projecting current earnings of the
debtor for the first five months of 1962 over the remainder of the
year, he concluded that pre-tax earnings would be $568,000. Reduced
by estimated income taxes and capitalized at 10%, this yielded a
going concern value of $2,780,000. Since this figure fell well
below the $5,477,370.05 of outstanding claims, he concluded that
the debtor was insolvent. On this basis, the plan was approved and
confirmed.
When the Court of Appeals remanded to the District Court for
determination of the feasibility of the reorganization plan after
giving full priority to the Government's
Page 390 U. S. 444
claims, the District Court concluded that TMT was "more
insolvent now than it was in 1962," for earnings had declined from
the high point of 1962, and the Court's initial determination had
been based on the projected earnings for that year. The decline in
earnings had occurred even though the volume of business had grown
substantially, for increased competition from large steamship lines
serving Puerto Rico had forced TMT to lower its rates, and thus its
margin of profit. The District Court reaffirmed its finding of
insolvency. On appeal, the Court of Appeals stated that it did not
have to determine whether or not the District Court's finding of
insolvency was accurately computed, but merely whether it was
"clearly erroneous." On this basis, the conclusion of insolvency
was affirmed.
In a complex case of this nature it is not the province of this
Court to attempt to retry issues of fact which have been fully
litigated below. Indeed, as the Court of Appeals stated, much
weight must be given to the long familiarity of the District Judge
with the debtor and to his evaluation of the witnesses who
testified in his presence. In the face of conflicting expert
testimony as to the going concern value of the debtor based on
current earnings, the trial judge adopted a position in between. We
are not disposed to dispute the conclusion of the Court of Appeals
that this determination by the trial judge was not "clearly
erroneous." However, examination of the facts of this case
demonstrates that the District Court did not have before it all of
the evidence and testimony relating to the future problems and
prospects of the company which were necessary to assess its value
as a going concern. Indeed, the trial judge steadfastly refused to
consider the value of the company once it was out of the
reorganization proceedings. In this there was error, and it was an
error which infected the conclusions of the trial court that the
debtor was insolvent.
Page 390 U. S. 445
Evaluations of evidence reached by the accurate application of
erroneous legal standards are erroneous evaluations.
TMT plays a minor but unique role in carrying goods between
Puerto Rico and the United States. This domestic offshore trade is
highly competitive and generally unprofitable. The high density,
high volume, and high operating cost trade with Puerto Rico flows
in and through the North Atlantic ports. TMT, operating in a
triangle between San Juan, Miami, and Jacksonville, is confined to
the low density, low investment South Atlantic trade. TMT carries
only about 2% of the total trade with Puerto Rico, and the dominant
carrier in the market is in direct competition with it in its home
port of Jacksonville. When TMT entered the market with its novel
idea of carrying roll-on and roll-off freight in towed vessels, the
market was ripe for an innovation of this sort. However, the ills
which plagued its early years threw TMT into bankruptcy in 1957.
Prevented by the exigencies of the bankruptcy proceeding from
capitalizing on the novel idea it had introduced, TMT has watched
the development of container shipping, which has taken over a large
share of the United States-Puerto Rico trade for which it might
otherwise have hoped to compete. Nonetheless, TMT remains the only
roll-on and roll-off carrier in the trade, and it has seen its own
business rise 10% to 20% a year due to the increased frequency of
direct interchange with piggyback rail transport. Despite the
inability of TMT to capitalize on its novel idea, it has remained
in a strong competitive position. Trade with Puerto Rico has
increased steadily and rapidly, and TMT's business has grown
commensurately. Despite a destructive rate war which markedly
lowered the revenues earned per voyage, TMT increased its revenue
from $3,801,000 in 1962, when the first insolvency hearing
Page 390 U. S. 446
was held, to $4,779,000 in 1964, the latest year in the record.
