Section 13 of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, which exempts
federal home loan banks and their "advances" from state taxation,
bars a State from requiring a federal savings and loan association
to pay documentary stamp taxes on promissory notes executed by the
association in favor of a federal home loan bank to cover loans
from the bank to the association. Pp.
365 U. S.
518-524.
(a) The immunity granted to "advances" of a federal home loan
bank by § 13 of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act is broad enough
to bar state stamp taxes on such a loan.
Pittman v. Home
Owners' Loan Corp., 308 U. S. 21. Pp.
365 U. S.
519-522.
(b) Section 5(h) of the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, which
provides that no State shall tax a federal savings and loan
association at a higher rate than it taxes other similar local
mutual or cooperative thrift and home financing institutions, did
not expressly or impliedly repeal § 13 of the Federal Home
Loan Bank Act, which exempts "advances" of federal home loan banks
from state taxation. Pp.
365 U. S.
522-524.
236 S.C. 2, 112 S.E.2d 716, reversed.
Page 365 U. S. 518
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether the State of South Carolina
has power to require a Federal Savings and Loan Association located
in that State to pay documentary stamp taxes on promissory notes
executed by the Association in favor of a Federal Home Loan Bank to
cover loans from the Bank to the Association.
Petitioner is a Federal Savings and Loan Association organized
under the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 [
Footnote 1] and doing business in Laurens, South
Carolina. It is also a member, with borrowing privileges, of the
Federal Home Loan Bank of Greensboro, North Carolina, which was
established under the Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932. [
Footnote 2] For the purpose of making
mortgage money available in the community which it serves,
petitioner Federal Savings and Loan Association has, since August
12, 1953, secured "advances," or loans, from the Federal Home Loan
Bank of Greensboro totalling $5,675,000, for which petitioner
executed written promissory notes to the Bank as required by the
1932 Act. The State assessed against petitioner documentary stamp
taxes on these notes of $2,270 under a state statute imposing a
stamp tax on promissory notes at the rate of four cents on each
$100. [
Footnote 3] Petitioner
paid these taxes under protest and then brought the present action
in the state court for refund of the payment, [
Footnote 4] claiming that the imposition of the
taxes constituted an unlawful attempt by the State to tax the
"advances" of the Federal Home Loan Bank of Greensboro in violation
of the provision of the 1932
Page 365 U. S. 519
Act exempting such banks from state taxation. This provision
states, in pertinent part:
"The bank, including its franchise, its capital, reserves, and
surplus,
its advances, and its income, shall be exempt
from all taxation now or hereafter imposed by the United States . .
. or
by any State. . . ."
12 U.S.C. § 1433. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the judgment
upholding the State's taxing power, basing its affirmance on two
grounds. [
Footnote 5] It was of
the opinion, first, that the exemption provision of the 1932 Act,
although completely exempting the loans of the Federal Home Loan
Bank from state taxation, did not cover the stamp taxes on the
promissory notes securing the loans, because these taxes were
imposed upon the borrowing Savings and Loan Association, rather
than upon the lending Home Loan Bank, and, for this reason, should
not be considered taxes on the Bank's loans within the meaning of
the 1932 provision. Secondly, the state court held that, regardless
of the original scope of the 1932 exemption, that exemption was
implicitly repealed as to transactions like this one by the
taxation provision of the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933. We granted
certiorari in order to determine whether the State has imposed a
tax forbidden by Congress. [
Footnote 6]
The first question is whether the immunity granted "advances" of
the Federal Home Loan Bank by the 1932 Act is broad enough to bar
state stamp taxes on this loan transaction. We decided a very
similar question in
Pittman v. Home Owners' Loan Corp.,
308 U. S. 21.
There, the State of Maryland imposed a stamp tax upon the
Page 365 U. S. 520
recording of mortgages at the rate of 10 cents for each $100 of
the principal amount of the mortgage indebtedness. The Home Owners'
Loan Corporation sought to record a mortgage upon payment of the
ordinary recording fee without payment of the additional state
stamp tax. The mortgage had been issued to it as security for a
loan which the Corporation had made under now defunct provisions of
the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933. Section 4(c) of that Act
provided that "[t]he Corporation, including . . . its loans" shall
be exempt "from all taxation . . . now or hereafter imposed . . .
by any State" except for real estate taxes. We unanimously affirmed
the holding of the state court that this exemption provision,
practically identical in language and substance to the exemption in
12 U.S.C. § 1433, precluded application of the recording tax
to mortgages securing loans from the Corporation.
