The contract whereby respondent agreed to construct a facility
for the Atomic Energy Commission contained a disputes clause which
provided that "all disputes concerning questions of fact arising
under this contract" should be decided by the contracting officer
subject to written appeal to the head of the department, "whose
decision shall be final and conclusive upon the parties thereto."
After completing the project, respondent filed claims seeking
additional compensation and time extensions pursuant to the
"changed conditions" clause of the contract. The Advisory Board of
Contract Appeals, after hearings, (1) denied the request for time
extension and damages for the "Pier Drilling" claim, finding that
increased costs were incurred by a subcontractor, rather than
respondent, and that the delay was caused by a dispute over the
quality of government-supplied concrete aggregate, which was not
before the Board for adjudication; (2) denied additional
compensation, but authorized a time extension for the "Shield
Window" claim; and (3) ruled that the appeal from the contracting
officer's rejection of the claim for additional compensation for
poor quality concrete aggregate was untimely, remarking however
that, if the claim was one for unliquidated damages for breach of
warranty or for delay, it had no jurisdiction to award monetary
relief. Respondent brought this action in the Court of Claims for
breach of contract, asserting government-caused unreasonable delay.
That court held that the Pier Drilling and Shield Window claims
were primarily for breach of contract, and ordered a trial
de
novo on the factual issues in those claims. On the concrete
aggregate claim, the court ruled that, if the claim was one for
breach of contract, rather than one "arising under" the contract,
the factual issues should be resolved in a judicial trial.
Held:
1. The government contract "disputes clause" does not extend to
breach of contract claims not redressable under other clauses of
the contract. Pp.
384 U. S.
403-418.
(a) In decisions both before and after the execution of this
contract, the Court of Claims had established that the
jurisdiction
Page 384 U. S. 395
of Boards of Contract Appeals was limited to claims under
specific contract provisions authorizing relief, and that
contractors need not process pure breach of contract claims through
the disputes machinery before filing suit. Pp.
384 U. S.
405-406.
(b) It was the settled practice of the Boards of Contract
Appeals at the time of execution of this contract to refuse to
consider pure breach of contract claims. P.
384 U. S.
406.
(c) While some Boards possess authority to make factual findings
in cases where they have no jurisdiction to grant relief, such
findings have no binding effect. Pp.
384 U. S.
407-411.
(d) Congress and the military procurement agencies recognize the
jurisdictional limitations of the Boards by enacting alternative
administrative remedies and by fashioning additional contract
adjustment provisions to deal with claims for delay damages such as
presented here. Pp.
384 U. S.
413-417.
(e) The development of these additional contractual provisions
illustrates not only administrative acceptance of the narrow
interpretation of the disputes clause, but also indicates the lack
of any compelling reason to overturn that interpretation now. Pp.
384 U. S.
417-418.
2. Although the Board here lacked authority to consider delay
damages under the Pier Drilling and Shield Window claims, it did
have authority to consider requests for time extensions under
specific contract provisions, and these requests called for
findings of fact which, if they meet the Wunderlich Act standards,
are conclusive on the parties not only under the contract
provisions, but also in the court action for breach of contract and
delay damages. Pp.
384 U. S.
418-423.
(a) Both the disputes clause and the Wunderlich Act provide that
administrative findings on factual issues relevant to questions
arising under the contract shall be final and conclusive on the
parties. P.
384 U. S.
419.
(b) A party cannot compel relitigation of a matter once decided
by merely couching a claim in breach of contract language. P.
384 U. S.
419.
(c)
United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co.,
373 U. S. 709,
held that administrative findings in the course of adjudicating
claims within the disputes clause were not to be retried in the
Court of Claims, but were only to be reviewed on the administrative
record. P.
384 U. S.
420.
Page 384 U. S. 396
(d) This result is in accord with the principles of collateral
estoppel. Pp.
384 U. S.
421-422.
(e) Since the Board was acting in a judicial capacity when it
considered these claims, the factual disputes were relevant to the
issues properly before it, and both parties had an opportunity to
argue their version of the facts and to seek court review of
adverse findings, there is no need or justification for a second
evidentiary hearing on these matters. P.
384 U. S.
422.
168 Ct.Cl. 522, 339 F.2d 606, affirmed in part and reversed in
part.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The typical construction contract between the Government and a
private contractor provides for an equitable adjustment of the
contract price or an appropriate extension of time, or both, if the
government orders permitted changes in the work or if the
contractor encounters changed conditions differing materially from
those ordinarily anticipated. Likewise, it is provided that the
contract shall not be terminated, nor the contractor charged with
liquidated damages, if he is delayed in completing the work by
unforeseeable conditions beyond his control, including acts of the
Government.
See Armed Services Procurement Regulations
(hereinafter ASPR), 32 CFR §§ 7.602-3 to 7.602-5; Atomic
Energy Commission Procurement Regulations (hereinafter AECPR), 41
CFR
Page 384 U. S. 397
§ 9-7.5005-2. [
Footnote
1] Article 15 provides that "all disputes concerning questions
of fact arising under this contract" shall be decided by the
contracting officer subject to written
Page 384 U. S. 398
appeal to the head of the department, "whose decision shall be
final and conclusive upon the parties thereto." ASPR, 32 CFR
§7.602-6; AECPR, 41 CFR
Page 384 U. S. 399
§ 9-7.5004-3. [
Footnote
2] Appeals from the decision of the contracting officer are
characteristically heard by a board or committee designated by the
head of the contracting department or agency. Should the contractor
be dissatisfied with the administrative decision and bring a Tucker
Act suit for breach of contract in the Court of Claims or the
District Court, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1964 ed.), the
finality accorded administrative fact finding by the disputes
clause is limited by the provisions of the Wunderlich Act of 1954
which directs that such a decision
"shall be final and conclusive unless the same is fra[u]dulent
or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily
to imply bad faith, or is not supported by substantial evidence.
[
Footnote 3]"
With respect to this statutory provision
Page 384 U. S. 400
we held in
United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co.,
373 U. S. 709,
that where the evidentiary basis for the administrative decision is
challenged in a breach of contract suit, Congress did not intend a
de novo determination of the facts by the court, which
must confine its review to the administrative record made at the
time of the administrative appeal.
The issues in this case involve the coverage of the disputes
clause and a recurring problem concerning the application of
Bianchi to certain findings made during the administrative
process. We granted certiorari because of the importance of these
questions in the administration of government contracts.
382 U. S. 900.
I
.
