This is a civil antitrust suit under § 1 of the Sherman Act
in which appellees were charged by the Government with a continuing
conspiracy, with others, to fix prices, to allocate exclusive
territories to wholesalers and jobbers, and to confine merchandise
to franchised dealers. Appellees are Arnold, Schwinn & Co.
(Schwinn), a leading bicycle manufacturer, and an association of
distributors handling Schwinn products. In 1951, Schwinn had the
largest share, 22.%, of the U.S. bicycle market. By 1961, its share
had fallen to 12.8%, although dollar and unit sales had risen. The
market leader, with 22.8% in 1961, which had increased its share
from 11.6% in 1951, sells mainly to mass merchandisers. Schwinn
sells to (1) distributors, (2) retailers by means of consignment or
agency arrangements with distributors, and (3) retailers under the
Schwinn Plan, which involves direct shipment to retailers with
Schwinn invoicing the dealers, extending credit, and paying a
commission to the distributor taking the order. Schwinn assigned
specific territories to each of its wholesale distributors who were
instructed to sell only to franchised dealers in their respective
territories. The District Court rejected the charge of
price-fixing, held that the Schwinn franchising system was fair and
reasonable, but that the territorial limitation was unlawful
per se as respects products sold by Schwinn to its
distributors. The United States did not appeal from the rejection
of the price-fixing charge, and appellees did not appeal from the
order invalidating restraints on resale by distributors who
purchase products from Schwinn. The Government requests that the
limitations on distribution where the distributor acts as agent or
consignee of Schwinn or on the Schwinn Plan be considered under the
"rule of reason," and that they be held to constitute an
unreasonable restraint of trade.
Held:
1. The promotion of Schwinn's self-interest alone does not
invoke the rule of reason to immunize otherwise illegal
conduct.
"It is only if the conduct is not unlawful in its impact in the
marketplace or if the self-interest coincides with the statutory
concern with
Page 388 U. S. 366
the preservation and promotion of competition that protection is
achieved."
P.
388 U. S.
375.
2. It is
"illogical and inconsistent to forbid territorial limitations on
resales by distributors where the distributor owns the goods . . .
and, at the same time, to exonerate arrangements which require
distributors to confine resales of the goods they have bought to
'franchised' retailers."
Pp.
388 U. S.
377-378.
(a) The decree should be revised on remand to
"enjoin any limitation upon the freedom of distributors to
dispose of the Schwinn products, which they have bought from
Schwinn, where and to whomever they choose."
P.
388 U.S. 378.
(b) Since this principle is equally applicable to sales to
retailers,
"the decree should similarly enjoin the making of any sales to
retailers upon any condition, agreement or understanding limiting
the retailer's freedom as to where and to whom it will resell the
products."
P.
388 U.S. 378.
3.
"Where the manufacturer retains title, dominion, and risk with
respect to the product and the position and function of the dealer
in question are, in fact, indistinguishable from that of an agent
or salesman of the manufacturer, it is only if the impact of the
confinement is 'unreasonably' restrictive of competition that a
violation of § 1"
of the Sherman Act results from such confinement, absent
culpable price-fixing. Pp.
388 U. S. 380-381.
(a) While a manufacturer's adoption "of an agency or consignment
pattern and the Schwinn type of restrictive distribution system"
would not be
"justified in any and all circumstances by the presence of the
competition of mass merchandisers and by the demonstrated need of
the franchise system to meet that competition,"
in the absence of price-fixing and with an adequate source of
alternative products to meet the needs of the unfranchised, the
vertically imposed distribution restraints may not be held to be
per se violations of the Sherman Act. P.
388 U. S.
381.
(b) As long as Schwinn retains all indicia of ownership and the
dealers' activities are indistinguishable from those of agents or
salesmen, Schwinn's franchising of retailers and confinement of
retail sales to them do not constitute an "unreasonable" restraint
of trade. P.
388 U. S.
381.
237 F.
Supp. 323, reversed and remanded.
Page 388 U. S. 367
MR. JUSTICE FORTAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The United States brought this appeal to review the judgment of
the District Court in a civil antitrust case alleging violations of
§ 1 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1. Direct appeal is authorized by 2 of the Expediting Act,
32 Stat. 823, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 29. The complaint
charged a continuing conspiracy since 1952 between defendants and
other alleged coconspirators involving price-fixing, allocation of
exclusive territories to wholesalers and jobbers, and confinement
of merchandise to franchised dealers. Named as defendants were
Arnold, Schwinn & Company ("Schwinn"), the Schwinn Cycle
Distributors Association ("SCDA"), and B. F. Goodrich Company ("B.
F. Goodrich"). [
Footnote 1]
At trial, the United States asserted that not only the
price-fixing, but also Schwinn's methods of distribution were
illegal
per se under § 1 of the Sherman Act. The
trial lasted 70 days. The evidence, largely offered by appellees,
elaborately sets forth information as to the total market
interaction and interbrand competition, as well as the distribution
program and practices.
The District Court rejected the charge of price-fixing. With
respect to the charges of illegal distribution practices, the court
held that the territorial limitation was
Page 388 U. S. 368
unlawful
per se as respects products sold by Schwinn to
its distributors, but that the limitation was not unlawful insofar
as it was incident to sales by Schwinn itself to franchised
retailers where the wholesaler or jobber (hereinafter referred to
as the distributor) functioned as agent or consignee, including
distribution pursuant to the "Schwinn Plan" described below.
The United States did not appeal from the District Court's
rejection of its price-fixing charge. The appellees did not appeal
from the findings and order invalidating restraints on resale by
distributors who purchase products from Schwinn.
In this Court, the United States has abandoned its contention
that the distribution limitations are illegal
per se.
Instead, we are asked to consider these limitations in light of the
"rule of reason," and, on the basis of the voluminous record below,
to conclude that the limitations are the product of "agreement"
between Schwinn and its wholesale and retail distributors and that
they constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade.
Appellee Schwinn is a family-owned business which for many years
has been engaged in the manufacture and sale of bicycles and some
limited bicycle parts and accessories. [
Footnote 2] Appellee SCDA is an association of
distributors handling Schwinn bicycles and other products. The
challenged marketing program was instituted in 1952. In 1951,
Schwinn had the largest single share of the United States bicycle
market -- 22.5%. In 1961, Schwinn's share of market had fallen to
12.8% although its dollar and unit sales had risen substantially.
