Petitioners,** members of a group of white and Negro clergymen
on a "prayer pilgrimage" to promote racial integration, attempted
to use a segregated interstate bus terminal waiting room in
Jackson, Mississippi, in 1961. They were arrested by respondent
policemen and charged with conduct breaching the peace in violation
of § 2087.5 of the Mississippi Code, which this Court, in
1965, held unconstitutional in
Thomas v. Mississippi,
380 U. S. 524, as
applied to similar facts. Petitioners waived a jury trial, and were
convicted by respondent municipal police justice. On appeal, one
petitioner was accorded a trial
de novo and, following a
directed verdict in his favor, the cases against the other
petitioners were dropped. Petitioners then brought this action in
the District Court for damages (1) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
which makes liable "every person" who under color of law deprives
another person of his civil rights, and (2) at common law for false
arrest and imprisonment. The evidence showed that the ministers
expected to be arrested on entering a segregated area. Though the
witnesses agreed that petitioners entered the waiting room
peacefully, petitioners testified that there was no crowd at the
terminal, whereas the police testified that a threatening crowd
followed petitioners. The jury found for respondents. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals held that (1) respondent police justice had
immunity for his judicial acts under both § 1983 and the state
common law and (2) the policemen had immunity under the state
common law of false arrest if they had probable cause to believe
§ 2087.5 valid, since they were not required to predict what
laws are constitutional, but that, by virtue of
Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U. S. 167,
they had no such immunity under § 1983 where the state statute
was subsequently declared invalid. The court remanded the case
against the officers for a new trial under § 1983 because of
prejudicial cross-examination of petitioners, but ruled that
they
Page 386 U. S. 548
could not recover if it were shown at the new trial that they
had gone to Mississippi in anticipation that they would be
illegally arrested.
Held:
1. The settled common law principle that a judge is immune from
liability for damages for his judicial acts was not abolished by
§ 1983.
Cf. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.
S. 367. Pp.
386 U. S.
553-555,
2. The defense of good faith and probable cause which is
available to police officers in a common law action for false
arrest and imprisonment is also available in an action under §
1983.
Monroe v. Pape, supra, distinguished. Pp.
386 U. S.
555-557.
3. Though the officers were not required to predict this Court's
ruling in
Thomas v. Mississippi, supra, that § 2087.5
was unconstitutional as applied, and the defense of good faith and
probable cause is available in an action under § 1983, it does
not follow that the count based thereon should be dismissed, since
the evidence was conflicting as to whether the police had acted in
good faith and with probable cause in arresting the petitioners.
Pp.
386 U. S.
557-558.
4. Petitioners did not consent to their arrest by deliberately
exercising their right to use the waiting room in a peaceful manner
with the expectation that they would be illegally arrested. P.
386 U. S. 558.
352 F. & 213, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of Court.
These cases present issues involving the liability of local
police officers and judges under § 1 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871, 17 Stat. 13, now 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [
Footnote 1] Petitioners
Page 386 U. S. 549
in No. 79 were members of a group of 15 white and Negro
Episcopal clergymen who attempted to use segregated facilities at
an interstate bus terminal in Jackson Mississippi, in 1961. They
were arrested by respondents Ray, Griffith, and Nichols, policemen
of the City of Jackson, and charged with violating § 2087.5 of
the Mississippi Code, which makes guilty of a misdemeanor anyone
who congregates with others in a public place under circumstances
such that a breach of the peace may be occasioned thereby, and
refuses to move on when ordered to do so by a police officer.
[
Footnote 2] Petitioners
[
Footnote 3] waived a jury
trial and were convicted of the offense by respondent Spencer, a
municipal police justice. They were each given the maximum sentence
of four months in jail and
Page 386 U. S. 550
a fine of $200. On appeal, petitioner Jones was accorded a trial
de novo in the County Court, and, after the city produced
its evidence, the court granted his motion for a directed verdict.
The cases against the other petitioners were then dropped.