The contractor, Utah Construction & Mining Company, executed
a contract in March, 1953, to build a facility for the Atomic
Energy Commission. After completing the project in January, 1955,
it filed with the contracting officer a "Pier Drilling" claim,
which asked for an adjustment in the contract price and an
extension of time under Article 4, the "changed conditions" clause.
The contractor asserted it had encountered float rock in the course
of excavating and drilling which, among other things, had increased
its costs and delayed the work. Contrary to the decision of the
contracting officer, the Advisory Board of Contract Appeals found
the float rock to be a changed condition within the meaning of
Article 4. But the Board nevertheless denied the request for a time
extension and for delay damages. It found that the increased costs
had been incurred by a subcontractor, rather than the contractor,
and that the delay experienced by the contractor was not caused by
the float rock, but by a dispute over the quality of concrete
aggregate furnished by the Government, a dispute not then before
the Board for adjudication.
Page 384 U. S. 401
Another claim filed by the contractor, its "Shield Window"
claim, asserted the existence of changed conditions calling for
relief under Article 4 by reason of inadequate specifications and
drawings furnished by the Government. Additional compensation and
additional time were demanded. The Board found there was no changed
condition within Article 4, and denied additional compensation.
However, it found the delay involved to be the result of
difficulties inherent in a new field of construction, rather than
the fault of either party, and it therefore authorized a time
extension under Article 9.
In the contractor's subsequent suit for breach of contract, the
Court of Claims held both the Pier Drilling claim and the Shield
Window claim to be claims for delay damages alleging a breach of
contract by reason of the Government's unreasonable delay. In its
view, such breach of contract claims were not within the disputes
clause, and the administrative findings regarding the
responsibility for the delays were subject to
de novo
determination in the Court of Claims. The disputes clause limited
the authority of the Board to "disputes concerning questions of
fact arising under this contract." That meant "a dispute over the
rights of the parties given by the contract; it [did] not mean a
dispute over a violation of the contract."
Utah Constr. &
Mining Co. v. United States, 339 F.2d 606, 609-610, 168 Ct.Cl.
522, 527 (1964). Because the Advisory Board of Contract Appeals was
clearly authorized to determine the cause of the delay in granting
or denying the request for an extension of time under Articles 4
and 9, the dissenting judge thought the findings were reviewable
only on the administrative record, and therefore objected to the
de novo trial ordered by the majority. 339 F.2d at 615,
168 Ct.Cl. at 537 (Davis, J.).
The meaning of the Court of Claims' distinction between disputes
over rights given by the contract and
Page 384 U. S. 402
disputes over a violation of the contract has been clarified in
a subsequent decision holding that, to the extent complete relief
is available under a specific contract adjustment provision, such
as the changes or changed conditions clauses, the controversy falls
within the disputes clause, and cannot be tried
de novo in
a suit for breach of contract.
Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. United
States, 345 F.2d 833, 837, 170 Ct.Cl. 757, 762 (1965). With
respect to relief available under the contract, therefore, the
contractor must exhaust his administrative remedies, and the
findings and determination of the Board would be subject to review
under the Wunderlich Act standards, as applied in
Bianchi.
But the Court of Claims has also ruled that, when only partial
relief is available under the contract --
e.g., an
extension of time under Article 4 -- the remedies under the
contract are not exclusive, and the contractor may secure damages
in breach of contract if the Government's conduct has been
unreasonable.
See Fuller Co. v. United States, 69 F. Supp.
409, 108 Ct.Cl. 70, 90-102 (1947);
Kehm Corp. v. United
States, 93 F. Supp. 620, 119 Ct.Cl. 454, 465-473 (1950). The
issue raised by the decision of the Court of Claims respecting the
Pier Drilling and Shield Window claims is therefore whether factual
issues that have once been properly determined administratively may
be retried
de novo in subsequent breach of contract
actions for relief that is unavailable under the contract.
The other issue of significance in this case is raised by a
third claim filed by the contractor, and involves the matter
referred to by the Advisory Board of Contract Appeals in disposing
of the contractor's Pier Drilling claim. The contractor, as it was
permitted to do under the contract, elected to purchase concrete
aggregate from the government stockpile, discovering very shortly
that the aggregate was dirty, and its poor quality the cause of
understrength concrete. The Government suspended the
Page 384 U. S. 403
work for a time, directed temporary corrective procedures, and
itself undertook more permanent remedial measures. After completing
the contract, the contractor claimed extra compensation based on
the poor condition of the aggregate, which was alleged to be a
changed condition under Article 4. The contracting officer rejected
the claim, and the Board ruled the appeal was untimely. It
remarked, however, that, if the claim was one for unliquidated
damages for breach of warranty or for delay, it had no jurisdiction
to award monetary relief. Rejecting the Government's position that
even if a claim sought only a remedy that was not available under
Articles 3, 4 or 9, it nevertheless was within the scope of the
disputes clause and subject to "final" administrative
determination, the Court of Claims held that, unless the claim
sought relief for a "change" under Article 3 or "changed
conditions" under Article 4 or "excusable delay" under Article 9
and was adjustable by the terms of those provisions, the claim was
not within the disputes clause, was not subject to administrative
determination, and was a matter for
de novo trial and
decision in the proper court. [
Footnote 4]
II
We deal first with the issue of the scope of the disputes clause
which is raised by the Court of Claims' treatment of the concrete
aggregate claim. The Government reasserts here its position in the
Court of Claims [
Footnote 5]
that the
Page 384 U. S. 404
disputes clause authorizes and compels administrative action in
connection with all disputes arising between the parties in the
course of completing the contract. In its view, the disputes clause
is not limited to those disputes arising under other provisions of
the contract -- Articles 3, 4 and 9 in this case -- that
contemplate equitable adjustment in price and time upon the
occurrence of the specified contingencies. If the Government is
correct, the concrete aggregate claim was a proper subject for
administrative handling even if the substandard aggregate was not a
changed condition within Article 4, and even if the claim was for
breach of warranty and delay damages. From this and from the
Government's position in
United States v. Anthony Grace &
Sons, Inc., post, p.
384 U. S. 424,
which we sustain, it would follow that the factual issues
underlying this claim were not subject to a
de novo trial
in the Court of Claims.