In the same period, a competitor, Murray Ohio Manufacturing
Company, which is now the leading United States bicycle
Page 388 U. S. 369
producer, increased its market share from 11.6% in 1951 to 22.8%
in 1961. Murray sells primarily to Sears, Roebuck & Company and
other mass merchandisers. By 1962 there were nine bicycle producers
in the Nation, operating 11 plants. Imports of bicycles amounted to
29.7% of sales in 1961.
Forty percent of all bicycles are distributed by national
concerns which operate their own stores and franchise others.
Another 20% are sold by giant chains and mass merchandisers like
Sears and Montgomery Ward & Company. Sears and Ward together
account for 20% of all bicycle sales. Most of these bicycles are
sold under private label. About 30% of all bicycles are distributed
by cycle jobbers which specialize in the trade, and the remaining
10% by hardware and general stores.
Schwinn sells its products primarily to or through 22 wholesale
distributors, with sales to the public being made by a large number
of retailers. In addition, it sells about 11% of its total to B. F.
Goodrich for resale in B. F. Goodrich retail or franchised stores.
There are about 5,000 to 6,000 retail dealers in the United States
which are bicycle specialty shops, generally also providing
servicing. About 84% of Schwinn's sales are through such
specialized dealers. Schwinn sells only under the Schwinn label,
never under private label, while about 64% of all bicycles are sold
under private label. Distributors and retailers handling Schwinn
bicycles are not restricted to the handling of that brand. They may
and ordinarily do sell a variety of brands.
The United States does not contend that there is in this case
any restraint on interbrand competition, nor does it attempt to
sustain its charge by reference to the market for bicycles as a
whole. Instead, it invites us to confine our attention to the
intrabrand effect of the contested restrictions. It urges us to
declare that the
Page 388 U. S. 370
method of distribution of a single brand of bicycles, amounting
to less than one-seventh of the market, constitutes an unreasonable
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States.
Schwinn's principal methods of selling its bicycles are as
follows: (1) sales to distributors, primarily cycle distributors,
B. F. Goodrich and hardware jobbers; (2) sales to retailers by
means of consignment or agency arrangements with distributors, and
(3) sales to retailers under the so-called Schwinn Plan, which
involves direct shipment by Schwinn to the retailer with Schwinn
invoicing the dealers, extending credit, and paying a commission to
the distributor taking the order. Schwinn fair-traded certain of
its models at retail in States permitting this, and suggested
retail prices for all of its bicycles in all States. During the
1952-1962 period, as the District Court found,
"well over half of the bicycles sold by Schwinn have been sold
direct to the retail dealer (not to a cycle distributor) by means
of Schwinn Plan sales and consignment and agency sales."
Less than half were sold to distributors. [
Footnote 3]
After World War II, Schwinn had begun studying and revamping its
distribution pattern. As of 1951-1952, it had reduced its mailing
list from about 15,000 retail outlets to about 5,500. It instituted
the practice of franchising approved retail outlets. The franchise
did not prevent the retailer from handling other brands, but it did
require the retailer to promote Schwinn bicycles and to give them
at least equal prominence with competing brands. The number of
franchised dealers in any area was limited, and a retailer was
franchised only as to a designated location or locations. Each
franchised dealer
Page 388 U. S. 371
was to purchase only from or through the distributor authorized
to serve that particular area. He was authorized to sell only to
consumers, and not to unfranchised retailers. The District Court
found that, while each Schwinn franchised retailer
"knows that he is an unrestricted retail dealer, free to sell at
his own price to any person who wants to buy on a retail basis. . .
, [he] knows also that he is not a wholesaler, and that he cannot
sell as a wholesaler or act as an agent for some other unfranchised
dealer, such as a discount house retailer. . . . When he acts as
such an agent, he subjects his franchise to cancellation at will by
Schwinn."
Schwinn assigned specific territories to each of its 22
wholesale cycle distributors. These distributors were instructed to
sell only to franchised Schwinn accounts and only in their
respective territories, which were specifically described and
allocated on an exclusive basis. The District Court found
"that certain cycle distributors have, in fact, not competed
with each other . . . , and that, in so doing, they have conspired
with Schwinn to unreasonably restrain competition contrary to the
provisions of Section 1 of the Sherman Act."
The court, however, restricted this finding and its consequent
order to transactions in which the distributor purchased the
bicycles from Schwinn for resale, as distinguished from sales by
the distributor as agent or consignee of Schwinn or on the Schwinn
Plan. The United States urges that this Court should require
revision of the decree in this respect to forbid territorial
exclusivity regardless of the technical form by which the products
are transferred from Schwinn to the retailer or consumer. [
Footnote 4]
Page 388 U. S. 372
The District Court rejected the Government's contention that
Schwinn had, in fact, canceled the franchises of some retailers
because of sales to discount houses or other unfranchised dealers,
nor did it find that distributors have been cut off because of
sales to unfranchised retailers or violation of territorial
limitations. The United States urges that this is "clearly
erroneous." In any event, it is clear and entirely consistent with
the District Court's findings that Schwinn has been "firm and
resolute" in insisting upon observance of territorial and customer
limitations by its bicycle distributors and upon confining sales by
franchised retailers to consumers, and that Schwinn's "firmness" in
these respects was grounded upon the communicated danger of
termination. Our analysis will embrace this conclusion, rather than
the finding which is urged by the Government and which was refused
by the trial court that Schwinn actually terminated retail
franchises or cut off distributors for the suggested reasons.
We come, then, to the legal issues in this case. We are here
confronted with challenged vertical restrictions as to territory
and dealers. The source of the restrictions is the manufacturer.
These are not horizontal restraints, in which the actors are
distributors with or without the manufacturer's participation. We
have held in such a case, where the purpose was to prevent the
distribution of automobiles to or by "discounters," that a "classic
conspiracy in restraint of trade" results.
Page 388 U. S. 373
United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.
