Construction of the Act of the Legislature of Maryland passed
December session, 1825, entitled, "An act relating to Illegitimate
Children," which provides that "the illegitimate child or children
of any female, and the issue of any such child or children," are
declared capable in law
"to take and inherit both real and personal estate from their
mother and from each other, and from the descendants of each other,
as the case may be, in like manner as if born in lawful
wedlock."
J.S., who had several children who were the children of an
incestuous connection, conveyed a tract of land in the State of
Maryland to one of those children. The grantee died intestate and
without issue, seized in fee of the land. Two brothers and one
sister of this incestuous intercourse survived him.
Held
that under the act of Maryland "Relating to Illegitimate Children,"
they inherited the estate of their deceased brother.
It is undoubtedly the duty of the court to ascertain the meaning
of the legislature from the words used in the statute and the
subject matter to which it relates, and to restrain its operation
within narrower limits than its words import if the court is
satisfied that the literal meaning of its language would extend to
cases which the legislature never designed to include in it.
According to the principles of the common law, an illegitimate
child is
filius nullius, and can have no father known to
the law, and when the legislature speaks in general terms of
children of that description, without making any exceptions, the
court is bound to suppose they design to include the whole
class.
An action of ejectment was instituted by the plaintiff in error,
a citizen of Pennsylvania, in the Circuit Court of the United
States for the District of Maryland, for the recovery of a tract of
land situated in Allegany County, in the State of Maryland, called
"Part of Grassy Cabin."
The following were the facts of the case, as agreed upon by the
parties to the suit.
John Sloan, late of Allegany County, was twice married; by his
first wife he had but one child, namely Mary Sloan, and by his
second wife he had the following children, namely William Sloan,
John Sloan, Elizabeth Sloan, Peggy Sloan, Sally Sloan, and Jane
Sloan, and that the plaintiff's lessor is the husband of the said
Elizabeth.
After the death of his second wife, John Sloan lived and
cohabited with and married Mary Sloan, his daughter, by his first
wife, and had by her the following children,
viz.: William
Sloan, John Joseph Sloan, Mary Sloan, Jesse Sloan, and David Sloan;
and William Sloan is since dead.
The said John Sloan, the father, was many years ago seized and
possessed of a tract of land lying in Allegany County, Maryland,
called "Grassy Cabin," containing four hundred twenty-seven and
one-fourth acres, to which tract he had an undisputed legal
title.
The said John Sloan being so seized and possessed of the said
tract of land, conveyed the same for a valuable consideration, by a
deed of bargain and sale, duly executed, acknowledged, and recorded
according to law, to John Joseph Sloan, and that the said
Page 39 U. S. 179
John Joseph Sloan became and was seized and possessed of the
said tract of land, under and by virtue of the said deed.
The said John Sloan, the father, and Mary Sloan, his said
daughter, by his first wife, both departed this life about the year
1826, and the said John Joseph Sloan died about the year 1832,
seized and possessed of the said tract of land, intestate, and
without issue, and unmarried, leaving Mary Sloan, Jesse Sloan, and
David Sloan, his brothers and sister, children of the said Mary
Sloan, by her said father as aforesaid, him surviving.
That the said Mary Sloan, Jesse Sloan, and David Sloan, being
possessed of and claiming title to the said tract of land called
"Grassy Cabin" by descent from the said John Joseph Sloan, conveyed
the same by a deed of bargain and sale duly executed, acknowledged,
and recorded according to law to Jacob Blougher and Daniel
Blougher, the defendants.
After the death of the said John Joseph Sloan, the plaintiff,
Henry Brewer, obtained out of the Western Shore Land Office a
special warrant of escheat to resurvey and affect the said tract of
land, called "Grassy Cabin," for an alleged want of the heirs of
John Joseph Sloan, who died seized thereof in fee and intestate as
aforesaid, and the patent was granted to the said Henry Brewer.
The patent was in legal form, and recited the escheat of the
land "for want of heirs of John Joseph Sloan, who died seized of
the premises."
The question for the decision of the circuit court upon these
facts was whether, upon the death of the said John Joseph Sloan,
according to the laws and statutes of Maryland, the said tract of
land, "Grassy Cabin," did not pass by descent to the said Mary
Sloan, Jesse Sloan, and David Sloan, his illegitimate sister and
brothers as aforesaid. If the court shall be of opinion that the
said tract of land did not so pass by descent, then judgment to be
given with costs for the plaintiff. If the court shall be of
opinion that the said tract of land did so pass by descent, then
judgment to be given with costs, for the defendants. Either party
to be at liberty to appeal or sue out a writ of error, it being
admitted that the value of the land in controversy is at least
twenty-five hundred dollars.
The circuit court gave a judgment for the defendants, and the
plaintiff prosecuted this writ of error.
Page 39 U. S. 197
The CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case depends upon the construction of the Act of Assembly
of Maryland, passed at December session, 1825, ch. 156, entitled
"An act relating to Illegitimate Children." By this act of
assembly, "The illegitimate child or children of any female, and
the issue of any such child or children," are declared to be
incapable in law
"to take and inherit both real and personal estate from their
mother, or from each other, or from the descendants of each other,
as the case may be, in like manner as if born in lawful
wedlock."
It appears from the record that a man by the name of John Sloan
had several children, who were the issue of an incestuous
connection of a shocking character. He conveyed a tract of land,
called "Grassy Cabin," situated in Allegany County in the State of
Maryland, to John Joseph Sloan, one of these children. John Joseph
Sloan, the grantee, died about the year 1832 intestate and without
issue and seized in fee simple of this land. Two brothers and one
sister, the
Page 39 U. S. 198
issue of the same incestuous intercourse, survived him, and they
conveyed the land to Jacob Blougher and Daniel Blougher, the
defendants in error.