We must reject the government position, as did all the judges in
the Court of Claims. The power of the administrative tribunal to
make final and conclusive findings on factual issues rests on the
contract, more specifically on the disputes clause contained in
Article 15. This basic proposition the United States does not
challenge; and the short of the matter is that, when the parties
signed this contract in 1953, neither could have understood that
the disputes clause extended to breach of contract claims not
redressable under other clauses of the contract. [
Footnote 6] Our conclusion rests on an
examination of
Page 384 U. S. 405
uniform, continuous, and longstanding judicial and
administrative construction of the disputes clause, both before and
after the contract here in question was executed. Reference to
decisions subsequent to 1953 is justified in many cases as a
practical construction of the clause by one of the contracting
parties, the Government (for it has frequently been the Government
that has urged a narrow construction of the disputes clause on the
various Boards of Contract Appeals), [
Footnote 7] and, in any event, as showing the construction
on which innumerable other government contractors may have relied
in not presenting breach of contract claims to the contracting
officer, which claims would now be forever barred under the
Government's interpretation by the contractual time limitations on
the presentation of claims and appeals. [
Footnote 8]
Beginning in 1937, a series of cases in the Court of Claims
decided prior to the execution of this contract had established
that the jurisdiction of the Boards of Contract Appeals under the
disputes clause was limited to claims for equitable adjustments,
time extensions, or other remedies under specific contract
provisions authorizing such relief, and, accordingly, that the
contractor need not process pure breach of contract claims through
the disputes machinery before filing his court action.
See,
e.g., Phoenix Bridge Co. v. United States, 85 Ct.Cl. 603,
629-630 (1937);
Plato v. United States, 86 Ct.Cl. 665,
677-678 (1938);
John A. Johnson Contracting Corp. v.
Page 384 U. S. 406
United States, 98 F. Supp. 154, 156, 119 Ct.Cl. 707,
745 (1951);
Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of
Chicago v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 892, 897, 126 Ct.Cl.
631, 640-641 (1953). That has continued to be the view of the Court
of Claims.
E.g., Railroad Waterproofing Corp. v. United
States, 137 F. Supp. 713, 715-716, 133 Ct.Cl. 911, 915-916
(1956);
Ekco Products Co. v. United States, 312 F.2d 768,
773, 160 Ct.Cl. 75, 84 (1963);
see also Hunter v. United
States, 9 C.C.F. � 72,647 (D.C.E.D.N.C.1963),
aff'd
per curiam, 331 F.2d 741 (C.A.4th Cir. 1964).
After its creation in 1942, the War Department Board of Contract
Appeals quickly accepted the principle established by the
Phoenix Bridge and
Plato cases,
Boyer t/a
Harry Boyer, Son & Co., 1 C.C.F. 53 (1943);
Kirk t/a
Kirk Bldg. Co., 1 C.C.F. 67, 70-71 (1943), and long prior to
1953 it was the settled practice of the various Boards to refuse to
consider pure breach of contract claims,
e.g., Asbestos Wood
Mfg. Co., 2 C.C.F. 203 (WDBCA 1944);
Specer B. Lane
Co., 2 C.C.F. 500, 505 (WDBCA 1944);
Rust Engr. Co.,
3 C.C.F. 1210 (NDBCA 1945). The United States, indeed, grudgingly
concedes that the boards "have frequently, and perhaps usually,"
declined such jurisdiction. Such rulings are, in fact, legion,
see, e.g., Dean Constr. Co., 1965-2 B.C.A. � 4888
(GSBCA 1965);
Prototype Development, Inc., 1965-2 B.C.A.
� 4993 (ASBCA 1965);
Electrical Builders, Inc.,
1964 B.C.A. � 4377 (IBCA 1964);
E. & E. J.
Pfotzer, 1965-2 B.C.A. � 5144 (ENG BCA 1965), and the
decisions cited therein and in the decision below, 339 F.2d at 616,
n. 2, 168 Ct.Cl. at 538 (Davis, J., dissenting and concurring), and
include decisions of the bodies appointed to administer the
disputes clause on behalf of the Atomic Energy Commission, the
contracting agency in this case,
see Claremont Constr.
Co., Dkt. No. 64 (Feb. 14, 1955);
Frontier Drilling
Co., Dkt. No. 74 (July 1, 1955);
Utah Constr. Co.,
Dkt. No. 91 (Dec. 12,
Page 384 U. S. 407
1956);
J. A. Tiberti Constr. Co., Dkt. No. CA-126 (May
2, 1961);
but cf. Fick Foundry Co., 1965-2 B.C.A. �
5052 at 23,786. The AEC Advisory Board of Contract Appeals
reaffirmed this interpretation of the disputes clause in its
discussion of respondent's concrete aggregate claim,
see
supra, p.
384 U. S.
403.
The United States does not dispute the fact that the past
construction of the standard disputes clause has been that it does
not authorize the Boards of Contract Appeals to finally determine,
and to grant relief for, all claims related to the contracted work.
[
Footnote 9] Instead, it
attacks these rulings of the Court of Claims and the Boards of
Contract Appeals concerning the scope of the standard disputes
clause as erroneous and premised on principles that have since been
rejected in other cases. But even if, as an original matter, the
language of the disputes clause might have been susceptible of the
interpretation urged by the Government, the restrictive meaning of
the words "arising under this contract" had long since been
established when these parties used them in 1953. The question
before us is what the parties intended, not whether the
construction on which they relied was erroneous.
The United States, as an alternative argument, would limit the
rulings described above to the question of availability of remedy,
and it contends that, even if it be accepted that the Boards of
Contract Appeals are without jurisdiction to grant relief for
breach of contract, they are nevertheless authorized by the
disputes clause to
Page 384 U. S. 408
make binding findings of fact respecting all disputes. The
argument is premised in the main on certain unique provisions in
the charter of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, which
is the successor to the War Department Board of Contract Appeals.
Special attention to the ASBCA is justified by its large caseload
and its consequent importance as a model for the development of
other Boards.
Originally, the WDBCA took a narrow view of its jurisdiction,
see Shedd, Disputes and Appeals: The Armed Services Board
of Contract Appeals, 29 Law & Contemp. Prob. 39, 55 (1964),
and, as a result, the Secretary of War issued, on July 4, 1944, a
memorandum directing the Board,
inter alia, to
"[f]ind and administratively determine the facts out of which a
claim by a contractor arises for damages against the Government for
breach of contract, without expressing opinion on the question of
the Government's liability for damages."
9 Fed.Reg. 9463. Similarly, the present charter of the ASBCA
provides that
"[w]hen, in the consideration of an appeal, it appears that a
claim is involved which is not cognizable under the terms of the
contract, the Board may, insofar as the evidence permits, make
findings of fact with respect to such a claim without expressing an
opinion on the question of liability."
32 CFR § 30.1, App. A, Part I, § 5. It will be noted
that, on their face, the very provisions on which the Government
relies in this phase of its argument conclusively refute the
broader contention that the Boards may determine and afford relief
for all contract claims, for they recognize that some claims for
breach of contract may not be "cognizable under the terms of
the
Page 384 U. S. 409
contract" and that, in such cases, the Boards should express no
opinion on the question of liability. [
Footnote 10] Nor do the provisions, in terms, provide
any support for the view that the Boards may make binding, as
distinguished from advisory, findings of fact.
