Petitioners, three Negro students and one white student, entered
a store in New Orleans, La., sat at a lunch counter reserved for
white people, and requested service, which was refused. For
refusing to leave when requested to do so by the manager of the
store, they were convicted of violating the Louisiana Criminal
Mischief Statute, which makes it a crime to refuse to leave a place
of business after being ordered to do so by the person in charge of
the premises. No state statute or city ordinance required racial
segregation in restaurants, but both the Mayor and the
Superintendent of Police had announced publicly that such "sit-in
demonstrations" would not be permitted.
Held: Petitioners' convictions violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Peterson v. City
of Greenville, ante, p.
373 U. S. 244. Pp.
373 U. S.
268-274.
241 La. 958,
132
So. 2d 860, reversed.
Page 373 U. S. 268
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents for review trespass convictions resulting
from an attempt by Negroes to be served in a privately owned
restaurant customarily patronized only by whites. However, unlike a
number of the cases this day decided, no state statute or city
ordinance here forbids desegregation of the races in all restaurant
facilities. Nevertheless, we conclude that this case is governed by
the principles announced in
Peterson v. City of Greenville,
ante, p.
373 U. S. 244, and
that the convictions, for this reason, must be reversed.
Petitioners are three Negro and one white college students. On
September 17, 1960, at about 10:30 in the morning, they entered the
McCrory Five and Ten Cent Store in New Orleans, Louisiana. They sat
down at a refreshment counter at the back of the store and
requested service, which was refused. Although no sign so
indicated, the management operated the counter on a segregated
basis, serving only white patrons. The counter was designed to
accommodate 24 persons. Negroes were welcome to shop in other areas
of the store. The restaurant manager, believing that the "unusual
circumstance" of Negroes sitting at the counter created an
"emergency," asked petitioners to leave, and, when they did not do
so, ordered that the counter be closed. The restaurant manager then
contacted the store manager and called the police. He frankly
testified that the petitioners did not cause any disturbance, that
they were orderly, and that he asked them to leave because they
were Negroes. Presumably, he asked the white petitioner to leave
because he was in the company of Negroes.
A number of police officers, including a captain and major of
police, arrived at the store shortly after they were called. Three
of the officers had a conference with the store manager. The store
manager then went behind
Page 373 U. S. 269
the counter, faced petitioners, and in a loud voice asked them
to leave. He also testified that the petitioners were merely
sitting quietly at the counter throughout these happenings. When
petitioners remained seated, the police major spoke to petitioner
Goldfinch, and asked him what they were doing there. Mr. Goldfinch
replied that petitioners "were going to sit there until they were
going to be served." When petitioners still declined to leave, they
were arrested by the police, led out of the store, and taken away
in a patrol wagon. They were later tried and convicted for
violation of the Louisiana criminal mischief statute. [
Footnote 1] This statute, in its
application to this case, has all the elements of the usual
trespass statute. Each petitioner was sentenced to serve 60 days in
the Parish Prison and to pay a fine of $350. In default of payment
of the fine, each was to serve 60 additional days in prison. On
appeal to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, the judgments of
conviction were affirmed.
State v. Goldfinch, 241 La. 958,
132 So. 2d
860. Because of the substantial federal questions presented, we
granted certiorari. 370 U.S. 935.
Prior to this occurrence, New Orleans city officials,
characterizing conduct such as petitioners were arrested for as
"sit-in demonstrations," had determined that such attempts to
secure desegregated service, though orderly and possibly
inoffensive to local merchants, would not be permitted.
Page 373 U. S. 270
Exactly one week earlier, on September 10, 1960, a like
occurrence had taken place in a Woolworth store in the same city.
In immediate reaction thereto, the Superintendent of Police issued
a highly publicized statement which discussed the incident and
stated that
"We wish to urge the parents of both white and Negro students
who participated in today's sit-in demonstration to urge upon these
young people that such actions are not in the community interest. .
