In No. 18, a union was charged by individual employees with
violations of the National Labor Relations Act, and the Board's
General Counsel issued a complaint. The NLRB dismissed the
complaint after a hearing, and the individual employees sought
review in the Court of Appeals. The NLRB filed an answer supporting
the decision. A motion of intervention filed by the union, although
not opposed by the NLRB or the employees, was denied by the court.
The union was permitted to file a brief as
amicus curiae.
In No. 53, a union filed charges against a company and the Board's
General Counsel issued a complaint. After a hearing, the NLRB
issued a cease and desist order against the company, which
petitioned for review in the Court of Appeals. The NLRB
cross-petitioned for enforcement, and the union moved to intervene.
Both the company and the NLRB opposed intervention. The court
denied the motion and authorized the union to file an
amicus brief. Certiorari was granted in both cases.
Held:
1. Although, under 28 U.S. C. §1254(1), only a "party" to a
case in the Court of Appeals (which does not include an
amicus
curiae) may seek review here, our decision makes clear that
the petitioners had a right to obtain review of the orders denying
intervention. Pp.
382 U. S.
208-209.
2. The successful charged party in NLRB proceedings has the
right to intervene in appellate proceedings brought by the
unsuccessful charging party. Pp.
382 U. S.
209-217.
(a) While the Act does not specifically provide for intervention
at the appellate level, most courts have recognized the right of
the successful charged party to intervene. P.
382 U. S.
211.
Page 382 U. S. 206
(b) To permit such intervention in the initial appellate review
proceedings will avoid duplication of proceedings, adhere to the
goal of obtaining just results with a minimum of technical
requirements, accomplish the objective of prompt determination of
labor disputes, insure fairness to the would-be intervenor, and
will not affect this Court's discretionary review powers nor delay
or complicate appellate procedures. Pp.
382 U. S.
212-216.
(c) The element of fortuity, whereby the unsuccessful charged
party has a right to review but the successful charged party does
not, is removed. Pp.
382 U. S.
216-217.
(d) Analogies in the Judicial Review Act of 1950, and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure manifest congressional concern
that interested private parties be given a right to intervene and
participate in agency review proceedings. Pp.
382 U. S.
216-217.
3. The successful charging party in NLRB proceedings also has
the right to intervene in the appellate review. Pp.
382 U. S.
217-222.
(a) A successful charging party, being not only a member of the
general public whose interests are protected by the NLRB but also
one with vital private interests which are involved and protected
by the Act in its blending of both interests, is entitled to
recognition as a party in appellate proceedings.
Amalgamated
Util. Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.
S. 261, distinguished. Pp.
382 U. S.
219-221.
(b) When the court rules on the merits of an NLRB order, the Act
supports the view that the court, and not the agency, defines the
public interest. P.
382 U. S.
221.
(c) This Court, and not the Labor Board, is the body having
discretion to decide which cases are suitable vehicles to raise
important issues on certiorari. P.
382 U. S.
221.
(d) As in the case of the charged party, the successful charging
party should have the same right as an unsuccessful party in
appearing before an appellate court. P.
382 U. S.
222.
No. 53, 339 F.2d 801, and No. 18, reversed and remanded.
Page 382 U. S. 207
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The two cases before us present converse sides of a single
question -- whether parties who are wholly successful in unfair
labor practice proceedings before the National Labor Relations
Board have a right to intervene in the Court of Appeals review
proceedings.
In No. 18 (
Scofield), the Union Local was charged by
four individual employees with violations of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C.
§ 151
et seq. (1964 ed.), for fining certain Union
members for exceeding incentive pay ceilings set by the Union. The
General Counsel of the Board issued a complaint. After a full
hearing, the Board dismissed the complaint, 145 N.L.R.B. 1097. The
individual employees then sought review in the Seventh Circuit. The
General Counsel filed an answer supporting the decision. At this
point, the Union filed a timely motion of intervention, alleging
that it would be directly affected should the appellate court set
aside the Board's decision and direct the entry of a remedial order
against it. Neither the individual employees nor the Board opposed
intervention. A division of the Seventh Circuit denied the motion
to intervene, but authorized the Union to file a brief as
amicus curiae without leave to participate in oral
argument. The Union sought review here, and we granted certiorari
to review the denial of intervention because of the importance of
the issue and the conflict among the courts of appeals, 379 U.S.