Having been vindicated in the County Court, petitioners brought
this action for damages in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Mississippi, Jackson Division, alleging that
respondents had violated § 1983,
supra, and that
respondents were liable at common law for false arrest and
imprisonment. A jury returned verdicts for respondents on both
counts. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held
that respondent Spencer was immune from liability under both §
1983 and the common law of Mississippi for acts committed within
his judicial jurisdiction. 352 F.2d 213. As to the police officers,
the court noted that § 2087.5 of the Mississippi Code was held
unconstitutional as applied to similar facts in
Thomas v.
Mississippi, 380 U. S. 524
(1965). [
Footnote 4] Although
Thomas was decided years after the arrest involved in this
trial, the court held that the policemen would be liable in a suit
under § 1983 for an unconstitutional arrest even if they acted
in good faith and with probable cause in making an arrest under a
state statute not yet held invalid. The court believed that this
stern result was required by
Monroe v.
Pape,
Page 386 U. S. 551
365 U. S. 167
(1961). Under the count based on the common law of Mississippi,
however, it held that the policemen would not be liable if they had
probable cause to believe that the statute had been violated,
because Mississippi law does not require police officers to predict
at their peril which state laws are constitutional and which are
not. Apparently dismissing the common law claim, [
Footnote 5] the Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded for a new trial on the § 1983 claim against the
police officers because defense counsel had been allowed to
cross-examine the ministers on various irrelevant and prejudicial
matters, particularly including an alleged convergence of their
views on racial justice with those of the Communist Party. At the
new trial, however, the court held that the ministers could not
recover if it were proved that they went to Mississippi
anticipating that they would be illegally arrested, because such
action would constitute consent to the arrest under the principle
of
volenti non fit injuria, he who consents to a wrong
cannot be injured.
We granted certiorari in No. 79 to consider whether a local
judge is liable for damages under § 1983 for an
unconstitutional conviction and whether the ministers should be
denied recovery against the police officers if they acted with the
anticipation that they would be illegally arrested. We also granted
the police officers' petition in No. 94 to determine if the Court
of Appeals correctly held that they could not assert the defense
of
Page 386 U. S. 552
good faith and probable cause to an action under § 1983 for
unconstitutional arrest. [
Footnote
6]
The evidence at the federal trial showed that petitioners and
other Negro and white Episcopal clergymen undertook a "prayer
pilgrimage" in 1961 from New Orleans to Detroit. The purpose of the
pilgrimage was to visit church institutions and other places in the
North and South to promote racial equality and integration, and,
finally, to report to a church convention in Detroit. Letters from
the leader of the group to its members indicate that the clergymen
intended from the beginning to go to Jackson and attempt to use
segregated facilities at the bus terminal there, and that they
fully expected to be arrested for doing so. The group made plans
based on the assumption that they would be arrested if they
attempted peacefully to exercise their right as interstate
travelers to use the waiting rooms and other facilities at the bus
terminal, and the letters discussed arrangements for bail and other
matters relevant to arrests.
The ministers stayed one night in Jackson, and went to the bus
terminal the next morning to depart for Chattanooga, Tennessee.
They entered the waiting room, disobeying a sign at the entrance
that announced "White Waiting Room Only -- By Order of the Police
Department." They then turned to enter the small terminal
restaurant, but were stopped by two Jackson police officers,
respondents Griffith and Nichols, who had been awaiting their
arrival and who ordered them to "move on." The ministers replied
that they wanted to eat,
Page 386 U. S. 553
and refused to move on. Respondent Ray, then a police captain
and now the deputy chief of police, arrived a few minutes later.
The ministers were placed under arrest and taken to the jail.
All witnesses, including the police officers, agreed that the
ministers entered the waiting room peacefully and engaged in no
boisterous or objectionable conduct while in the "White Only" area.
There was conflicting testimony on the number of bystanders present
and their behavior. Petitioners testified that there was no crowd
at the station, that no one followed them into the waiting room,
and that no one uttered threatening words or made threatening
gestures. The police testified that some 25 to 30 persons followed
the ministers into the terminal, that persons in the crowd were in
a very dissatisfied and ugly mood, and that they were mumbling and
making unspecified threatening gestures. The police did not
describe any specific threatening incidents, and testified that
they took no action against any persons in the crowd who were
threatening violence because they "had determined that the
ministers was the cause of the violence if any might occur,"
[
Footnote 7] although the
ministers were concededly orderly and polite and the police did not
claim that it was beyond their power to control the allegedly
disorderly crowd. The arrests and convictions were followed by this
lawsuit.