. . [W]e want everyone to fully understand that the police
department and its personnel is ready and able to enforce the laws
of the city of New Orleans and the state of Louisiana. [
Footnote 2]"
On September 13,
Page 373 U. S. 271
four days before petitioners' arrest, the Mayor of New Orleans
issued an unequivocal statement condemning such conduct and
demanding its cessation. This statement was also widely publicized;
it read in part:
"I have today directed the superintendent of police that no
additional sit-in demonstrations . . . will be permitted . . .
regardless of the avowed purpose or intent of the participants. . .
."
"
* * * *"
"It is my determination that the community interest, the public
safety, and the economic welfare of this city require that such
demonstrations cease, and that henceforth they be prohibited by the
police department. [
Footnote 3]
"
Page 373 U. S. 272
Both statements were publicized in the New Orleans
Times-Picayune. The Mayor and the Superintendent of Police both
testified that, to their knowledge, no eating establishment in New
Orleans operated desegregated eating facilities.
Both the restaurant manager and the store manager asked the
petitioners to leave. Petitioners were charged with failing to
leave at the request of the store manager. There was evidence to
indicate that the restaurant manager asked petitioners to leave in
obedience to the directive of the city officials. He told them that
"I am not allowed to serve you here. . . . We
have to sell
to you at the rear of the store, where we have a colored counter."
(Emphasis supplied.) And he called the police "[a]s a matter of
routine procedure." The petitioners testified that, when they did
not leave, the restaurant manager whistled, and the employees
removed the stools, turned
Page 373 U. S. 273
off the lights, and put up a sign saying that the counter was
closed. One petitioner stated that "it appeared to be a very
efficient thing, everyone knew what to do." The store manager
conceded that his decision to operate a segregated facility
"conform[ed] to state policy and practice," as well as local
custom. When asked whether,
"in the last 30 days to 60 days, [he had] entered into any
conference with other department store managers here in New Orleans
relative to sit-in problems,"
the store manager stated: "[w]e have spoken of it." The above
evidence all tended to indicate that the store officials' actions
were coerced by the city. But the evidence of coercion was not
fully developed, because the trial judge forbade petitioners to ask
questions directed to that very issue.
But we need not pursue this inquiry further. A State, or a city,
may act as authoritatively through its executive as through its
legislative body.
See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.
S. 339,
100 U. S. 347.
As we interpret the New Orleans city officials' statements, they
here determined that the city would not permit Negroes to seek
desegregated service in restaurants. Consequently, the city must be
treated exactly as if it had an ordinance prohibiting such conduct.
We have just held in
Peterson v. City of Greenville, ante,
p.
373 U. S. 244,
that where an ordinance makes it unlawful for owners or managers of
restaurants to seat whites and Negroes together, a conviction under
the State's criminal processes employed in a way which enforces the
discrimination mandated by that ordinance cannot stand. Equally,
the State cannot achieve the same result by an official command
which has at least as much coercive effect as an ordinance. The
official command here was to direct continuance of segregated
service in restaurants, and to prohibit any conduct directed toward
its discontinuance; it was not restricted solely to preserve the
public peace in a nondiscriminatory fashion in a situation where
violence
Page 373 U. S. 274
was present or imminent by reason of public demonstrations.
Therefore, here, as in
Peterson, these convictions,
commanded as they were by the voice of the State directing
segregated service at the restaurant, cannot stand.
Turner v.
City of Memphis, 369 U. S. 350.
Reversed.
[For opinion of MR. JUSTICE HARLAN,
see ante, p.
373 U. S.
248.]
[
Footnote 1]
La.Rev.Stat., 1950 (Cum.Supp.1960), § 14:59(6), provides in
pertinent part:
"Criminal mischief is the intentional performance of any of the
following acts:"
"
* * * *"
"(6) Taking temporary possession of any part or parts of a place
of business, or remaining in a place of business after the person
in charge of such business or portion of such business has ordered
such person to leave the premises and to desist from the temporary
possession of any part or parts of such business."