S. 127 (1966);
see also Klor's, Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U. S. 207
(1959);
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States,
341 U. S. 593
(1951). Nor is this a case of territorial or dealer restrictions
accompanied by price-fixing, for here the issue of unlawful
price-fixing was tendered, litigated, decided against the
appellant, and appellant has not appealed. If it were otherwise --
if there were here a finding that the restrictions were part of a
scheme involving unlawful price-fixing, the result would be a
per se violation of the Sherman Act.
United States v.
Sealy, Inc., ante, p.
388
U. S. 350;
United States v. Bausch & Lomb
Co., 321 U. S. 707,
321 U. S. 724
(1944). Because of the posture of the case and the failure of the
Government to urge the point, we do not here pause to consider
whether a case might be presented, short of unlawful price-fixing,
in which the activities of the manufacturer to affect resale prices
-- whether styled price "maintenance" or "stabilization" or
otherwise -- would fatally infect vertical customer restrictions so
as to require a conclusion of
per se violation. The
Government does not contend that a
per se violation of the
Sherman Act is presented by the practices which are involved in
this appeal (that is, without reference to the practice which the
lower court enjoined, and which is not before us). Accordingly, we
are remitted to an appraisal of the market impact of these
practices.
In
White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.
S. 253 (1963), this Court refused to affirm summary
judgment against the manufacturer even though there were not only
vertical restrictions as to territory and customer selection, but
also unlawful price-fixing. The Court held that there was no
showing that the price-fixing was "an integral part of the whole
distribution system," and accordingly it declined to outlaw the
system because of the possibility that a trial laying bare "the
economic
Page 388 U. S. 374
and business stuff out of which these arrangements emerge" might
demonstrate their reasonableness.
Id. at
372 U. S. 263.
So here we must look to the specifies of the challenged practices
and their impact upon the marketplace in order to make a judgment
as to whether the restraint is or is not "reasonable" in the
special sense in which § 1 of the Sherman Act must be read for
purposes of this type of inquiry.
Chicago Board of Trade v.
United States, 246 U. S. 231,
246 U. S. 238
(1918);
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S.
1,
221 U. S. 51
(1911);
Apex Hosiery v. Leader, 310 U.
S. 469,
310 U. S. 498
(1940). [
Footnote 5]
We first observe that the facts of this case do not come within
the specific illustrations which the Court in
White Motor
articulated as possible factors relevant to a showing that the
challenged vertical restraint is sheltered by the rule of reason
because it is not anticompetitive. Schwinn was not a newcomer,
seeking to break into or stay in the bicycle business. It was not a
"failing company." On the contrary, at the initiation of these
practices, it was the leading bicycle producer in the Nation.
Schwinn contends, however, and the trial court found, that the
reasons which induced it to adopt the challenged distribution
program were to enable it and the small, independent merchants that
made up its chain of distribution to compete more effectively in
the marketplace. Schwinn
Page 388 U. S. 375
sought a better way of distributing its product: a method which
would promote sales, increase stability of its distributor and
dealer outlets, and augment profits. But this argument, appealing
as it is, is not enough to avoid the Sherman Act proscription,
because, in a sense, every restrictive practice is designed to
augment the profit and competitive position of its participants.
Price fixing does so, for example, and so may a well calculated
division of territories.
See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U. S. 150
(1940). The antitrust outcome does not turn merely on the presence
of sound business reason or motive. Here, for example, if the test
of reasonableness were merely whether Schwinn's restrictive
distribution program and practices were adopted "for good business
reasons," and not merely to injure competitors, or if the answer
turned upon whether it was indeed "good business practice," we
should not quarrel with Schwinn's eloquent submission or the
finding of the trial court. But our inquiry cannot stop at that
point. Our inquiry is whether, assuming nonpredatory motives and
business purposes and the incentive of profit and volume
considerations, the effect upon competition in the marketplace is
substantially adverse. The promotion of self-interest alone does
not invoke the rule of reason to immunize otherwise illegal
conduct. It is only if the conduct is not unlawful in its impact in
the marketplace or if the self-interest coincides with the
statutory concern with the preservation and promotion of
competition that protection is achieved.
Chicago Board of
Trade, supra, at
246 U. S.
238.
On this basis, restraints as to territory or customers, vertical
or horizontal, are unlawful if they are "ancillary to the
price-fixing" (
White Motor Co. v. United States, supra, at
372 U. S. 260)
or if the price-fixing is "an integral part of the whole
distribution system." (
Bausch & Lomb, supra, at
321 U. S.
720.) In those situations, it is needless to inquire
further
Page 388 U. S. 376
into competitive effect because it is established doctrine that,
unless permitted by statute, the fixing of prices at which others
may sell is anticompetitive, and the unlawfulness of the
price-fixing infects the distribution restrictions.
Cf. Sealy,
supra, and
Bausch & Lomb, supra. At the other
extreme, a manufacturer of a product other and equivalent brands of
which are readily available in the market may select his customers,
and, for this purpose, he may "franchise" certain dealers to whom,
alone, he will sell his goods.
Cf. United States v. Colgate
& Co., 250 U. S. 300
(1919). If the restraint stops at that point -- if nothing more is
involved than vertical "confinement" of the manufacturer's own
sales of the merchandise to selected dealers, and if competitive
products are readily available to others, the restriction, on these
facts alone, would not violate the Sherman Act. It is within these
boundary lines that we must analyze the present case.
The District Court here enjoined appellees from limiting the
territory within which any wholesaler or jobber may sell any
Schwinn product which it has purchased. It held that these are
agreements to divide territory, and, as such, are
per se
violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act. The court made clear
that it confined its order to transactions in which the distributor
purchases from Schwinn. As to consignment, agency and Schwinn Plan
transactions, the court held that, in these instances, "Schwinn has
a right to allocate its agents or salesmen to a particular
territory." The court also held that the franchising of retailers
was reasonable in view of the competitive problem presented by
"giant" bicycle retailers such as Sears and Ward and by other mass
merchandisers, and it declined to enjoin appellees' practices with
respect to confinement of sale by distributors or Schwinn to
franchised retailers, or to forbid Schwinn and its distributors
from continuing to prohibit franchised retailers
Page 388 U. S. 377
from selling to discount houses or other unfranchised retailers
for resale to the public.