959. Further proceedings were stayed pending the completion of our
review.
In No. 53 (
Fafnir), the Local filed unfair labor
practice charges against the Fafnir Bearing Company. The
Page 382 U. S. 208
charging party alleged that the company had violated its
statutory bargaining obligation by refusing to permit the
contracting Union to conduct its own time studies of job operations
in the plant. The Union allegedly needed to conduct these studies
to ascertain whether it should proceed to arbitration. The General
Counsel issued a complaint, a hearing was held, and the Board
entered a cease and desist order against the company, 146 N.L.R.B.
1582. The company petitioned for review in the Second Circuit, and
the Board filed a cross-petition for enforcement. The Union -- the
successful party before the Board -- moved to intervene, alleging
numerous grounds in support. Both the company and the Board opposed
intervention. The Second Circuit denied the motion, although
cognizant of the difficulties of the problem, and authorized the
Union to file an
amicus brief.
Fafnir Bearing Co. v.
NLRB, 339 F.2d 801. We granted certiorari, 380 U.S. 950, and
consolidated
Fafnir with
Scofield in order to
consider both facets of the intervention problem.
We hold that both the successful charged party (in
Scofield) and the successful charging party (in
Fafnir) have a right to intervene in the Court of Appeals
proceeding which reviews or enforces Labor Board orders. We think
that Congress intended to confer intervention rights upon the
successful party to the Labor Board proceedings in the court in
which the unsuccessful party challenges the Board's decision.
A threshold question concerns our jurisdiction to grant
certiorari. Under § 1254(1) of the Judicial Code, [
Footnote 1] only
Page 382 U. S. 209
a "party" to a case in the Court of Appeals may seek review
here. In both these cases, the Union seeking certiorari was denied
intervention and relegated to the status of an
amicus
curiae. Because an
amicus is not a "party" to the
case, it would not have been entitled to file a petition to review
a judgment on the merits by the Court of Appeals,
Ex parte Leaf
Tobacco Board, 222 U. S. 578,
222 U. S. 581;
Ex parte Cutting, 94 U. S. 14,
94 U. S. 20-22.
In view of our decision herein, we think that § 1254(1)
permits us to review the orders denying intervention.
See
Railroad Trainmen v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 331 U.
S. 519.
I
Congress has made a careful adjustment of the individual and
administrative interests throughout the course of litigation over a
labor dispute. The Labor Act does not, however, provide explicitly
for intervention at the appellate court level. Section 10(f) of the
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1964 ed.), serves as our guide, even
though it is silent on the intervention problem. It states, in
pertinent part:
"Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board granting or
denying in whole or in part the relief sought may obtain a review
of such order in any United States court of appeals in the circuit
wherein the unfair labor practice in question was alleged to have
been engaged in or wherein such person resides or transacts
business, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia, by filing in such a court a written petition praying
that the order of the Board be modified or set aside."
Similarly, no specific standards govern the propriety of
intervention in Labor Board review proceedings. The Rules of the
Courts of Appeals typically provide:
"A person desiring to intervene in a case where the
applicable
Page 382 U. S. 210
statute does not provide for intervention shall file with the
court and serve upon all parties a motion for leave to intervene.
[
Footnote 2]"
Lacking a clear directive on the subject, we look to the
statutory design of the Act.
Cf. Scripps-Howard Radio v.
Commission, 316 U. S. 4,
316 U. S. 11. Of
course, in considering the propriety of intervention in the courts
of appeals, our discussion is limited to Labor Board review
proceedings. Federal agencies are not fungibles for intervention
purposes -- Congress has treated the matter with attention to the
particular statutory scheme and agency.