[
Footnote 2]
The full text of the statement reads:
"The regrettable sit-in activity today at the lunch counter of a
Canal St. chain store by several young white and Negro persons
causes me to issue this statement to the citizens of New
Orleans."
"We urge every adult and juvenile to read this statement
carefully, completely and calmly."
"First, it is important that all citizens of our community
understand that this sit-in demonstration was initiated by a very
small group."
"We firmly believe that they do not reflect the sentiments of
the great majority of responsible citizens, both white and Negro,
who make up our population."
"We believe it is most important that the mature responsible
citizens of both races in this city understand that, and that they
continue the exercise of sound, individual judgment, goodwill, and
a sense of personal and community responsibility."
"Members of both the white and Negro groups in New Orleans, for
the most part, are aware of the individual's obligation for good
conduct -- an obligation both to himself and to his community. With
the exercise of continued, responsible law-abiding conduct by all
persons, we see no reason for any change whatever in the normal,
good race relations that have traditionally existed in New
Orleans."
"At the same time, we wish to say to every adult and juvenile in
this city that the police department intends to maintain peace and
order."
"No one should have any concern or question over either the
intent or the ability of this department to keep and preserve peace
and order."
"As part of its regular operating program, the New Orleans
police department is prepared to take prompt and effective action
against any person or group who disturbs the peace or creates
disorder on public or private property."
"We wish to urge the parents of both white and Negro students
who participated in today's sit-in demonstration to urge upon these
young people that such actions are not in the community
interest."
"Finally, we want everyone to fully understand that the police
department and its personnel is ready and able to enforce the laws
of the city of New Orleans and the state of Louisiana."
[
Footnote 3]
The full text of the Mayor's statements reads:
"I have today directed the superintendent of police that no
additional sit-in demonstrations or so-called peaceful picketing
outside retail stores by sit-in demonstrators or their sympathizers
will be permitted."
"The police department, in my judgment, has handled the initial
sit-in demonstration Friday and the follow-up picketing activity
Saturday in an efficient and creditable manner. This is in keeping
with the oft-announced policy of the New Orleans city government
that peace and order in our city will be preserved."
"I have carefully reviewed the reports of these two initial
demonstrations by a small group of misguided white and Negro
students, or former students. It is my considered opinion that,
regardless of the avowed purpose or intent of the participants, the
effect of such demonstrations is not in the public interest of this
community."
"Act 70 of the 1960 Legislative session redefines disturbing the
peace to include 'the commission of any act as would foreseeably
disturb or alarm the public.'"
"Act 70 also provides that persons who seek to prevent
prospective customers from entering private premises to transact
business shall be guilty of disorderly conduct and disturbing the
peace."
"Act 80 -- obstructing public passages -- provides that"
"no person shall wilfully obstruct the free, convenient, and
normal use of any public sidewalk, street, highway, road, bridge,
alley or other passage way or the entrance, corridor or passage of
any public building, structure, water craft or ferry by impeding,
hindering, stifling, retarding or restraining traffic or passage
thereon or therein."
"It is my determination that the community interest, the public
safety, and the economic welfare of this city require that such
demonstrations cease, and that henceforth they be prohibited by the
police department."
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concurring.
While I join the opinion of the Court, I have concluded it
necessary to state with more particularity why Louisiana has become
involved to a "significant extent" (
Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715,
365 U. S. 722)
in denying equal protection of the laws to petitioners.
I
The court below based its affirmance of these convictions on the
ground that the decision to segregate this restaurant was a private
choice, uninfluenced by the officers of the State.
State v.
Goldfinch, 241 La. 958,
132 So. 2d
860. If this were an intrusion of a man's home or yard or farm
or garden, the property owner could seek and obtain the aid of the
State against the intruder. For the Bill of Rights, as applied to
the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, casts its weight on the side of the privacy of homes.
The Third Amendment, with its ban on the quartering of soldiers in
private homes, radiates that philosophy. The Fourth Amendment,
while concerned with official invasions of privacy through searches
and seizures, is eloquent testimony of the sanctity of private
premises. For, even when the police enter private precincts, they
must, with rare exceptions, come armed with a warrant issued by a
magistrate.
