Petitioner was convicted of violating the so-called membership
clause of the Smith Act, which makes a felony the acquisition or
holding of membership in any organization which advocates the
overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or
violence, knowing the purpose thereof.
Held: the judgment is reversed, because the evidence
was insufficient to prove that the Communist Party presently
advocated forcible overthrow of the Government not as an abstract
doctrine, but by the use of language reasonably and ordinarily
calculated to incite persons to action, immediately or in the
future. Pp.
369 U.S.
291-300.
(a) In order to support a conviction under the membership clause
of the Smith Act, there must be some substantial direct or
circumstantial evidence of a call to violence now or in the future
which is both sufficiently strong and sufficiently pervasive to
lend color to the otherwise ambiguous theoretical material
regarding Communist Party teaching and to justify the inference
that such a call to violence may fairly be imputed to the Party as
a whole, and not merely to some narrow segment of it. P.
367 U. S.
298.
(b) It is
present advocacy, not an intent to advocate
in the future or a conspiracy to advocate in the future, which is
an element of the crime under the membership clause of the Smith
Act. P.
367 U. S.
298.
(c) A defendant must be judged upon the evidence in his own
trial, and not upon the evidence in some other trial or upon what
may be supposed to be the tenets of the Communist Party. P.
367 U. S.
299.
262 F.2d 501 reversed.
Page 369 U. S. 291
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case, like
Scales v. United States, ante, p.
367 U. S. 203, was
brought here to test the validity of a conviction under the
membership clause of the Smith Act. 361 U.S. 813. The case comes to
us from the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which affirmed
petitioner's conviction in the District Court for the Western
District of New York after a jury trial. 262 F.2d 501.
The only one of petitioner's points we need consider is his
attack on the sufficiency of the evidence, since his statutory and
constitutional challenges to the conviction are disposed of by our
opinion in
Scales, and consideration of his other
contentions is rendered unnecessary by the view we take of his
evidentiary challenge.
In considering that challenge, we start from the premise that
Smith Act offenses require rigorous standards of proof.
Scales,
ante, p.
367 U. S. 230.
We find that the record in this case, which was tried before our
opinion issued in
Yates v. United States, 354 U.
S. 298, bears much of the infirmity that we found in the
Yates record, and requires us to conclude that the
evidence of illegal Party advocacy was insufficient to support this
conviction.
A large part of the evidence adduced by the Government on that
issue came from the witness Lautner, and the reading of copious
excerpts from the "communist classics." This evidence, to be sure,
plentifully shows the Party's teaching of abstract doctrine that
revolution is an inevitable product of the "proletarian" effort to
achieve communism in a capitalist society, but testimony as to
happenings which might have lent that evidence to an inference of
"advocacy of action" to accomplish that end during the period of
the indictment, 1946-1954, or itself supported such an inference,
is sparse indeed. Moreover, such testimony as there is of that
nature was not broadly based, but was limited almost exclusively to
Party doings
Page 367 U. S. 292
in western New York, more especially in the cities of Rochester
and Buffalo, the scene of petitioner's principal Party activities.
Further, the showing of illegal Party advocacy lacked the
compelling quality which in
Scales, ante, p.
367 U. S. 203, was
supplied by the petitioner's own utterances and systematic course
of conduct as a high Party official. We proceed to a summary of
this testimony.
The witness Dietch described mainly episodes from his
indoctrination as a member of the Rochester Young Communist League
during the years 1935-1938. In that time, he knew petitioner, with
whom he had gone to high school, and testified that petitioner,
then a youth, was an active and convinced member of the League.
Apart from those early years, Dietch's testimony as to the Party
and the petitioner referred to one other possibly relevant episode
when, in 1951, he obtained for the Party at petitioner's request
two pieces of special printing equipment for which petitioner paid
$100 and $200. However, this episode is deprived of significance
when it appears from the witness' testimony that petitioner
explained to him at the time that pressure brought to bear on the
Party had made it difficult for it to get its printing done by
conventional commercial means.
The witness Geraldine Hicks had joined the Party in 1943 at the
request of the FBI and continued to be involved with it until 1953.
She knew petitioner in connection with his work as Chairman of the
Erie County Communist Party from 1946 until 1950. Her testimony
related to classes and meetings which she attended in the Buffalo
area, where the "communist classics" were used for teaching
purposes. Extensive passages from these works were read into
evidence. She also testified as to the importance attributed by the
local Party to its "industrial concentration" work and to its
recruitment of workers
Page 367 U. S. 293
in those industries, as well as to the importance attributed to
the recruitment of Negroes.