We find no difficulty in agreeing with the Court of Appeals that
Judge Spencer is immune from liability for damages for his role in
these convictions. The record is barren of any proof or specific
allegation that Judge Spencer played any role in these arrests and
convictions other than to adjudge petitioners guilty when their
cases came before his court. [
Footnote 8] Few doctrines were more solidly
Page 386 U. S. 554
established at common law than the immunity of judges from
liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial
jurisdiction, as this Court recognized when it adopted the doctrine
in
Bradley v.
Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872). This immunity applies
even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly,
and it
"is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt
judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that
the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with
independence and without fear of consequences."
(
Scott v. Stansfield, L.R. 3 Ex. 220, 223 (1868),
quoted in
Bradley v. Fisher, supra, 80 U. S. 349,
note, at
80 U. S. 350.)
It is a judge's duty to decide all cases within his jurisdiction
that are brought before him, including controversial cases that
arouse the most intense feelings in the litigants. His errors may
be corrected on appeal, but he should not have to fear that
unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice
or corruption. Imposing such a burden on judges would contribute
not to principled and fearless decisionmaking, but to
intimidation.
We do not believe that this settled principle of law was
abolished by § 1983, which makes liable "every person" who
under color of law deprives another person of his civil rights. The
legislative record gives no clear indication that Congress meant to
abolish wholesale all common law immunities. Accordingly, this
Court held in
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.
S. 367 (1951), that the immunity of legislators for acts
within the legislative role was not abolished. The immunity of
judges for acts within the judicial role is equally well
established, and
Page 386 U. S. 555
we presume that Congress would have specifically so provided had
it wished to abolish the doctrine. [
Footnote 9]
The common law has never granted police officers an absolute and
unqualified immunity, and the officers in this case do not claim
that they are entitled to one. Their claim is, rather, that they
should not be liable if they acted in good faith and with probable
cause in making an arrest under a statute that they believed to be
valid. Under the prevailing view in this country, a peace officer
who arrests someone with probable cause is not liable for false
arrest simply because the innocence of the suspect is later proved.
Restatement, Second, Torts § 121 (1965); 1 Harper & James,
The Law of Torts § 3.18, at 277-278 (1956);
Ward v.
Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 179 F.2d 327 (C.A. 8th
Cir.1950). A policeman's lot is not so unhappy that he must choose
between being charged with dereliction of duty if he does not
arrest when he has probable cause and being mulcted in damages if
he does. Although the matter is not entirely free from doubt,
[
Footnote 10] the same
consideration would seem to require excusing him from liability for
acting under a statute that he reasonably believed to be valid, but
that was later held unconstitutional, on its face or as
applied.
The Court of Appeals held that the officers had such a limited
privilege under the common law of Mississippi, [
Footnote 11] and indicated that it would
have recognized a similar privilege under § 1983 except that
it felt compelled to hold otherwise by our decision in
Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S.
Page 386 U. S. 556
167 (1961).
Monroe v. Pape presented no question of
immunity, however, and none was decided. The complaint in that case
alleged that
"13 Chicago police officers broke into petitioners' home in the
early morning, routed them from bed, made them stand naked in the
living room, and ransacked every room, emptying drawers and ripping
mattress covers. It further allege[d] that Mr. Monroe was then
taken to the police station and detained on 'open' charges for 10
hours while he was interrogated about a two-day-old murder, that he
was not taken before a magistrate, though one was accessible, that
he was not permitted to call his family or attorney, that he was
subsequently released without criminal charges' being preferred
against him."