Page 373 U. S. 275
A private person has no standing to obtain even limited access.
The principle that a man's home is his castle is basic to our
system of jurisprudence.
But a restaurant, like the other departments of this retail
store where Negroes were served, though private property within the
protection of the Fifth Amendment, has no aura of constitutionally
protected privacy about it. Access by the public is the very reason
for its existence.
"Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The more an
owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the
public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by
the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it."
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501,
326 U. S.
506.
The line between a private business and a public one has been
long and hotly contested.
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,
285 U. S. 262, is
one of the latest cases in a long chain. The Court, over the
dissent of Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Stone, held
unconstitutional an Oklahoma statute requiring those manufacturing
ice for sale and distribution to obtain a license from the State.
Mr. Justice Brandeis' dissent was in the tradition of an ancient
doctrine perhaps best illustrated [
Footnote 2/1] by
German Alliance Ins. Co. v.
Kansas, 233 U. S. 389,
which upheld a Kansas statute that regulated fire insurance rates.
Mr. Justice McKenna, writing for the Court, said,
"It is the business that is the fundamental thing; property is
but its instrument, the means of rendering the service which has
become of public interest."
Id., 233 U. S. 408.
Cf. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726.
Some of the cases reflect creative attempts by judges to make
innkeepers, common carriers, and the like perform
Page 373 U. S. 276
the public function of taking care of all travelers. [
Footnote 2/2] Others involve the power of
the legislature to impose various kinds of restraints or conditions
on business. As a result of the conjunction of various forces,
judicial and legislative, it came to pass that "A large province of
industrial activity is under the joint sovereignty of the market
and the state." [
Footnote 2/3]
The present case would be on all fours with the earlier ones
holding that a business may be regulated when it renders a service
which "has become of public interest" (
German Alliance Ins. Co.
v. Kansas, supra, 233 U. S. 408)
if Louisiana had declared, as do some States, [
Footnote 2/4] that a business may not refuse
service to a customer on account of race, and the proprietor of the
restaurant were charged with violating this statute. We should not
await legislative action before declaring that state courts cannot
enforce this type of segregation. Common law judges fashioned the
rules governing innkeepers and carriers. [
Footnote 2/5]
Page 373 U. S. 277
As stated by Holt, C.J., in
Lane v. Cotton, 12 Mod.
472, 484 (1701):
"Wherever any subject takes upon himself a public trust for the
benefit of the rest of his fellow-subjects, he is
eo ipso
bound to serve the subject in all the things that are within the
reach and comprehension of such an office, under pain of an action
against him. . . . If on the road a shoe fall off my horse, and I
come to a smith to have one put on, and the smith refuse to do it,
an action will lie against him, because he has made profession of a
trade which is for the public good, and has thereby exposed and
vested an interest of himself in all the king's subjects that will
employ him in the way of his trade. If an innkeeper refuse to
entertain a guest where his house is not full, an action will lie
against him, and so against a carrier, if his horses be not loaded,
and he refuse to take a packet proper to be sent by a carrier.
[
Footnote 2/6]"
Judges who fashioned those rules had no written constitution as
a guide. There were, to be sure, criminal statutes that regulated
the common callings. [
Footnote 2/7]
But the civil remedies were judge-made. We live under a
constitution that proclaims equal protection of the laws. That
standard is our guide.
See Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U. S. 12;
Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353.
And, under that standard, business serving the public cannot seek
the aid
Page 373 U. S. 278
of the state police or the state courts or the state
legislatures to foist racial segregation in public places under its
ownership and control. The constitutional protection extends only
to "state" action, not to personal action. But we have "state"
action here, wholly apart from the activity of the Mayor and
police, for Louisiana has interceded with its judiciary to put
criminal sanctions behind racial discrimination in public places.
She may not do so consistently with the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The criminal penalty (60 days in jail and a $350 fine) was
imposed on these petitioners by Louisiana's judiciary. That action
of the judiciary was state action. Such are the holdings in
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, and
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249.