In the first case before the WDBCA under the 1944 directive, the
Board ruled that it would retain jurisdiction to hold a hearing and
to make findings of fact even though it expressly recognized it
could grant no relief, and it was "doubtful whether any findings
the Board should make . . . would be given any consideration by a
court. . . ."
Columbia Constructors, Inc., 2 C.C.F. 942
(WDBCA 1944). Such willingness to make findings even though no
hearing had theretofore been held was in keeping with the dual
function of adjudicatory body and advisor to the Secretary then
exercised by the WDBCA, which heard appeals on an advisory basis in
the case of contracts that did not authorize the designation of a
board as the representative of the Secretary to hear appeals,
see generally Smith, The War Department Board of Contract
Appeals, 5 Fed.B.J. 74, 77 (1943), and sometimes investigated
claims for extraordinary relief under Title II of the First War
Powers Act, 55 Stat. 838 (1941),
see Ardmore Constr. Co.,
3 C.C.F. 255, 265 (WDBCA 1944). Subsequently, the contractor's
appeal in the Columbia Constructors case was dismissed when the
contractor represented that he did not desire a hearing if the
Board could award no relief, thus confirming the parties'
understanding that the 1944 memorandum did not require presentation
to the WDBCA of all contract disputes as a prerequisite to a court
action. 2 C.C.F. 1162 (WDBCA 1944). In later cases where a hearing
had been held in connection with other claims
Page 384 U. S. 410
the WDBCA did make special findings, but without any intimation
that such findings were to have binding effect.
E.g.,
Swords-McDougal Co., 3 C.C.F. 238 (WDBCA 1944);
Fiske-Carter Constr. Co., 3 C.C.F. 415 (WDBCA 1945);
Hargrave t/a Hargrave Constr. Co., 3 C.C.F. 1113, 1120
(WDBCA 1945).
The practice of the ASBCA has evidenced an even narrower
understanding of the charter provision authorizing findings without
expression of opinion on liability. In cases heard on the merits
prior to decision of the jurisdictional question the Board has made
special findings in accordance with the charter.
See Specialty
Assembling & Packing Co., 1959-2 B.C.A. � 2370;
J. W. Bateson Co., 1962 B.C.A. � 3293;
see also
the Metrig Corp., 1963 B.C.A. � 3658. But in
Simmel-Industrie Meccaniche Societa per Azioni, 1961-1
B.C.A. � 2917, the Board rejected the contractor's
contention that
"[t]he ASBCA has jurisdiction and is under a duty to make
findings of fact in this appeal even if it lacked jurisdiction to
make an award to appellant,"
id. at 15,233. The Board interpreted the charter to
mean that it would make special findings only in "appeals where a
hearing on the merits has been completed prior to the filing of a
rule to show cause or a motion to dismiss."
Id. at 15,235.
More recently the Board has explained that
"[g]enerally, as a matter of sound policy, the Board's
discretionary right to make findings of fact in instances where a
claim is not cognizable under the contract is not exercised, simply
because the Board has no way to afford the parties the remedy which
logically would flow from the facts found. The cases wherein the
Board has declined to consider an appeal because it had no method
within the confines of the contract terms to afford a remedy have
sometimes been described, perhaps rather inaptly,
Page 384 U. S. 411
as being beyond our jurisdiction or beyond our authority to
consider. Basically, the lack is not of authority to hear, but of
authority finally to dispose administratively."
Lenoir Wood Finishing Co., 1964 B.C.A. � 4111 at
20,061.
As
Lenoir Wood Finishing Co. indicates, the ASBCA, like
the WDBCA, has disclaimed any binding effect for its findings in
those cases where it has made special findings solely under
authority of the special charter provision.
See also
Simmel-Industrie Meccaniche Societa per Azioni, supra, at
15,235;
J. W. Bateson Co., supra, at 16,985. Since the
ASBCA has declared it is not under any mandatory duty to make
findings at a contractor's request in cases where it has no
jurisdiction to grant relief, it would seem strange indeed to
interpret the disputes clause as embodying the parties'
understanding that such cases were nevertheless to be determined
administratively.
Since it is so clearly established that the special charter
authority to make findings without expression of opinion on
liability does not expand the scope of the disputes clause or
empower the Board to make binding determinations of fact, one may
well ask what purpose such authority, and the findings made
pursuant to it, can possibly serve. One obvious answer is that the
Board's findings may facilitate a settlement of the contractor's
breach of contract claim. For example, the General Accounting
Office, which has statutory authority to settle claims against the
United States, Budget and Accounting Act, 1921, §305, 42 Stat.
24, 31 U.S.C. § 71 (1964 ed.), provides no procedure for
resolution of factual disputes, 21 Comp.Gen. 244, and thus refuses
to undertake settlement where there are substantial factual
disputes. Comp.Gen.Dec. B-147326, May 25, 1962; Comp.Gen.Dec.
B-149795, Jan. 4, 1963. Accordingly, acceptance
Page 384 U. S. 412
by the parties of the Board's findings might provide the
necessary requisite for intervention of the GAO. [
Footnote 11]
Thus, the settled construction of the disputes clause excludes
breach of contract claims from its coverage, whether for purposes
of granting relief or for purposes of making binding findings of
fact that would be reviewable under Wunderlich Act standards,
rather than
de novo. This is not to say that the
Government does not have a powerful argument for construing the
disputes clause to afford administrative relief for a wider
spectrum of disputes arising between the contracting parties. It
can be argued, as the Government persuasively does, that the same
considerations which initially led to providing an administrative
remedy in those situations covered by such clauses as Articles 3, 4
and 9 of the contract also support the broader reading of the
disputes
Page 384 U. S. 413
clause permitting and requiring administrative factfinding with
respect to all disputes arising between the contracting parties.
But the coverage of the disputes clause is a matter susceptible of
contractual determination,
United States v. Moorman,
338 U. S. 457,
subject to the limitations on finality imposed by the Wunderlich
Act, and one would have expected modification of the disputes
clause to encompass breach of contract disputes if the restrictive
interpretation of Article 15 was thought unduly to hinder
government contracting. In fact, the contracting department have
not rejected the narrower judicial reading of the disputes clause,
nor attempted any wholesale revision of its language to cover all
factual disputes. Instead, they have acted to create alternative
administrative remedies for some breach of contract claims, and to
disestablish others by fashioning additional specific adjustment
provisions contemplating relief under the contract in specified
situations not reached by such provisions as Articles 3, 4 and
9.
