An indictment against appellee under the Sherman Act and
Conspiracy Act concerned matters about which he had previously
testified before a congressional subcommittee. The District Court
dismissed the indictment, upholding appellee's contention that
prosecution was barred under the immunity provision of the Act of
February 25, 1903, providing that no person shall be prosecuted on
account of any matter concerning which he testifies "in any
proceeding, suit, or prosecution" under the Sherman Act and other
specified statutes.
Held: Appellee's testimony before the congressional
subcommittee did not immunize him from prosecution, the Act of
February 25, 1903, as amended in 1906, confining immunity to
persons who testify in judicial proceedings under oath and in
response to a subpoena.
215 F. Supp. 656 reversed and remanded.
MR. JUSTICE GOLDBERG delivered the opinion of the Court.
This appeal presents the question of whether a person who has
testified under subpoena before a congressional committee
investigating the operation of the Antitrust Acts has testified in
a "proceeding, suit, or prosecution under said Acts" thereby
acquiring immunity from prosecution
Page 377 U. S. 96
under the Act of February 25, 1903, 32 Stat. 854, 904. [
Footnote 1]
The facts are undisputed. On September 6, 1962, appellee, along
with other individuals and corporations, was indicted on charges of
conspiring to fix milk prices and to defraud the United States, in
violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 1, and the Conspiracy Act, 62 Stat. 701, 18 U.S.C.
§ 371. Appellee moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground,
inter alia, that the prosecution was barred under the
immunity provision of the Act of February 25, 1903, because he had
previously testified before a subcommittee of the House Select
Committee on Small Business concerning matters covered by the
indictment. The Government opposed the motion to dismiss,
contending that the immunity provision of the Act of February 25,
1903, extends only to judicial proceedings, and not to hearings
before congressional committees. [
Footnote 2] The District Court for the District of
Massachusetts, rejecting the Government's contention, dismissed the
indictment against appellee. The Government appealed the dismissal
directly to this Court pursuant to the Criminal Appeals Act, 62
Stat. 844, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 3731. Probable jurisdiction
was noted. 375 U.S. 809.
We hold, for the reasons stated below, that the immunity
provision of the Act of February 25, 1903, applies only to persons
testifying in judicial proceedings, not to persons testifying
before committees or subcommittees of Congress.
The immunity provision in question was enacted as part of an
appropriations act which declared:
"That for the enforcement of the provisions of the Act entitled
'An Act to regulate commerce,'
Page 377 U. S. 97
approved February fourth, eighteen hundred and eighty-seven, and
all Acts amendatory thereof or supplemental thereto, and of the Act
entitled 'An Act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful
restraints and monopolies,' approved July second, eighteen hundred
and ninety, and all Acts amendatory thereof or supplemental
thereto, and sections seventy-three, seventy-four, seventy-five,
and seventy-six of the Act entitled 'An Act to reduce taxation, to
provide revenue for the Government, and other purposes,' approved
August twenty-seventh, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, the sum of
five hundred thousand dollars, to be immediately available, is
hereby appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not
heretofore appropriated, to be expended under the direction of the
Attorney General in the employment of special counsel and agents of
the Department of Justice
to conduct proceedings, suits, and
prosecutions under said Acts in the courts of the United States:
Provided, That no person shall be prosecuted or be subjected
to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction,
matter, or thing concerning which he may testify or produce
evidence, documentary or otherwise, in any proceeding, suit, or
prosecution under said Acts. . . ."
32 Stat. 903-904. (Emphasis added.)
By any common sense reading of this statute, the words "any
proceeding, suit, or prosecution under said Acts" in the proviso
plainly refer to the phrase "proceedings, suits, and prosecutions
under said Acts in the courts of the United States," in the
previous clause. The words "under said Acts" confirmed that the
immunity provision is limited to judicial proceedings, which are
brought "under" specific existing acts, such as the Sherman Act or
the Commerce Act. Congressional investigations, although they may
relate to specific existing acts, are not
Page 377 U. S. 98
generally so restricted in purpose or scope as to be spoken of
as being brought "under" these Acts. [
Footnote 3]
In
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43,
decided only three years after the passage of the Act of February
25, 1903, this Court construed that Act in accordance with the
plain meaning of its words as follows:
"While there may be some doubt whether the examination of
witnesses before a grand jury is a suit or prosecution, we have no
doubt that it is a 'proceeding' within the meaning of this proviso.
The word should receive as wide a construction as is necessary to
protect the witness in his disclosures, whenever such disclosures
are made in pursuance of a judicial inquiry, whether such inquiry
be instituted by a grand jury or upon the trial of an indictment
found by them."
Id. at
201 U. S. 66.
(Emphasis added.) We conclude, therefore, that, as enacted, the Act
of February 25, 1903, applies only to judicial proceedings.
[
Footnote 4]
Page 377 U. S. 99
Appellee does not really dispute this. His basic contention,
which is not accepted by any member of the Court, [
Footnote 5] is that the 1906 immunity statute
[
Footnote 6] amended the Act of
February 25, 1903, to extend immunity to persons who testified in
nonjudicial, as well as judicial, proceedings. He does not contend
that the 1906 statute, by its terms, so amended the 1903 Act. He
offers the following interpretation of the events leading up to the
enactment of the 1906 statute in support of the contention that the
1903 Act was amended by implication to extend to nonjudicial
proceedings. In the case of
United States v. Armour &
Co., 142 F. 808, decided three years after the enactment of
the 1903 Act, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois held that certain defendants had been
immunized from prosecution under the Antitrust Laws by giving
unsubpoenaed and
unsworn testimony in a
nonjudicial investigation conducted
Page 377 U. S. 100
by the Commissioner of Corporations, [
Footnote 7] an official of the Department of Commerce
and Labor. [
Footnote 8]
Congressional reaction to this decision was immediate and adverse,
and within four months, Congress enacted the 1906 immunity statute.
[
Footnote 9] This statute
specifically limited immunity under existing immunity statutes to
persons testifying
under oath and
in obedience to
subpoena. [
Footnote 10]
Appellee contends that the purpose of Congress in enacting the 1906
statute was to remedy the objectionable features of the
Armour decision, and that, since the statute did not
"remedy" the court's holding that immunity could be obtained by
testifying in a nonjudicial proceeding, it follows that Congress
did not regard that holding as objectionable. He asks us to
conclude, therefore, that
Page 377 U. S. 101
"proceeding," as used in the immunity provision of the Act of
February 25, 1903, must now be read to include nonjudicial, as well
as judicial, proceedings.