The plaintiff in error, after the death of John Joseph Sloan,
took out an escheat warrant for the above-mentioned tract of land
upon the ground that there could be no lawful heirs of the said
Sloan, and having obtained a patent for the said land, he brought
an ejectment for it in the Circuit Court of the United States for
the District of Maryland, and, the judgment of that court being
against him, the case has been brought here by a writ of error.
There is no controversy about the facts in the case. It was
tried in the circuit court upon a case stated, and has been
elaborately argued her, and many authorities cited to show that the
court, in construing a statute, may restrict the literal meaning of
the words used in order to effectuate the intention of the
legislature. The plaintiff in error contends that in passing the
act of assembly above mentioned, the legislature never contemplated
a case like the present, and never intended to give the right of
inheritance to the children of an intercourse so deeply
criminal.
It is undoubtedly the duty of the court to ascertain the meaning
of the legislature from the words used in the statute and the
subject matter to which it relates, and to restrain its operation
within narrower limits than its words import if the court is
satisfied that the literal meaning of its language would extend to
cases which the legislature never designed to embrace in it.
In the case before us the words are general, and include all
persons who come within the description of illegitimate children.
According to the principles of the common law, an illegitimate
child is
filius nullius, and can have no father known to
the law. And when the legislature speaks in general terms of
children of that description without making any exceptions, we are
bound to suppose they design to include the whole class. And as
illegitimate children, in a question as to the inheritance or
distribution of property, can have no father whom the law will
acknowledge as such, how can we, in a controversy like this,
inquire who was the father of these children in order to determine
upon their right to the property?
The expediency and moral tendency of this new law of inheritance
are questions for the Legislature of Maryland, and not for this
Court. It seems to have been supposed by the legislature that as
there could be no doubt of the relation which the mother bears
towards her illegitimate children, the reasons of policy which must
always preclude such children from claiming the inheritance of
anyone upon the ground that he was their father do not apply to the
property of the mother or the property of each other. To this
extent, therefore, the right to inherit is given by this act of
assembly. And it would appear to have been given upon the principle
that it is unjust to punish the offspring for the crime of the
parents. The right of the children therefore is not made to depend
upon the degree of guilt of which they were the offspring. All
illegitimate
Page 39 U. S. 199
children are the fruits of crime -- differing, indeed, greatly
in its degree of enormity. And the legislature, if it had been
proper to do so, might undoubtedly have made the right to the
inheritance to depend upon the character of the offense committed
by the parents. But they have used no language showing any such
design. On the contrary, they appear to have looked at the
unoffending character of the children, rather than at the criminal
conduct of the parents of whom they were the offspring.
It has been said that the expressions in the enacting clause of
this act of assembly, which declares that the illegitimate children
spoken of shall be capable of inheriting from their mother and from
each other "in like manner as if born in lawful wedlock" imply that
those children only were intended to be provided for whose parents
were capable of contracting a lawful marriage with each other. The
same argument has also been urged upon the proviso, which declares,
that nothing in the law shall be construed
"to change the law respecting illegitimate persons whose parents
marry after the birth of such persons and who are by them
acknowledged agreeably to the seventh section of the act of
assembly passed at December session, 1820, ch. 191."
We do not perceive the force of this argument. It is admitted
that the act of assembly now in question must be taken in
connection with the previous laws of Maryland regulating the
descent of real estate and the distribution of personal property,
for this law forms a part of the entire system of legislation on
these subjects. But the expressions referred to in the enacting
clause, so far from implying that the parents may marry,
presupposes that they never will marry, and provides for the
children on that account. The expressions are evidently used merely
to denote the shares and proportions in which such children are to
take, and the reference for the rule is made to children born in
wedlock, in order to save the necessity of introducing into this
law, a table of descents as to real property and of distribution as
to personal.
In relation to the proviso it is proper to remark that the
rights of primogeniture were abolished in Maryland by the act of
1786, ch. 45. There was a provision in this law declaring that
illegitimate children whose parents afterwards married and
acknowledged them should be thereby legitimated and made capable of
taking and inheriting property as if born in lawful wedlock. The
act of 1820 embodied the original act to direct descents, with its
various supplements, into one law and provided for some laws of
descents which had before been omitted. This act of assembly, of
course, contained the clause in favor of illegitimate children
whose parents should afterwards marry, which had been introduced
into the act of 1786 and which had always been the law of the state
from the time that act went into operation. And the proviso in the
act of assembly now in question was introduced manifestly from the
apprehension that the general expressions of the enacting clause of
the law might be held to reach those whose parents afterwards
Page 39 U. S. 200
married and deprive them of the greater rights of inheritance
which belonged to them under the previous acts of assembly. The
proviso, like the expressions in the enacting clause, shows that
the legislature was not looking to children whose parents would
probably marry, but to children whose parents never would marry,
and it make no distinction between the issue of those who could not
and of those who would not become lawfully joined in wedlock. If
from any cause whatever the parents were never married, the
children were illegitimate, and all illegitimate children, under
this act of assembly, may inherit from their mother and from each
other. It follows that the tract of land called "Grassy Cabin,"
upon the death of John Joseph Sloan, descended to his brothers and
sister before mentioned, and the plaintiff is not entitled to
recover.
The judgment of the circuit court is therefore
affirmed.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of
Maryland, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof it is
now here ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of
the said circuit court in this cause be and the same is hereby
affirmed with costs.