An example of the creation of alternative administrative
remedies is afforded by the provisions in effect at various times
since World War II,
see First War Powers Act, Title II, 55
Stat. 838 (1941); Act of January 12, 1951, 64 Stat. 1257,
authorizing extraordinary relief for certain claims of contractors.
Pursuant to a delegation by the President under the statute
presently in effect, Public Law 85-804, 72 Stat. 972, 50 U.S.C.
§ 1431 (1964 ed.), government departments and agencies
exercising functions in connection with the national defense may,
upon a finding that such action would "facilitate the national
defense," enter into amendments and modifications of contracts
without regard to other provisions of law respecting such
amendments and modifications. As implemented by the departmental
procurement regulations,
see ASPR, 32 CFR § 17.000
et seq.; AECPR, 41 CFR § 9-17.000
et seq.,
the authority conferred encompasses
Page 384 U. S. 414
amendments without consideration, correction of mutual mistakes,
and formalization of informal commitments. This authority, which in
many respects is analogous to power to settle claims, is delegated
to Contract Adjustment Boards established within the departments
and agencies concerned separate from the Boards of Contract
Appeals. Because the regulations preclude resort to the powers
conferred by Public Law 85-804 "[u]nless other legal authority in
the Department concerned is deemed to be lacking or inadequate,"
ASPR, 32 CFR § 17.205-1(b)(2), the Army Contract Adjustment
Board has required contractors to exhaust remedies before the ASBCA
under the disputes clause,
Blaw-Knox Co., ACAB Dkt. No.
1019, Nov. 2, 1960. However, in
Bendix Corp., ACAB Dkt.
No. 1050, Sept. 11, 1962, which involved a claim for delay damages
arising out of the Government's failure to make the construction
site available on time, the Board ruled that the contractor need
not present its claim to the ASBCA in view of that body's lack of
jurisdiction over claims that were not premised on a provision for
adjustment within the contract. Further, the ACAB confirmed that it
was empowered to grant unliquidated damages for delay in breach of
contract even though the contractor might also have a court action.
Likewise, the Boards of Contract Appeals have consistently
recognized that, while they themselves may be without jurisdiction
to grant relief for claimed breaches of contract, such claims, in
appropriate cases, could be presented to the Adjustment Boards.
See, e.g., Fiske-Carter Constr. Co., 3 C.C.F. 415 (WDBCA
1945);
Ardmore Constr. Co., 3 C.C.F. 468 (WDBCA 1945);
see generally Smith, The War Department Board of Contract
Appeals, 5 Fed.B.J. 74, 82 (1943);
cf. Doyle & Russell,
Inc., 1965-2 2 B.C.A. � 4912 at 23,220 (NASA BCA). Thus
it is quite evident from the administration of Public Law
Page 384 U. S. 415
85-804 and its predecessors that the limitations on the
jurisdiction of the Boards of Contract Appeals are well understood
by the military procurement departments and Congress. [
Footnote 12]
An illustration of the disestablishment of breach of contract
claims through the fashioning of additional contract adjustment
provisions is provided by contractual provisions designed to deal
with just such claims for delay damages as are presented here. In
response to the importunings of Army contractors following this
Court's ruling in
United States v. Rice, 317 U. S.
61, that the contractor's remedy under Article 9 was
limited to an extension of time, a "Suspension of Work" clause was
adopted for use in construction contracts,
see T. C. Bateson
Constr. Co., 1960-1 B.C.A. � 2552 (ASBCA 1960) at
12,347-12,348, [
Footnote 13]
and has been the basis for administrative
Page 384 U. S. 416
allowance of delay damages in numerous cases. A more extensive
clause for "Price Adjustment for Suspension, Delays, or
Interruption of Work," ASPR, 32 CFR § 7.604-3, was promulgated
in 1961 for optional use in Department of Defense fixed-price
construction contracts. Effective April 1965, the clause was made
mandatory in such contracts, ASPR § 7-602.46, [
Footnote 14] and the
Page 384 U. S. 417
Armed Services Procurement Regulations Committee has proposed
its use in fixed-price supply contracts as well.
See
generally Kelly, Government Contractors' Remedies: A
Regulatory Reform, 18 Admin.L.Rev. 145, 148-152 (1965). An
Interagency Task Group is currently reviewing the clauses in the
standard contract form, including the Changes, Changed Conditions
and Suspension of Work clauses, to determine whether they should be
expanded in coverage to prevent fragmentation of remedies.
See Federal Contracts Report, No. 79, Aug. 23, 1965, pp.
A-6-A-7. While, in one respect, it can be said that clauses
broadening remedies under the contract have been adopted in
response to restrictive interpretation of the disputes clause and
express dissatisfaction with the unavailability of an
administrative remedy, the fact that the response has taken this
measured form has manifested the parties' reliance on the prior
interpretation and has properly tended to reinforce it. As the
ASBCA remarked in
Simmel-Industrie, supra,
"[i]t is noteworthy that, when it is intended to provide an
administrative remedy for Government delays, specific contract
clauses have been developed and are set forth for that
purpose,"
1961-1 B.C.A. at 15,234.
Finally, we may note that development of provisions such as the
Suspension of Work Clause illustrates not only administrative
acceptance of the narrow interpretation of the disputes clause; it
also indicates the lack of any compelling reason for overturning
that interpretation at this late stage. Inclusion of such
additional clauses in the contract naturally limits the area of
disputes falling outside the framework of contractual adjustment
and thus outside the disputes clause, as does
Page 384 U. S. 418
expansive construction of the existing adjustment clauses. As
one member of the ASBCA has recently remarked:
". . . government procurement agencies started several years ago
adding various contract clauses designed to convert what would
otherwise be claims for damages for breach of contract into claims
payable under such contract clauses and, hence, to be regarded as
'arising under the contract.' This trend has continued to the point
where the field of claims for breach of contract that are not
regarded as 'arising under the contract' is becoming very narrow
indeed. Also, there has been an increasing tendency for contract
appeal boards to give a broad interpretation to contract clauses as
vehicles for the administrative settlement of meritorious contract
claims. Decisions where ASBCA dismisses an appeal for lack of
jurisdiction as involving a claim for breach of contract are
becoming increasingly rare."
Shedd, Disputes and Appeals: The Armed Services Board of
Contract Appeals, 29 Law & Contemp.Prob. 39, 74 (1964).
For the reasons stated, we reject the Government's contention
that the disputes clause covers all disputes relating to the
contract.
