An interstate railroad applied to the public utility commissions
of four States for permission to abolish or consolidate many of its
little-used stations. The labor union which was the bargaining
agent of the station agents and telegraphers whose jobs would be
abolished notified the railroad under § 6 of the Railway Labor
Act of a desire to negotiate for an amendment to its current
bargaining agreement which would prevent the railroad from
abolishing any position without the union's consent, and it
threatened to strike if the railroad refused to negotiate about the
amendment. The railroad sued in a Federal District Court to enjoin
such a strike.
Held: the case involves or grows out of a "labor
dispute" within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and the
District Court was without jurisdiction to enjoin the strike
permanently. Pp.
362 U. S.
331-343.
(a) This controversy was a "labor dispute," as defined in §
13(c) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Pp.
362 U. S.
335-338.
(b) The strike here involved could not be enjoined on the theory
that it was unlawful for the union to seek to bargain about the
consolidation or abandonment of railroad stations, which are within
the control of state regulatory commissions. Pp.
362 U. S.
338-341.
(c) The dispute here involved was not a "minor" one which the
Railway Labor Act requires to be heard by the National Railroad
Adjustment Board. P.
362 U. S.
341.
264 F.2d 254 reversed.
Page 362 U. S. 331
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
According to the verified complaint filed in a United States
District Court in Illinois by the respondent, Chicago & North
Western Railway Company against the petitioners, the Order of
Railroad Telegraphers and its officials,
"This is an action for injunction to restrain and enjoin the
calling and carrying out of a wrongful and unlawful strike or work
stoppage on plaintiff's railroad."
Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides, however,
that
"No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue
any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any
case involving or growing out of
any labor dispute to
prohibit any person or persons . . . from . . . (a) [c]easing or
refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of
employment; . . . [
Footnote
1]"
The main question in this case then was, and still is, whether
this prohibition of the Norris-LaGuardia Act bars an injunction in
the circumstances of this case.
Respondent railroad, owning and operating a rail system of over
9,000 miles in the States of Illinois, Wisconsin,
Page 362 U. S. 332
Iowa, Minnesota, Michigan, Nebraska, South Dakota, North Dakota,
and Wyoming, is an integral part of the nationwide railway system
important to the transportation of passengers and freight in
interstate commerce. When the railroad began operations, about 100
years ago, traffic was such that railroad stations were established
about 7 to 10 miles apart. Trucks, automobiles, airplanes, barges,
pipelines and modern roads have reduced the amount of railroad
traffic so that the work now performed at many of these stations by
agents is less than one hour during a normal eight-hour day.
Maintenance of so many agencies where company employees do so
little work, the complaint alleges, is wasteful, and, consequently,
in 1957, the railroad filed petitions with the public utility
commissions in four of the nine States in which it operated asking
permission to institute a "Central Agency Plan whereby certain
stations would be made central agencies . . . " and others
abolished. The plan would necessarily result in loss of jobs for
some of the station agents and telegraphers, members of the
petitioner union. A few weeks after the state proceedings were
filed and before any decision had been made, the petitioner union,
the duly recognized, certified and acting collective bargaining
agent for the railroad's employees, notified the railroad under
§ 6 of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 156, that it
wanted to negotiate with the railroad to amend the current
bargaining agreement by adding the following rule:
"No position in existence on December 3, 1957, will be abolished
or discontinued except by agreement between the carrier and the
organization."
The railroad took the position, according to its complaint, that
this request did not constitute a "labor dispute under the Railway
Labor Act," that it did not raise a bargainable issue, and that the
union had no right to protest
Page 362 U. S. 333
or to seek relief except by appearing before the state public
utility commissions, which had power to determine whether station
agencies could be discontinued, a power which private parties could
not thwart by entering into a bargaining agreement. The respondent
added that maintenance of the unnecessary agencies was offensive to
the national transportation policy Congress adopted in the
Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-27, and that the
duties that Act imposed on railroads could not be contracted
away.
