Appellant, who has lived in New York since 1948, was born in
Puerto Rico and educated there. Although able to read and write
Spanish, she could not satisfy New York's English literacy
requirement, and was therefore refused registration by the Board of
Elections. Alleging that requirement unconstitutional, she brought
suit in a New York court seeking an order directing the Board to
register her. The trial court denied appellant relief and the New
York Court of Appeals affirmed. Thereafter Congress enacted §
4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
See Katzenbach v.
Morgan, ante, p.
384 U. S. 641.
Held: the judgment is vacated and the case is remanded
to the New York Court of Appeals for whatever proceedings it may
deem appropriate. P.
384 U. S.
674.
(a) If appellant completed the sixth grade in a public school or
an accredited private school in Puerto Rico, this case would be
moot as § 4(e) did not specifically cover appellant, the New
York courts should determine whether the New York English literacy
requirement remains valid in light of § 4(e). P.
384 U. S.
674.
(b) Even if § 4(e) did not specifically cover appellant,
the New York courts should determine whether the New York English
literacy requirement remains valid in light of § 4(e). P.
384 U. S.
674.
16 N.Y.2d 639, 708, 827, 209 N.E.2d 119, 556, 210 N.E.2d 458,
vacated and remanded.
Page 384 U. S. 673
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case was argued with
Katzenbach v. Morgan, ante,
p.
384 U. S. 641,
also decided today. We there sustained the constitutionality of
§ 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and held that, by
force of the Supremacy Clause and as provided in § 4(e), the
State of New York's English literacy requirement cannot be enforced
against persons who had successfully completed a sixth grade
education in a public school in, or a private school accredited by,
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in which the language of
instruction was other than English. In this case, which was
adjudicated by the New York courts before the enactment of §
4(e), appellant unsuccessfully sought a judicial determination that
the New York English literacy requirement, as applied to deny her
the right to vote in all elections, violated the Federal
Constitution.
Appellant was born and educated in the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, and has lived in New York City since about 1948. On July 23,
1963, she attempted to register to vote, presenting evidence of
United States citizenship, her age and residence; and she
represented that, although she was able to read and write Spanish,
she could not satisfy New York's English literacy requirement. ,The
New York City Board of Elections refused to register her as a voter
solely on the ground that she was not literate in English.
Appellant then brought this proceeding in state court against the
Board of Elections and its members. She alleged that the New York
English literacy requirement, as applied, was invalid under the
Federal Constitution, and sought an order directing the Board to
register her as a duly qualified voter, or, in the alternative,
directing the Board to administer a literacy test in the Spanish
language, and, if she passed the test, to register her as a duly
qualified voter. The
Page 384 U. S. 674
trial court denied the relief prayed for, and the New York Court
of Appeals, three judges dissenting, affirmed. 16 N.Y.2d 639, 261
N.Y.S.2d 78, 209 N.E.2d 119,
remittitur amended, 16 N.Y.2d
708, 827, 261 N.Y.S.2d 900, 209 N.E.2d 556, 210 N.E.2d 458. We
noted probable jurisdiction. 382 U.S. 1008.
Although appellant's complaint alleges that she attended a
school in Puerto Rico, it is not alleged therein, nor have we been
clearly informed in any other way whether, as required by §
4(e), she successfully completed the sixth grade of a public school
in, or a private school accredited by, the Commonwealth.
* If she had
completed the sixth grade in such a school, her failure to satisfy
the New York English literacy requirement would no longer be a bar
to her registration in light of our decision today in
Katzenbach v. Morgan. This case might therefore be moot;
appellant would not need any relief if § 4(e) in terms
accomplished the result she sought.
Cf., e.g., Dinsmore v.
Southern Express Co., 183 U. S. 115,
183 U. S.
119-120. Moreover, even if appellant were not
specifically covered by § 4(e), the New York courts should, in
the first instance, determine whether, in light of this federal
enactment, those applications of the New York English literacy
requirement not, in terms prohibited by § 4(e), have
continuing validity. We therefore vacate the judgment, without
costs to either party in this Court, and remand the cause to the
Court of Appeals of New York for such further proceedings as it may
deem appropriate.
It is so ordered.
Page 384 U. S. 675
* Presumably, the predominant classroom language of the school
she attended was other than English, and, thus, that element of
§ 4(e) is satisfied. If the predominant classroom language had
been English, and if she had successfully completed the sixth
grade, then she would be entitled to vote under § 168 of the
New York Election Law.
See n 2, in
Katzenbach v. Morgan, ante.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. JUSTICE FORTAS concurs,
dissenting.
