Petitioner insurance workers union seeks to represent respondent
insurance company's "debit agents." The company refused to
recognize the union, claiming that the agents were independent
contractors, rather than employees. The National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB), in the ensuing unfair labor practice proceeding,
determined under the common law of agency that the agents were
employees. It found that the agents do not operate their own
independent businesses, but perform functions that are an essential
part of the company's normal operations; are trained by company
supervisory personnel; do business in the company's name and
ordinarily sell only the company's policies; operate under terms
and conditions established and changed unilaterally by the company;
account for funds under strict company procedures; receive the
benefit of the company's vacation plan and group insurance and
pension fund, and have a permanent working arrangement under which
they may continue with the company as long as their performance is
satisfactory. The Court of Appeals refused to enforce the NLRB's
order.
Held: The NLRB's determination that the agents were
company employees, and not independent contractors, represented a
choice between two fairly conflicting views, and its order should
have been enforced by the Court of Appeals. Pp.
390 U. S.
256-260.
371 F.2d 316, reversed.
Page 390 U. S. 255
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
In its insurance operations, respondent United Insurance Company
uses "debit agents" whose primary functions are collecting premiums
from policyholders, preventing the lapsing of policies, and selling
such new insurance as time allows. The Insurance Workers
International Union, having won a certification election, seeks to
represent the debit agents, and the question before us is whether
these agents are "employees" who are protected by the National
Labor Relations Act or "independent contractors" who are expressly
exempted from the Act. [
Footnote
1] Respondent company refused to recognize the Union, claiming
that its debit agents were independent contractors, rather than
employees. In the ensuing unfair labor practice proceeding, the
National Labor Relations Board held that these agents were
employees, and ordered the company to bargain collectively with the
Union. 154 N.L.R.B. 38. On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that
the debit agents were independent contractors and refused to
enforce the Board's order. 371 F.2d 316 (C.A. 7th Cir.). The
importance of the question in the context involved to the
administration of the
Page 390 U. S. 256
National Labor Relations Act prompted us to grant the petitions
of the Board and the Union for certiorari. 389 U.S. 815.
At the outset, the critical issue is what standard or standards
should be applied in differentiating "employee" from "independent
contractor" as those terms are used in the Act. Initially this
Court held in
NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.
S. 111, that
"Whether . . . the term 'employee' includes [particular] workers
. . . must be answered primarily from the history, terms and
purposes of the legislation."
322 U.S. at
322 U. S. 124.
Thus, the standard was one of economic and policy considerations
within the labor field. Congressional reaction to this construction
of the Act was adverse, and Congress passed an amendment
specifically excluding "any individual having the status of an
independent contractor" from the definition of "employee" contained
in § 2(3) of the Act. The obvious purpose of this amendment
was to have the Board and the courts apply general agency
principles in distinguishing between employees and independent
contractors under the Act. [
Footnote 2] And both petitioners and respondents agree
that the proper standard here is the law of agency. Thus, there is
no doubt that we should apply the common law agency test here in
distinguishing an employee from an independent contractor.
Since agency principles are to be applied, some factual
background showing the relationship between the debit agents and
respondent company is necessary. These basic facts are stated in
the Board's opinion, and will be very briefly summarized here.
Respondent has district offices in most States which are run by a
manager who usually has several assistant managers under him.
Page 390 U. S. 257
Each assistant manager has a staff of four or five debit agents,
and the total number of such agents connected with respondent
company is approximately 3,300. New agents are hired by district
managers, after interviews; they need have no prior experience, and
are assigned to a district office under the supervision of an
assistant district manager. Once he is hired, a debit agent is
issued a debit book which contains the names and addresses of the
company's existing policyholders in a relatively concentrated
geographic area. This book is company property, and must be
returned to the company upon termination of the agent's service.
The main job of the debit agents is to collect premiums from the
policyholders listed in this book. They also try to prevent the
lapsing of policies and sell new insurance when time allows. The
company compensates the agents as agreed to in the "Agent's
Commission Plan" under which the agent retains 20% of his weekly
premium collections on industrial insurance and 10% from holders of
ordinary life, and 50% of the first year's premiums on new ordinary
life insurance sold by him. The company plan also provides for
bonuses and other fringe benefits for the debit agents, including a
"vacation with pay" plan and participation in a group insurance and
profit-sharing plan. At the beginning of an agent's service, an
assistant district manager accompanies the new agent on his rounds
to acquaint him with his customers and show him the approved
collection and selling techniques. The agent is also supplied with
a company "Rate Book," which the agent is expected to follow,
containing detailed instructions on how to perform many of his
duties. An agent must turn in his collected premiums to the
district office once a week, and also file a weekly report. At this
time, the agent usually attends staff meetings for the discussion
of the latest company sales techniques, company directives, etc.