This argument erroneously assumes that the
Armour
decision rested on a construction of "proceeding, suit, or
prosecution" in the immunity provision of the Act of February 25,
1903. A reading of that decision reveals, however, that it rested
primarily on the Commerce and Labor Act, which contained a specific
grant of immunity to persons who testified in investigations,
admittedly nonjudicial, conducted by the Commissioner of
Corporations. [
Footnote 11]
In deciding the
Armour case, the court felt it
Page 377 U. S. 102
"necessary to look into the purposes of Congress in passing the
commerce and labor act in order that the court may determine what
construction will best carry out the legislative intent."
142 F. at 819. After a detailed analysis of that statute and its
history, the court concluded that the Commerce and Labor Act was
dispositive of the case, and that defendants were entitled to
immunity thereunder. Following this conclusion, the judge added a
brief paragraph in which he said, without analyzing (or even
quoting) the language or history of the Act of February 25, 1903,
that he was "of opinion" that the defendants would also be entitled
to immunity under that Act as well.
Id., 142 F. at 826.
[
Footnote 12] In the very
next paragraph,
Page 377 U. S. 103
however, the judge again described the opinion as resting on
"the construction here given to the commerce and labor law. . . ."
Ibid.
The controversial feature of the
Armour decision, and
the only one which Congress was interested in remedying, was the
holding that unsubpoenaed and unsworn testimony came within "the
purposes of Congress in passing the commerce and labor act. . . ."
142 F. at 819. Congress wanted to be certain that persons
anticipating indictment could not immunize themselves from
prosecution by volunteering to give unsworn testimony. [
Footnote 13] There was nothing
controversial about the court's holding that immunity could result
from testimony given in an investigation conducted by the
Commissioner of Corporations, since the Commerce and Labor Act
specifically granted immunity for testimony given in such an
investigation.
It is not at all significant, therefore, that Congress, while
"remedying" the
Armour holding that immunity could be
obtained from testimony which was unsworn and voluntary, did not
"remedy" the holding that immunity could result from testimony
given in nonjudicial investigations conducted by the Commissioner
of Corporations.
Page 377 U. S. 104
Congress, in enacting the 1906 statute, did not manifest any
intent to enlarge the reach of the immunity provision of the Act of
February 25, 1903, to include nonjudicial proceedings. The purpose
of the 1906 statute was not to define the type of proceeding in
which immunity, under existing statutes, could be obtained. Its
sole purpose was to define the type of testimony for which
immunity, under existing statutes, could be obtained. This is all
Congress was asked to do by President Theodore Roosevelt in his
message recommending the legislation which became the 1906 statute.
In his message, the President said:
"It has hitherto been supposed that the immunity conferred by
existing laws was only upon persons who, being subpoenaed, had
given testimony or produced evidence. . . ."
"
* * * *"
"But Judge Humphrey [the district judge who decided the
Armour case] holds that, if the Commissioner of
Corporations (and therefore if the Interstate Commerce Commission),
in the course of any investigations prescribed by Congress, asks
any questions of a person not called as a witness, or asks any
questions of an officer of a corporation not called as a witness,
with regard to the action of the corporation on a subject out of
which prosecutions may subsequently arise, then the fact of such
questions having been asked operates as a bar to the prosecution of
that person or of that officer of the corporation for his own
misdeeds. Such interpretation of the law comes measurably near
making the law a farce, and I therefore recommend that the Congress
pass a declaratory act stating its real intention."
H.R.Doc. No. 706, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. The limited purpose of
the 1906 Act is also apparent from the response made by Senator
Knox, the manager of the
Page 377 U. S. 105
bill which became the 1906 Act, [
Footnote 14] to a statement made by Senator Daniel, a
critic of immunity legislation. Senator Daniel said:
"I suppose that the bill under consideration, as it reads now,
applies only to persons who testify in a judicial proceeding or to
those who are responding to some body such as a Congressional
committee that has the right to enforce an answer from a witness.
[
Footnote 15]"
"
* * * *"
"I should like very much to hear from the patron of this bill
some statement as to the present state of the law, and as to the
benefits to be derived from the bill."
Senator Knox responded as follows:
"Mr. President, the purpose of this bill is clear, and its range
is not very broad. It is not intended to cover all disputed
provisions as to the rights of witnesses under any circumstances,
except those enumerated in the bill itself. . . ."
"
* * * *"
"Mr. President, the whole purpose of this bill is to define the
right of the witness as we thought it was defined in the statute
which I have read, and to say, as the statute said, but to say it
even more clearly and emphatically, that the immunity shall
Page 377 U. S. 106
only extend to witnesses who have been subpoenaed to produce
books and papers or subpoenaed to give testimony. The essence of
the whole act is found in lines 18, 19, and 20, on page 2, which
read that these immunity provisions -- only the immunity provisions
under the Interstate Commerce Act and under the Commerce and Labor
Act, not the general immunity that the citizen enjoys in judicial
proceedings, but merely in relation to the proceedings of these two
great bureaus of the Government -- 'shall extend only to a natural
person.' That is, that a corporation is not to have the benefit of
the immunity provisions, but they"
"shall extend only to a natural person who, in obedience to a
subpoena, given testimony under oath or produces evidence,
documentary or otherwise, under oath."
40 Cong.Rec. 7657-7658. [
Footnote 16]
This Court, in
United States v. Monia, 317 U.
S. 424,
317 U. S.
429-430, recognized that "the sole purpose" of the 1906
statute was to limit immunity to persons "who, in obedience to a
subpoena, testified or produced evidence under oath," so that the
decision whether or not to grant immunity would be that of the
appropriate "Government officials," rather than of private citizens
anticipating indictment. [
Footnote 17]
Page 377 U. S. 107
We conclude, therefore, that the 1906 statute did not, either
expressly or implicitly, extend the immunity provision of the Act
of February 25, 1903, to include nonjudicial proceedings. The 1906
Act simply limited immunity to persons testifying under oath and in
response to subpoena.
Our decision today is based solely on the language and
legislative history of the relevant congressional enactments.
Congress has extended immunity, with careful safeguards, to persons
testifying before congressional committees in certain limited
situations not here involved. [
Footnote 18] Where Congress, however, has limited
immunity to persons testifying in judicial proceedings, as it has
plainly done here, it is not for the courts to extend the scope of
the immunity.