365 U.S. at
365 U. S. 169.
The police officers did not choose to go to trial and defend the
case on the hope that they could convince a jury that they believed
in good faith that it was their duty to assault Monroe and his
family in this manner. Instead, they sought dismissal of the
complaint, contending principally that their activities were so
plainly illegal under state law that they did not act "under color
of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory," as required by § 1983. In rejecting this
argument, we in no way intimated that the defense of good faith and
probable cause was foreclosed by the statute. We also held that the
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state that the
officers had "a specific intent to deprive a person of a federal
right," but this holding, which related to requirements of
pleading, carried no implications as to which defenses would be
available to the police officers. As we went on to say in the same
paragraph, § 1983 "should be read against the background of
tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural
consequences of his actions." 365 U.S. at
365 U. S. 187.
Part of the background of tort liability, in the
Page 386 U. S. 557
case of police officers making an arrest, is the defense of good
faith and probable cause.
We hold that the defense of good faith and probable cause, which
the Court of Appeals found available to the officers in the common
law action for false arrest and imprisonment, is also available to
them in the action under § 1983. This holding does not,
however, mean that the count based thereon should be dismissed. The
Court of Appeals ordered dismissal of the common law count on the
theory that the police officers were not required to predict our
decision in
Thomas v. Mississippi, 380 U.
S. 524. We agree that a police officer is not charged
with predicting the future course of constitutional law. But the
petitioners in this case did not simply argue that they were
arrested under a statute later held unconstitutional. They claimed
and attempted to prove that the police officers arrested them
solely for attempting to use the "White Only" waiting room, that no
crowd was present, and that no one threatened violence or seemed
about to cause a disturbance. The officers did not defend on the
theory that they believed in good faith that it was constitutional
to arrest the ministers solely for using the waiting room. Rather,
they claimed and attempted to prove that they did not arrest the
ministers for the purpose of preserving the custom of segregation
in Mississippi, but solely for the purpose of preventing
violence
They testified, in contradiction to the ministers, that a crowd
gathered and that imminent violence was likely. If the jury
believed the testimony of the officers and disbelieved that of the
ministers, and if the jury found that the officers reasonably
believed in good faith that the arrest was constitutional, then a
verdict for the officers would follow even though the arrest was,
in fact, unconstitutional. The jury did resolve the factual issues
in favor of the officers but, for reasons previously stated,
Page 386 U. S. 558
its verdict was influenced by irrelevant and prejudicial
evidence. Accordingly, the case must be remanded to the trial court
for a new trial.
It is necessary to decide what importance should be given at the
new trial to the substantially undisputed fact that the petitioners
went to Jackson expecting to be illegally arrested. We do not agree
with the Court of Appeals that they somehow consented to the arrest
because of their anticipation that they would be illegally
arrested, even assuming that they went to the Jackson bus terminal
for the sole purpose of testing their rights to unsegregated public
accommodations. The case contains no proof or allegation that they
in any way tricked or goaded the officers into arresting them. The
petitioners had the right to use the waiting room of the Jackson
bus terminal, and their deliberate exercise of that right in a
peaceful, orderly, and inoffensive manner, does not disqualify them
from seeking damages under § 1983. [
Footnote 12]
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and
reversed in part, and the cases are remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
* Together with No. 94,
Ray et al. v. Pierson et al.,
also on certiorari to the same court.
**
See n 3,
infra.
[
Footnote 1]
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
[
Footnote 2]
"1. Whoever with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or
under circumstances such that a breach of the peace may he
occasioned thereby: "
"(1) crowds or congregates with others in . . . any hotel,
motel, store, restaurant, lunch counter, cafeteria, sandwich shop,
. . . or any other place of business engaged in selling or serving
members of the public, or in or around any free entrance to any
such place of business or public building, or to any building owned
by another individual, or a corporation, or a partnership or an
association, and who fails or refuses to disperse and move on, or
disperse or move on, when ordered so to do by any law enforcement
officer of any municipality, or county, in which such act or acts
are committed, or by any law enforcement officer of the State of
Mississippi, or any other authorized person, . . . shall be guilty
of disorderly conduct, which is made a misdemeanor, and, upon
conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not more than
two hundred dollars ($100.00), or imprisonment in the county jail
for not more than four (4) months, or by both such fine and
imprisonment. . . ."
[
Footnote 3]
The ministers involved in No. 79 will be designated as
"petitioners" throughout this opinion, although they are the
respondents in No. 94.