In some instances, the words of the statute themselves elicit an
answer. When the Board enters a final order against the charged
party, it is clear that the phrase "[a]ny person aggrieved" in
§ 10(f) enables him to seek immediate review in the
appropriate Court of Appeals. Alternatively, if the Board
determines that a complaint should be dismissed, the charging party
has a statutory right to review as a "person aggrieved." A hybrid
situation occurs when the Board dismisses certain portions of the
complaint and issues an order on others. As to that portion which
results in a remedial order against him, the charged party is
aggrieved; likewise, the charging party is aggrieved with respect
to the portion of the decision dismissing the complaint. Each one
is a "party" in a consolidated appeal, and has invariably been
granted leave to intervene with regard to the portion of the order
on which the Board found in his favor. [
Footnote 3]
Page 382 U. S. 211
Scofield serves as an example of another variant in
review proceedings. The unsuccessful charging party to the Board
proceedings petitioned for review, and the successful charged party
wished to intervene. The vast majority of the courts have
recognized his right to do so. [
Footnote 4] Recognition of intervention rights in this
instance is in complete accord with the statements in
Ford
Motor Co. v. Labor Board, 305 U. S. 364,
305 U. S. 369,
305 U. S. 373,
that:
"While Section 10(f) assures to any aggrieved person opportunity
to contest the Board's order, it does not require an unnecessary
duplication of proceedings. The aim of the Act is to attain
simplicity and directness both in the administrative procedure and
on judicial review. . . ."
"
* * * *"
". . . The jurisdiction to review the orders of the Labor
Relations Board is vested in a court with equity powers, and while
the court must act within the bounds of the statute and without
intruding upon the administrative province, it may adjust its
Page 382 U. S. 212
relief to the exigencies of the case in accordance with the
equitable principles governing judicial action. The purpose of the
judicial review is consonant with that of the administrative
proceeding itself -- to secure a just result with a minimum of
technical requirements. . . ."
To allow intervention to the charged party in the first
appellate review proceeding is to avoid "unnecessary duplication of
proceedings," and to adhere to the goal of obtaining "a just result
with a minimum of technical requirements." Analysis of the Act's
machinery in practice so indicates. A decision of the reviewing
court to set aside a Board order dismissing a complaint has the
effect of returning the case to the Board for further proceedings.
This normally results in the Board's entering an order against the
charged party. From this remedial order, as noted, the charged
party is aggrieved, and may seek review. Judicial time and energy
is then expended in pursuit of issues already resolved in the first
appeal. [
Footnote 5] Moreover,
the second appeal could lead to undesirable
Page 382 U. S. 213
"circuit shopping" and useless proliferation of judicial effort.
Under § 10(f), an aggrieved person has the option of obtaining
review either in the circuit in which he maintains his residence or
place of business or in the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit. In the second appellate proceeding, he could
obtain a hearing in the circuit which did not originally decide the
validity of the Board's dismissal of the complaint. Permitting
intervention in the first review thus centralizes the controversy
and limits it to a single decision, accelerating final resolution.
This is in accord with one of the objectives of the Labor Act --
the prompt determination of labor disputes.
Permitting intervention also insures fairness to the would-be
intervenor. If intervention is permitted, the parties to the Board
proceedings are able to present their arguments on the issues to a
reviewing court which has not crystallized its views. To be sure,
if intervention is denied in the initial review proceeding, the
charged party would not be bound by the decision under technical
res judicata rules. Still, the salient facts having been
resolved and the legal problems answered in this initial review,
subsequent litigation serves little practical value to the
potential intervenor. In the second appellate proceeding, the Court
of Appeals would almost invariably defer to the initial decision as
a matter of
stare decisis or of comity. [
Footnote 6]
See, e.g., Henry I. Siegel
Co., Inc. v. Labor Board, 340
Page 382 U. S. 214
F.2d 309;
Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 949-950,
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934.