Between the 1962 and the 1965 hearings, the fleet of vessels was
increased from three to five, and the number of truck trailers from
350 to 670. Moreover, in the 1965 hearing. the business manager
could report that, after it paid the forthcoming installment for
the reconversion of one of its vessels, the company would have no
further significant outstanding indebtedness. TMT has continued to
be the only unsubsidized carrier in the South Atlantic trade, the
only one that makes money. Despite the increase in volume and
revenue, however, the rate war and other factors such as rising
costs caused net earnings to drop after 1962, and they have not yet
regained the level established that year. TMT's tax loss carry-over
has expired, with the result that earnings are now substantially
reduced by federal taxes. The general trade picture between Puerto
Rico and the United States is in flux, and the rates applicable to
the trade are undergoing continuing revision and investigation. The
vessels TMT uses are old, and in need of replacement. The supply of
LST's has nearly dried up, and it seems to be understood that the
replacement vessels will have to be built from scratch.
In short, TMT would seem to be a company which has established,
preserved, and increased its share of a highly competitive market
despite intense competition and major internal crises. It operates
in a market undergoing substantial change, and is itself faced with
the imminent need to reequip its fleet. In these circumstances, an
adequate notion of the going concern value of TMT could be obtained
only by looking to the future, as well as the past. Against this
background, we must examine the information which the trial court
had before it for assessing the future prospects of TMT. The basic
source for information on these matters was, of course, the trustee
and his business manager. A short summary of
Page 390 U. S. 447
the highlights of their testimony as it related to the future
prospects of TMT will demonstrate the inadequacy of the information
provided the trial judge for making this crucial determination.
At the first insolvency hearing, the business manager attempted
to estimate the earnings of the company for the next four years,
but he made his projections solely on the business as it then was.
Although TMT had attained the maximum number of voyages possible
with the fleet it then had, the business manager had not looked
into the possibility of chartering additional vessels. The trustee
testified that several vessels would have to be replaced in the
next two years, but admitted that he was unable to predict what
such vessels would cost. When the trustee was asked if there was
foreseeable room for expansion of TMT's business, the Court agreed
with an objection that this was beyond the scope of the valuation
hearing. The trustee's expert on valuation gave his opinion as to
going concern value solely on the basis of the trustee's projection
of earnings, which, in turn, was based wholly on past earnings.
Those earnings figures had been drawn up some time prior to the
hearing, and it was conceded that they might have come out
differently if the projection had been made at the time of the
valuation hearing. When asked if he would attempt to predict
whether the company would be able to pay dividends once it was out
of reorganization, or whether large capital investments would soak
up all earnings, the trustee's expert replied that he had not been
asked to consider that question, and did not think it legitimate.
Although he agreed that reasonably foreseeable changes and
improvements should be taken into account in valuing the company,
he stated that he had been given no information on which to make
such predictions.
Page 390 U. S. 448
At the second hearing on the value of the company, the business
manager admitted that he had made no new projection of future
expenses, revenue, or income, even though three years had passed
and the business outlook of the firm was markedly different.
Although TMT's fleet had grown in the interim from three to five
vessels, and there was an imminent need for replacement of the
older ships, the business manager was unable to predict the likely
impact on earnings of the acquisition of newer vessels. He stated
that the new vessels would be towed craft that loaded from the
stern, and that they were apt to cost between $1,250,000 and
$1,500,000 each. However, though some studies and inquiries had
been conducted, there were no final or definite plans or drawings
for the new ships. Although new, better, and more efficient vessels
were needed soon to improve the company's competitive situation, in
the present state of planning, it would be two years after the
company was out of reorganization before new vessels would be
obtained. At the second hearing, as at the first, the business
manager could give no estimate of what portion of the
administration costs of running TMT was due to the reorganization
proceedings. Although he thought that trade between the United
States and Puerto Rico was increasing, he did not know how much or
in what ways. Though he thought that TMT's share of the Puerto
Rican trade was remaining comparatively constant, he did not know
for certain. He also did not know what portion of TMT's present
volume of business was attributable to direct piggyback
interchange. The data which the trustee and his business manager
had submitted with regard to past income and expenses undoubtedly
provided a clear picture of what the company had been experiencing
in the past. Given, however, that it was a relatively small and
young company
Page 390 U. S. 449
much in need of internal rebuilding and operating in a market
undergoing important economic and technological change, it was
essential that some clear idea be gained of its future prospects.