As noted above, appellees have not appealed from the District
Court's order, and, accordingly, we have before us only the
Government's pleas: (1) that the decree should not be confined to
sale transactions between Schwinn and wholesalers, but should reach
territorial restrictions upon distributors whether they are
incident to sale and resale transactions or to consignment, agency
or Schwinn-Plan relationship between Schwinn and the distributors;
(2) that agreements requiring distributors to limit their
distribution to only such retailers as are franchised should be
enjoined, and (3) that arrangements preventing franchised retailers
from supplying non-franchised retailers, including discount stores,
should also be forbidden.
As to point (2), the Government argues that it is illogical and
inconsistent to forbid territorial limitations on resales by
distributors where the distributor owns the goods, having bought
them from Schwinn, and, at the same time, to exonerate arrangements
which require distributors to confine resales of the goods they
have bought to "franchised" retailers. It argues that requiring
distributors, once they have purchased the product, to confine
sales to franchised retailers is indistinguishable in law and
principle from the division of territory which the decree condemns.
Both, the Government argues, are in the nature of restraints upon
alienation which are beyond the power of the manufacturer to impose
upon its vendees and which, since the nature of the transaction
includes an agreement, combination or understanding, are violations
of § 1 of the Sherman Act.
Cf. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373
(1911);
United States v. Bausch & Lomb Co., supra; Klor's,
Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., supra; 312 U.
S. S. 378� Originators' Guild v. FTC,
312 U. S. 457
(1941); United States v. General Motors Corp.,@
384 U.
S. 127 (1966). We agree, and, upon remand, the decree
should be revised to enjoin any limitation upon the freedom of
distributors to dispose of the Schwinn products, which they have
bought from Schwinn, where and to whomever they choose. The
principle is, of course, equally applicable to sales to retailers,
and the decree should similarly enjoin the making of any sales to
retailers upon any condition, agreement or understanding limiting
the retailer's freedom as to where and to whom it will resell the
products.
The appellant vigorously argues that, since this remedy is
confined to situations where the distributor and retailer acquire
title to the bicycles, it will provide only partial relief; that,
to prevent the allocation of territories and confinement to
franchised retail dealers, the decree can and should be enlarged to
forbid these practices, however effected -- whether by sale and
resale or by agency, consignment, or the Schwinn Plan. But we are
dealing here with a vertical restraint embodying the unilateral
program of a single manufacturer. We are not dealing with a
combination of manufacturers, as in
Klor's, or of
distributors, as in
General Motors. We are not dealing
with a "division" of territory in the sense of an allocation by and
among the distributors,
see Sealy, supra, or an agreement
among distributors to restrict their competition,
see General
Motors, supra. We are here concerned with a truly vertical
arrangement, raising the fundamental question of the degree to
which a manufacturer may not only select the customers to whom he
will sell, but also allocate territories for resale and confine
access to his product to selected, or franchised, retailers. We
conclude that the proper application of § 1 of the Sherman Act
to this problem requires differentiation between the situation
where the manufacturer
Page 388 U. S. 379
parts with title, dominion, or risk with respect to the article,
and where he completely retains ownership and risk of loss.
As the District Court held, where a manufacturer sells products
to his distributor subject to territorial restrictions upon resale,
a
per se violation of the Sherman Act results. And, as we
have held, the same principle applies to restrictions of outlets
with which the distributors may deal and to restraints upon
retailers to whom the goods are sold. Under the Sherman Act, it is
unreasonable, without more, for a manufacturer to seek to restrict
and confine areas or persons with whom an article may be traded
after the manufacturer has parted with dominion over it.
White
Motor, supra; Dr. Miles, supra. Such restraints are so
obviously destructive of competition that their mere existence is
enough. If the manufacturer parts with dominion over his product or
transfers risk of loss to another, he may not reserve control over
its destiny or the conditions of its resale. [
Footnote 6] To permit this would sanction
franchising and confinement of distribution as the ordinary,
instead of the unusual, method which may be permissible in an
appropriate and impelling competitive setting, since most
merchandise is distributed by means of purchase and sale. On the
other hand, as indicated in
White Motor, we are not
prepared to introduce the inflexibility which a
per se
rule might bring if it were applied to prohibit all vertical
restrictions of territory and all franchising, in the sense of
designating specified distributors and retailers as the chosen
instruments through which the manufacturer, retaining
Page 388 U. S. 380
ownership of the goods, will distribute them to the public. Such
a rule might severely hamper smaller enterprises resorting to
reasonable methods of meeting the competition of giants and of
merchandising through independent dealers, and it might sharply
accelerate the trend towards vertical integration of the
distribution process. But to allow this freedom where the
manufacturer has parted with dominion over the goods -- the usual
marketing situation -- would violate the ancient rule against
restraints on alienation and open the door to exclusivity of
outlets and limitation of territory further than prudence
permits.
The Government does not here contend for a
per se rule
as to agency, consignment, or Schwinn-Plan transactions, even
though these may be used -- as they are here -- to implement a
scheme of confining distribution outlets as in this case. Where the
manufacturer retains title, dominion, and risk with respect to the
product and the position and function of the dealer in question
are, in fact, indistinguishable from those of an agent or salesman
of the manufacturer, it is only if the impact of the confinement is
"unreasonably" restrictive of competition that a violation of
§ 1 results from such confinement, unencumbered by culpable
price-fixing.
Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U. S.
13 (1964). As the District Court found, Schwinn adopted
the challenged distribution programs in a competitive situation
dominated by mass merchandisers which command access to large-scale
advertising and promotion, choice of retail outlets, both owned and
franchised, and adequate sources of supply. It is not claimed that
Schwinn's practices or other circumstances resulted in an
inadequate competitive situation with respect to the bicycle
market, and there is nothing in this record -- after elimination of
the price-fixing issue -- to lead us to conclude that Schwinn's
program exceeded the limits reasonably necessary to meet
Page 388 U. S. 381
the competitive problems posed by its more powerful competitors.
In these circumstances, the rule of reason is satisfied.