III
We are unable to accept, however, the Court of Claims'
disposition of the Pier Drilling and Shield Window claims. Although
the Board lacked authority to consider delay damages under these
two claims, it did have authority to consider the requests for
extensions of time under Articles 4 and 9, and these requests
called for an administrative determination of the facts. Such
findings, if they otherwise satisfy the standards of the Wunderlich
Act, are conclusive on the parties not only with respect to the
Articles 4 and 9 claims, but also in the
Page 384 U. S. 419
court suit for breach of contract and delay damages. This
finality is required by the language and policies underlying the
disputes clause and the Wunderlich Act, and by the general
principles of collateral estoppel.
Both the disputes clause and the Wunderlich Act categorically
state that administrative findings on factual issues relevant to
questions arising under the contract shall be final and conclusive
on the parties. [
Footnote
15] There is no room in the language of Article 15 or of the
Act to consider factual findings final for some purposes, but not
for others. It would disregard the parties' agreement to conclude,
as the Court of Claims did, that, because the court suit was one
for breach of contract which the administrative agency had no
authority to decide, the court need not accept administrative
findings which were appropriately made and obviously relevant to
another claim within the jurisdiction of the board.
The position of the Court of Claims would permit erosion of the
policies behind both the Wunderlich Act and the disputes clause.
Any claim, whether within or without the disputes clause, can be
couched in breach of contract language. [
Footnote 16] The contractual and statutory scheme
would be too easily avoided if a party could compel relitigation of
a matter once decided by a mere exercise of semantics. Certainly,
as the Court of Claims
Page 384 U. S. 420
itself has since held, where the administrative agency has made
relevant factual findings in the course of refusing relief which
the contract authorizes it to give, the finality of these findings,
if sufficiently supported, cannot be avoided in a court action for
the same relief by labeling the refusal of an equitable adjustment
as a breach of contract, or by asserting that the primary issue
involved is a question of law,
Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. United
States, 345 F.2d 833, 170 Ct.Cl. 757;
Allied Paint &
Color Works, Inc. v. United States, 309 F.2d 133. Likewise,
when the Board of Contract Appeals has made findings relevant to a
dispute properly before it and which the parties have agreed shall
be final and conclusive, these findings cannot be disregarded, and
the factual issues tried
de novo in the Court of Claims
when the contractor sues for relief which the board was not
empowered to give.
This is no more than our decision in
Carlo Bianchi
requires. We there held that administrative findings in the course
of adjudicating claims within the disputes clause were not to be
retried in the Court of Claims, but were to be reviewed by that
court on the administrative record. This result, which was required
both by the contract of the parties and by the Wunderlich Act,
avoids "a needless duplication of evidentiary hearings and a heavy
additional burden in the time and expense required to bring
litigation to an end," [
Footnote
17] 373 U.S. at
373 U. S. 717,
and it encourages the parties to make a complete disclosure at the
administrative level, rather than holding evidence back for
subsequent litigation. H.R.Rep. No. 1380, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 5
(1954). These same reasons support the finality, in a suit for
delay damages, of all valid and appropriate administrative findings
already made in the course of resolving a dispute "arising under"
the contract.
Page 384 U. S. 421
Although the decision here rests upon the agreement of the
parties as modified by the Wunderlich Act, we note that the result
we reach is harmonious with general principles of collateral
estoppel. [
Footnote 18]
Occasionally courts have used language to the effect that
res
judicata principles do not apply to administrative
proceedings, [
Footnote 19]
but
Page 384 U. S. 422
such language is certainly too broad. [
Footnote 20] When an administrative agency is acting
in a judicial capacity and resolved disputed issues of fact
properly before it which the parties have had an adequate
opportunity to litigate, the courts have not hesitated to apply
res judicata to enforce repose.
Sunshine Anthracite
Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381;
Hanover Bank v. United States, 285 F.2d 455;
Fairmont
Aluminum Co. v. Commissioner, 222 F.2d 622;
Seatrain
Lines, Inc. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 207 F.2d 255. [
Footnote 21]
See also Goldstein
v. Doft, 236 F.
Supp. 730,
aff'd, 353 F.2d 484,
cert. denied,
383 U.S. 960, where collateral estoppel was applied to prevent
relitigation of factual disputes resolved by an arbitrator.
In the present case, the Board was acting in a judicial capacity
when it considered the Pier Drilling and Shield Window claims, the
factual disputes resolved were clearly relevant to issues properly
before it, and both parties had a full and fair opportunity to
argue their version of the facts and an opportunity to seek court
review of any adverse findings. There is, therefore, neither need
nor justification for a second evidentiary hearing on these matters
already resolved as between these two parties. [
Footnote 22]
Accordingly, in light of the above, we affirm the Court of
Claims in its interpretation of the scope of the disputes clause,
and we reverse as to its failure to give finality, in the suit for
delay damages and breach of contract, to factual findings properly
made by the Board.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
In the contract presently before us, these clauses read as
follows:
"Article 3.
Changes. --"
"The contracting officer may at any time, by a written order,
and without notice to the sureties, make changes in the drawings
and/or specifications of this contract and within the general scope
thereof. If such changes cause an increase or decrease in the
amount due under this contract, or in the time required for its
performance, an equitable adjustment shall be made and the contract
shall be modified in writing accordingly. Any claim for adjustment
under this article must be asserted within 10 days from the date
the change is ordered:
Provided, however, That the
contracting officer, if he determines that the facts justify such
action, may receive and consider, and with the approval of the head
of the department or his duly authorized representative, adjust any
such claim asserted at any time prior to the date of final
settlement of the contract. If the parties fail to agree upon the
adjustment to be made, the dispute shall be determined as provided
in Article 15 hereof. But nothing provided in this article shall
excuse the contractor from proceeding with the prosecution of the
work so changed."
"Article 4.
Changed conditions. --"
"Should the contractor encounter, or the Government discover,
during the progress of the work subsurface and/or latent conditions
at the site materially differing from those shown on the drawing or
indicated in the specifications, or unknown conditions of an
unusual nature differing materially from those ordinarily
encountered and generally recognized as inhering in work of the
character provided for in the plans and specifications, the
attention of the contracting officer shall be called immediately to
such conditions before they are disturbed. The contracting officer
shall thereupon promptly investigate the conditions, and if he
finds that they do so materially differ, the contract shall be
modified to provide for any increase or decrease of cost and/or
difference in time resulting from such conditions."
"
* * * *"
"Article 9.