Appellant is an American of Spanish ancestry, literate in the
Spanish language but illiterate in English, and hence barred from
voting by New York's statute.
I doubt that literacy is a wise prerequisite for exercise of the
franchise. Literacy and intelligence are not synonymous. The
experience of nations [
Footnote
1] like India, where illiterate persons have returned to office
responsible governments over and again, emphasizes that the ability
to read and write is not necessary for an intelligent use of the
ballot. Yet our problem as judges is not to determine what is wise
or unwise. The issues of constitutional power are more confined. A
State has broad powers over elections, and I cannot say that it is
an unconstitutional exercise of that power to condition the use of
the ballot on the ability to read and write. That is the only
teaching of
Lassiter v. Northampton Election Board,
360 U. S. 45. But
we are a multi-racial and multi-linguistic nation, and there are
groups in this country as versatile in Spanish, French, Japanese,
and Chinese, for example, as others are in English. Many of them
constitute communities in which there are widespread organs of
public communication in one of those tongues -- such as newspapers,
magazines, radio, and television -- which regularly report and
comment on matters of political interest and public concern. Such
is the case in New York City where Spanish language newspapers
Page 384 U. S. 676
and periodicals flourish, and where there are Spanish language
radio broadcasts which appellant reads and listens to. Before
taking up residence in New York City, she lived in Puerto Rico,
where she regularly voted in gubernatorial, legislative, and
municipal elections. And so our equal protection question is
whether intelligent use of the ballot should not be as much
presumed where one is versatile in the Spanish language as it is
where English is the medium.
New York's law permits an English-speaking voter to qualify
either by passing an English literacy test [
Footnote 2] or by presenting a certificate showing
completion of the sixth grade of an approved elementary school in
which English is the language of instruction. [
Footnote 3] But a Spanish-speaking person such as
appellant is offered no literacy test in Spanish. Her only recourse
is to a certificate showing completion of the sixth grade of a
public school in, or a private school accredited by, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, [
Footnote 4] and, prior to § 4(e) of the Voting Rights
Act, that school had to be one in which English was the language of
instruction. The heavier burden which New York has placed on the
Spanish-speaking American cannot, in my view, be sustained under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
We deal here with the right to vote which, over and again, we
have called a "fundamental matter in a free and democratic
society."
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.
S. 533,
377 U. S.
561-562;
Harper v. Virginia State Board of
Elections, 383 U. S. 663,
383 U. S. 667.
Where classifications might "invade or restrain" fundamental rights
and liberties, they must be "closely scrutinized and carefully
confined."
Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections,
supra, at
383 U. S. 670.
Our philosophy that removal of &
Page 384 U. S. 677
unwise laws must be left to the ballot, not to the courts,
requires that recourse to the ballot not be restricted as New York
has attempted. It little profits the Spanish-speaking people of New
York that this literacy test can be changed by legislation either
in Albany or in Washington, D.C., if they are barred from
participating in the process of selecting those legislatures. This
is a fundamental reason why a far sterner test is required when a
law -- whether state or federal -- abridges a fundamental right.
[
Footnote 5]
New York, as I have said, registers those who have completed six
years of school in a classroom where English is the medium of
instruction and those who pass an English literacy test. In my
view, there is no rational basis -- considering the importance of
the right at stake -- for denying those with equivalent
qualifications except that the language is Spanish. Thus, appellant
has, quite apart from any federal legislation, a constitutional
right to vote in New York on a parity with an English-speaking
citizen -- either by passing a Spanish literacy test or through a
certificate showing completion of the sixth grade in a Puerto Rican
school where Spanish was the classroom language. In no other way
can she be placed on a constitutional parity with English-speaking
electors.
[
Footnote 1]
Puerto Rico, in the last quarter century, has also provided a
demonstration of the point, although it is fast overcoming its
illiteracy problem. In 1940, 31.5% of its people were illiterate.
The rate was reduced to 13.8% in 1965. Selected Indices of Social
and Economic Progress: Fiscal Years 1939-40, 1947-48 to 1964-65
(Puerto Rico Bureau of Economic and Social Analysis) 7-8. During
this period, the people have elected highly progressive and able
officials.
[
Footnote 2]
Section 168(1), McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Ann.,
Election Law.
[
Footnote 3]
Id., § 168(2).
[
Footnote 4]
Ibid.
[
Footnote 5]
See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S.
88,
310 U. S. 95-96;
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516,
323 U. S. 530;
Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U. S. 195.