The union contended that the District Court was without
jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief under the provisions of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act because this case involved a labor dispute,
and that the railroad had refused to negotiate in good faith on the
proposed change in the agreement in violation of § 2, First,
of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152, First, which
requires the railroad to exert every reasonable effort to make and
maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules and working
conditions. Therefore, the union argued, an injunction in federal
court is barred, if for no other reason, because of § 8 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, which provides:
"No restraining order or injunctive relief shall be granted to
any complainant who has failed to comply with any obligation
imposed by law which is involved in the labor dispute in question,
or who has failed to make every reasonable effort to settle such
dispute either by negotiation or with the aid of any available
governmental machinery of mediation or voluntary arbitration."
29 U.S.C. § 108.
See Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen
v. Toledo, P. & W. R.R., 321 U. S. 50.
After hearings, the District Court found, so far as is relevant
here, that the railroad
"refused to negotiate, confer, mediate or otherwise treat with
defendant Telegraphers
Page 362 U. S. 334
on the proposed change in agreement set forth in the Section 6
notice,"
although the railroad "did show willingness to negotiate upon
the central agency plan, including a possibility concerning
severance pay"; that the proposed contract change referred to in
the § 6 notice "relates to the length or term of employment as
well as stabilization of employment," and that collective
bargaining as to the length or term of employment is commonplace;
that
"The dispute giving rise to the proposed strike is a major
dispute, and not a minor grievance, under the Railway Labor Act,
and no issue involved therein is properly referable to the National
Railroad Adjustment Board; [
Footnote 2]"
and that the contract change proposed in the § 6 notice
related to "rates of pay, rules and working conditions," and was
therefore a bargainable issue under the Railway Labor Act. On its
findings and conclusions of law, the District Court granted
temporary relief, but declined to grant a permanent injunction on
the ground that it was without jurisdiction to do so.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals did grant a permanent injunction
upon its decision that
"The District Court's finding that the proposed contract change
related to 'rates of pay, rules, or working conditions,' and was
thus a bargainable issue under the Railway Labor Act, is clearly
erroneous. [
Footnote 3]"
It held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not apply to bar an
injunction against this strike, [
Footnote 4] and
Page 362 U. S. 335
we granted certiorari, 361 U.S. 809, to consider this important
question. [
Footnote 5]
We hold, with the District Court, that this case involves or
grows out of a labor dispute within the meaning of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, and that the District Court was without
jurisdiction permanently to enjoin the strike.
Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act specifically withdraws
jurisdiction from a District Court to prohibit any person or
persons from "[c]easing or refusing to perform any work or to
remain in any relation of employment" "in any case involving or
growing out of any labor dispute" as "herein defined." [
Footnote 6] Section 13(c) of the Act
defines a labor dispute as including,
"any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment,
or concerning the association or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and
employee. [
Footnote 7]"
Unless the literal language of this definition is to be ignored,
it squarely covers this controversy. Congress made the definition
broad because it wanted it to be broad. There are few pieces of
legislation where the congressional hearings, committee reports,
and the language in the legislation itself more clearly point to
the necessity for giving an Act a construction that will protect
the congressional policy the Act adopted. Section 2 of this Act
specifies the public policy to be taken into
Page 362 U. S. 336
consideration in interpreting the Act's language and in
determining the jurisdiction and authority of federal courts; it is
one of freedom of association, organization, representation and
negotiation on the part of workers. [
Footnote 8] The hearings and committee reports reveal that
Congress attempted to write its bill in unmistakable language
because it believed previous measures looking toward the same
policy against nonjudicial intervention in labor disputes had been
given unduly limited constructions by the courts. [
Footnote 9]
Plainly, the controversy here relates to an effort on the part
of the union to change the "terms" of an existing collective
bargaining agreement. The change desired just as plainly referred
to "conditions of employment" of the railroad's employees who are
represented by the union. The employment of many of these station
agents inescapably hangs on the number of railroad stations that
will be either completely abandoned or consolidated with other
stations. And, in the collective bargaining world today, there is
nothing strange about agreements that effect the permanency of
employment. The District Court's finding that "[c]ollective
bargaining as to the length or term of employment is commonplace,"
is not challenged.
We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals that the union's
effort to negotiate about the job security of its members
"represents an attempt to usurp legitimate managerial
prerogative in the exercise of business judgment with respect to
the most economical and efficient conduct of its operations.