The District Court erred, therefore, in holding that appellee's
testimony before a congressional subcommittee had immunized him
from prosecution. The judgment dismissing the indictment is
reversed, and the case remanded for proceedings in conformity with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
The relevant portion of this Act is set forth
infra at
377 U. S.
96-97.
[
Footnote 2]
The Government concedes that the testimony given before the
subcommittee related to matters charged in the indictment.
[
Footnote 3]
Congressional hearings are generally conducted under the
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 812, under the
rules or regulations of either House, or, as in the present, case,
under a special resolution. H.Res. 51, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 105
Cong.Rec. 1785.
[
Footnote 4]
This Act, as codified, appears at 15 U.S.C. § 32. The
codification, which has not been enacted into positive law,
eliminates the appropriation provision of the Act which, by its
terms, was of no effect after June 30, 1904. The codification makes
no other change. 61 Stat. 638, 1 U.S.C. § 204(a), declares
that the United States Code establishes
"
prima facie the laws of the United States, general and
permanent in their nature . . .
Provided, however, That
whenever titles of such Code shall have been enacted into positive
law, the text thereof shall be legal evidence of the laws therein
contained, in all the courts. . . ."
This Court, in construing that statute, has said that "the very
meaning of
prima facie' is that the Code cannot
prevail over the Statutes at Large when the two are inconsistent."
Stephan v. United States, 319 U.
S. 423, 319 U. S. 426.
Even where Congress has enacted a codification into positive law,
this Court has said that the
"change of arrangement, which placed portions of what was
originally a single section in two separated sections, cannot be
regarded as altering the scope and purpose of the enactment. For it
will not be inferred that Congress, in revising and consolidating
the laws, intended to change their effect unless such intention is
clearly expressed."
Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Corp., 353 U.
S. 222,
353 U. S. 227,
quoting
Anderson v. Pacific Coast S.S. Co., 225 U.
S. 187,
225 U. S.
198-199.
Certainly where, as here, the "change of arrangement" was made
by a codifier without the approval of Congress, it should be given
no weight.
"If construction [of a section of the United States Code which
has not been enacted into positive law] is necessary, recourse must
be had to the original statutes themselves."
Murrell v. Western Union Tel. Co., 160 F.2d 787, 788.
Accordingly, in order to construe the immunity provision of the
Appropriations Act of February 25, 1903, we must read it in the
context of the entire Act, rather than in the context of the
"arrangement" selected by the codifier.
[
Footnote 5]
See dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE BLACK,
post, at
377 U. S. 113,
note 11.
[
Footnote 6]
The text of the 1906 statute is set forth
infra,
note 9
[
Footnote 7]
This conclusion was reached after the taking of testimony.
Accordingly, the Government could not appeal the trial court's
directed verdict of acquittal.
[
Footnote 8]
The
Armour case arose before the creation of
independent Departments of Labor and of Commerce.
[
Footnote 9]
The full text of the 1906 Act is as follows:
"
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That,
under the immunity provisions in the Act entitled 'An Act in
relation to testimony before the Interstate Commerce Commission,'
and so forth, approved February eleventh, eighteen hundred and
ninety-three, in section six of the Act entitled 'An Act to
establish the Department of Commerce and Labor,' approved February
fourteenth, nineteen hundred and three, and in the Act entitled 'An
Act to further regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the
States,' approved February nineteenth, nineteen hundred and three,
and in the Act entitled 'An Act making appropriations for the
legislative, executive, and judicial expenses of the Government for
the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and four,
and for other purposes,' approved February twenty-fifth, nineteen
hundred and three, immunity shall extend only to a natural person
who, in obedience to a subpoena, gives testimony under oath or
produces evidence, documentary or otherwise, under oath."
34 Stat. 798, 15 U.S.C. § 33.
[
Footnote 10]
See discussion of these events in
United States v.
Monia, 317 U. S. 424,
317 U. S.
428-429.
[
Footnote 11]
"An Act To establish the Department of Commerce and Labor"
provided in relevant part:
"In order to accomplish the purposes declared in the foregoing
part of this section, the said Commissioner shall have and exercise
the same power and authority in respect to corporations, joint
stock companies, and combinations subject to the provisions hereof
as is conferred on the Interstate Commerce Commission in said 'Act
to regulate commerce' and the amendments thereto in respect to
common carriers so far as the same may be applicable, including the
right to subpoena and compel the attendance and testimony of
witnesses and the production of documentary evidence and to
administer oaths. All the requirements, obligations, liabilities,
and immunities imposed or conferred by said 'Act to regulate
commerce' and by 'An Act in relation to testimony before the
Interstate Commerce Commission,' and so forth, approved February
eleventh, eighteen hundred and ninety-three, supplemental to said
'Act to regulate commerce,' shall also apply to all persons who may
be subpoenaed to testify as witnesses or to produce documentary
evidence in pursuance of the authority conferred by this
section."
32 Stat. 825, 828.
The Act of February 11, 1893, provides in relevant part:
"That no person shall be excused from attending and testifying
or from producing books, papers, tariffs, contracts, agreements and
documents before the Interstate Commerce Commission, or in
obedience to the subpoena of the Commission, whether such subpoena
be signed or issued by one or more Commissioners, or in any cause
or proceeding, criminal or otherwise, based upon or growing out of
any alleged violation of the act of Congress, entitled, 'An act to
regulate commerce,' approved February fourth, eighteen hundred and
eighty-seven, or of type of proceeding in which immunity, or for
the reason that the testimony or evidence, documentary or
otherwise, required of him, may tend to criminate him or subject
him to a penalty or forfeiture. But no person shall be prosecuted
or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any
transaction, matter or thing, concerning which he may testify, or
produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, before said Commission,
or in obedience to its subpoena, or the subpoena of either of them,
or in any such case or proceeding:
Provided, That no
person so testifying shall be exempt from prosecution and
punishment for perjury committed in so testifying."