It seems perfectly obvious that the information introduced at the
two hearings was inadequate for gaining even a rough idea of TMT's
future prospects.
The fundamental reason that there was insufficient evidence
concerning the future prospects of TMT was that the trial court
showed itself unalterably hostile to inquiries directed to TMT's
future. During the first hearing, the following interchange took
place when the court cut off a question aimed at determining
whether the volume of TMT's south-bound traffic could be increased
during the off-peak season:
"Q. But if this enterprise were out from under the proceedings,
would it?"
"The COURT. Well, we are dealing with an organization that is
in. Let's assume that it will stay right there and try to get the
value. It is not going to get out until it is reorganized."
"Mr. MASON. We are trying to get the value when
reorganized."
"The COURT. That is of no importance to me. Let's value it as it
now exists to determine what should be done in these
proceedings."
At a later time, when counsel again sought to establish that the
proper way to value the company was to try to determine foreseeable
factors which would affect future earnings, the court preempted the
answer by remarking, "Mr. Witness, we do not want possibilities."
Still later, the judge said:
"All these projections into the future are not going to bother
the Court. These creditors have waited
Page 390 U. S. 450
too long to get their money. We have had this thing for years
and years. I imagine most of them long since have gone to the
poorhouse or given up."
One can easily sympathize with the desire of a court to
terminate bankruptcy reorganization proceedings, for they are
frequently protracted. The need for expedition, however, is not a
justification for abandoning proper standards. It is also easy to
share the court's concern that creditors receive their money as
promptly as possible. However, the right of stockholders to
participate at all hung on the result of the valuation proceedings;
sedulously eliminating all inquiry into the future may, in this
context, have caused the rights of the stockholders to have been
relinquished by default.
Although three years elapsed before the next hearing, the judge
displayed the same unwillingness to permit inquiry into the future
prospects of TMT. When counsel for the SEC tried to open up the
subject, the following dialogue occurred:
"Mr. GONSEN. We have no startling figures, but a series of
questions relating to the possible future prospects of this
company."
"The COURT. There is no possible future prospects other than
what is going on. It is possible it will become the greatest fleet
in the world, and it is possible to go bankrupt in a few months. As
a matter of fact, if the competition had succeeded in their plans,
you would have no problem here, they would have been sold."
"Mr. GONSEN. Do I understand Your Honor does not desire me to
examine as to evaluation?"
"The COURT. YOU do."
Perhaps the proper reading of the reluctance of the judge to go
into future prospects at the second hearing was that, in his view,
the issue of insolvency was no longer in
Page 390 U. S. 451
the case. The Court of Appeals had ruled on the question of
whether the trustee could be the president of the reorganized
company and whether the Government's nontax claims should be
allowed in full without discussing the other issues. In the trial
judge's view, the Court of Appeals' failure to speak on other
issues constituted affirmance. On the appeal from the second
hearing, however, the Court of Appeals took pains to point out the
error in this conclusion. The result of the trial court's ruling
was to exclude from the hearing the general issue of insolvency and
to limit the hearing to the question of whether developments
between the first and second hearings had rendered the plan
unfeasible in light of the necessity of giving full priority to the
Government's nontax claims. In such circumstances, it might be
expected that the Court of Appeals would have examined the record
to see if the facts supported the conclusion which the trial judge
had felt foreclosed from having to make again, but which was, in
fact, still in the case. Instead, however, the Court of Appeals
merely quoted at length from the trial court's conclusions that the
plan was feasible and stated that the ruling that the company was
still insolvent was not clearly erroneous.
At the close of the second hearing, the SEC and the Committee
argued vigorously that the issue of valuation was still open, and
that future prospects should have been considered by the judge.
Although its view of the effect of the appeal from the first
hearing did not require it to do so, the court addressed itself to
the merits of this contention in its opinion and order approving
the amended plan of reorganization:
"The SEC and the Stockholders Committee insist, as they did
during the valuation hearings in 1962, that the court should have
required evidence of future earnings, subsequent to reorganization,
based upon estimates of revenues and expenses after substantial
Page 390 U. S. 452
changes in operations and acquisition and substitution of
new-type vessels and other equipment, and based upon expanded
operations expected to take place under private management.