[
Footnote 10]"
The Railway Labor Act
Page 362 U. S. 337
and the Interstate Commerce Act recognize that stable and fair
terms and conditions of railroad employment are essential to a well
functioning national transportation system. The Railway Labor Act
safeguards an opportunity for employees to obtain contracts through
collective, rather than individualistic, bargaining. Where
combinations and consolidations of railroads might adversely affect
the interests of employees, Congress, in the Interstate Commerce
Act, has expressly required that, before approving such
consolidations, the Interstate Commerce Commission "shall require a
fair and equitable arrangement to protect the interests of the
railroad employees affected." [
Footnote 11] It requires the Commission to do this by
including "
terms and conditions" which provide that for a
term of years after a consolidation employees shall not be "in a
worse position with respect to their employment" than they would
otherwise have been. [
Footnote
12] (Emphasis supplied.)
In 1942, this Court held that, when a railroad abandons a
portion of its lines, the Interstate Commerce Commission has power
to include conditions for the protection of displaced workers in
deciding what "the public convenience and necessity may require."
We so construed the Interstate Commerce Act specifically on the
basis that imposition of such conditions "might strengthen the
national system through their effect on the morale and stability of
railway workers generally."
Interstate Commerce Comm'n v.
Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n, 315 U. S. 373,
315 U. S. 375,
citing
United States v. Lowden, 308 U.
S. 225. The brief for the railroad associations there
called our attention to testimony previously given to Congress that
as early as 1936 railroads representing 85% of the mileage of the
country had made collective bargaining agreements
Page 362 U. S. 338
with their employees to provide a schedule of benefits for
workers who might be displaced or adversely affected by
coordinations or mergers. [
Footnote 13] In an effort to prevent a disruption and
stoppage of interstate commerce, the trend of legislation affecting
railroads and railroad employees has been to broaden, not narrow,
the scope of subjects about which workers and railroads may or must
negotiate and bargain collectively. Furthermore, the whole idea of
what is bargainable has been greatly affected by the practices and
customs of the railroads and their employees themselves. It is too
late now to argue that employees can have no collective voice to
influence railroads to act in a way that will preserve the
interests of the employees as well as the interests of the railroad
and the public at large.
The railroad has argued throughout the proceedings that the
union's strike here may be enjoined, regardless of
Norris-LaGuardia, because its effort to bargain about the
consolidation and abandonment of railroad stations is unlawful. It
is true that, in a series of cases where collective bargaining
agents stepped outside their legal duties and violated the Act
which called them into being, we held that they could be enjoined.
[
Footnote 14] None of these
cases, however, enjoined conduct which the Norris-LaGuardia Act
withdrew from the injunctive power of the federal courts except the
Chicago River case, which held
Page 362 U. S. 339
that a strike could be enjoined to prevent a plain violation of
a basic command of the Railway Labor Act "adopted as a part of a
pattern of labor legislation."
353 U. S. 353 U.S.
30,
353 U. S. 42.
The Court there regarded as inapposite those cases in which it was
held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act's ban on federal injunctions is
not lifted because the conduct of the union is unlawful under some
other, nonlabor statute. [
Footnote 15] Here, far from violating the Railway Labor
Act, the union's effort to negotiate its controversy with the
railroad was in obedience to the Act's command that employees as
well as railroads exert every reasonable effort to settle all
disputes "concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions."