27 Stat. 443-444.
[
Footnote 12]
Although Congressman Littlefield referred to the this dictum in
the debate on the House version of the bill, 40 Cong.Rec. 8738, he
did not intimate that the 1903 Act was applicable to congressional
investigations, or that the purpose of the 1906 Act was to make it
so applicable. On the contrary, Congressman Littlefield stated that
the sole purpose of the Act was to limit immunity to subpoenaed and
sworn testimony. He specifically said, moreover, that the 1906 Act
and the Acts which it amended were intended to apply only to a
"criminal prosecution . . . [and to investigations conducted by]
the Interstate Commerce Commission . . . or by the Commissioner of
Corporations . . . ,"
and that the 1906 Act as intended to assure that no
"person shall have the power to offer immunity to a witness
except the Government of the United States or some officer acting
in behalf thereof."
Id. at 8739. This language, in its context, would not
seem to include members or Committees of Congress.
See
also H.R.Rep. No. 3797, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. Furthermore,
even if we were to assume
arguendo that the
Armour decision was based on a construction of the Act of
February 25, 1903, we would be hesitant to accept appellee's
argument that the failure of Congress to overrule that construction
resulted in an amendment by implication. Amendments by implication,
like repeals by implication, are not favored.
See 1
Sutherland, Statutory Construction (3d ed.) 365-366 (citing cases).
As this Court said in
Jones v. Liberty Glass Co.,
332 U. S. 524,
332 U. S.
534:
"We do not expect Congress to make an affirmative move every
time a lower court indulges in an erroneous interpretation. In
short, the original legislative language speaks louder than such
judicial action."
[
Footnote 13]
See United States v. Monia, supra, at
317 U. S.
429.
[
Footnote 14]
The Senate version of the bill prevailed in conference, and was
adopted.
See H.R.Rep. No. 5049, 59th Cong., 1st Sess.
[
Footnote 15]
Senator Daniel's supposition that the 1906 Act "applies" to
congressional committees was probably based on the erroneous
assumption that the 1906 Act, in addition to amending the Acts to
which it made specific reference,
see note 9 supra, also amended 12 Stat. 333
which provided that:
"the testimony of a witness examined and testifying before
either House of Congress, or any committee of either House of
Congress shall not be used as evidence in any criminal proceeding
against such witness in any court of justice. . . ."
This statute was superseded in 1954 by 68 Stat. 745, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3486.
[
Footnote 16]
Although the 1906 amendment referred to the Act of February 25,
1903, along with other immunity statutes, in limiting immunity to
persons testifying under oath and in response to subpoena, Senator
Knox was correct in suggesting that the Amendment would have
little, if any, application to judicial testimony which is commonly
sworn and subpoenaed.
[
Footnote 17]
In
Monia, which involved a grand jury investigation,
the appropriate "Government officials" were the Attorney General
and his subordinates. In
Armour, the appropriate
government official was the Commissioner of Corporations. Congress
may, of course, designate its own members as appropriate officials,
as it has in fact done in certain limited situations not here
involved,
see note
18 infra.
It is true that the
Monia opinion, with regard to the
issue raised in that case, considered the 1903 Act as having the
same effect as the Interstate Commerce Act. The issue in that case
was whether a witness was required to claim his privilege against
self-incrimination as a condition of obtaining immunity. It is
undisputed that the 1906 Act standardized the rules relating to the
types of testimony which would be privileged under the
Interstate Commerce Act, the Commerce and Labor Act, and the Act of
February 25, 1903. The 1906 Act did not, however, standardize (or
alter) the
types of proceedings in which immunity could be
obtained.
[
Footnote 18]
See Immunity Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 745, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3486.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS joins,
dissenting.
The appellee was indicted for conspiracy [
Footnote 2/1] and violation of § 1 of the Sherman
Act [
Footnote 2/2] shortly after he
had
Page 377 U. S. 108
appeared and testified about the alleged violation before a
Committee of Congress in obedience to its subpoena. The District
Court dismissed the indictment on the ground that the prosecution
was barred by the Antitrust Immunity Act of February 25, 1903,
[
Footnote 2/3] as amended in 1906.
[
Footnote 2/4] The Immunity Act
provides:
". . . no person shall be prosecuted or be subjected to any
penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter,
or thing concerning which he may testify or produce evidence,
documentary or otherwise, in any proceeding, suit, or prosecution
under said (Interstate Commerce or Antitrust [
Footnote 2/5]) Acts. . . ."
The 1903 Act was amended in 1906 so as to limit its
application
"only to a natural person who, in obedience to a subpoena, gives
testimony under oath or produces evidence, documentary or
otherwise, under oath."
The Court holds that the word "proceeding" in the 1903 Act
"applies only to persons testifying in judicial proceedings." This
narrow and grudging interpretation of the Act is, in my judgment,
not justified by either the language or the history of the
legislation.
The Court appears to find much comfort for its holding in the
Act's language appropriating funds to the Attorney General for the
employment of special counsel and agents of the Department of
Justice
"to conduct proceedings, suits, and prosecutions under said
[Interstate Commerce or Antitrust] Acts in the courts of the
United
Page 377 U. S. 109
States."
The Immunity Act itself was appended to the appropriation
language following the word "
Provided." But the
appropriation provision was merely utilized as a legislative
vehicle for passage of the substantive Immunity Act in the form of
a proviso. The language after the word "Provided" is a separate and
distinct immunity enactment, itself part of an immunity program
enacted by Congress in 1903 in order to aid in the enforcement of
the Antitrust Acts by compelling witnesses to testify upon this
broad statutory promise of immunity by the Government. [
Footnote 2/6] This immunity provision of
the 1903 enactment is complete in itself, independent of the
appropriation provision. In fact, so independent is the immunity
provision that, in the codification of the statute, 15 U.S.C.
§ 32, the appropriation provision has been dropped altogether,
making the majority's effort to limit the immunity provision's
language by that of the appropriation provision even more strained.
Therefore, the 1903 Act, as amended in 1906, clearly -- unless the
meaning of its language is to be amended by judicial decree --
stands as a lasting obligation upon the Government to give complete
immunity to a witness who testifies "in obedience to a subpoena . .
. under oath," not merely in a "suit, or prosecution under said
Acts," but "in any proceeding . . . under said [Interstate Commerce
or Antitrust] Acts." The word "proceeding," broad enough to include
testimony before a grand jury,
Hale v. Henkel,
201 U. S. 43, is
also broad enough to include testimony given under oath in
obedience to a subpoena before any federal agency or legislative
committee investigating antitrust violations.