The witness Chatley, who was a bus driver during the period of
his Communist Party membership from 1949 onwards, testified to his
contacts with petitioner and other Party members in the Buffalo
area. He testified to Party teachings as to the importance of
receiving solid support from the labor unions. He was given various
items of literature such as the History of the Russian Revolution
and The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky, which
latter dealt with an early Communist who had been singled out for
condemnation because of his views that communism could be achieved
ultimately by peaceful means. He was told by petitioner that,
"if I would reread the book[s], most of my questions would be
answered. He said if there were any points I did not understand, he
would be happy to clear them up at a later visit."
Perhaps the most significant item of Chatley's testimony dealt
with an interview with petitioner at which Chatley was requested to
hide out a Party member who was fleeing the FBI in connection with
"what the newspapers called this Atom Spy Ring business." So far as
the record reveals, the plans never progressed beyond this request.
The petitioner had also told Chatley that the Federal Government
was building concentration camps:
". . . He said they are not building them for ornamental
purposes. He said 'They are going to fill them with our people,
starting with the leaders.' . . . He said that he expected, when
they were ready, he would be one of the first people to go. He said
the Federal Government would continue with these camps and fill
them with a lot of people, but the time would come when there would
be a show-down,
Page 367 U. S. 294
working people will stand just so much. It might take several
years, it will result in bad times, but, in the end, it will result
in a turn in the country to Marxism and Leninism. He said then his
part might be in it; he was willing to suffer anything to bring it
to that glorious end."
Certainly the most damaging testimony came from the witness
Regan, who, as a government agent and Party member from 1947 in the
Buffalo-Rochester area, gathered considerable information on the
Party's "industrial concentration" program in that area. Regan, at
the request of petitioner, attended a Party meeting in New York
City on creating a Party commission in the United Auto Workers. The
conference concerned the penetration of the United Auto Workers,
and plans were made for getting people into various shops in
automobile plants in the State who could later assume positions of
leadership in the union. At a later date petitioner also discussed
the penetration of an automobile plant in the area by Party members
sent up from New York City. Regan also received a pamphlet, but not
from the petitioner, dealing with the concentration program in the
steel industry. The pamphlet stated at one point:
"1. Three basic industries, steel, railroad, and mining. These
are basis [
sic] to the National economy, that is if any
one or all three are shut down by strike, our economy is paralyzed.
It is necessary for a Marxist revolutionary party to be rooted in
these industries."
In 1949, Regan attended a conference in Rochester at which the
petitioner spoke:
"He discussed concentration work, and he said the task of the
Party was to build the Party within the shop in Buffalo . . . ; he
specifically mentioned both steel and Westinghouse Electric."
Another speaker said that
"steel industry was a basic industry,
Page 367 U. S. 295
by basic industry, he said the entire section of industry within
the country depended on steel."
Regan also attended a conference in New York City at which
petitioner spoke:
". . . He said a Lenin method of work within the shop was to
decide upon the particular dependent within the shop, that the shop
as a rule depended upon, to suspend production, it was the job of
every communist to know the people, executives, and product of the
company, if possible, to direct his attention on the key
department; better still, to get a job in the key department."
Several other passages in Regan's testimony should be adverted
to for their bearing on the tone of the record before us. Speaking
of the war in Korea, Regan testified that the petitioner had said
at the conference of the Upstate District of the Party in 1950:
". . . the war . . . was caused by an aggressive action of the
United States; American troops would follow Wall Street policy. He
said it is possible for this to break out in other parts of the
world. He mentioned the near East."
"Q. Is that all?"
"A. Yes."
No effort was made to link up this conference with particularly
trusted Party members, but it does appear that it was at this
conference that plans were laid for building a Communist Party club
"on the railroad."
Regan also testified to a remark made at another Party
conference by a lecturer that a "social democrat was an
evolutionist who waited for socialism, where the Communist Party
would achieve socialism through revolutions." At this same meeting,
the lecturer recounted an incident
Page 367 U. S. 296
that had occurred at a class she had once taught in New
Rochelle, New York at an unspecified time:
". . . She said a person at this class, they were discussing the
Soviet Union, asked her would it be possible for him to own twenty
pairs of shoes in the Soviet Union. She made the statement he was
the kind of a guy they hoped to shoot someday."
The witness recalled a similar intemperate remark by the
petitioner during a meeting in 1947:
"Lumpkin [a Party member] was talking about a visit to his home
by a local newspaper reporter. He said the reporter came to his
home. They let him in and answered a lot of questions. . . ."