[
Footnote 4]
In
Thomas, various "Freedom Riders" were arrested and
convicted under circumstances substantially similar to the facts of
these cases. The police testified that they ordered the "Freedom
Riders" to leave because they feared that onlookers might breach
the peace. We reversed without argument or opinion, citing
Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U. S. 454
(1960).
Boynton held that racial discrimination in a bus
terminal restaurant utilized as an integral part of the
transportation of interstate passengers violates § 216(d) of
the Interstate Commerce Act. State enforcement of such
discrimination is barred by the Supremacy Clause.
[
Footnote 5]
Respondents read the court's opinion as remanding for a new
trial on this claim. The court stated, however, that the
officers
"are immune from liability for false imprisonment at common law,
but not from liability for violations of the Federal statutes on
civil rights. It therefore follows that there should be a new trial
of the civil rights claim against the appellee police officers so
that there may be a determination of the fact issue as to whether
the appellants invited or consented to the arrest and
imprisonment."
352 F.2d at 221.
[
Footnote 6]
Respondents did not challenge in their petition in No. 94 the
holding of the Court of Appeals that a new trial is necessary
because of the prejudicial cross-examination. Belatedly, they
devoted a section of their brief to the contention that the
cross-examination was proper. This argument is no more meritorious
than it is timely. The views of the Communist Party on racial
equality were not an issue in these cases.
[
Footnote 7]
Transcript of Record, at 347. (Testimony of Officer
Griffith.)
[
Footnote 8]
Petitioners attempted to suggest a "conspiracy" between Judge
Spencer and the police officers by questioning him about his
reasons for finding petitioners guilty in these cases and by
showing that he had found other "Freedom Riders" guilty under
similar circumstances in previous cases. The proof of conspiracy
never went beyond this suggestion that inferences could be drawn
from Judge Spencer's judicial decisions.
See Transcript of
Record at 35-371.
[
Footnote 9]
Since our decision in
Tenney v. Brandhove, supra, the
courts of appeals have consistently held that judicial immunity is
a defense to an action under § 1983.
See Bauers v.
Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (C.A.3d Cir.1966), and cases cited
therein.
[
Footnote 10]
See Caveat, Restatement, Second, Torts § 121, at
207-208 (1965);
Miller v. Stinnett, 257 F.2d 910 (C.A.
10th Cir.1958).
[
Footnote 11]
See Golden v. Thompson, 194 Miss. 241, 11 So. 2d 906
(1943).
[
Footnote 12]
The petition for certiorari in No. 79 also presented the
question whether the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the count
based on the common law of Mississippi. We do not ordinarily review
the holding of a court of appeals on a matter of state law, and we
find no reason for departing from that tradition in this case. The
state common law claim in this case is merely cumulative, and
petitioners' right to recover for an invasion of their civil
rights, subject to the defense of good faith and probable cause, is
adequately secured by § 1983.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting.
I do not think that all judges, under all circumstances, no
matter how outrageous their conduct, are immune
Page 386 U. S. 559
from suit under 17 Stat. 13, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court's
ruling is not justified by the admitted need for a vigorous and
independent judiciary, is not commanded by the common law doctrine
of judicial immunity, and does not follow inexorably from our prior
decisions.
The statute, which came on the books as § 1 of the Ku Klux
Klan Act of April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13, provides that "every
person" who, under color of state law or custom,
"subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen . . . to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress."
To most, "every person" would mean every person, not every
person except judges. Despite the plain import of those words, the
Court decided in
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.
S. 367, that state legislators are immune from suit as
long as the deprivation of civil rights which they caused a person
occurred while the legislators "were acting in a field where
legislators traditionally have power to act."
Id. at
341 U. S. 379.
I dissented from the creation of that judicial exception, as I do
from the creation of the present one.
The congressional purpose seems to me to be clear. A condition
of lawlessness existed in certain of the States under which people
were being denied their civil rights. Congress intended to provide
a remedy for the wrongs being perpetrated. And its members were not
unaware that certain members of the judiciary were implicated in
the state of affairs which the statute was intended to rectify. It
was often noted that "[i]mmunity is given to crime, and the records
of the public tribunals are searched in vain for any evidence of
effective redress." Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 374. Mr.