Allowing intervention does not affect the discretionary review
powers of this Court. One occupying the status of intervenor in the
Court of Appeals proceeding may seek certiorari from the decision
there,
Steelworkers v. Labor Board, 373 U.S. 908;
376 U. S. 492;
International Union of Mine Workers v. Eagle-Picher Co.,
325 U. S. 335,
325 U. S.
338-339. Denial of intervention in the initial review
proceedings -- and the attendant remand to the Board and second
appeal to the Court of Appeals -- only results in a delay of the
time when the disaffected party may seek review here. Should we
decide to grant certiorari, the first review would seem the more
propitious time, since all the parties are then before the Court
and the dispute has been fully developed without inconvenience to
either private party.
Steelworkers v. Labor Board,
376 U. S. 492,
affords an apt illustration. The Court of Appeals had permitted
intervention to the charged party, who sought review from the
adverse decision there. We reversed unanimously. The Board itself
had not sought certiorari, because
"the Solicitor General concluded that other cases were entitled
to priority in selecting the limited number of cases which the
government [could] properly ask this Court to review."
Memorandum for the NLRB, p. 2, filed in connection with the
petition for certiorari, No. 89, October Term, 1963. Had the
charged party been denied intervention in the Court of Appeals, the
decision of the Government not to apply for certiorari -- unrelated
to the merits of the cause -- would have unnecessarily postponed
resolution on that important issue. [
Footnote 7]
Page 382 U. S. 215
In fact, the Labor Board itself agrees that intervention by
charged parties will not impair effective discharge of its duties,
and may well promote the public interest. The rights typically
secured to an intervenor in a reviewing court -- to participate in
designating the record, to participate in prehearing conferences
preparatory to simplification of the issues, to file a brief, to
engage in oral argument, to petition for rehearing in the appellate
court or to this Court for certiorari -- are not productive of
delay, nor do they cause complications in the appellate courts.
Appellate records in Labor Board cases are generally complete, and
whatever material the charged party may see fit to add to the
appendix will not affect the burden in preparation. Participation
in defining the issues before the court guarantees that all
relevant material is brought to its attention, and makes the briefs
on the merits more meaningful. The charged party is usually
accorded the right as an
amicus to file a brief on the
merits even if denied intervention. Participation in oral argument
does not necessarily enlarge the total time allocated, since
parties aligned on the same side are usually required to share the
time. [
Footnote 8] And, as
noted, petitioning for certiorari at this time has the salutary
effect of insuring prompt adjudication. Further, if a charged party
permitted to intervene decides to acquiesce in the
Page 382 U. S. 216
decision or if certiorari is denied by this Court, it is likely
that he will then stipulate to the entry of an order against him.
This would obviate the need for supplemental agency or court
proceedings. On the other hand, an
amicus -- with the
exception of the right to file a brief -- might be unable
adequately to present all the relevant data to the court.
Finally, an element of fortuity would be injected by the denial
of intervention to a successful party in the Board proceedings.
When the charged party loses before the Board, he is accorded a
statutory right to immediate review, and may seek or oppose this
Court's ultimate review of the case. If he prevails at the agency
level, however, denial of intervention deprives him of the rights
accorded a losing party, even though the issue before the reviewing
court is identical -- whether a remedial order should have been
entered against the charged party. These considerations lead us to
the assumption that Congress would not intend, without clearly
expressing a view to the contrary, that a party should suffer by
his own success before the agency.
Additionally, helpful analogies may be found in the Judicial
Review Act of 1950, governing intervention in the Courts of Appeals
by private parties directly affected by agency orders, [
Footnote 9] and in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. [
Footnote
10]
Page 382 U. S. 217
We take these provisions to mean that Congress has exhibited a
concern that interested private parties be given a right to
intervene and participate in the review proceedings involving the
specified agency and its orders.
II
The problem of whether intervention should be granted to the
successful charging party to the Labor Board proceedings presents
considerations somewhat distinct from the case of the intervening
charged party. Resolution of the problem is no easy matter, and it
is understandable that the courts have divided on the issue.
[
Footnote 11] Still, we
believe that Congress intended intervention rights to obtain.