Complaints against an agent are investigated
Page 390 U. S. 258
by the manager or assistant manager, and, if well founded, the
manager talks with the agent to "set him straight." Agents who have
poor production records, or who fail to maintain their accounts
properly or to follow company rules, are "cautioned." The district
manager submits a weekly report to the home office, specifying,
among other things, the agents whose records are below average; the
amounts of their debits; their collection percentages, arrears, and
production, and what action the district manager has taken to
remedy the production "letdown." If improvement does not follow,
the company asks such agents to "resign," or exercises its rights
under the "Agent's Commission Plan" to fire them "at any time."
There are innumerable situations which arise in the common law
where it is difficult to say whether a particular individual is an
employee or an independent contractor, [
Footnote 3] and these cases present such a situation. On
the one hand, these debit agents perform their work primarily away
from the company's offices and fix their own hours of work and work
days, and clearly they are not as obviously employees as are
production workers in a factory. On the other hand, however, they
do not have the independence, nor are they allowed the initiative
and decisionmaking authority, normally associated with an
independent contractor. In such a situation as this, there is no
shorthand formula or magic phrase that can be applied to find the
answer, but all of the incidents of the relationship must be
assessed and weighed, with no one factor being decisive. What is
important is that the total factual context is assessed in light of
the pertinent common law agency principles. When this is done, the
decisive factors in these cases become the following:
Page 390 U. S. 259
the agents do not operate their own independent businesses, but
perform functions that are an essential part of the company's
normal operations; they need not have any prior training or
experience, but are trained by company supervisory personnel; they
do business in the company's name with considerable assistance and
guidance from the company and its managerial personnel, and
ordinarily sell only the company's policies; the "Agent's
Commission Plan" that contains the terms and conditions under which
they operate is promulgated and changed unilaterally by the
company; the agents account to the company for the funds they
collect under an elaborate and regular reporting procedure; the
agents receive the benefits of the company's vacation plan and
group insurance and pension fund, and the agents have a permanent
working arrangement with the company under which they may continue
as long as their performance is satisfactory. Probably the best
summation of what these factors mean in the reality of the actual
working relationship was given by the chairman of the board of
respondent company in a letter to debit agents about the time this
unfair labor practice proceeding arose:
"if any agent believes he has the power to make his own rules
and plan of handling the company's business, then that agent should
hand in his resignation at once, and if we learn that said agent is
not going to operate in accordance with the company's plan, then
the company will be forced to make the agents final
[
sic]."
"The company is going to have its business managed in your
district the same as all other company districts in the many states
where said offices are located. The other company officials and I
have managed the United Insurance Company of America's
Page 390 U. S. 260
operations for over 45 years very successfully, and we are going
to continue the same successful plan of operation, and we will not
allow anyone to interfere with us and our successful plan."
The Board examined all of these facts and found that they showed
the debit agents to be employees. This was not a purely factual
finding by the Board, but involved the application of law to facts
-- what do the facts establish under the common law of agency:
employee or independent contractor? It should also be pointed out
that such a determination of pure agency law involved no special
administrative expertise that a court does not possess. On the
other hand, the Board's determination was a judgment made after a
hearing with witnesses and oral argument had been held, and on the
basis of written briefs. Such a determination should not be set
aside just because a court would, as an original matter, decide the
case the other way. As we said in
Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB, 340 U. S. 474,
"Nor does it [the requirement for canvassing the whole record]
mean that, even as to matters not requiring expertise, a court may
displace the Board's choice between two fairly conflicting views,
even though the court would justifiably have made a different
choice had the matter been before it
de novo."
340 U.S. at
340 U. S. 488.
Here, the least that can be said for the Board's decision is that
it made a choice between two fairly conflicting views, and, under
these circumstances, the Court of Appeals should have enforced the
Board's order. It was error to refuse to do so.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the
consideration or decision of these cases.
* Together with No. 179,
Insurance Workers International
Union, AFL-CIO v. National Labor Relation Board et al., also
on certiorari to the same court.
[
Footnote 1]
The National Labor Relations Act, as amended (61 Stat. 136, 73
Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C. § 151
et seq.), protects an
"employee" only and specifically excludes "any individual having
the status of an independent contractor." (§ 2(3).)
[
Footnote 2]
See 93 Cong.Rec. 6441-6442, 2 Leg.Hist. of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 1947, p. 1537.
See also H.R.Rep.
No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 18, 1 Leg.Hist., 1947, p. 309;
H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 32-33, 1 Leg.Hist.,
1947, pp. 536-537.
[
Footnote 3]
See annotated cases in 55 A.L.R. 289
et seq.
and 61 A.L.R. 218
et seq.