[
Footnote 2/8] Those cases involved
restrictive covenants.
Shelley v. Kraemer was a civil suit
to enjoin violation of a restrictive covenant by a Negro purchaser.
Barrows v. Jackson was a suit to collect damages for
violating a restrictive covenant by selling residential property to
a Negro. Those cases, like the present one, were "property" cases.
In those cases, as in the present one, the line was drawn at
dealing with Negroes. There, as here, no state legislature was
involved, only the state judiciary. The Court said in
Shelley
v. Kraemer:
"That the action of state courts and of judicial officers in
their official capacities is to be regarded as action of the State
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is a proposition
which has long been established by decisions of this Court."
334 U.S. at
334 U. S. 14.
The list of instances where action of the state judiciary is
state action within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is a
long one. Many were noted in
Shelley
Page 373 U. S. 279
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. at
334 U. S. 14-18.
Most state convictions in violation of the First, Fourth, or Fifth
Amendment, as incorporated in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, have indeed implicated not the state
legislature, but the state judiciary, or the state judiciary and
the state prosecutor and the state police.
Shelley v.
Kraemer -- and later
Barrows v. Jackson -- held that
the state judiciary, acting alone to enforce private discrimination
against Negroes who desired to buy private property in residential
areas, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Places of public accommodation such as retail stores,
restaurants, and the like render a "service which has become of
public interest" (
German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas,
supra, 233 U. S. 408)
in the manner of the innkeepers and common carriers of old. The
substance of the old common law rules has no direct bearing on the
decision required in this case. Restaurateurs and owners of other
places of amusement and resort have never been subjected to the
same duties as innkeepers and common carriers. [
Footnote 2/9] But, what is important is that this
whole body of law was a response to the felt needs of the times
that spawned it. [
Footnote 2/10]
In our time, the interdependence of people has greatly increased;
the days of
laissez faire have largely disappeared; men
are more and more dependent on their neighbors for services, as
well as for housing and the other necessities of life. By enforcing
this criminal mischief statute, invoked in the manner now before
us, the Louisiana courts are denying some people access to the
mainstream of our highly interdependent life solely
Page 373 U. S. 280
because of their race. Yet,
"if there is any one purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment that is
wholly outside the realm of doubt, it is that the Amendment was
designed to bar States from denying to some groups, on account of
their race or color, any rights, privileges, and opportunities
accorded to other groups."
Oyama v. California, 332 U. S. 633,
332 U. S. 649
(concurring opinion).
An innkeeper or common carrier has always been allowed to
exclude drunks, criminals and diseased persons, but only because
the public's interest in protecting his and his guests' health and
property outweighs its interest in providing accommodations for
this small group of travelers. [
Footnote 2/11] As a general rule, innkeepers and
carriers cannot refuse their services on account of race; though
the rule developed in this country that they can provide "separate
but equal" facilities. [
Footnote
2/12] And, for a period of our history, even this Court upheld
state laws giving sanction to such a rule.
Compare Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537,
with Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903,
affirming 142 F.
Supp. 707. But surely
Shelley v. Kraemer, supra, and
Barrows v. Jackson, supra, show that the day has passed
when an innkeeper, carrier, housing developer, or retailer can draw
a racial line, refuse service to some on account of color, and
obtain the aid of a State in enforcing his personal bias by sending
outlawed customers to prison or exacting fines from them.
Business, such as this restaurant, is still private property.
Yet there is hardly any private enterprise that does not feel the
pinch of some public regulation -- from price control, to health
and fire inspection, to zoning, to safety measures, to minimum
wages and working conditions,
Page 373 U. S. 281
to unemployment insurance. When the doors of a business are open
to the public, they must be open to all, regardless of race, if
apartheid is not to become engrained in our public places. It
cannot, by reason of the Equal Protection Clause, become so
engrained with the aid of state courts, state legislatures, or
state police. [
Footnote 2/13]
II
There is even greater reason to bar a State, through its
judiciary, from throwing its weight on the side of racial
discrimination in the present case, because we deal here with a
place of public accommodation under license from the State. This is
the idea I expressed in
Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.