The Board opposes intervention in
Fafnir. A charged
party may incur a liability on account of an order being entered
against him. Fairness to him thus requires that
Page 382 U. S. 218
he be allowed to intervene to preclude that possibility. On the
other hand, the Board reasons, the charging party stands only to
become a beneficiary of an order entered. [
Footnote 12] As such, he is but another member
of the public whose interests the Board is designed to serve. The
Labor Board is said to be the custodian of the "public interest,"
to the exclusion of the so-called "private interests" at stake.
Support for this view is claimed to be found in our decision in
Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co.,
309 U. S. 261
(1940). Also, the Board fears that enabling the intervenor to
petition for certiorari from an adverse circuit decision will be
inimical to the public interest. We disagree.
In prior decisions, this Court has observed that the Labor Act
recognizes the existence of private rights within the statutory
scheme. [
Footnote 13] These
cases have, to be sure, emphasized the "public interest" factor. To
employ the rhetoric of "public interest," however, is not to imply
that the public right excludes recognition of parochial private
interests. A perusal of the statutory scheme and of the Board's
Rules and Regulations is illustrative.
Page 382 U. S. 219
The statutory machinery begins with the filing of an unfair
labor practice charge by a private person, § 10(b), 61 Stat.
146;
see also 24 Fed.Reg. 9102 (1959), 29 CFR § 102.9
(1965). When the General Counsel issues a complaint and the
proceeding reaches the adjudicative stage, the course the hearing
will take is in the agency's control, but the charging party is
accorded formal recognition: he participates in the hearings as a
"party"; [
Footnote 14] he
may call witnesses and cross-examine others, may file exceptions to
any order of the trial examiner, and may file a petition for
reconsideration to a Board order, 28 Fed.Reg. 7973 (1963), as
amended, 29 CFR § 102.46 (1965). Of course, if the Board
dismisses the complaint, he can obtain review as a person
aggrieved, which serves the "public interest" by guaranteeing that
the Board interpretation of the relevant provisions accords with
the intent of Congress. [
Footnote 15]
Page 382 U. S. 220
And that the charging party may have vital "private rights" in
the Board proceeding is clear in this very case, which also
involves, potentially, a breach of the parties' collective
bargaining agreement. [
Footnote
16] Under our decisions in the
Steelworkers trilogy,
363 U. S. 564,
363 U. S. 574,
363 U. S. 593, and
Carey v. Westinghouse Corp., 375 U.
S. 261, the Union could take whatever contractual claim
it had to arbitration and from there to a federal court. And while
it is true that the rights and duties under § 301(a) of the
Labor Act, 61 Stat. 156, are not coextensive with those redressed
in Labor Board proceedings, a determination by an appellate court
that the Union has no statutory right to conduct its own time
studies will surely have an impact upon a later decision by an
arbitrator or an appellate court under § 301(a) on the
contractual issue.
In short, we think that the statutory pattern of the Labor Act
does not dichotomize "public," as opposed to "private," interests.
Rather, the two interblend in the intricate statutory scheme.
[
Footnote 17] Nor do we
think that our holding in
Amalgamated Utility Workers v.
Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U. S. 261,
casts doubt on these notions. The Court there held that private
parties who initiated unfair labor practice charges may not
prosecute a contempt action against the charged
Page 382 U. S. 221
party in the court which enforces the Labor Board order.
[
Footnote 18] In the same
case, the private parties had been permitted to intervene in the
Court of Appeals when the merits of the Board's decision were at
stake, 309 U.S. at
309 U. S. 263.
We find nothing inconsistent in denying the right of a private
party to institute a contempt proceeding -- where the Board's
expertness in achieving compliance with orders is challenged --
and, on the other hand, in permitting intervention in a proceeding
already in the court for decision. When the court is to rule on the
merits of the Board's order, the Act supports the view that it is
the court, and not the agency, which will define the public
interest,
see § 10(d), 49 Stat. 454,
Ford Motor
Co. v. Labor Board, 305 U. S. 364.
