Petitioner, a section foreman for a railroad, sued the railroad
in a state court under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for
injuries sustained when he was assaulted by a member of his section
gang whom he accused of stealing a ballast fork. A jury awarded
damages to petitioner, but the trial judge set aside the verdict
and granted the railroad a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
The Appellate Court affirmed.
Held: The evidence was sufficient to support the jury's
finding that the assault was foreseeable; the trial court and the
Appellate Court improperly invaded the function and province of the
jury; certiorari is granted; the judgment is reversed; and the case
is remanded. Pp.
372 U. S.
248-250.
Reversed.
PER CURIAM.
The petition for writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment is
reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
The petitioner, a section foreman for respondent railroad, was
assaulted by one of his section gang whom he accused of stealing a
ballast fork. In this action under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51
et seq., the petitioner was
awarded damages by a jury in the Circuit Court of St. Clair County,
Illinois. The trial judge set aside the verdict and granted
respondent's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The
Appellate Court affirmed, 35 Ill.App.2d 66, 181 N.E.2d 737. Its
Page 372 U. S. 249
judgment became final when the Illinois Supreme Court denied
petitioner leave to appeal. Ill.Rev.Stat., 1961, c. 110, §
75.
The trial judge granted respondent's motion on the ground that
"there was a lack of evidence to sustain" the jury's verdict. The
Appellate Court, in affirming, held that there was no evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the respondent knew or should
have known prior to the assault of propensities of the assailant to
commit such assaults.
We think that the Illinois courts improperly invaded the
function and province of the jury in this case. While ". . .
reasonable foreseeability of harm is an essential ingredient of
Federal Employers' Liability Act negligence,"
Gallick v.
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., ante, p.
372 U. S. 108 at
372 U. S. 117,
we have held that the fact that
"the foreseeable danger was from intentional or criminal
misconduct is irrelevant; respondent nonetheless had a duty to make
reasonable provision against it."
Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U. S. 459,
332 U. S. 462.
The petitioner's evidence was that his immediate superior, a
roadmaster, assigned the assailant to petitioner's crew and at the
time warned him: "You will have to watch him, because he is a bad
actor and a troublemaker. You will have to watch him." He also
testified to having several times complained to the roadmaster
about the assailant's misconduct and refusal to follow his orders
during the two months the assailant was with his crew. Finally, he
testified that, after the assault, the roadmaster said to him: "I
told you to look out for him. Now you got yourself in plenty of
trouble." This testimony was disputed but, if believed by the jury,
it constituted probative facts sufficient to support the jury's
finding of foreseeability and withstand the respondent's motion.
McBride v. Toledo Terminal R.
Co.,
Page 372 U. S. 250
354 U. S. 517;
Ringhiser v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co., 354 U.
S. 901;
see also Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.
Co., 352 U. S. 500.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN and MR. JUSTICE STEWART would deny
certiorari.
See dissenting opinion of Frankfurter, J., and
separate opinion of HARLAN, J., in
Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.
Co., 352 U. S. 500,
352 U. S. 524,
352 U. S. 559;
concurring opinion of Stewart, J., in
Sentilles v.
Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corp., 361 U.
S. 107,
361 U. S. 111;
dissenting opinion of HARLAN, J., in
Gallick v. Baltimore &
Ohio R. Co., ante, p.
372 U. S. 122. The case having been taken, however, they
concur in the judgment of the Court, 352 U.S. at
352 U. S.
559-562; 361 U.S. at
361 U. S.
111.