The state court in the present case, although drawing no
distinction between the terms "loans" and "advances," nevertheless
thought the
Pittman decision inapplicable here because, in
that case, the mortgage was presented for recording by the exempt
lender itself (the Home Owners' Loan Corporation), while here, the
South Carolina tax was assessed against the borrowing petitioner
association, rather than against the exempt lender (the Home Loan
Bank). We distinctly said in
Pittman, however, that the
fact that the state taxing statute did not require payment of the
tax by the lender has "no determining significance," our reason
being that "whoever pays it, it is a tax upon the mortgage, and
that is what is forbidden by the law of the United States."
[
Footnote 7] We went on in
Pittman to recognize that the real question was whether
the
Page 365 U. S. 521
"critical term . . . '
loans' . . . should be construed
as covering the entire process of lending, the debts which result
therefrom and the mortgages given . . . as security. [
Footnote 8]"
The question here is the same as to the synonymous term
"advances" [
Footnote 9] and as
to the promissory notes securing the advances, since the language
of the exemption is equally broad. The factors given weight in the
Pittman opinion in deciding that the exemption covered the
entire loan transaction are also present here. The Act under
consideration there required that the loans "be secured by a duly
recorded home mortgage" just as here the Act requires the advances
to be secured by the note or obligation of the borrower. Here, as
we said in
Pittman, therefore, the documents sought to be
taxed "were indispensable elements in the lending operations
authorized by Congress" [
Footnote 10] and were required for the protection of the
lending institution. The tax in
Pittman was "graded
according to the amount of the loan," [
Footnote 11] and here too the face value of the notes
is the measure of the tax.
While the question of the breadth of the exemption of "advances"
in the 1932 Act thus is persuasively answered by our reasoning in
Pittman, the same conclusion is called for by the language
and legislative history of that Act as a whole. It set up a system
of federally chartered
Page 365 U. S. 522
Home Loan Banks for the purpose, as stated in the House and
Senate Committee Reports, of placing "long-term funds in the hands
of local institutions" in order to alleviate the pressing need of
home owners for "low-cost, long-term, installment mortgage money"
and to "decrease costs of mortgage money" with a "resulting benefit
to home ownership in the form of lower costs and more liberal
loans." [
Footnote 12] It is
to this end that the Act authorizes the Federal Home Loan Banks to
make "advances" of funds to eligible borrower institutions "upon
the note or obligation" of the borrower secured primarily by
mortgages on homes. [
Footnote
13] The exemption of these "advances" from taxation obviously
is in keeping with the Act's over-all policy of making these
mortgage funds available at low cost to home owners. Regardless of
who pays the documentary stamp taxes here at issue, the necessary
effect of the taxes is to increase the cost of obtaining the
advances of funds from the Home Loan Bank to be used in making
loans to home owners. In its impact, therefore, this tax, whether
nominally imposed on the Bank or on the petitioner, is bound to
increase the cost of loans to home owners, and thus contravene the
basic purpose of Congress in insulating these advances from state
taxation. We hold that it was error to construe the exemption
provision of the 1932 Act as not broad enough to bar imposition of
the State's stamp taxes on the notes which were an integral part of
these loan transactions.
This leaves for consideration the state court's holding that, in
instances where the borrower is a Federal Savings and Loan
Association such as petitioner, the exemption conferred upon the
entire loan transaction by the 1932 Act was impliedly repealed by
the taxation provision in
Page 365 U. S. 523
the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933. The court based this holding
upon the following language of the 1933 Act:
". . . [N]o State . . . or local taxing authority shall impose
any tax on such associations or their franchise, capital, reserves,
surplus, loans, or income greater than that imposed by such
authority on other similar local mutual or cooperative thrift and
home financing institutions."
12 U.S.C. § 1464(h). This provision unequivocally bars
discriminatory state taxation of the Federal Savings and Loan
Associations. The state court held that this prohibition of
discriminatory taxes also impliedly authorizes all
nondiscriminatory state taxes imposed on these Federal
Associations, thereby to that extent repealing the 1932 exemption.