The Board also argues that permitting intervention will
adversely affect its tactical or budgetary decision not to bring a
case here for review. But the opportunity is open to the Board to
advise this Court whether a case that the intervening charging
party brings here is an appropriate vehicle to raise important
issues. And Congress
Page 382 U. S. 222
has entrusted to this Court, rather than the Labor Board,
discretionary jurisdiction to review cases decided by the Courts of
Appeals. [
Footnote 19]
Many of the considerations which favor intervention in
Scofield are also pertinent here. [
Footnote 20] Of special note is the
capriciousness we would have to ascribe to Congress in refusing to
afford the successful party to a Labor Board proceeding an
opportunity tantamount to that of the unsuccessful party in
persuading an appellate court. The charging party, like the charged
party, should not be prejudiced by his success before the agency.
Accordingly, we reverse both cases and remand them to the
respective courts for further proceedings.
It is so ordered.
* Together with No. 53,
International Union, United
Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of
America, Local 1, UAW, AFL-CIO v. Fafnir Bearing Co. et al.,
on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.
[
Footnote 1]
Section 1254(1), 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (1964 ed.),
provides:
"Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme
Court . . . :"
"(1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any
party to any civil . . . case, before or after rendition of
judgment or decree."
[
Footnote 2]
Second Circuit Rule 13(f); Seventh Circuit Rule 14(f). The other
circuits which provide for intervention have substantively
identical rules: First Circuit Rule 16(6); Third Circuit Rule
18(6); Fourth Circuit Rule 27(6); Sixth Circuit Rule 13(6); Eighth
Circuit Rule 27(f); Ninth Circuit Rule 34(6); Tenth Circuit Rule
34(6); District of Columbia Circuit Rule 38(f).
[
Footnote 3]
Darlington Mfg. Co. v. Labor Board, 325 F.2d 682
(C.A.4th Cir.),
vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom.
Textile Workers v. Darlington Co., 380 U.
S. 263;
Industrial Union of Marine &
Shipbuilding Workers v. Labor Board, 320 F.2d 615 (C.A.3d
Cir.);
Labor Board v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp.,
236 F.2d 898 (C.A.6th Cir.);
see also American Newspaper
Publishers Assn. v. Labor Board, 190 F.2d 45 (C.A.7th
Cir.).
[
Footnote 4]
Carrier Corp. v. Labor Board, 311 F.2d 135 (C.A.2d
Cir.),
reversed on other grounds sub nom. Steelworkers v. Labor
Board, 376 U. S. 492;
Local 1441, Retail Clerks International Assn. v. Labor
Board, 117 U.S.App.D.C. 120, 326 F.2d 663;
Amalgamated
Clothing Workers of America v. Labor Board, 324 F.2d 228
(C.A.2d Cir.);
Minnesota Milk Co. v. Labor Board, 314 F.2d
761 (C.A.8th Cir.);
Great Western Broadcasting Corp. v. Labor
Board, 310 F.2d 591 (C.A.9th Cir.);
Selby-Battersby &
Co. v. Labor Board, 259 F.2d 151 (C.A.4th Cir.);
Kovach v.
Labor Board, 229 F.2d 138 (C.A.7th Cir.).
Contra, Superior
Derrick Corp. v. Labor Board, 273 F.2d 891 (C.A.5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 816;
Amalgamated Meat Cutters
v. Labor Board, 267 F.2d 169 (C.A.1st Cir.),
cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 863;
Haleston Drug Stores, Inc. v. Labor
Board, 190 F.2d 1022 (C.A.9th Cir.).
[
Footnote 5]
There are, of course, cases in which the Court of Appeals will
remand to the Board to take additional evidence or to reconsider
the order in light of litigational developments. In these cases,
there is a greater opportunity for the party originally victorious
before the Board successfully to persuade it or the appellate court
then in the case in which no additional evidence need be taken.
Still, the considerations discussed herein strongly suggest the
propriety of intervention in these cases as well, especially since,
at the time a motion for leave to intervene is filed, the reviewing
court will not be fully apprised of the issues involved in the
case.