"John Noto said Lumpkin should never let the reporter into the
house. Should not have answered any questions. He said 'Sometime I
will see the time we can stand a person like this S.O.B. against
the wall and shoot him.'"
The witness Greenberg testified largely about the Party program
in the upstate area as to setting up printing and mimeographing
equipment in case commercial channels were cut off or the Party was
forced underground, and three other witnesses testified briefly to
the effect that they had known petitioner when he had moved to
Newark, New Jersey, and obtained a job under an assumed name as a
helper or stockkeeper in the Goodyear Rubber Products Corporation
factory, in connection with which he used a false Social Security
number.
Finally, there was testimony through the witness Lautner as to
the Party's underground organization in northern New York,
including petitioner's participation therein as one of the three
Party members in charge.
We must consider this evidence in the light most favorable to
the Government to see whether it would support
Page 367 U. S. 297
the conclusion that the Party engaged in the advocacy
"not of . . . mere abstract doctrine of forcible overthrow, but
of action to that end, by the use of language reasonably and
ordinarily calculated to incite persons to . . . action"
immediately or in the future.
Yates v. United States,
supra, at
354 U. S. 316.
In that case, we said:
". . . The essence of the
Dennis holding was that
indoctrination of a group in preparation for future violent action,
as well as exhortation to immediate action, by advocacy found to be
directed to 'action for the accomplishment' of forcible overthrow,
to violence as 'a rule or principle of action,' and employing
'language of incitement' . . . is not constitutionally protected. .
. . This is quite a different thing from the view of the District
Court here, that mere doctrinal justification of forcible
overthrow, if engaged in with the intent to accomplish overthrow,
is punishable
per se under the Smith Act. That sort of
advocacy, even though uttered with the hope that it may ultimately
lead to violent revolution, is too remote from concrete action to
be regarded as the kind of indoctrination preparatory to action
which was condemned in
Dennis. As one of the concurring
opinions in
Dennis put it:"
"Throughout our decisions, there has recurred a distinction
between the statement of an idea which may prompt its hearers to
take unlawful action and advocacy that such action be taken."
Id. at
354 U. S.
321-322.
The great bulk of the evidence in this record seems to us to
come within the purview of the first of the contrasted alternatives
elaborated in the concurring opinion in
Dennis v. United
States, 341 U. S. 494,
341 U. S. 545,
and referred to in the passage just quoted. We held in
Yates, and we reiterate now, that the mere abstract
teaching of Communist
Page 367 U. S. 298
theory, including the teaching of the moral propriety or even
moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same
as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such
action. There must be some substantial direct or circumstantial
evidence of a call to violence now or in the future which is both
sufficiently strong and sufficiently pervasive to lend color to the
otherwise ambiguous theoretical material regarding Communist Party
teaching, and to justify the inference that such a call to violence
may fairly be imputed to the Party as a whole, and not merely to
some narrow segment of it.
Surely the offhand remarks that certain individuals hostile to
the Party would one day be shot cannot demonstrate more than the
venomous or spiteful attitude of the Party towards its enemies, and
might indicate what could be expected from the Party if it should
ever succeed to power. The "industrial concentration" program, as
to which the witness Regan testified in some detail, does indeed
come closer to the kind of concrete and particular program on which
a criminal conviction in this sort of case must be based. But, in
examining that evidence, it appears to us that, in the context of
this record, this too fails to establish that the Communist Party
was an organization which presently advocated violent overthrow of
the Government now or in the future, for that is what must be
proven. The most that can be said is that the evidence as to that
program might justify an inference that the leadership of the Party
was preparing the way for a situation in which future acts of
sabotage might be facilitated, but there is no evidence that such
acts of sabotage were presently advocated; and it is
present advocacy, and not an intent to advocate in the
future or a conspiracy to advocate in the future once a groundwork
has been laid, which is an element of the crime under the
membership clause. To permit an inference of present advocacy from
evidence
Page 367 U. S. 299
showing, at best, only a purpose or conspiracy to advocate in
the future would be to allow the jury to blur the lines of
distinction between the various offenses punishable under the Smith
Act.
The kind of evidence which we found in
Scales
sufficient to support the jury's verdict of present illegal Party
advocacy is lacking here in any adequately substantial degree. It
need hardly be said that it is upon the particular evidence in a
particular record that a particular defendant must be judged, and
not upon the evidence in some other record or upon what may be
supposed to be the tenets of the Communist Party.
See Yates,
supra, at
354 U. S.
330.