We do not suggest that the unilateral adoption by a single
manufacturer of an agency or consignment pattern and the Schwinn
type of restrictive distribution system would be justified in any
and all circumstances by the presence of the competition of mass
merchandisers and by the demonstrated need of the franchise system
to meet that competition. But certainly, in such circumstances, the
vertically imposed distribution restraints -- absent price-fixing
and in the presence of adequate sources of alternative products to
meet the needs of the unfranchised -- may not be held to be
per
se violations of the Sherman Act. The Government, in this
Court, so concedes in this case.
On this record, we cannot brand the District Court's finding as
clearly erroneous, and cannot ourselves conclude that Schwinn's
franchising of retailers and its confinement of retail sales to
them -- so long as it retains all indicia of ownership, including
title, dominion, and risk, and so long as the dealers in question
are indistinguishable in function from agents or salesmen --
constitute an "unreasonable" restraint of trade. Critical in this
respect are the facts: (1) that other competitive bicycles are
available to distributors and retailers in the marketplace, and
there is no showing that they are not in all respects reasonably
interchangeable as articles of competitive commerce with the
Schwinn product; [
Footnote 7]
(2) that Schwinn distributors and retailers handle other brands of
bicycles as well as Schwinn's; (3) in the present posture of the
case, we cannot rule that the vertical restraints are unreasonable
because of their intermixture with price-fixing, and (4) we cannot
disagree with the findings of
Page 388 U. S. 382
the trial court that competition made necessary the challenged
program; that it was justified by, and went no further than
required by, competitive pressures, and that its net effect is to
preserve, and not to damage, competition in the bicycle market.
Application of the rule of reason here cannot be confined to
intrabrand competition. When we look to the product market as a
whole, we cannot conclude that Schwinn's franchise system with
respect to products as to which it retains ownership and risk
constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade. This does not, of
course, excuse or condone the
per se violations which, in
substance, consist of the control over the resale of Schwinn's
products after Schwinn has parted with ownership thereof. Once the
manufacturer has parted with title and risk, he has parted with
dominion over the product, and his effort thereafter to restrict
territory or persons to whom the product may be transferred --
whether by explicit agreement or by silent combination or
understanding with his vendee -- is a
per se violation of
§ 1 of the Sherman Act.
Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is reversed, and
the cause remanded for the entry of a decree in accordance with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE CLARK and MR. JUSTICE WHITE took no part in the
decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
B. F. Goodrich negotiated a consent decree with the Government
prior to trial, and dropped out of the case.
[
Footnote 2]
Its parts and accessory business is less than 4% of its total
sales. Like other bicycle producers, Schwinn manufactures the basic
parts of its bicycles and purchases components from parts
producers.
[
Footnote 3]
Schwinn's brief represents that presently about 75% of all
Schwinn sales are now made under the Schwinn Plan; that there are
no longer any consignment agreements, and that only two cycle
distributors remain under agency contract.
[
Footnote 4]
The United States did not perfect this point below, and its
Jurisdictional Statement in this Court did not expressly request
revision of the decree. Appellees strenuously urge that we should
for these reasons refuse to consider the United States' present
argument that the decree should be enlarged as stated.
See
Supreme Court Rules 15(1)(c)(1) and 40(1)(d)(2);
General
Pictures Co . v. Electric Co., 304 U.
S. 175,
304 U. S.
177-179 (1938). While we regard with disfavor the
Government's practice in this case, both with respect to the point
here at issue and its change of theory, in view of the nature and
importance of the case, we shall not reject the tendered issues
because the request for the substance of the relief was embraced in
the question presented in the Jurisdictional Statement and because
appellees have not been adversely affected.
[
Footnote 5]
The United States, having abandoned its contention that the
restraints in the present case are
per se violations of
the Sherman Act, now urges "a standard of presumptive illegality,"
presumably on the basis of a showing that a product has been
distributed by means of arrangements for territorial exclusivity
and restricted retail and wholesale customers. We do not consider
this additional subtlety, which was not advanced in the trial
court. The burden of proof in antitrust cases remains with the
plaintiff, deriving such help as may be available in the
circumstances from particularized rules articulated by law -- such
as the
per se doctrine.
Cf. Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 283 U. S. 163,
283 U. S. 179
(1931).
[
Footnote 6]
We have no occasion here to consider whether a patentee has any
greater rights in this respect.
Compare United States v.
General Electric Co., 272 U. S. 476
(1926),
with United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc.,
342 U. S. 371
(1952);
United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.
S. 287 (1948), and
United States v. Masonite
Corp., 316 U. S. 265
(1942).
[
Footnote 7]
We do not regard Schwinn's claim of product excellence as
establishing the contrary.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, whom MR. JUSTICE HARLAN joins, concurring
in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the Court's basic determination that Schwinn's
marketing system is, under the rule of reason, entirely consonant
with the antitrust laws. But I cannot understand how that marketing
system becomes
per se unreasonable and illegal in those
instances where it is effectuated through sales to wholesalers and
dealers.
Page 388 U. S. 383
Schwinn's present marketing policies were developed in the late
1940's and early 1950's. Studies undertaken at that time revealed
that Schwinn's existing distribution activities were haphazard and
inefficient, involving a large number of wholesalers and over
15,000 retailers of every size and variety. Many of the retailers
were largely or completely inactive, resulting in unprofitable
overhead costs and wasted advertising and promotional expenditures
for Schwinn. Moreover, the sales methods and service resources of
many of these outlets did not comport with Schwinn's traditional
policy of manufacturing and selling quality bicycles. Schwinn
believed that proper promotion of its products required an active
and stable dealer organization, composed of experienced people who
could properly promote, assemble and service bicycles. Such dealers
were to be found primarily in small independent bicycle sales and
repair shops, rather than hardware stores or mass merchandisers
that sold bicycles unassembled in the carton and provided no
service and repair facilities. [
Footnote 2/1] As the District Court found,
"Schwinn determined that it did not want Tom, Dick and Harry to
be selling its product in a carton, collecting the price paid,
'kissing the customer goodbye,' depositing his profit, and
forgetting the customer, Schwinn, and the public generally.
[
Footnote 2/2]"
Schwinn accordingly developed a franchising policy that would
assure quality and efficiency in its distribution system. After
consulting with marketing experts in government and industry and
clearing its program with the Federal Trade Commission, it
franchised about 5,500
Page 388 U. S. 384
selected retailers to market its products.