45 U.S.C. § 152, First. Moreover, neither the respondent nor
anyone else points to any other specific legal command that the
union violated here by attempting to bring about a change in its
collective bargaining agreement. It would stretch credulity too
far
Page 362 U. S. 340
to say that the Railway Labor Act, designed to protect railroad
workers, was somehow violated by the union's acting precisely in
accordance with that Act's purpose to obtain stability and
permanence in employment for workers. There is no express provision
of law, and certainly we can infer none from the Interstate
Commerce Act, making it unlawful for unions to want to discuss with
railroads actions that may vitally and adversely affect the
security, seniority and stability of railroad jobs. [
Footnote 16] And, for a number of reasons,
the state public utility proceedings, invoked by the railroad to
obtain approval of consolidation or abandonment of stations, could
not stamp illegality on the union's effort to negotiate this whole
question with the railroad. The union merely asked for a
contractual right to bargain with the railroad about any voluntary
steps it might take to abandon stations or to seek permission to
abandon stations and thus abolish jobs. Nothing the union requested
would require the railroad to violate any valid law or the valid
order of any public agency. There is no testimony, and there are no
findings, that this union has set itself up in defiance of any
state mandatory order. In fact, there was no state order of any
kind at the time the union first asked to negotiate about the
proposed contractual change. Even if a Norris-LaGuardia "labor
dispute" could not arise out
Page 362 U. S. 341
of an unlawful bargaining demand,
but see Afran Transport
Co. v. National Maritime Union, 169 F.
Supp. 416, 1959 A.M.C. 326, the union's proposal here was not
unlawful.
The union contends that, whether the state rulings were
mandatory or permissive, the States are without authority to order
an abandonment of stations that would conflict with collective
bargaining agreements made or to be made between the railroad and
the union. Whether this contention is valid or not we need not
decide, since there is no such conflict before us. And the District
Court expressly refused to find that the union's proposal was
prompted by the railroad's action in seeking state authority to put
its Central Agency Plan into effect. Instead, the District Court
specifically found that the dispute grew out of the failure of the
parties to reach an agreement on the contract change proposed by
the union.
Only a word need be said about the railroad's contention that
the dispute here with the union was a minor one relating to an
interpretation of its contract, and therefore one that the Railway
Labor Act requires to be heard by the National Railroad Adjustment
Board. We have held that a strike over a "minor dispute" may be
enjoined in order to enforce compliance with the Railway Labor
Act's requirement that minor disputes be heard by the Adjustment
Board.
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River &
I. R. Co., 353 U. S. 30. But
it is impossible to classify as a minor dispute this dispute
relating to a major change, affecting jobs, in an existing
collective bargaining agreement, rather than to mere infractions or
interpretations of the provisions of that agreement. Particularly
since the collective bargaining agreement which the union sought to
change was a result of mediation under the Railway Labor Act, this
is the type of major dispute that is not governed by the Adjustment
Board.
Page 362 U. S. 342
In concluding that the injunction ordered by the Court of
Appeals is forbidden by the Norris-LaGuardia Act, we have taken due
account of the railroad's argument that the operation of
unnecessary stations, services and lines is wasteful, and thus runs
counter to the congressional policy, expressed in the Interstate
Commerce Act, to foster an efficient national railroad system. In
other legislation, however, like the Railway Labor and
Norris-LaGuardia Acts, Congress has acted on the assumption that
collective bargaining by employees will also foster an efficient
national railroad service. It passed such Acts with knowledge that
collective bargaining might sometimes increase the expense of
railroad operations because of increased wages and better working
conditions. It goes without saying, therefore, that added railroad
expenditures for employees cannot always be classified as
"wasteful." It may be, as some people think, that Congress was
unwise in curtailing the jurisdiction of federal courts in railroad
disputes as it did in the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Arguments have even
been presented here pointing to the financial debilitation of the
respondent Chicago & North Western Railroad and to the absolute
necessity for the abandonment of railroad stations. These
arguments, however, are addressed to the wrong forum. If the scope
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is to be cut down in order to prevent
"waste" by the railroads, Congress should be the body to do so.
Such action is beyond the judicial province, and we decline to take
it.
There are other subsidiary questions raised with reference to
the validity of a second 30-day restraining order issued by the
district judge and an injunction pending appeal under Rule 62(c) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. But since we have determined
the main controversy between the parties, we think it inadvisable
to decide either of these questions now. We intimate no opinion
concerning either at this time.
Page 362 U. S. 343
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of
the District Court is affirmed insofar as it held that the court
was without jurisdiction under the Norris-LaGuardia Act to enter
the injunction.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
47 Stat. 70, 29 U.S.C. § 104. (Emphasis supplied.)
[
Footnote 2]
See Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River &
I. R. Co., 353 U. S. 30.
[
Footnote 3]
Chicago & N.W. R. Co. v. Order of Railroad
Telegraphers, 264 F.2d 254 at 260.