However, neither the trustee [n]or the court can anticipate what
the reorganized company will do, and any estimates of future
earnings under different circumstances of operation would be
speculative and unreliable."
This was not a correct statement or application of the law. This
Court has declared that, in every case, it is incumbent upon the
reorganization court to consider
"all facts relevant to future earning capacity . . . , including
. . . all circumstances which indicate whether or not [the past
earnings] record is a reliable criterion of future
performance."
Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois, supra. If it
is shown that the record of past earnings is not a reliable
criterion of future performance, the court must form an estimate of
future performance by inquiring into all foreseeable factors which
may affect future prospects. In forming this estimate,
"mathematical certitude" is neither expected nor required.
In this case, we have a company engaged in a hotly competitive
market, a market experiencing a severe rate war which would
probably alter the relative standings of the competitors. The
market as a whole was witnessing substantial technological change,
and TMT itself was one of the prime innovators. TMT's principal
market, Puerto Rico, was undergoing considerable expansion. It was
shown without contradiction that TMT needed to replace its present
fleet with new and different ships. It should have been clear to
the trial court that the circumstances brought out at the two
hearings showed that the past earnings record was not a reliable
criterion of future performance, and that sound evaluation of
the
Page 390 U. S. 453
company as a going concern required examination of the future
prospects of the company. The court was not dealing with an
established company in a static market, nor was it being asked to
value the company's future prospects by hypothesizing unforeseeable
changes in operations or market structure. It was evident that
certain specific and predictable alterations would have to be made
in the equipment and operations of the company in order to meet
foreseeable alterations in the market. The trial court shut its
eyes to these important developments, and, in so doing, ignored a
cardinal principle of proper evaluation.
IV
Because only past earnings were relied upon in this case in
determining the value of the debtor as a going concern, we reverse
and remand to the Court of Appeals with directions to remand to the
District Court to hold new hearings on valuation. Without in any
way prejudging the issue, it is possible that, when the compromises
discussed in
390 U. S. and
when the company is properly valued by taking into account its
future prospects, the company will be found not to be insolvent.
Such a finding would permit stockholders to participate. There is,
therefore, no point in considering at this juncture the question
presented by the petitioner concerning the stockholders' claims
under the federal securities laws. Since the Committee will, of
course, be entitled to participate in the new hearings on valuation
and insolvency, the order of the District Court discharging it is
vacated. So doing, however, reflects no opinion on the merits of
the arguments presented in this Court by petitioner as to why it
should not have been discharged. Finally, there is no necessity to
determine whether it was improper to contemplate making the trustee
president of the reorganized company. A great deal of time has
passed since that was deemed
Page 390 U. S. 454
an advisable plan, and intervening circumstances may well have
altered the views of the participants. Since new hearings on
valuation and insolvency will further protract these proceedings,
it seems advisable to put that question aside.
For the reasons stated in this opinion, we reverse and remand to
the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
This case has been in the federal courts for over 10 years. The
earlier reported decisions consist of the following:
Caplan v.
Anderson, 256 F.2d 416 (C.A. 5th Cir.1958);
Caplan v.
Anderson, 259 F.2d 283 (C.A. 5th Cir.1958);
TMT Trailer
Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 292 F.2d 455 (C.A. 5th Cir.1961),
cert. denied sub nom. Shaffer v. Anderson, 368 U.S. 956
(1962);
United States v. Anderson, 334 F.2d 111 (C.A. 5th
Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 879 (1964);
In re TMT
Trailer Ferry, Inc., 334 F.2d 118 (C.A. 5th Cir.1964).
[
Footnote 2]
The order of the District Court discharging the petitioner
Committee was later modified to permit the Committee to prosecute
appeals from that decision.
[
Footnote 3]
The SEC participated as a party in both the District Court and
the Court of Appeals, and has appeared as an unnamed respondent
before this Court.
See 52 Stat. 890, 894, 11 U.S.C.
§§ 572, 608. This Court requested the Government to
express its views at the petition stage,
386 U.
S. 91 (1967). For the most part, the SEC has taken
positions consistent with those of the petitioner Committee.