Page 377 U. S. 110
The historical setting of the 1903 Immunity Act shows, I think,
beyond any shadow of a doubt, that the word "proceeding" was
deliberately chosen in order to provide a grant of immunity for
testimony concerning antitrust violations given before
investigatory agencies that were wholly nonjudicial. During the
month of February, 1903, Congress also passed an Act, including
provisions for immunity, which established the Department of
Commerce and Labor and conferred upon the Commissioner of
Corporations (an official of the Department of Commerce and Labor)
the investigatory powers possessed by the Interstate Commerce
Commission. 32 Stat. 825, 828.
See also 32 Stat. 847, 848.
Soon after the 1903 legislation was passed, officers of Armour
& Company testified voluntarily before the Commissioner of
Corporations concerning antitrust violations. The company and the
officers were later indicted by a federal grand jury for violation
of the Sherman Act. United States District Judge Humphrey, in 1905,
in
United States v. Armour & Co., 142 F. 808
(D.C.N.D.Ill.), directed a verdict for the individual defendants on
the ground that the Antitrust Immunity Act of February 25, 1903,
gave individuals who testified before the Commissioner of
Corporations complete immunity from prosecution. The district judge
held that this immunity was granted both by that Act (the Act here
in question) and by the Commerce and Labor Act of 1903,
supra. As to the applicability of the Act before us, he
said:
"If it shall be said that the act of February 14, 1903,
establishing the Department of Commerce and Labor, allows immunity
to the witness only upon the conditions urged by the government,
viz., that he shall have resisted until regularly
subpoenaed and sworn, no such contention can fairly be made as to
the immunity clause of the act of February 25,
Page 377 U. S. 111
1903. . . . It is contended that . . . the defendants are
entitled to immunity under the independent and unconditional act of
February 25, 1903, and I am of opinion that they are so entitled.
[
Footnote 2/7]"
Judge Humphrey held that both the Commerce and Labor Act and the
Antitrust Immunity Act now before us granted complete immunity. His
holding as to the latter Act cannot be dismissed, as the Court
attempts to do, by calling it "dictum."
The subsequent legislative treatment of the Antitrust Immunity
Act of 1903 supports Judge Humphrey's holding that the complete
immunity which that Act granted was not limited to testimony given
in judicial proceedings only. The part of Judge Humphrey's opinion
that caused great concern to the Government was his holding that
witnesses obtained complete immunity from prosecution based on
their testimony even though they had not been subpoenaed or put
under oath. This concern prompted President Theodore Roosevelt to
send a message to Congress requesting that the law be amended in
this respect. The President's message specifically showed that he
did not want to take away the immunity of witnesses who testified
or produced documentary evidence, but simply wanted the law to
grant immunity only to witnesses who appeared under subpoena and
testified under oath -- that is, those who were compelled to
testify. Showing that this was his only objection to Judge
Humphrey's holding, the President in his message told the
Congress:
"It is, of course, necessary, under the Constitution and the
laws, that persons who give testimony or produce evidence as
witnesses should receive immunity from prosecution. [
Footnote 2/8] "
Page 377 U. S. 112
Without at all attempting to limit the kinds of "proceeding" in
which the witness can earn the promised immunity, Congress followed
the President's suggestion and provided, in the 1966 amendment to
the 1903 Immunity Act now before us, that the immunity would apply
only to individuals testifying in obedience to subpoena and under
oath. After thorough scrutiny of the
Armour decision,
Congress, agreeing with President Roosevelt, made no move to change
the part of the holding which stated flatly that the antitrust
immunity provision of the Act of February 25, 1903, applied to
witnesses testifying before the Commissioner of Corporations, and
so was not limited to "judicial proceedings." And this part of the
Armour holding did not pass unnoticed, for Congressman
Littlefield, who presented to the House of Representatives the
Attorney General's request for an amendment to the Antitrust
Immunity Act, told the House:
"Perhaps I ought to say that, in my judgment, the legislation
upon which Judge Humphrey largely based his ruling was not the act
relating to interstate commerce, under which the Interstate
Commerce Commission acts, nor the act creating the Bureau of
Corporations, under which the Commissioner of Corporations acts,
but probably the resolution appropriating $500,000, which contained
a very broad and loosely drawn provision in relation to immunity. I
am not authorized to say upon what the judge based his decision,
but, having read what he did say, it is rather my judgment that he
was controlled in his conclusion very largely by the language
contained in that appropriation, which was, in my judgment, very
much broader than is found in the Interstate Commerce Act or in the
act creating the Department of Commerce and Labor. [
Footnote 2/9] "
Page 377 U. S. 113
And in the Senate debate on the 1906 amendment, Senator Daniel
expressed an understanding which no one questioned:
"I suppose that the bill under consideration, as it reads now,
applies only to persons who testify in a judicial proceeding or to
those who are responding to some body
such as a Congressional
Committee that has the right to enforce an answer from a
witness. [
Footnote 2/10]"
Senator Knox, the manager of the amendment in the Senate,
thereupon explained the bill to Senator Daniel in detail, never
contradicting what Senator Daniel had said on this point. Neither
Congressman Littlefield, Senator Daniel, Senator Knox, nor any
other member of Congress suggested altering the
Armour
holding that the Antitrust Immunity Act of 1903 was not limited to
judicial proceedings -- none, in fact, ever questioned it --
because that holding, it may fairly be inferred, correctly read the
intent of an almost identical Congress in passing the Act three
years earlier. [
Footnote
2/11]
From that day until this, no one seems ever to have doubted that
this reading of the 1903 Antitrust Immunity Act was correct. In
fact, in 1942, this Court obviously read the statute the same way
in
United States v. Monia, 317 U.
S. 424. Monia and another claimed complete immunity
under that Act as amended in 1906 because they had testified before
a federal grand jury inquiring into alleged violations of the
federal antitrust laws. The Act
Page 377 U. S. 114
was fully considered in the majority opinion by Mr. Justice
Roberts, and in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter.
Not only was there in that case no intimation that the immunity
provided in the Act was for testimony given before judicial
agencies only, but both opinions went on a precisely opposite
assumption. In holding that the Act gave immunity even to a witness
who had not asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege against being
compelled to testify against himself, Mr. Justice Roberts, speaking
for the Court, treated the 1903 Act before us as covering the same
kinds of "proceedings" as the immunity provisions of the Interstate
Commerce Act, as amended in 1893, [
Footnote 2/12] which gave a complete immunity for
testimony given before the Commission. Moreover, in his detailed
dissent, Mr. Justice Frankfurter referred at length to the immunity
provisions contained in various statutes establishing governmental
agencies both before and after the passage of the 1903 Act, such as
the Securities Act, [
Footnote
2/13] the Public Utility Holding Company Act, [
Footnote 2/14] the Motor Carrier Act, [
Footnote 2/15] the Fair Labor Standards
Act, [
Footnote 2/16] and various
others.