S. 157, where another owner of a restaurant refused
service to a customer because he was a Negro. That view is not
novel; it stems from the dissent of the first Mr. Justice Harlan in
the
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3,
109 U. S.
58-59:
"In every material sense applicable to the practical enforcement
of the Fourteenth Amendment, railroad corporations, keepers of
inns, and managers of places of public amusement are agents or
instrumentalities of the State, because they are charged with
duties to the public, and are amenable, in respect of their duties
and functions, to governmental regulation. It seems to me that,
within the principle settled in
Ex parte Virginia, a
denial, by these instrumentalities of the State, to the citizen,
because of his race, of that equality of civil rights secured to
him by law, is a denial by the State, within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment. If it be not, then that race
Page 373 U. S. 282
is left, in respect of the civil rights in question, practically
at the mercy of corporations and individuals wielding power under
the States."
The nexus between the State and the private enterprise may be
control, as in the case of a state agency.
Pennsylvania v.
Board of Trusts, 353 U. S. 230. Or
the nexus may be one of numerous other devices. "State support of
segregated schools through any arrangement, management, funds, or
property cannot be squared" with the Equal Protection Clause.
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1,
358 U. S. 19.
Cf. Hampton v. Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320. A
state-assisted enterprise serving the public does not escape its
constitutional duty to serve all customers irrespective of race,
even though its actual operation is in the hands of a lessee.
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.
S. 715.
Cf. Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.
S. 454. State licensing and surveillance of a business
serving the public also brings its service into the public domain.
This restaurant needs a permit from Louisiana to operate; [
Footnote 2/14] and, during the existence
of the license, the State has broad powers of visitation and
control. [
Footnote 2/15] This
restaurant is
Page 373 U. S. 283
thus an instrumentality of the State, since the State charges it
with duties to the public and supervises its performance. The
State's interest in and activity with regard to its restaurants
extends far beyond any mere income-producing licensing
requirement.
There is no constitutional way, as I see it, in which a State
can license and supervise a business serving the public and endow
it with the authority to manage that business on the basis of
apartheid, which is foreign to our Constitution.
[
Footnote 2/1]
See Hamilton, Affectation with Public Interest, 39 Yale
L.J. 1089, 1098-1099.
[
Footnote 2/2]
See Jeremy, The Law of Carriers, Inn-Keepers, etc.
(1815) 4-5, 144-147; Tidswell, The Innkeeper's Legal Guide (1864),
c. 1; Schouler, Law of Bailments (2d ed. 1887), §§
274-329, 330-341; Beale, The Law of Innkeepers and Hotels (1906)
passim; 1 Wyman, Public Service Corporations (1911)
§§ 1-5; Burdick, The Origin of the Peculiar Duties of
Public Service Companies, 11 Col.L.Rev. 514, 616; Arterburn, The
Origin and First Test of Public Callings, 75 U. of Pa.L.Rev.
411.
[
Footnote 2/3]
Hamilton,
supra, 373
U.S. 267fn2/1|>note 1, p. 1110.
[
Footnote 2/4]
See, e.g., McKinney's Consol.N.Y.Laws, Vol. 8, Civil
Rights Law, c. 6, Art. 4;
id., Vol. 18, Executive Law, c.
18, Art. 15; N.J.Stat.Ann., Tit. 10;
id., Tit. 18, c. 25;
Cal.Civ.Code, § 51.
Cf. Cal.Health and Safety Code,
§§ 35700 (1962 Supp.)
et seq.; Burks v. Poppy Constr.
Co., 57 Cal. 2d
463, 20 Cal. Rptr. 609, 370 P.2d 313;
Martin v. New
York, 22 Misc.2d 389, 201 N.Y.S.2d 111.
See
generally, Greenberg, Race Relations and American Law, 101-114
(1959); 7 St. Louis U.L.J. 88 (1962).