[
Footnote 4]
TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 292 F.2d 455 (C.A.
5th Cir.1961),
cert. denied sub nom. Shaffer v. Anderson,
368 U.S. 956 (1962). The Committee's earlier appeal attacking the
confirmation of the 1959 plan, which had been consolidated with
this appeal by the Caplan mortgage group, was mooted by the order
of the trial court vacating the confirmation.
[
Footnote 5]
In re TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc., 334 F.2d 118 (C.A. 5th
Cir.1964).
[
Footnote 6]
United States v. Anderson, 334 F.2d 111 (C.A. 5th
Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 879 (1964).
[
Footnote 7]
Protective Committee v. Anderson, 364 F.2d 936, 939
(C.A. 5th Cir.1966).
[
Footnote 8]
The other issues, briefed and argued at length, are succinctly
stated in the brief filed by the SEC:
"1. Whether, under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, which
provides for a disinterested trustee as the focal point of the
reorganization, the trustee is precluded from assuming the
presidency of the reorganized company, and whether a plan that
contemplates that result may be confirmed."
"
* * * *"
"4. Whether the courts below erred in refusing to consider the
merits of the stockholders' claims based on asserted violations of
the securities laws."
"5. Whether the district court erred in discharging the
Stockholders' Committee before the reorganization proceedings were
completed, on the basis of its finding that the debtor was
insolvent."
Brief for SEC 2, 3.
[
Footnote 9]
The interest is to be treated as an unsecured claim payable in
common stock in the reorganized company. The plan confirmed by the
court was later amended to provide that the holders of the Caplan
mortgage would receive $250,000 in cash at the date of consummation
of the reorganization plan, rather than $280,500 over five
years.
[
Footnote 10]
Since the rest of the voting stock will go to the other numerous
and scattered general creditors, petitioner argues that M-S' 40%
ownership will give it initial working control of the reorganized
company. Petitioner's Brief 28, 2.
[
Footnote 11]
Accordingly, to pay holders of the Caplan mortgage $280,500 in
cash, even though only the amount they paid for the mortgage, would
be a substantial preferment of them when the reorganization plan
allows general unsecured creditors only a
pro rata portion
of some 1,300,000 shares of new common stock in the reorganized
company.
[
Footnote 12]
17 CFR § 240.10b-5; promulgated by the SEC pursuant to
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 891,
15 U.S.C. § 78j.
[
Footnote 13]
Such subordination would effectively eliminate their claims if
TMT were as insolvent as the court subsequently found.
[
Footnote 14]
These terms were later modified, as indicated in
n 9,
supra.
[
Footnote 15]
The trustee reached this conclusion after an investigation
described by him in full as follows:
"[T]he trustee, with the assistance of attorneys in the office
of his counsel, investigated the facts alleged in the
specifications of objections filed by the SEC and in the answer of
Merrill-Stevens. This investigation consisted of an examination of
numerous documents assembled by the SEC during its investigation,
together with copies of statements made by individuals which had
been obtained during the investigation. Also examined were numerous
documents and statements furnished by Merrill-Stevens in support of
its answer to the specifications of objections by the SEC."
The trustee did not set out any findings of fact which he
arrived at in the course of this "investigation," and provided no
explanation of the reasoning which had led to his "considered
opinion" that the M-S claims should be allowed in full.
[
Footnote 16]
In December, 1964, after the case had been remanded for the
second time by the Court of Appeals, the Committee sought an order
for production of documents relating to the
Carib Queen,
alleging they would show that TMT had a cause of action against M-S
and the Caplan group. The Committee said these parties had
acted
"in collusion with members of the debtor's old management and
control group to defraud the Maritime Administration and the debtor
by misrepresentation of the reconversion contract price and by
premature release of the vessel without proper compliance with the
requirements of the reconversion contract. The same documents also
bear on the propriety of the compromises. . . ."
At the hearing held on this motion, it appeared that these
documents were held by the Maritime Administration, which had no
objection to turning them over but wished the court to issue a
formal order so that all parties could have access to them. The
court denied the motion, saying "there is nothing in the motion
that shows that these documents are material to any issue before
this Court."