Rainey of South Carolina noted that "[T]he courts are in many
instances under the control of those who are wholly inimical to the
impartial administration of law and equity."
Id. at
394.
Page 386 U. S. 560
Congressman Beatty of Ohio claimed that it was the duty of
Congress to listen to the appeals of those who,
"by reason of popular sentiment or secret organizations or
prejudiced juries or bribed judges, [cannot] obtain the rights and
privileges due an American citizen. . . ."
Id. at 429. The members supporting the proposed measure
were apprehensive that there had been a complete breakdown in the
administration of justice in certain States, and that laws
nondiscriminatory on their face were being applied in a
discriminatory manner, that the newly won civil rights of the Negro
were being ignored, and that the Constitution was being defied. It
was against this background that the section was passed, and it is
against this background that it should be interpreted.
It is said that, at the time of the statute's enactment, the
doctrine of judicial immunity was well settled, and that Congress
cannot be presumed to have intended to abrogate the doctrine, since
it did not clearly evince such a purpose. This view is beset by
many difficulties. It assumes that Congress could and should
specify in advance all the possible circumstances to which a
remedial statute might apply and state which cases are within the
scope of a statute.
"Underlying [this] view is an atomistic conception of intention,
coupled with what may be called a pointer theory of meaning. This
view conceives the mind to be directed toward individual things,
rather than toward general ideas, toward distinct situations of
fact, rather than toward some significance in human affairs that
these situations may share. If this view were taken seriously, then
we would have to regard the intention of the draftsman of a statute
directed against 'dangerous weapons' as being directed toward an
endless series of individual objects: revolvers,
Page 386 U. S. 561
automatic pistols, daggers, Bowie knives, etc. If a court
applies the statute to a weapon its draftsman had not thought of,
then it would be 'legislating,' not 'interpreting,' as even more
obviously it would be if it were to apply the statute to a weapon
not yet invented when the statute was passed."
Fuller, The Morality of Law 84 (1964).
Congress, of course, acts in the context of existing common law
rules, and, in construing a statute, a court considers the "common
law before the making of the Act."
Heydon's Case, 3
Co.Rep. 7a, 76 Eng.Rep. 637 (Ex. 1584). But Congress enacts a
statute to remedy the inadequacies of the preexisting law,
including the common law. [
Footnote
2/1] It cannot be presumed that the common law is the
perfection of reason, is superior to statutory law (Sedgwick,
Construction of Statutes 270 (1st ed. 1857); Pound, Common Law and
Legislation, 21 Harv.L.Rev. 383, 404-406 (1908)), and that the
legislature always changes law for the worse. Nor should the canon
of construction "statutes in derogation of the common law are to be
strictly construed" be applied so as to weaken a remedial statute
whose purpose is to remedy the defects of the preexisting law.
The position that Congress did not intend to change the common
law rule of judicial immunity ignores the fact that every member of
Congress who spoke to the issue assumed that the words of the
statute meant what they said, and that judges would be liable. Many
members of Congress objected to the statute because it imposed
Page 386 U. S. 562
liability on members of the judiciary. Mr. Arthur of Kentucky
opposed the measure because:
"Hitherto . . . no judge or court has been held liable, civilly
or criminally, for judicial acts. . . . Under the provisions of
[section 1], every judge in the State court . . . will enter upon
and pursue the call of official duty with the sword of Damocles
suspended over him. . . ."
Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 365-366. And Senator Thurman
noted that:
"There have been two or three instances already under the civil
rights bill of State judges being taken into the United States
district court, sometimes upon indictment for the offense . . . of
honestly and conscientiously deciding the law to be as they
understood it to be. . . ."
"Is [section 1] intended to perpetuate that? Is it intended to
enlarge it? Is it intended to extend it so that no longer a judge
sitting on the bench to decide causes can decide them free from any
fear except that of impeachment, which never lies in the absence of
corrupt motive? Is that to be extended so that every judge of a
State may be liable to be dragged before some Federal judge to
vindicate his opinion and to be mulcted in damages if that Federal
judge shall think the opinion was erroneous? That is the language
of this bill."
Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., Appendix 217. Mr. Lewis of
Kentucky expressed the fear that:
"By the first section, in certain cases, the judge of a State
court, though acting under oath of office, is made liable to a suit
in the Federal court and subject to damages for his decision
against a suitor. . . ."
Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 385.
Page 386 U. S. 563
Yet, despite the repeated fears of its opponents and the
explicit recognition that the section would subject judges to suit,
the section remained as it was proposed: it applied to "any
person." [
Footnote 2/2] There was
no exception for members of the judiciary. In light of the sharply
contested nature of the issue of judicial immunity, it would be
reasonable to assume that the judiciary would have been expressly
exempted from the wide sweep of the section if Congress had
intended such a result.
The section's purpose was to provide redress for the deprivation
of civil rights. It was recognized that certain members of the
judiciary were instruments of oppression, and were partially
responsible for the wrongs to be remedied. The parade of cases
coming to this Court shows that a similar condition now obtains in
some of the States. Some state courts have been instruments of
suppression of civil rights. The methods may have changed; the
means may have become more subtle; but the wrong to be remedied
still exists.
Today's decision is not dictated by our prior decisions. In
Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, the
Court held that a judge who excluded Negroes from juries could be
held liable under the Act of March 1, 1875 (18 Stat. 335), one of
the Civil Rights Acts. The Court assumed that the judge was merely
performing a ministerial function. But it went on to state that the
judge would be liable under the statute even if his actions were
judicial. [
Footnote 2/3] It is one
thing to say that the common law doctrine of
Page 386 U. S. 564
judicial immunity is a defense to a common law cause of action.
But it is quite another to say that the common law immunity rule is
a defense to liability which Congress has imposed upon "any officer
or other person," as in
Ex parte Virginia, or upon "every
person," as in these cases.
The immunity which the Court today grants the judiciary is not
necessary to preserve an independent judiciary. If the threat of
civil action lies in the background of litigation, so the argument
goes, judges will be reluctant to exercise the discretion and
judgment inherent in their position and vital to the effective
operation of the judiciary. We should, of course, not protect a
member of the judiciary "who is, in fact, guilty of using his
powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for any other personal
motive not connected with the public good."
Gregoire v.
Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581. To deny recovery to a person
injured by the ruling of a judge acting for personal gain or out of
personal motives would be "monstrous."
Ibid. But it is
argued that absolute immunity is necessary to prevent the chilling
effects of a judicial inquiry, or the threat of such inquiry, into
whether, in fact, a judge has been unfaithful to his oath of
office. Thus, it is necessary to protect the guilty as well as the
innocent. [
Footnote 2/4]
The doctrine of separation of powers is, of course, applicable
only to the relations of coordinate branches of the same
government, not to the relations between the
Page 386 U. S. 565
branches of the Federal Government and those of the States.
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186,
369 U. S. 210.
Any argument that Congress could not impose liability on state
judges for the deprivation of civil rights would thus have to be
based upon the claim that doing so would violate the theory of
division of powers between the Federal and State Governments. This
claim has been foreclosed by the cases recognizing "that Congress
has the power to enforce provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment
against those who carry a badge of authority of a State. . . ."
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167,
365 U. S.
171-172. In terms of the power of Congress, I can see no
difference between imposing liability on a state police officer
(
Monroe v. Pape, supra) and on a state judge. The question
presented is not of constitutional dimension; it is solely a
question of statutory interpretation.
The argument that the actions of public officials must not be
subjected to judicial scrutiny because to do so would have an
inhibiting effect on their work is but a more sophisticated manner
of saying "The King can do no wrong." [
Footnote 2/5] Chief Justice Cockburn long ago disposed
of the argument that liability would deter judges:
"I cannot believe that judges . . . would fail to discharge
their duty faithfully and fearlessly according to their oaths and
consciences . . . from any fear of exposing themselves to actions
at law. I am persuaded that the number of such actions would be
infinitely small, and would be easily disposed of.
Page 386 U. S. 566
While, on the other hand, I can easily conceive cases in which
judicial opportunity might be so perverted and abused for the
purpose of injustice as that, on sound principles, the authors of
such wrong ought to be responsible to the parties wronged."