Then, too, only 12 proceedings in which the Board had entered an
order dismissing the complaint and the charging party appealed the
dismissal in the Court of Appeals occurred during the 1964 fiscal
year.
See 29 NLRB Ann.Rep. 201, Table 19 (1964). In eight
of these, the Board orders were affirmed in full.
Ibid.
The small caseload gives further support for the notion that the
courts of appeals, and the Board, will not be disadvantaged by
allowing intervention to the charged party.
[
Footnote 6]
In the rare instance in which the reviewing court does not abide
by these principles, an even more aggravated situation could
result. In the second review proceeding, if the now-successful
charging party is denied intervention and the appellate court takes
a different view of the applicable law, the charging party might
later have the opportunity to seek review again as a "person
aggrieved." Thus, three or even more review proceedings could be
engendered out of the failure to permit intervention at the most
convenient stage -- the initial review proceeding. Such an
incongruous result should not be sanctioned in light of our
statement in
Ford Motor Co. v. Labor Board, 305 U.
S. 364,
305 U. S. 370,
that, although
"there are two proceedings, separately carried on the docket,
they were essentially one so far as any question as to the legality
of the Board's order was concerned."
[
Footnote 7]
The Labor Board may also adversely affect the rights of the
private parties in other instances. For example, the Board may
decide a case and later reevaluate its position at a time when that
case is before an appellate court. The General Counsel, in such a
situation, cannot be expected wholeheartedly to attempt to convince
an appellate court of the correctness of a doctrine which the Board
itself has abandoned.
[
Footnote 8]
First Circuit Rule 28(3); Second Circuit Rule 23(c); Third
Circuit Rule 31(3); Fourth Circuit Rule 15(3); Fifth Circuit Rule
25(3); Sixth Circuit Rule 20(3); Seventh Circuit Rule 21(b); Eighth
Circuit Rule 13(c); Ninth Circuit Rule 20(3); Tenth Circuit Rule
20(3); District of Columbia Circuit Rule 19(c).
Additionally, all the circuits have rules which permit the court
to increase the time for oral argument upon a showing of good
cause.
[
Footnote 9]
Review of commission orders in general is governed by the
provisions of the Judicial Review Act of 1950 (the Hobbs Act), 64
Stat. 1129, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1031-1042 (1964 ed.). The
provision regarding appellate court intervention, 5 U.S.C. §
1038, provides as follows:
"The Attorney General shall be responsible for and have charge
and control of the interests of the Government in all court
proceedings authorized by this chapter. The agency, and any party
or parties in interest in the proceeding before the agency whose
interests will be affected if an order of the agency is or is not
enjoined, set aside, or suspended, may appear as parties thereto of
their own motion and as of right, and be represented by counsel in
any proceeding to review such order. . . ."
[
Footnote 10]
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of course, apply only in
the federal district courts. Still, the policies underlying
intervention may be applicable in appellate courts. Under Rule
24(a)(2) or Rule 24(b)(2), we think the charged party would be
entitled to intervene.
See Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v.
United States, 312 U. S. 502,
312 U. S.
505-506;
Textile Workers Union of America v.
Allendale, 96 U.S.App.D.C. 401, 403-404, 266 F.2d 765,
767-768.
The Advisory Panel on Labor-Management Relations Law issued a
report, S.Doc. No. 81, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), which contained
a statement of policy that "any party to NLRB proceedings should be
allowed to intervene in the appellate proceedings," p. 17.
[
Footnote 11]
The cases which have permitted intervention usually have not
discussed the question,
e.g., Labor Board v. Johnson, 322
F.2d 216 (C.A.6th Cir.);
Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Labor
Board, 210 F.2d 852 (C.A.7th Cir.),
cert. denied, sub nom.
Kearney-Trecker Employees, UAW v. Labor Board, 348 U.S. 824;
West Texas Utilities Co. v. Labor Board, 87 U.S.App.D.C.
179, 184 F.2d 233,
cert. denied, 341 U.S. 939.