When reconfirming the plan after the second remand, the court
added nothing to the explanation quoted in the text, for it
erroneously concluded that approval of the settlement had already
been affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
[
Footnote 17]
Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.
S. 106 (1939).
"[W]here a plan is not fair and equitable as a matter of law, it
cannot be approved by the court. . . . Congress has required both
that the required percentages of each class of security holders
approve the plan and that the plan be found to be 'fair and
equitable.' The former is not a substitute for the latter."
Id. at
308 U. S.
114.
[
Footnote 18]
The answer filed to the Anderson report occupies seven pages in
the record. Aside from bare statements that insufficient facts were
found and that the trustee's conclusions were not conceded, it
opposes vacating the original plan of reorganization almost wholly
on grounds of estoppel, laches,
res judicata, and
reliance. The claim itself merely details the terms of the mortgage
and the amounts due under it. The recommendations favoring
settlement stated only that the merits of the claims had been
examined, that the possibility of recovery was remote, and that
litigation would cause "unnecessary delay."
[
Footnote 19]
Respondent contends that the trial court could have rendered an
informed decision on the merits of the M-S compromise on the basis
of the following matters in the record:
(1)
The summary of M-S' proof of claim (the full proof
not having been included in the record). This merely stated the
amounts claimed by M-S and the liens asserted to secure some of the
claims.
(2)
The 1958 letter from the Committee to the Court.
This asserted that TMT had good causes of action against M-S which
would result in substantial recovery. With regard to the
Carib
Queen, it accused M-S of
"faulty design, inadequate inspection, defective work on the
remodeling and later repair of the ship, hasty and improper
preparations for a hazardous sea voyage and utilization of the ship
in a service for which she was not fitted and in an unseaworthy
condition."
(3)
The trustee's report. This merely stated a few
facts relating to the breakdown of the
Carib Queen on her
maiden voyage, and the expenses incurred in connection with the
Carib Queen.
(4)
The SEC's specifications in support of the objections to
the M-S claims. This was a report of the SEC's independent
investigation of the M-S claims. It set out in some detail the
facts supporting its contention that TMT had good defenses or
setoffs because
"M-S (a) did not properly convert the vessel; (b) did not comply
with the terms of the contract; (c) did not properly repair the
vessel, and (d) performed certain work for and furnished certain
materials to TMT, with no agreement as to price; M-S has failed to
establish the value of such work and materials."
(5)
The M-S answer to these specifications. This was
principally a formal document, and contained no additional facts or
arguments. It admitted that the
Carib Queen was suffering
construction deficiencies when delivered to TMT, and that there was
a boiler failure on the first voyage, but denied liability.
(6)
The motion for allowance of the claim filed on behalf of
the trustee. This summarized the proceedings relating to the
M-S claims. Noting that the SEC had filed detailed specifications
of its objections, and that the special master appointed by the
court had held no hearings, it stated that the trustee and his
attorneys had examined the documents relating to the M-S claims.
The motion stated that the trustee had tried unsuccessfully to get
M-S to reduce its claims, that the possibility of recovering
through litigation was remote, and that litigation would cause
unnecessary delay. These conclusions were neither expanded upon nor
explained.
(7)
Objections of the United States to the above
motion. The United States opposed the M-S claims on the
grounds that none of them was entitled to secured status. They had
arisen more than a year prior to the bankruptcy proceedings, and
claims for reconstructing vessels do not give rise to maritime
liens.
(8)
The transcript of the hearings held on the motion for
allowance of the claims. The transcript of this portion of the
hearing occupies five pages. Most of it was devoted to the question
of how much time the Committee would be allowed for filing a
memorandum objecting to the proposed compromise. The court was told
that the trustee and his lawyers had looked at the relevant papers,
that the possibility of recovery was remote, and that litigation
would cause unnecessary delay. No facts or arguments to support
these conclusions were presented. Counsel for the Committee
objected that this was not a report, but a bare statement of
conclusion. The court indicated that someone had been at fault over
the boiler breakdown.