317 U. S. 317 U.S.
424,
317 U. S. 431.
Surely all these were not cited in the belief that the 1903 Act
related to testimony given before judicial bodies only. It is plain
beyond doubt that they were referred to on the assumption that the
1903 Act granted whatever immunity it did not merely for testimony
given before judicial bodies, but for testimony given before all
the various governmental agencies that subpoena witnesses to give
evidence before them on antitrust matters.
The Antitrust Immunity Act of 1903 was passed at a time when the
fear of prosecution was making testimony
Page 377 U. S. 115
from witnesses often impossible to obtain, and thereby impeding
enforcement of the antitrust laws. It was passed by a Congress
friendly to those laws, not to frustrate, but to help enforce them.
[
Footnote 2/17] Whether it was a
wise or, in the case of an unwilling witness, constitutionally
legitimate [
Footnote 2/18] means
for Congress to use in seeking that goal is not the issue in this
case. Wise or unwise, it was a solemn promise made by Congress
which I think the Government should keep, just as I thought that
the Government should have been compelled to keep a solemn promise
of immunity made by the Secretary of the Treasury in
Shotwell
Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 U. S. 341,
371 U. S. 367
(dissenting opinion). The very fact that the Court must labor so
long and hard to reach its result is, in my judgment, strong
evidence that that result should not have been reached, for I think
that, when the Government makes an obligation in broad terms on
which individuals have a reasonable right to rely, it should not
seek to have all doubts resolved in its own favor against the
private citizens who have taken it at its word. Important as I
believe the antitrust laws to be, I believe it is more important
still that there should be no room for anyone to doubt that, when
the Government makes a promise, it keeps it.
Cf. Federal Power
Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U. S.
99,
362 U.S. 124
(dissenting opinion).
I would affirm the judgment.
[
Footnote 2/1]
62 Stat. 701, 18 U.S.C. § 371.
[
Footnote 2/2]
26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1.
[
Footnote 2/3]
32 Stat. 854, 904, 15 U.S.C. § 32.
[
Footnote 2/4]
34 Stat. 798, 15 U.S.C. § 33.
[
Footnote 2/5]
The Acts will respect to which immunity from prosecution was
given are the Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 379, as amended, 49
U.S.C. §§ 1-27, 41-43, 301-327, the Sherman Act, 26 Stat.
209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7, and the antitrust
provisions of the Wilson Tariff Act of 1894, §§ 73-76, 28
Stat. 509, 570, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11.
[
Footnote 2/6]
See also the identical immunity provisions in the
Commerce and Labor Act of February 14, 1903, § 6, 32 Stat.
825, 828, incorporating by reference Compulsory Testimony Amendment
of 1893 to the Interstate Commerce Act, 27 Stat. 443, 49 U.S.C.
§ 46, and in the Elkins Amendment to the Interstate Commerce
Act, Act of February 19, 1903, § 3, 32 Stat. 847, 848, 49
U.S.C. §§ 41-43.
[
Footnote 2/7]
142 Fed. at 826.
[
Footnote 2/8]
Message of the President, H.R.Doc. No. 706, 59th Cong., 1st
Sess., p. 2.
[
Footnote 2/9]
40 Cong.Rec. 8738.
[
Footnote 2/10]
40 Cong.Rec. 7657 (emphasis supplied).
[
Footnote 2/11]
I agree with the Court that Congress, in the 1906 statute, did
not "manifest any intent to enlarge the reach of the immunity
provision of the Act of February 25, 1903, to include nonjudicial
proceedings."
Ante, p.
377 U. S. 104.
But the Act of 1903, as pointed out above, clearly applied to
nonjudicial proceedings without any enlargement; it was never
limited to judicial "proceedings," but granted complete immunity to
witnesses who testified before governmental agencies other than
those that could be called judicial.
[
Footnote 2/12]
27 Stat. 443, 49 U.S.C. § 46.
[
Footnote 2/13]
48 Stat. 74, 87, 15 U.S.C. § 77v(c).
[
Footnote 2/14]
49 Stat. 803, 832, 15 U.S.C. § 79r.
[
Footnote 2/15]
49 Stat. 543, 550, 49 U.S.C. § 305(d).
[
Footnote 2/16]
52 Stat. 1060, 1065, 29 U.S.C. § 209.
[
Footnote 2/17]
See 36 Cong.Rec. 411-419. The provision was not debated
in the Senate.
See id., 989-990.
[
Footnote 2/18]
Compare Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.
S. 422,
350 U. S. 440
(dissenting opinion).
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK concurs,
dissenting.
I am inclined to construe this Immunity Act more in harmony with
its literal language than is the Court;
Page 377 U. S. 116
and the reasons I do so are, in part, those stated by MR.
JUSTICE BLACK and in part the nature of the modern congressional
committee. The trial nature of the modern investigating committee
argues strongly for a construction of this Act that gives immunity
to one subjected to scrutiny and probing under the full glare of
today's hearing methods.
Congressional investigations, as they have evolved, are, in
practice, "proceedings" of a grave nature so far as individual
liberties are concerned. Not all committee hearings are "trials" of
the witness; not all committee hearings are televised or broadcast;
and, so far as appears, this witness was not subjected to any such
ordeal. [
Footnote 3/1] But the
problem with which we deal concerns not a particular committee nor
a particular hearing but the generalized meaning of "proceeding" as
used in the Act of February 25, 1903.
Courts cannot enjoin a committee from questioning a witness any
more than they can enjoin passage of a palpably unconstitutional
bill.
See Nelson v. United States, 93 U.S.App.D.C. 14, 208
F.2d 505. But courts, knowing the manner in which committees often
operate, are properly alert either in denying legal effect to what
has been done or in taking other steps protective of the rights of
the accused. [
Footnote 3/2]
See
Nelson v. United States, 93 U.S.App.D.C. at 22, 208 F.2d at
513. That is one reason why I would not import any ambiguities into
this Immunity Act to the disadvantage of the accused.
The present investigation was, in my view, a "proceeding, suit,
or prosecution" under the antitrust laws within
Page 377 U. S. 117
the meaning of the Act of February 25, 1903. The House Committee
before which Welden testified was trenching on the same ground as
the present antitrust prosecution. Its power to proceed derived, of
course, from the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 60 Stat.