Delays -- Damages. --"
"If the contractor refuses or fails to prosecute the work, or
any separable part thereof, with such diligence as will insure its
completion within the time specified in article 1, or any extension
thereof, or fails to complete said work within such time, the
Government may, by written notice to the contractor, terminate his
right to proceed with the work or such part of the work as to which
there has been delay. In such event, the Government may take over
the work and prosecute the same to completion, by contract or
otherwise, and the contractor and his sureties shall be liable to
the Government for any excess cost occasioned the Government
thereby. If the contractor's right to proceed is so terminated, the
Government may take possession of and utilize in completing the
work such materials, appliances, and plant as may be on the site of
the work and necessary therefor. If the Government does not
terminate the right of the contractor to proceed, the contractor
shall continue the work, in which event it will be impossible to
determine the actual damages for the delay and in lieu thereof the
contractor shall pay to the Government as fixed, agreed, and
liquidated damages for each calendar day of delay until the work is
completed or accepted the amount as set forth in the specifications
or accompanying papers and the contractor and his sureties shall be
liable for the amount thereof:
Provided, That the right of
the contractor to proceed shall not be terminated or the contractor
charged with liquidated damages because of any delays in the
completion of the work due to unforeseeable causes beyond the
control and without the fault or negligence of the contractor,
including, but not restricted to, acts of God, or of the public
enemy, acts of the Government, acts of another contractor in the
performance of a contract with the Government, fires, floods,
epidemics, quarantine restrictions, strikes, freight embargoes, and
unusually severe weather or delays of subcontractors due to such
causes, if the contractor shall within 10 days from the beginning
of any such delay (unless the contracting officer shall grant a
further period of time prior to the date of final settlement of the
contract) notify the contracting officer in writing of the causes
of delay, who shall ascertain the facts and the extent of the delay
and extend the time for completing the work when in his judgment
the findings of fact justify such an extension, and his findings of
fact thereon shall be final and conclusive on the parties hereto,
subject only to appeal, within 30 days, by the contractor to the
head of the department concerned or his duly authorized
representative, whose decision on such appeal as to the facts of
delay and the extension of time for completing the work shall be
final and conclusive on the parties hereto."
[
Footnote 2]
The disputes clause in the instant contract reads:
"Article 15.
Disputes. --"
"Except as otherwise specifically provided in this contract, all
disputes concerning questions of fact arising under this contract
shall be decided by the contracting officer subject to written
appeal by the contractor within 30 days to the head of the
department concerned or his duly authorized representative, whose
decision shall be final and conclusive upon the parties thereto. In
the meantime, the contractor shall diligently proceed with the work
as directed."
[
Footnote 3]
"[N]o provision of any contract entered into by the United
States, relating to the finality or conclusiveness of any decision
of the head of any department or agency or his duly authorized
representative or board in a dispute involving a question arising
under such contract shall be pleaded in any suit now filed or to be
filed as limiting judicial review of any such decision to cases
where fraud by such official or his said representative or board is
alleged:
Provided, however, That any such decision shall
be final and conclusive unless the same is fraudulent
[
sic] or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous
as necessarily to imply bad faith, or is not supported by
substantial evidence."
"SEC. 2. No Government contract shall contain a provision making
final on a question of law the decision of any administrative
official, representative, or board."
68 Stat. 81, 41 U.S.C. §§ 321-322 (1964 ed.).
[
Footnote 4]
The court did not decide whether or not the substandard
aggregate was or was not a "changed condition" under Article 4.
This matter it referred back to the Commissioner. It did hold,
however, that if the claim fell within Article 4, and if the Board
of Appeals had erroneously refused to hear it as untimely, court
proceedings should be suspended until appropriate administrative
action was completed. This latter determination the Court of Claims
refused to follow in No. 439,
United States v. Anthony Grace
& Sons, Inc., 384 U. S. 424.
[
Footnote 5]
Before the Advisory Board of Contract Appeals the Government
asserted a contrary position.
See n 7,
infra.
[
Footnote 6]
When the contract makes provision for equitable adjustment of
particular claims, such claims may be regarded as converted from
breach of contract claims to claims for relief under the contract.
See Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. United States, 345 F.2d 833,
170 Ct.Cl. 757 (1965); Shedd, Disputes and Appeals: The Armed
Services Board of Contract Appeals, 29 Law & Contemp. Prob. 39,
74 (1965); Kelly, Government Contractors' Remedies: A Regulatory
Reform, 18 Admin.L.Rev. 145, 147 (1964). For ease of reference, we
will therefore use the term "breach of contract claims" to refer to
contract claims that are not redressable under specific contract
adjustment provisions.
[
Footnote 7]
With respect to the concrete aggregate claim in this case, for
example, the attorney appearing for the contracting officer moved
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the claim
was for breach of contract, rather than for an equitable adjustment
under Article 4, and did not fall within the coverage of the
disputes clause.
[
Footnote 8]
By contrast, the period of limitations for contract actions in
the Court of Claims is six years. 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (1964
ed.).
[
Footnote 9]
The Government does assert that the NASA Board of Contract
Appeals "apparently asserts jurisdiction for some purposes over
claims for breach of contract," citing
Doyle & Russell,
Inc., 1965-2 B.C.A. � 4912. The purpose for which the
Board asserted jurisdiction, however, was to determine whether it
had authority to grant relief, and the Board also noted that the
contractor had asserted a claim for additional compensation under
the changes clause.
[
Footnote 10]
The ASBCA has also interpreted this charter provision as
recognizing the narrow interpretation of the disputes clause.
Lenoir Wood Finishing Co., 1964 B.C.A. � 4111 at
20,060-20,061.
[
Footnote 11]
Of course, such findings might also provide the foundation for
action by other agencies authorized to compromise the claim or
otherwise to grant relief, such as the Contract Adjustment Boards,
see text,
infra. With respect to the whole
question of settlement, the Government contends that the early
restrictive construction of the disputes clause was based in part
on the belief that the various departments and their contracting
officers had no authority to settle pure breach of contract claims,
which view is asserted to have now been abandoned.
See Cannon
Constr. Co. v. United States, 319 F.2d 173, 162 Ct.Cl. 94
(1963). Since the authority of contracting officers to grant relief
for all claims, through settlement, is now established, the
argument continues, all contract claims may now be the basis of a
dispute reviewable under the disputes clause. The error in this
argument is that it fails to differentiate between an advance
agreement to be bound by the decision of the contracting officer
and the Board respecting an equitable adjustment and the power,
without being bound prior to agreement, mutually to settle
differences. This distinction has not escaped the ASBCA, which has
ruled that, although it subscribes to the view that contracting
officers may negotiate settlements, it has no power under the
disputes clause to compel negotiation or settlement.