"Schwinn chose those who, by their record, were best credit
risks, made the most sales, and provided the best service for
Schwinn bicycles. [
Footnote
2/3]"
These retailers were predominantly the small independent bicycle
sales and repair dealers mentioned above, who now represent nearly
all of Schwinn's outlets.
By forming this relationship with independent dealers, Schwinn
hoped to meet the competition of the giant chain distributors.
These distributors account for 60% of retail bicycle sales.
Although the past decade and a half has been one of unprecedented
vigorous competition in the industry, spurred by a flood of
imported bicycles, Schwinn's policy has in large part succeeded.
While profits and margins have been squeezed, [
Footnote 2/4] Schwinn's sales have increased
substantially, it has pared the number of inactive retailers and
increased the number of high-volume dealers, and it has reaped a
greater return from its advertising and promotional expenditures.
As the District Court concluded: [
Footnote 2/5]
"The evidence is abundantly clear that Schwinn's practice of
eliminating dead timber, useless and inactive or relatively
inactive accounts, and persons and firms unable or unwilling to
provide service and part replacements, and adopting and adhering to
a franchise program, instead of restraining trade in Schwinn
bicycles, has greatly enhanced trade in Schwinn bicycles and has,
in fact, been the salvation of Schwinn . . . , and has actually
made for genuine competition in the bicycle manufacturing
industry."
Of course, the whole premise of Schwinn's marketing program was
that its product would be sold to the public
Page 388 U. S. 385
only by the qualified retailers whom it had franchised.
[
Footnote 2/6] Accordingly, Schwinn
unilaterally instituted a policy of ensuring that only franchised
retailers would be supplied with its products. This policy was the
same whether distribution took the form of the so-called Schwinn
Plan deliveries to retailers or agency and consignment
arrangements, or whether it took the form of sales by Schwinn to
wholesalers and resale by them to retailers. The record shows that
this policy was implemented largely through request and persuasion
by Schwinn.
Schwinn's selective distribution policy may be said to embody
restraints on trade. As such, it is subject to antitrust scrutiny,
but the scrutiny does not stop with the label "restraint." The
words written by Mr. Justice Brandeis for a unanimous Court in
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.
S. 231,
246 U. S. 238,
bear repeating:
"Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade,
restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The true
test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates, and perhaps thereby promotes competition, or whether it
is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine
that question, the court must ordinarily consider the facts
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its
condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of
the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of
the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting
the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained,
are all relevant facts."
In
White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.
S. 253, we reaffirmed this formulation of the rule of
reason and
Page 388 U. S. 386
refused to adopt
per se rules to invalidate vertical
restraints on distribution analogous to, but more restrictive than,
those involved here. The District Court in this case explicitly
followed the directive of
White Motor and examined in
detail the historical and economic context in which Schwinn's
distribution policies were developed and applied. The evidence
fully supports the District Court's findings that the ultimate
effect of these policies was to enhance, rather than undermine or
destroy, competition, and I fully join the Court's approval of
those findings today.
It is worth emphasizing that the justifications for Schwinn's
franchising policy rest not only on the facts of this particular
record, but on larger issues of social and economic policy. This
Court has recognized Congress' concern with the disappearance of
the small independent merchant in the face of competition from
vertically integrated giants.
See Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U. S. 294,
370 U. S. 333,
370 U. S. 346.
This trend in many cases reflects the inexorable economic realities
of modern marketing. But franchising promises to provide the
independent merchant with the means to become an efficient and
effective competitor of large integrated firms. Through various
forms of franchising, the manufacturer is assured qualified and
effective outlets for his products, and the franchisee enjoys
backing in the form of know-how and financial assistance. [
Footnote 2/7] These franchise arrangements
also make significant social and economic contributions of
importance to the whole society, as at least one federal court has
noted:
"The franchise method of operation has the advantage, from the
standpoint of our American system
Page 388 U. S. 387
of competitive economy, of enabling numerous groups of
individuals with small capital to become entrepreneurs. . . . If
our economy had not developed that system of operation, these
individuals would have turned out to have been merely employees.
The franchise system creates a class of independent businessmen; it
provides the public with an opportunity to get a uniform product at
numerous points of sale from small independent contractors, rather
than from employees of a vast chain. [
Footnote 2/8]"
Indiscriminate invalidation of franchising arrangements would
eliminate their creative contributions to competition, and
force
"suppliers to abandon franchising and integrate forward, to the
detriment of small business. In other words, we may inadvertently
compel concentration"
by misguided zealousness. [
Footnote
2/9] As a result, "[t]here [would be] less and less place for
the independent."
Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
337 U. S. 293,
337 U. S. 315
(separate opinion of MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS). "The small, independent
business man [would] be supplanted by clerks."
Id. at
337 U. S.
321.
For these reasons I completely agree with the Court's basic
approach to this case. The Court fully recognizes
Page 388 U. S. 388
that outlawry of franchising
"might severely hamper smaller enterprises resorting to
reasonable methods of meeting the competition of giants and of
merchandising through independent dealers, and it might sharply
accelerate the trend towards vertical integration of the
distribution process.' It acknowledges that Schwinn's marketing
program has operated 'to preserve and not to damage
competition,"
and concludes that "the rule of reason" is satisfied. It upholds
the legality of the Schwinn Plan, which is the heart of Schwinn's
marketing system, now accounting for 75% of the distribution of
Schwinn's products. It also upholds the legality of Schwinn's
agency and consignment arrangements.
But the Court inexplicably turns its back on the values of
competition by independent merchants and the flexible wisdom of the
rule of reason when dealing with distribution effected through
sales to wholesalers. In Schwinn's particular marketing system,
this mode of distribution plays a subsidiary role, serving to meet
"fill-in" orders by dealers, whose basic stock is obtained through
the Schwinn Plan. Without considering its function, purpose or
effect, the Court declares this aspect of Schwinn's program to be
per se invalid. It likewise applies the same automatic
rule of illegality to strike down Schwinn's policy of ensuring that
franchised dealers do not resell to unfranchised retailers, and
thus subvert the whole distributional scheme.