Contra,
Labor Board v. Retail Clerks Assn., 243 F.2d 777, 783 (C.A.9th
Cir.);
Stewart Die Casting Corp. v. Labor Board, 132 F.2d
801 (C.A.7th Cir.);
Aluminum Ore Co. v. Labor Board, 131
F.2d 485, 488 (C.A.7th Cir.).
[
Footnote 12]
Cf. Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts and The
Federal System, 326 (1953):
"Haven't you noticed how frequently the protected groups in an
administrative program pay for their protection by a sacrifice of
procedural and litigating rights? The agency becomes their
champion, and they stand or fall by it. Does this phenomenon
reflect a disregard or a recognition of the equities of the
situation?"
See also Jaffe, The Public Right Dogma in (1946).
[
Footnote 13]
Labor Board v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp.,
306 U. S. 240,
306 U. S. 258;
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U.
S. 177,
313 U. S. 194;
Nathanson v. Labor Board, 344 U. S.
25,
344 U. S. 27;
Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U.
S. 195.
See Jaffe, The Individual Right to
Initiate Administrative Process, 25 Iowa L.Rev. 485, 528-531
(1940).
[
Footnote 14]
The NLRB Rules and Regulations and Statements of Procedure, 29
CFR § 102.8 (1965), afford the charging party this status. The
section provides as follows:
"The term 'party' as used herein shall mean . . . any person
named or admitted as a party, or properly seeking and entitled as
of right to be admitted as a party, in any Board proceeding,
including, without limitation,
any person filing a charge
or petition under the act, any person named as respondent, as
employer, or as party to a contract in any proceeding under the
act. . . ."
(Emphasis added.)
[
Footnote 15]
For an analysis of the rights of a charging party before the
Board,
see Comment, 32 U.Chi.L.Rev. 786 (1965). Of course,
the considerations involved in determining whether the charging
party has certain rights before the Board are not dispositive on
the question of appellate intervention. In the first place, the
need for centralized control over the agency hearings and the
standards under which they operate is much greater at the
administrative than the appellate level, where perforce an adequate
record has been made for adjudication. Also, the statistics of the
NLRB reveal that over 97% of the unfair labor practice charges are
resolved before the circuit court has entered a decree. 29 NLRB
Ann.Rep. 178-179, Table 7 (1964). This winnowing process diminishes
once a case is lodged in the circuit court and falls within our
supervisory power over the federal courts. Then, too, manpower and
budgetary considerations are of great concern at the administrative
level. These factors are not nearly as great when a labor dispute
reaches the appellate courts since the Board will invariably appear
to defend its order.
[
Footnote 16]
In the Board's opinion in
Fafnir, the charging party's
interests were referred to a dozen times as a statutory right of
the "private party," 146 N.L.R.B. at 1585-1587.
[
Footnote 17]
See Retail Clerks Local 137 v. Food Employers Council,
Inc., 351 F.2d 525.
[
Footnote 18]
The Court placed great weight upon the language and legislative
history behind § 10(a), 49 Stat. 453, as it read at that
time:
"The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any
person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in
section 8) affecting commerce.
This power shall be
exclusive, and shall not be affected by any other means of
adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by
agreement, code, law, or otherwise."
(Emphasis added.) The italicized portion of § 10(a) was
deleted in the Taft-Hartley amendments to the Wagner Act in 1947,
when Congress added the union unfair labor practice provisions and
enacted § 301(a). While it is true that the Labor Board does
not confer a private administrative remedy, it is equally true
that, since 1947, it serves substantially as an organ for
adjudicating private disputes.
See Report of the Advisory
Panel on Labor, Management Relations Law,
supra, n 10, p. 5.
[
Footnote 19]
The Board also claims that the charging party, if permitted to
intervene, will be able to thwart proposed settlements between the
Board and the charged party when the case is in the appellate
court. Nothing in the record indicates that this will be the
consequence of allowing intervention and we intimate no view on the
question.
[
Footnote 20]
As in the case of the charged party, disallowing intervention
could lead to duplicity in appellate review, "circuit shopping,"
unfairness to the successful party to the Board proceedings,
etc.