812, the Rules and Regulations of the House, or a Special
Resolution. The power to investigate extends to the manner in which
laws are being administered and to the need for new laws.
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.
S. 178,
354 U. S. 187.
The questions put by the House Committee were allowable, as they
clearly were, only because they pertained to the manner in which
the antitrust laws were operating or to the need for more effective
laws. They were therefore "under" the antitrust laws.
We have repeatedly said that a congressional investigation which
exposes for exposure's sake or which is "conducted solely for the
personal aggrandizement of the investigators or to
punish'
those investigated [is] indefensible." Watkins v. United
States, 354 U.S. at 354 U. S. 187.
Congress is not a law enforcement agency; that power is entrusted
to the Executive. Congress is not a trial agency; that power is
entrusted to the Judiciary. Some elements of a "fair" hearing are
provided by Committee Rules (Yellin v. United States,
374 U. S. 109);
some, by constitutional requirements. By reason of the First
Amendment, Congress, being unable to abridge freedom of speech or
freedom of the press, may not probe into what a witness reads
(cf. United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S.
41), or why a publisher chose one editorial policy
rather than another. Since, by reason of the First Amendment,
Congress may make no law "prohibiting the free exercise" of
religion, it may not enter the field through investigation and
probe the minds of witnesses as to whether they go to church or to
the confessional regularly, why they chose this church, rather than
that one, etc. By reason of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, witnesses
Page 377 U. S. 118
may refuse to answer certain questions.
See Quinn v. United
States, 349 U. S. 155;
Emspak v. United States, 349 U. S. 190;
Bart v. United States, 349 U. S. 219.
There are other limitations.
"The Senate, for instance, could not compel a witness to testify
in a Senate investigation whose sole and avowed purpose was to
determine whether a particular federal official should be
impeached, since only the House can impeach. The House could not
force a witness to testify in a House investigation whose sole and
avowed purpose was to decide the guilt of a person already
impeached, or to determine whether or not a treaty should be
ratified, since the Constitution entrusts these functions to the
Senate. Neither House could conduct an investigation for the sole
and avowed purpose of determining whether an official of the State
of New York should be impeached, since that determination is
reserved to the Legislature of that State."
Snee, Televising Congressional Hearings, 42 Geo.L.J. 1, 9
(1953).
In these and other related ways, congressional committees are
fenced in. Yet, in the view of some of us, the tendency has been to
trench on First Amendment rights.
See Braden v. United
States, 365 U. S. 431;
Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.
S. 399;
Barenblatt v. United States,
360 U. S. 109;
Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., 372 U.
S. 539. There was a time when a committee, knowing that
a witness would not answer a question by reason of the Fifth
Amendment, would not put the question to him. Today, witnesses who
invoke the Fifth Amendment at the threshold have been minutely
examined, apparently to see how many times they can be forced to
invoke it. [
Footnote 3/3] Hearings
have indeed often become a spectacle, [
Footnote 3/4]
Page 377 U. S. 119
some of the reasons being succinctly stated by the experienced
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, and head
of the Permanent Committee on Investigations, Senator McClellan of
Arkansas:
"First, let me say that the primary purpose, and actually the
only legitimate purpose, for such hearings must be a legislative
purpose, but out of that also flows the opportunity to disseminate
information of great value and advantage to the public. Because the
public, of course, is interested in legislation and upon what you
premise it -- upon what is the need for it. It all fits in. Now ,my
position has been, and there are those, who, I'm sure, disagree
with me, when we hold a public hearing, it is public. Those who
have the opportunity, who can conveniently act some times attend in
person and witness everything that occurs -- the press is present
to make a reporting on what occurs -- radio is there to disseminate
the information as it is produced -- I can see no good reason for
barring television. That too is a medium of communication, and, in
my judgment, sometimes is the most effective, next to actually
being present in person and witnessing what has occurred. So I have
always felt that, if the press is to be present, radio coverage is
to be given, the television is entitled to the same privileges. I
do think that the lights' being on is a distraction -- I think the
lights should be turned off, and we have always observed that,
except where a man is simply taking the
Page 377 U. S. 120
Fifth Amendment. If he's taking the Fifth Amendment and reading
from a card, the light helps him to see to read the script on the
card, and I don't see any reason to turn them off. [
Footnote 3/5]"
A strong case has been made for holding these "spectacles" to be
out of bounds:
"1. The use of these publicity media bears no real and
substantial relation to any legitimate purpose of a congressional
investigating committee. Yet it constitutes a substantial restraint
upon the liberty of an unwilling witness. Hence, to force him to
testify before these media exceeds the constitutional bounds of the
investigating power; the attempt to do so, and
a fortiori
punishment under R.S. § 102 (1875), 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1946
ed.), is therefore a denial of substantive due process under the
Fifth Amendment."
"2. The use of these media creates an atmosphere in which it is
normally unfair to compel the testimony of an unwilling witness,
and in which rights guaranteed by the Constitution are placed in
jeopardy. Hence, to use these media without reasonable necessity
constitutes a denial of procedural due process under the same
Amendment. [
Footnote 3/6]"
President Truman condemned "spectacles" of that kind. His
specific objection was directed to the televised hearings by the
Kefauver Committee in 1951:
"The President is most seriously concerned. The trouble with
television, he said, is that a man is held before cameras and
40,000,000, people more or less,
Page 377 U. S. 121
hear him charged with so and so, and the public, untrained
generally with evaluating the presentation of evidence, is inclined
to think him guilty just because he is charged."
"It is the very negation of judicial process, with the committee
acting as prosecutor and defense and the public acting as the jury.