Despite the Government's concession that the rule of reason
applies to all aspects of Schwinn's distribution system, the Court
nevertheless reaches out to adopt a potent
per se rule. No
previous antitrust decision of this Court justifies its action.
[
Footnote 2/10] Instead, it
completely
Page 388 U. S. 389
repudiates the only case in point,
White Motor. There,
the manufacturer sold its products to retailers and wholesalers and
imposed territorial and customer restrictions on their resale,
restrictions much more stringent than those involved here. But the
Court in
White Motor refused to apply a
per se
rule to invalidate these restrictions, and declared that their
legality must be tested under the rule of reason by examining their
actual impact in a particular competitive context. The Court today
is unable to give any reasons why, only four years later, this
precedent should be overruled. Surely we have not in this short
interim accumulated sufficient new experience or insight to justify
embracing a rule automatically invalidating any vertical restraints
in a distribution system based on sales to wholesalers and
retailers.
See 372 U.S. at
372 U. S.
264-266 (concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN).
Indeed, the Court does not cite or discuss any new data that might
support such a radical change in the law. And I am completely at a
loss to fathom how the Court can adopt its
per se rule
concerning distributional sales and yet uphold identical
restrictions in Schwinn's marketing scheme when distribution takes
the form of consignment or Schwinn Plan deliveries. It does not
demonstrate that these restrictions are, in their actual operation,
somehow more anticompetitive or less justifiable merely because the
contractual relations between Schwinn and its jobbers and dealers
bear the label "sale", rather than "agency" or "consignment." Such
irrelevant formulae are false guides to sound adjudication in the
antitrust field: "Our choice must be made on the basis not of
abstractions, but of the realities of modern industrial life."
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.
S. 293,
337 U. S. 320
(separate opinion of MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS).
The Court advances two justifications for its new
per
se rule. I do not find either persuasive. First, the
Page 388 U. S. 390
Court correctly observes that the District Court invalidated
territorial limitations on the resale activities of Schwinn's
wholesalers. The Court then states that it would be "illogical and
inconsistent" not to strike down all the other restrictions in
Schwinn's marketing program insofar as sales are involved. But the
Court completely overlooks the fact that the territorial
limitations invalidated by the District Court were the product of a
horizontal conspiracy between the wholesalers. The District Court
found a "division of territory by agreement between the
distributors . . . horizontal in nature." [
Footnote 2/11] Schwinn played a part in this
conspiracy, but, just as in
United States v. General Motors
Corp., 384 U. S. 127,
384 U. S. 140,
that did not alter its fundamentally horizontal nature as a
"classic conspiracy in restraint of trade." In striking down this
horizontal division of markets between competing distributors, the
District Court was simply following familiar precedent.
Timken
Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.
S. 593. By contrast, the restrictions involved in the
franchising methods now before us are quite different in nature, as
the Court points out elsewhere in its opinion:
"[W]e are dealing here with a vertical restraint embodying the
unilateral program of a single manufacturer. We are not dealing
with a combination . . . of distributors, as in
General
Motors. We are not dealing with a 'division' of territory in
the sense of an allocation by and among the distributors . . . or
an agreement among distributors to restrict their competition,
see General Motors, supra. We are here concerned with a
truly vertical arrangement."
Ante at
388 U.S.
378. As the Court also emphasizes, the legal principles
applicable to horizontal and vertical restrictions are quite
Page 388 U. S. 391
different. [
Footnote 2/12]
Thus, applying the rule of reason to the vertical restraints now in
issue is not at all "illogical and inconsistent" with
per
se invalidation of the wholesalers' horizontal division of
markets.
The Court's second justification for its new
per se
doctrine is the "ancient rule against restraints on alienation."
This rule of property law is certainly ancient -- it traces its
lineage to Coke on Littleton. [
Footnote 2/13] But it is hardly the practice of this
Court to embrace a rule of law merely on grounds of its antiquity.
Moreover, the common law doctrine of restraints on alienation is
not nearly so rigid as the Court implies. The original rule
concerned itself with arbitrary and severe restrictions on
alienation, such as total prohibition of resale. [
Footnote 2/14] As early as 1711, it was recognized
that only
unreasonable restraints should be proscribed,
and that partial restrictions could be justified when ancillary to
a legitimate business purpose and not
Page 388 U. S. 392
unduly anticompetitive in effect.
Mitchel v. Reynolds,
1 P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng.Rep. 347.
Cf. Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Ph.
774, 41 Eng.Rep. 1143. This doctrine of ancillary restraints was
assimilated into the jurisprudence of this country in the
nineteenth century.
See Oregon Steam Navigation Co. v.
Winsor, 20 Wall. 64;
United States v. Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271.
Centuries ago, it could perhaps be assumed that a manufacturer
had no legitimate interest in what happened to his products once he
had sold them to a middleman and they had started their way down
the channel of distribution. But this assumption no longer holds
true in a day of sophisticated marketing policies, mass
advertising, and vertically integrated manufacturer-distributors.
[
Footnote 2/15] Restrictions like
those involved in a franchising program should accordingly be able
to claim justification under the ancillary restraints doctrine.
In any event, the state of the common law 400 or even 100 years
ago is irrelevant to the issue before us: the effect of the
antitrust laws upon vertical distributional restraints in the
American economy today. The problems involved are difficult and
complex, [
Footnote 2/16] and our
response should be more reasoned and sensitive than the simple
acceptance of a hoary formula.
"It does seem possible that the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries have contributed legal conceptions growing out of new
types of
Page 388 U. S. 393
business which make it inappropriate"
for the Court to base its "overthrow of contemporary commercial
policies on judicial views of the reign of Queen Elizabeth."
[
Footnote 2/17] Moreover, the
Court's answer makes everything turn on whether the arrangement
between a manufacturer and his distributor is denominated a "sale"
or "agency." Such a rule ignores and conceals the "economic and
business stuff out of which" a sound answer should be fashioned.
White Motor Co. v. United States, supra, at
372 U. S. 263.
The Court has emphasized in the past that these differences in form
often do not represent "differences in substance."
Simpson v.
Union Oil Co., 377 U. S. 13,
377 U. S. 22.
Draftsmen may cast business arrangements in different legal molds
for purposes of commercial law, but these arrangements may operate
identically in terms of economic function and competitive effect.