Dawkins v. Lord Paulet, L.R. 5 Q.B. 94, 110 (C.J.
Cockburn, dissenting).
This is not to say that a judge who makes an honest mistake
should be subjected to civil liability. It is necessary to exempt
judges from liability for the consequences of their honest
mistakes. The judicial function involves an informed exercise of
judgment. It is often necessary to choose between differing
versions of fact, to reconcile opposing interests, and to decide
closely contested issues. Decisions must often be made in the heat
of trial. A vigorous and independent mind is needed to perform such
delicate tasks. It would be unfair to require a judge to exercise
his independent judgment and then to punish him for having
exercised it in a manner which, in retrospect, was erroneous.
Imposing liability for mistaken, though honest judicial acts, would
curb the independent mind and spirit needed to perform judicial
functions. Thus, a judge who sustains a conviction on what he
forthrightly considers adequate evidence should not be subjected to
liability when an appellate court decides that the evidence was not
adequate. Nor should a judge who allows a conviction under what is
later held an unconstitutional statute.
But that is far different from saying that a judge shall be
immune from the consequences of any of his judicial actions, and
that he shall not be liable for the knowing and intentional
deprivation of a person's civil rights. What about the judge who
conspires with local law enforcement officers to "railroad" a
dissenter? What about the judge who knowingly turns a trial into a
"kangaroo" court? Or one who intentionally flouts the
Page 386 U. S. 567
Constitution in order to obtain a conviction? Congress, I think,
concluded that the evils of allowing intentional, knowing
deprivations of civil rights to go unredressed far outweighed the
speculative inhibiting effects which might attend an inquiry into a
judicial deprivation of civil rights. [
Footnote 2/6]
The plight of the oppressed is indeed serious. Under
City of
Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U. S. 808, the
defendant cannot remove to a federal court to prevent a state court
from depriving him of his civil rights. And under the rule
announced today, the person cannot recover damages for the
deprivation.
[
Footnote 2/1]
"Remedial statutes are to be liberally construed."
See
generally Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate
Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be
Construed, 3 Vand.L.Rev. 395 (1950); Llewellyn, The Common Law
Tradition, Appendix C (1960).
[
Footnote 2/2]
As altered by the reviser who prepared the Revised Statutes of
1878, and as printed in 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the statute refers
to "every person," rather than to "any person."
[
Footnote 2/3]
The opinion in
Ex parte Virginia, supra, did not
mention
Bradley v.
Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, which held that a judge could
not be held liable for causing the name of an attorney to be struck
from the court rolls. But in
Bradley, the action was not
brought under any of the Civil Rights Acts.
[
Footnote 2/4]
Other justifications for the doctrine of absolute immunity have
been advanced: (1) preventing threat of suit from influencing
decision; (2) protecting judges from liability for honest mistakes;
(3) relieving judges of the time and expense of defending suits;
(4) removing an impediment to responsible men entering the
judiciary; (5) necessity of finality; (6) appellate review is
satisfactory remedy; (7) the judge's duty is to the public and not
to the individual; (8) judicial self-protection; (9) separation of
powers.
See generally Jennings, Tort Liability of
Administrative Officers, 21 Minn.L.Rev. 263, 271-272 (1937).
[
Footnote 2/5]
Historically, judicial immunity was a corollary to that theory.
Since the King could do no wrong, the judges, his delegates for
dispensing justice, "ought not to be drawn into question for any
supposed corruption [for this tends] to the slander of the justice
of the King."
Floyd & Barker, 12 Co.Rep. 23, 25, 77
Eng.Rep. 1305, 1307 (Star Chamber 1607). Because the judges were
the personal delegates of the King, they should be answerable to
him alone.
Randall v.
Brigham, 7 Wall. 523,
74 U. S.
539.
[
Footnote 2/6]
A judge is liable for injury caused by a ministerial act; to
have immunity, the judge must be performing a judicial function.
See, e.g., 100 U. S.
100 U. S. 339; 2
Harper & James, The Law of Torts, 1642-1643 (1956). The
presence of malice and the intention to deprive a person of his
constitutional rights he exercises no discretion or individual
judgment; he acts no longer as a judge, but as a "minister" of his
own prejudices.