Although our conclusion renders unnecessary consideration of the
evidence as to petitioner's personal criminal purpose to bring
about the overthrow of the Government by force and violence, a
further word may be desirable. While evidence of the industrial
concentration program, in which petitioner was active, does not
alone justify an inference of the Party's present advocacy of
violent overthrow, it may very well tend to show the quite
different element of the petitioner's own purpose. Even though it
is not enough to sustain a conviction that the Party has engaged in
"mere doctrinal justification of forcible overthrow . . . [even]
with the intent to accomplish overthrow,"
Yates, supra, at
354 U. S. 321,
it would seem that such a showing might be of weight in meeting the
requirement that the particular defendant in a membership clause
prosecution had the requisite criminal intent. But it should also
be said that this element of the membership crime, like its others,
must be judged
strictissimi juris, for otherwise there is
a danger that one in sympathy with the legitimate aims of such an
organization, but not specifically intending to accomplish them by
resort to violence, might be punished for his adherence to lawful
and constitutionally
Page 367 U. S. 300
protected purposes because of other and unprotected purposes
which he does not necessarily share.
In view of our conclusion as to the insufficiency of the
evidence as to illegal Party advocacy, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals must be
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and THE CHIEF JUSTICE would remand to the
District Court with direction to that court to dismiss the
indictment. For the reasons expressed in MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN's
dissent in
Scales v. United States, ante, p.
367 U. S. 278,
they believe that this prosecution was barred by § 4(f) of the
Internal Security Act. They also believe that the dismissal is
required because of the insufficiency of the evidence.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, concurring.
In 1799, the English Parliament passed a law outlawing certain
named societies on the ground that they were engaged in "a
traitorous Conspiracy . . . in conjunction with the Persons from
Time to Time exercising the Powers of Government in
France. . . ." [
Footnote
1] One of the many strong arguments made by those who opposed
the enactment of this law was stated by a member of that body, Mr.
Tierney:
"The remedy proposed goes to the putting an end to all these
societies together. I object to the system, of which this is only a
branch, for the right hon. gentleman has told us he intends to
propose laws from time to time upon this subject, as cases may
arise to require them. I say these attempts lead to
Page 367 U. S. 301
consequences of the most horrible kind. I see that government
are acting thus. Those whom they cannot prove to be guilty, they
will punish for their suspicion. To support this system, we must
have a swarm of spies and informers. They are the very pillars of
such a system of government. [
Footnote 2]"
The decision in this case, in my judgment, dramatically
illustrates the continuing vitality of this observation.
The conviction of the petitioner here is being reversed because
the Government has failed to produce evidence the Court believes
sufficient to prove that the Communist Party presently advocates
the overthrow of the Government by force. The Government is being
told, in effect, that if it wishes to get convictions under the
Smith Act, it must maintain a permanent staff of informers who are
prepared to give up-to-date information with respect to the present
policies of the Communist Party. Given the fact that such
prosecutions are to be permitted at all, I do not disagree with the
wisdom of the Court's decision to compel the Government to come
forward with evidence to prove its charges in each particular case.
But I think that it is also important to realize the overriding
preeminence that such a system of laws gives to the perpetuation
and encouragement of the practice of informing -- a practice which,
I think it is fair to say, has not always been considered the sort
of system to which a wise government
Page 367 U. S. 302
would entrust the security of a Nation. I have always thought,
as I still do think, that this Government was built upon a
foundation strong enough to assure its endurance without resort to
practices which most of us think of as being associated only with
totalitarian governments.
I cannot join an opinion which implies that the existence of
liberty is dependent upon the efficiency of the Government's
informers. I prefer to rest my concurrence in the judgment
reversing petitioner's conviction on what I regard as the more
solid ground that the First Amendment forbids the Government to
abridge the rights of freedom of speech, press and assembly.
[
Footnote 1]
39 George III, c. 79. For a more complete discussion of the
provisions of this law and the arguments surrounding its enactment,
see my dissenting opinion in
Communist Party v.
Subversive Activities Control Board, ante, p. 1, at
367 U. S.
151-154,
367 U. S.
162.
[
Footnote 2]
See Parliamentary Debates, Hansard, 1st Series, 34 at
991.
Cf. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.
S. 353,
299 U. S.
365:
"The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from
incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force and
violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the
constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free assembly
in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion,
to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the
people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful
means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very
foundation of constitutional government."
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concurring.
The utterances, attitudes, and associations in this case, like
those in
Scales v. United States, ante, p.
367 U. S. 203,
are, in my view, wholly protected by the First Amendment, and not
subject to inquiry, examination, or prosecution by the Federal
Government.
For that reason, as well as for the one mentioned by MR. JUSTICE
BRENNAN, I would remand the case to the District Court with
directions to dismiss the indictment.