Lenoir
Wood Finishing Co., 1964 B.C.A. � 4111 at 20,061;
accord, John McShain, Inc., 1965-1 B.C.A. � 4844
(GSBCA).
[
Footnote 12]
The committee reports on Public Law 85-804 indicate that
Congress was well aware that the powers conferred under Title II of
the First War Powers Act had been used "to extend the time of
performance on contracts and to waive liquidated damages
provisions" and that
"[a]mendments without consideration have also been used to
provide relief for defense contractors where losses have resulted
from inequitable action of the Government. . . ."
H.R.Rep.No.2232, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 4, 6 (1958);
accord, S.Rep.No.2281, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 4, 5 (1958).
The House subcommittee said that it had given particular attention
to the regulations and administrative procedures employed under
Title II and had found them to be proper. H.R.Rep.No.2232, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1958). Congress thus acted upon the clear
understanding that certain claims of the type the Government now
contends to be covered by the disputes clause were not cognizable
under normal contract adjustment procedures, thus necessitating the
grant of extraordinary authority in Public Law 85-804.
[
Footnote 13]
A typical Suspension of Work clause provided:
"The Contracting Officer may order the Contractor to suspend all
or any part of the work for such period of time as may be determine
by him to be necessary or desirable for the convenience of the
Government. Unless such suspension unreasonably delays the progress
of the work and causes additional expense or loss to the
Contractor, no increase in contract price will be allowed. In the
case of suspension of all or any part of the work for an
unreasonable length of time, causing additional expense or loss,
not due to the fault or negligence of the Contractor, the
Contracting Officer shall make an equitable adjustment in the
contract price and modify the contract accordingly."
Barnet Brezner, 1961-1 B.C.A. � 2895 at 15,119
(ASBCA).
See also T. C. Bateson Constr. Co., 1960-1 B.C.A.
� 2552 at 12,319 (ASBCA).
[
Footnote 14]
This clause provides:
"(a) The Contracting Officer may order the Contractor in writing
to suspend all or any part of the work for such period of time as
he may determine to be appropriate for the convenience of the
Government."
"(b) If, without the fault or negligence of the Contractor, the
performance of all or any part of the work is for an unreasonable
period of time, suspended, delayed, or interrupted by an act of the
Contracting Officer in the administration of the contract, or by
his failure to act within the time specified in the contract (or if
no time is specified within a reasonable time), an adjustment shall
be made by the Contracting Officer for any increase in the cost of
performance of the contract (excluding profit) necessarily caused
by the unreasonable period of such suspension, delay, or
interruption, and the contract shall be modified in writing
accordingly. No adjustment shall be made to the extent that
performance by the Contractor would have been prevented by other
causes even if the work had not been so suspended, delayed, or
interrupted. No claim under this clause shall be allowed (i) for
any costs incurred more than twenty days before the Contractor
shall have notified the Contracting Officer in writing of the act
or failure to act involved (but this requirement shall not apply
where a suspension order has been issued), and (ii) unless the
claim, in an amount stated, is asserted in writing as soon as
practicable after the termination of such suspension, delay, or
interruption, but not later than the date of final payment under
the contract. Any dispute concerning a question of fact arising
under this clause shall be subject to the Disputes clause."
[
Footnote 15]
Of course, if the findings made by the Board are not relevant to
a dispute over which it has jurisdiction, such findings would have
no finality whatsoever.
See 384 U.
S. supra; Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. United
States, 345 F.2d 833, 170 Ct.Cl. 757;
Utah Constr. &
Mining Co. v. United States, 339 F.2d 606, 617, 168 Ct.Cl.
522, 539-540 (dissenting opinion of Judge Davis).
[
Footnote 16]
See the example given by the Court of Claims below, 339
F.2d 606, 611, 168 Ct.Cl. 522, 530, where the addition of the
adjective "unreasonable" was felt sufficient to transform a dispute
under the contract into a breach of contract claim. This position
is now rejected.
See n
6,
supra, and
Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. United States,
supra.
[
Footnote 17]
The Court of Claims observed, for example, that the testimony
relating to the Shield Window claim took three days of the Board's
time, and the transcript runs 453 pages in length.
[
Footnote 18]
Judge Davis, in dissent below, wrote:
"This is the same general policy which nourishes the doctrine of
collateral estoppel. The court is reluctant, however, to apply that
principal to these administrative findings because of the nature
and genesis of the boards. The Wunderlich Act, as applied in
Bianchi, should dispel these doubts. The Supreme Court
made it plain that Congress intended the boards (and like
administrative representatives) to be the factfinders within their
contract area of competence, just as the Interstate Commerce
Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and the National Labor
Relations Board are the factfinders for other purposes. In the
light of
Bianchi's evaluation of the statutory policy, we
should not squint to give a crabbed reading to the board's
authority where it has stayed within its sphere, but should accept
it as the primary factfinding tribunal whose factual determinations
(in disputes under the contract) must be received, if valid, in the
same way as those of other courts or of the independent
administrative agencies. Under the more modern view, the findings
of the latter, at least when acting in an adjudicatory capacity,
are considered final, even in a suit not directly related to the
administrative proceeding, unless there is some good reason for a
new judicial inquiry into the same facts.
See Davis,
Administrative Law 566 (1951);
Fairmont Aluminum Co. v.
Commissioner, 222 F.2d 622, 627 (4th Cir., 1955). The only
reasons the majority now offers for a judicial retrial of factual
questions already determined by valid board findings are the same
policy considerations which Congress and the Supreme Court have
already discarded in the Wunderlich Act and the
Bianchi
opinion."
339 F.2d at 618, 168 Ct.Cl. at 541-542.
For a frequently quoted and similar position relating to the
finality to be given to findings of an arbitrator,
see Bower v.
Eastern Airlines, 214 F.2d 623, 626.
[
Footnote 19]
Pearson v. Williams, 202 U. S. 281;
Churchill Tabernacle v. FCC, 81 U.S.App.D.C. 411, 160 F.2d
244.
[
Footnote 20]
See generally 2 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise
§§ 18.01-18.12 (1958); Groner & Sternstein,
Res
Judicata in Federal Administrative Law, 39 Iowa L.Rev. 300
(1954).
[
Footnote 21]
Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.
S. 591, and
United States v. International Building
Co., 345 U. S. 502,
clearly contemplated the application of principles of
res
judicata to administrative findings, although, for other
reasons, in those cases,
res judicata was not applied.
[
Footnote 22]
Had the contractor not sought an extension of time in this case,
he would have forfeited this relief "under the contract" for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. But, at the same time,
the findings which the Board made in connection with the time
extension claim would not then have been available for introduction
in the breach of contract action for relief not available under the
contract.