We agree with petitioner, however, that in enacting § 1464(h)
in 1933, Congress did not, either expressly or impliedly, repeal
the provision of the 1932 Act which had exempted these loan
transactions from state taxation. Clearly there is no express
language providing for such repeal, and it is significant that when
other provisions of the 1932 Act were to be superseded by the 1933
Act they were repealed expressly, and not by implication. [
Footnote 14] It also would be
difficult to think of less apt circumstances for the finding of an
implied repeal. These two Acts, both designed to provide home
owners with easy credit at low cost, were passed within a year of
each other on the basis of the same hearings and when read together
form a consistent scheme in which the 1932 exemption provision
contributes to the major purpose of low-cost credit precisely as it
did before passage of the 1933 Act. Nor is there even an intimation
in the legislative history of the 1933 Act of any intention to
reduce the scope of the exempt status of Home Loan Banks. Indeed,
the only
Page 365 U. S. 524
comment that would seem to have any bearing on the matter is the
statement in the House and Senate Committee Reports that the 1933
Act was to provide new means of "direct relief to home owners"
without "otherwise disturb[ing] the functioning of the Federal
home-loan bank system." [
Footnote 15] Moreover, a construction of the 1933 Act to
permit state taxation of these loan transactions when the borrower
is a Federal Savings and Loan Association would bring about an
incongruous result. The States would still be barred by the
exemption provision of the 1932 Act from taxing these transactions
when the borrower is a state-chartered association. [
Footnote 16] To contend that the 1933 Act
allows the State to tax Federal Associations on the loan
transactions when it is barred by the 1932 Act from similarly
taxing state-chartered associations is to urge the very kind of
discriminatory taxation which the 1933 Act itself emphatically
prohibits. And surely it would be completely unwarranted to
construe the 1933 Act, which concerns only Federal Savings and Loan
Associations, as eliminating the exemption on Home Loan Bank
"advances" when the borrower is a state-chartered institution.
For all these reasons, the more sensible as well as the more
natural conclusion is that, in the 1933 Act, Congress left
unimpaired the exemption of these loan transactions from state
taxation conferred by the 1932 Act. The judgment of the state court
therefore is reversed and the cause remanded for proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
[
Footnote 1]
48 Stat. 128, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1468.
[
Footnote 2]
47 Stat. 725, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1449.
[
Footnote 3]
Code of Laws of South Carolina, § 65-688 (1952).
[
Footnote 4]
Such suits are authorized by Code of Laws of South Carolina,
§ 65-2662 (1952).
[
Footnote 5]
236 S.C. 2, 112 S.E.2d 716.
[
Footnote 6]
364 U.S. 812.
[
Footnote 7]
308 U.S. at
308 U. S. 31,
citing
Federal Land Bank of New Orleans v. Crosland,
261 U. S. 374,
261 U. S.
378-379.
[
Footnote 8]
308 U.S. at
308 U. S.
31.
[
Footnote 9]
The fact that the term used throughout the 1932 Act with
reference to these transactions is "advances," rather than "loans,"
is not a significant distinction from
Pittman, but merely
represents a congressional choice between synonyms, as was
indicated by Senator Reed in introducing on the Senate floor the
amendment which added the word "advances" to the exemption
provision:
"MR. REED. We should not, of course, put the
loans of
this new bank in the position of being taxable in the several
States."
75 Cong.Rec. 14659. (Emphasis supplied.)
[
Footnote 10]
308 U.S. at
308 U. S.
32.
[
Footnote 11]
308 U.S. at
308 U. S.
31.
[
Footnote 12]
H.R.Rep. No. 1418, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 8-10; S.Rep. No.
837, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 9-11.
[
Footnote 13]
12 U.S.C. §§ 1429-1430b.
[
Footnote 14]
See 48 Stat. 129; H.R.Rep. No. 55, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess., p. 1; S.Rep. No. 91, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1.
[
Footnote 15]
H.R.Rep. No. 55, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1; see R.Rep. No. 91,
73d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1.
[
Footnote 16]
The 1932 exemption of Home Loan Bank "advances" obviously does
not in any way depend upon the fact that the borrower is a Federal
Savings and Loan Association, as is made all the more evident by
the fact that such Federal Associations did not come into existence
until passage of the 1933 Act.