[
Footnote 2/5]
See Schouler,
op. cit., supra, 373
U.S. 267fn2/2|>note 2, §§ 274, 335; Wyman,
op.
cit., supra, 373
U.S. 267fn2/2|>note 2, § 1; Arterburn,
supra,
373
U.S. 267fn2/2|>note 2.
[
Footnote 2/6]
See also White's Case (1558), 2 Dyer 158.b.;
Warbrooke v. Griffin (1609), 2 Brownl. 254;
Bennett v.
Mellor (1793), 5 Term Rep. 273;
Thompson v. Lacy
(1820), 3 B. & Ald. 283.
For criminal prosecutions,
see, e.g., Rex v. Ivens
(1835), 7 Car. & P. *213;
Regina v. Sprague (1899), 63
J.P. 233.
For a collection of the English cases,
see 21
Halsbury's Laws of England (3d ed. 1957) 441
et seq.; 10
Mews' Dig.Eng.Cas.L. to 1924, pp. 1463
et seq.
[
Footnote 2/7]
Arterburn,
supra, 373
U.S. 267fn2/2|>note 2.
[
Footnote 2/8]
See also Abstract Investment Co. v.
Hutchinson, 204 Cal. App.
2d 242, 251, 22 Cal. Rptr. 309, 315; 10 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 401.
[
Footnote 2/9]
See Marrone v. Washington Jockey Club, 227 U.
S. 633;
Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club,
296 N.Y. 249, 72 N.E.2d 697;
Alpaugh v. Wolverton, 184 Va.
943, 36 S.E.2d 906;
Nance v. Mayflower Tavern, 106 Utah
517, 150 P.2d 773.
[
Footnote 2/10]
Wyman,
op. cit., supra, 373
U.S. 267fn2/2|>note 2, §§ 1, 2-16, 330; Schouler,
op. cit., supra, 373
U.S. 267fn2/2|>note 2, §§ 274, 335; Beale,
op.
cit., supra, 373
U.S. 267fn2/2|>note 2, c. I; Arterburn,
supra,
373
U.S. 267fn2/2|>note 2, 420-426.
[
Footnote 2/11]
Wyman,
op. cit., supra, 373
U.S. 267fn2/2|>note 2, c. 18; Schouler,
op. cit.,
supra, 373
U.S. 267fn2/2|>note 2, §§ 320, 322.
[
Footnote 2/12]
Compare, e.g., Constantine v. Imperial Hotels [1944], 1
K.B. 693; Wyman,
op. cit., supra, 373
U.S. 267fn2/2|>note 2, §§ 361, 565, 566,
with
State v. Steele, 106 N.C. 766, 782, 11 S.E. 478, 484.
[
Footnote 2/13]
See generally Pollitt, Dime Store Demonstrations:
Events and Legal Problems of First Sixty Days, 1960 Duke L.J. 315,
350-365; Henkin,
Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised
Opinion, 110 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 473.
[
Footnote 2/14]
Under the provisions of Article 7.02 of the Sanitary Code,
promulgated by the State Board of Health pursuant to La.Rev.Stat.
§ 40:11, no person shall operate a public eating place of any
kind in the State of Louisiana unless he has been issued a permit
to operate by the local health officer; and permits shall be issued
only to persons whose establishments comply with the requirements
of the Sanitary Code.
[
Footnote 2/15]
Under La.Rev.Stat., Title 40, §§ 11, 12, 15, 16, 52,
and 69, state and local health officials closely police the
provisions of the Sanitary Code. They may
"enter, examine, and inspect all grounds, structures, public
buildings, and public places in execution of a warrant issued in
accordance with the constitution and laws of Louisiana,"
and "arrest . . . all persons violating any rule or regulation
of the board or any article or provision of the sanitary code. . .
." Penalties are provided for code violations.
See also
New Orleans City Code, 1956, §§ 29-55, 56, and 58; Home
Rule Charter of the City of New Orleans, § 4-1202(2).