It is the latter factors which are the concern of the antitrust
laws. The record does not show that the purposes of Schwinn's
franchising program and the competitive consequences of its
implementation differed, depending on whether Schwinn sold its
products to wholesalers or resorted to the agency, consignment, or
Schwinn Plan methods of distribution. And there is no reason
generally to suppose that variations in the formal legal packaging
of franchising programs produce differences in their actual impact
in the marketplace. Our experience is to the contrary. As stated in
United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.
S. 265,
316 U. S. 278,
316 U. S.
280:
"[T]his Court has quite consistently refused to allow the form
into which the parties chose to cast the transaction to
govern."
"
* * * *"
"So far as the Sherman Act is concerned, the result must turn
not on the skill with which counsel has
Page 388 U. S. 394
manipulated the concepts of 'sale' and 'agency,' but on the
significance of the business practices in terms of restraint of
trade."
The impact of today's decision on Schwinn may be slight, because
over 75% of its distribution is done through the Schwinn Plan,
which the Court upholds. Perhaps Schwinn can rearrange the legal
terminology of its other distributional arrangements to avoid "the
ancient rule against restraints on alienation" which the Court
adopts. Perhaps other manufacturers who use sales as a means of
distribution in a franchise or analogous marketing system can do
likewise. If they can, the Court has created considerable business
for legal draftsmen. If they cannot, vertical integration and the
elimination of small independent competitors are likely to follow.
Meanwhile, the Court has,
sua sponte, created a bluntly
indiscriminate and destructive weapon which can be used to
dismantle a vast variety of distributional systems -- competitive
and anticompetitive, reasonable and unreasonable.
In view of the commendably careful and realistic approach the
Court has taken in analyzing the basic structure of Schwinn's
marketing program, it is particularly disappointing to see the
Court balk at the label "sale," and turn from reasoned response to
a wooden and irrelevant formula.
[
Footnote 2/1]
The District Court found that:
"Bicycles are in constant need of service. Hardware stores,
department stores, and most other sales outlets do not furnish
these services. Retail cycle outlets do. That is the type of
business establishment that Schwinn has turned to as their local
sales representatives."
237 F.
Supp. 323, 335.
[
Footnote 2/2]
237 F. Supp. at 338.
[
Footnote 2/3]
Ibid.
[
Footnote 2/4]
In the 1951-1961 period, Schwinn's prices fell between 9% and
12%, and its profits also declined. The margins of its wholesalers
and retailers were reduced about 10% during the same period.
[
Footnote 2/5]
237 F. Supp. at 338.
[
Footnote 2/6]
This premise is common to all forms of franchising.
See
Lewis Hancock, The Franchise System of Distribution 4, 9
(1963).
[
Footnote 2/7]
See Lewis & Hancock, The Franchise System of
Distribution (1963); Small Business Administration, Management Aids
for Small Manufacturers, No. 182, "Expanding Sales Through
Franchising" (1966).
[
Footnote 2/8]
Susser v. Carvel Corp., 206 F.
Supp. 636, 640,
aff'd, 332 F.2d 505,
cert.
granted, 379 U.S. 885,
cert. dismissed, 381 U.
S. 125.
See also Distribution Problems
Affecting Small Business, Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Antitrust and Monopoly, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess., 7-9, 12-13 (statement of Small Business
Administration Administrator Eugene P. Foley), 90 (statement of
Federal Trade Commission Chairman Paul Rand Dixon) (March 1965);
Lewis & Hancock, The Franchise System of Distribution 91-92
(1963); Handler, Statement Before the Small Business
Administration, 11 Antitrust Bull. 417, 419.
[
Footnote 2/9]
Wilson, Some Problems Relative to Franchise Arrangements, 11
Antitrust Bull. 473, 488. It should be noted that, since the start
of this litigation, Schwinn has taken over 30% of the wholesaling
of its products by vertical integration.
[
Footnote 2/10]
The Court cites
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons
Co., 220 U. S. 373, but
that case was decided on common law principles, and involved
price-fixing, long recognized by this Court as
per se
invalid.
[
Footnote 2/11]
237 F. Supp. at 342.
[
Footnote 2/12]
One difference between a horizontal conspiracy and vertical
restraints imposed by the manufacturer is that there is often
serious question whether the latter conduct involves the "contract,
combination . . . or conspiracy" required by § 1 of the
Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1. The
District Judge in this case refused to find that the relevant
conduct of Schwinn and its distributors amounted to a "contract,"
"combination" or "conspiracy." Instead, he stated that "the Schwinn
franchising program was conceived, hatched and born into life . . .
in the minds of the Schwinn officials," and agreed that "the action
was unilateral in nature." Although essential to its case, the
Government failed specifically to raise this issue in its
Jurisdictional Statement, and I must register my disagreement with
the Court's cursory treatment of the matter. The Court merely notes
that "Schwinn has been
firm and resolute' in insisting upon
observance" of the restrictions involved in its franchising
program, and that there was a "communicated danger of termination"
for violations of its policies. This alone does not amount to a
"contract," "combination" or "conspiracy" under established
precedent. United States v. Colgate & Co.,
250 U. S. 300;
United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U. S.
29.
[
Footnote 2/13]
2 Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England § 360 (Day ed.
1812).
[
Footnote 2/14]
Ibid.
[
Footnote 2/15]
See Elman, "Petrified Opinions" and Competitive
Realities, 66 Col.L.Rev. 625.
[
Footnote 2/16]
See Jordan, Exclusive and Restricted Sales Areas Under
the Antitrust Laws, 9 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 111; McLaren, Territorial
Restrictions, Exclusive Dealing, and Related Sales Distribution
Problems Under the Antitrust Laws, 11 Prac.Law. No. 4, 79, Preston
Restrictive Distribution Arrangements: Economic Analysis and Public
Policy Standards, 30 Law & Contemp.Prob. 506; Robinson,
Restraints on Trade and the Orderly Marketing of Goods, 45 Cornell
L.Q. 254; Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the
Sherman Act, 75 Harv.L.Rev. 795.
[
Footnote 2/17]
Chafee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 Harv.L.Rev. 945,
983.