[
Footnote 3/7]"
Alan Barth reviewed the nature of the "legislative trial":
"The legislative trial carries with it sanctions of a severe
order. It is, to begin with, unimpeded by any
Page 377 U. S. 122
statute of limitations; an error committed in the 1930s may be
judged in the 1950s -- and without any allowance whatever for
altered conditions or a changed political climate. Defendants may
be subjected to double or triple jeopardy, that is, they may be
tried by different committees for the same deed. The punishments
meted out are uninhibited by any sort of criminal code. Persons
convicted in the courts of Congress may not suffer imprisonment,
but they are likely to be subjected, in addition to loss of
reputation, to a blacklisting which may effectively deny them any
means of gaining a livelihood. [
Footnote 3/8]"
Barth goes on to say:
"The legislative trial serves three distinct though related
purposes: (1) it can be used to punish conduct which is not
criminal; (2) it can be used to punish supposedly criminal conduct
in the absence of evidence requisite to conviction in a court of
law; and (3) it can be used to drive or trap persons suspected of
'disloyalty' into committing some collateral crime such as perjury
or contempt of Congress, which can then be subjected to punishment
through a judicial proceeding. [
Footnote 3/9]"
Benjamin V. Cohen has shown why the legislative trial has no
place in our system:
"There is no excuse for congressional committees' acting as
'people's courts,' following totalitarian patterns."
"Legislative trials, since the trial of Socrates, have had an
odious history. Legislative trials combine the functions of
prosecutor and judge, and deny to the accused the right to
impartial and independent judgment. Legislative trials are
subject
Page 377 U. S. 123
to the influence of partisanship, passion and prejudice.
Legislative trials are political trials. Let us remember that, in
the past, legislative justice has tended to degenerate into mob
injustice. [
Footnote 3/10]"
The legislative "trial" is a phenomenon that Senator Cain once
described as a committee "running wild," becoming "victims of a
wave of emotion which they created, but over which they had no
control." [
Footnote 3/11]
Some may see wisdom in this modern kind of "trial by committee,"
so to speak, with committees and prosecutors competing for victims.
But the more I see of the awesome power of government to ruin
people, to drive them from public life, to brand them forever as
undesirable, the deeper I feel that protective measures are needed.
I speak now not of constitutional power, but of the manner in which
a statute should be read. I therefore incline to construe the
Immunity Act freely to hold that he who runs the gantlet of a
committee cannot be "tried" again.
[
Footnote 3/1]
Respondent's testimony before the Committee appears in Hearings,
Special Subcommittee of the House Select Committee on Small
Business, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., pursuant to H.Res. 51, Pt. IV, pp.
665-700.
[
Footnote 3/2]
For analogous instances of the alertness of the Court to protect
an accused against the effect of pretrial publicity,
see Irvin
v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717;
Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U. S. 723.
[
Footnote 3/3]
See Hearings before Senate Committee on Rules and
Administration on Financial or Business Interests of Officers or
Employees of the Senate, 88th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., pp.
1337-1363 (Robert G. Baker); Hearings before Senate Select
Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field,
85th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 1511-1578, 1654-1684, 2038-2047,
2374-2405 (Dave Beck);
Beck v. Washington, 369 U.
S. 541,
369 U. S.
583-587 (dissenting opinion).
[
Footnote 3/4]
Barth, Government by Investigation (1955), p. 81; Rogge, The
First and the Fifth (1960), p. 204; American Bar Association,
Report on Congressional Investigations (1954).
[
Footnote 3/5]
Metropolitan Broadcasting, "Opinion in the Capital," Interview
with Senator John McClellan, March 1, 1964. For a like defense of
televised hearings,
see Senator Kefauver, 97 Cong.Rec.
9777
et seq.
[
Footnote 3/6]
Snee, Televising Congressional Hearings, 42 Geo.L.J. 1, 2-3
(1953).
[
Footnote 3/7]
White House Press Release, as quoted by Chicago Daily News, June
27, 1951, p. 49, col. 5, and quoted in Snee,
supra,
377 U.S.
95fn3/6|>note 6 at 2.
Congressman Magee said in 97 Cong.Rec. A1145:
". . . there is no more reason for televising crime
investigations than there is in televising criminal trials. Of
necessity, many of our criminal cases develop lurid and obscene
testimony. Some of it is unfit to put in public print. Certainly it
is unfit to go out over the air waves. Many witnesses would despair
at the thought of testifying when they were being viewed by
television. It is bad enough for a timid witness to face a small
courtroom of spectators; but it would be far worse if that person
knew that he or she was being spied upon by television addicts all
over the Nation. Certainly it would not be conducive to clear
thought or expression. I cannot feel that the courts will ever
force witnesses to subject themselves to this needless procedure.
To me, the whole idea is inane and repulsive. It would bring the
Congress to a new low level in public esteem. The dignity of the
courtroom would become only a memory, while its sacred portals
became a testing ground for the future Faye Emersons and Jimmie
Durantes."
And see Gossett, Justice and TV, 38 A.B.A.J. 15 (1952);
Yesawich, Televising & Broadcasting Trials, 37 Cornell L.Q. 701
(1952); Arnold, Mob Justice and Television, 12 Fed.Com.B.J. 4
(1951); Klots, Trial by Television, Harper's, October 1951, 90;
Report of the Special Committee on Televising and Broadcasting, 77
Rep.A.B.A., p. 607
et seq. (1952).
Telecasting and broadcasting of committee hearings are banned by
the House.
See 98 Cong.Rec. 1334-1335, 1443, 1567-1571,
1689-1691, 1949-1952, 5394-5395, A1152-A1153, A1176, A1180, A1196,
A1227; 108 Cong.Rec. 267-269.
[
Footnote 3/8]
Op.cit. supra, 377 U.S.
95fn3/4|>note 4, at 82.
[
Footnote 3/9]
Id. at 83.
[
Footnote 3/10]
When Men Fear to Speak, Freedom Withers on the Vine, Address,
Indiana B'nai B'rith Convention, Sept. 27, 1953.
See Delaney v.
United States, 199 F.2d 107, 113, where the Court of Appeals,
in setting aside a conviction, said:
"This is not a case of pretrial publicity of damaging material,
tending to indicate the guilt of a defendant, dug up by the
initiative and private enterprise of newspapers. Here, the United
States, through its legislative department, by means of an open
committee hearing held shortly before the trial of a pending
indictment, caused and stimulated this massive pretrial publicity,
on a nationwide scale. Some of this evidence was indicative of
Delaney's guilt of the offenses charged in the indictment. Some of
the damaging evidence would not be admissible at the forthcoming
trial, because it related to alleged criminal derelictions and
official misconduct outside the scope of the charges in the
indictment. None of the testimony of witnesses heard at the
committee hearing ran the gauntlet of defense cross-examination.
Nor was the published evidence tempered, challenged, or minimized
by evidence offered by the accused."
See Nelson v. United States, 93 U.S.App.D.C. 14, 208
F.2d 505.
[
Footnote 3/11]
97 Cong.Rec. 9768.