(9)
The Committee's specification of objections to the M-S
claims. This 35-page report, 22 pages of which are devoted to
the
Carib Queen contract, was the result of an independent
examination conducted by the Committee into the M-S claims. The
Committee charged M-S with faulty design, construction, and repair
of the
Carib Queen. With regard to two other ships on
which M-S worked for TMT, the Committee charged M-S with
responsibility for the swamping of one on its trial trip, and with
failing to get Coast Guard approval of the other. The Committee
also claimed that the maritime liens asserted by M-S had been
reduced by payments on account, and that the original TMT
management, M-S, and Abrams and Shaffer had worked together in a
collusive relationship designed to make large profits by selling
cheaply purchased stock to the public at inflated values. Some idea
of the factual particularity of the Committee's objections is
provided by the abbreviated subheadings of their charges against
M-S in connection with the
Carib Queen. The Committee
stated that TMT had causes of action growing out of the fact that
M-S (a) failed to secure proper certificates of work completion
affecting the classification and rating of the vessel, (b) failed
to fit riveted crack-arresting seams, (c) failed to produce a
vessel of 3,050 shaft horsepower per shaft, propeller speed of 216
r.p.m., and speed in service of 15 1/2 knots, (d) failed to produce
a ship of high enough classification and rating, (e) failed to
clean the boilers chemically, (f) wrongly assumed that the boilers
had been properly protected up to the time of conversion, (g)
failed to use distilled water in its preliminary running of the
boilers, (h) improperly connected the piping, (i) installed
incorrect baffle plates, (j) failed to clean the boilers adequately
when performing the repair work, (k) failed to install the
ventilating system properly, (1) installed an inadequate and
inappropriate evaporator, (m) failed to put the feed water
regulator and the feed pump governor into proper working order, (n)
failed to install a boiler compound injector pump, (o) failed to
provide equipment for coping with the excessive oxygen content of
the water in the system, and (p) was responsible for deficiencies
in the electrical system. In addition, the Committee stated that
M-S was improperly claiming for repair work done under its
guarantee obligation, and that M-S had included claims for work
done as to which no amount had ever been agreed upon.
(10)
The statement by the SEC supporting the Committee's
specification of objection. The SEC, while not necessarily
agreeing with all the allegations and contentions of the Committee,
felt that the Committee had demonstrated that M-S should be
required to prove its claims at a judicial hearing.
In addition to these matters of record, respondent refers to
several matters not in the record, which are said to support the
propriety of accepting the compromises. Matters not in the record
and not properly the subject of judicial notice cannot form the
basis of judicial confirmation of a plan of reorganization. They
are equally unavailing on review.
[
Footnote 20]
Further on the subject of valuation,
see 2 J.
Bonbright, Valuation of Property 88881 (1937); 6A Collier,
Bankruptcy � 10.13 and 11.05 (14th ed.1965); H. Guthmann
& H. Dougall, Corporate Financial Policy 656-657 (4th ed.1962).
See also Frank, Epithetical Jurisprudence and the Work of
the Securities and Exchange Commission in the Administration of
Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 18 N.Y.U.L.Q.Rev. 317, 342, n. 68
(1941):
"Value is the present worth of future anticipated earnings. It
is not directly dependent on past earnings; these latter are
important only as a guide in the prediction of future
earnings."
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, whom MR. JUSTICE STEWART and MR. JUSTICE
FORTAS join, dissenting.
In my opinion, the only question which could be thought even
remotely to justify the presence of this case in this Court is
whether the trustee, by virtue of his office, was, as a matter of
law, disqualified from being selected as president of the
reorganized company. The Court, however, does not decide that
question. The review of the massive record in these reorganization
proceedings, which have been in the courts for over 10 years and on
six occasions before the Court of Appeals at various stages, is
not, in my view, an appropriate task for this Court. Believing that
this decision bodes little but further delay in bringing this
protracted proceeding to a conclusion, I feel justified in voting
to dismiss the writ as improvidently granted, despite the fact that
the case was brought here on an unrestricted writ. Since the Court
does not reach the "disqualification" issue, I consider it
inappropriate for me, as an individual Justice, to express my own
views upon it.