[
Footnote 4]
Ibid. See Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. New
York Central R. Co., 246 F.2d 114.
But see A. H. Bull
Steamship Co. v. Seafarers' International Union, 250 F.2d
326.
At the time of the District Court's decision, two States (South
Dakota and Iowa) of the four in which the railroad had sought
permission to institute its Central Agency Plan (the other two were
Minnesota and Wisconsin) had granted permission, and the plan was
promptly placed in effect. Since then, we are given to understand,
the commissions in the remaining two States have issued orders
approving the plan.
[
Footnote 5]
Compare Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama Steamship Co.,
post, p.
362 U. S. 365,
decided this day.
[
Footnote 6]
29 U.S.C. § 104.
[
Footnote 7]
29 U.S.C. § 113(c).
[
Footnote 8]
29 U.S.C. § 102.
[
Footnote 9]
See Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3,
325 U. S. 797,
325 U. S. 805;
United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.
S. 219,
312 U. S.
230-236;
Milk Wagon Drivers' Union Local 753 v. Lake
Valley Farm Products, Inc., 311 U. S. 91,
311 U. S.
102-103.
[
Footnote 10]
264 F.2d at 259.
[
Footnote 11]
49 U.S.C. § 5(2)(f).
And see § 5(2)(c).
[
Footnote 12]
49 U.S.C. § 5(2)(f).
[
Footnote 13]
Hearings before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce on H.R. 2531, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 216-217.
[
Footnote 14]
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & I.
R. Co., 353 U. S. 30;
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.
S. 768;
Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen
& Enginemen, 338 U. S. 232;
Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen &
Enginemen, 323 U. S. 210;
Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.
S. 515.
See also Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U. S. 448,
353 U. S.
457-459.
And see Steele v. Louisville & N. R.
Co., 323 U. S. 192.
[
Footnote 15]
The Court cited the following cases to show that unlawfulness
under nonlabor legislation did not remove the restrictions of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act upon the jurisdiction of federal courts:
Milk Wagon Drivers' Union Local 753 v. Lake Valley Farm
Products, Inc., 311 U. S. 91,
311 U. S. 103
(alleged violations of Sherman Act);
East Texas Motor Freight
Lines v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 163 F.2d 10,
12 (violation of Interstate Commerce Act and Motor Carrier
Act).
Of course, a holding here that mere unlawfulness under any law
is enough to remove the strictures of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
would require a modification or abandonment of our statement
that
"For us to hold, in the face of this legislation [the Clayton
and Norris-LaGuardia Acts], that the federal courts have
jurisdiction to grant injunctions in cases growing out of labor
disputes merely because alleged violations of the Sherman Act are
involved would run counter to the plain mandate of the
[Norris-LaGuardia] Act, and would reverse the declared purpose of
Congress."
Milk Wagon Drivers' Union Local 753 v. Lake Valley Farm
Products, Inc., 311 U. S. 91,
311 U. S. 103.
See also Lee Way Motor Freight v. Keystone Freight Lines,
126 F.2d 931, 934.
[
Footnote 16]
Moreover, this railroad operates in nine States; it has
instituted proceedings in the state regulatory commissions of four
only, and, at the time of the District Court's decision, only two
of these had rendered decisions. Yet the union's proposal was to
negotiate for a clause which would apply to respondent's entire
system. The railroad's refusal to bargain was not limited, however,
to operations in the four States in which proceedings had begun.
And, even assuming that the order of one State, South Dakota, was
mandatory, and that this fact is of importance, it would not
relieve the railroad from any duty it had to bargain on the
proposed contract change in the eight other States involved.
MR. JUSTICE CLARK, dissenting.
The respondent, suffering from financial headaches, conducted an
efficiency survey of its operations. This indicated that it was
carrying considerable dead weight on its payroll in the form of
local, one-man stations. Some of its local agents worked as little
as 12 minutes a day, and the average daily work time on its one-man
stations was only 59 minutes. All drew a full day's pay. In fact,
the pay for time worked, it was found, ran in some cases as high as
$300 per hour. Meanwhile, the railroad was facing a slow death for
lack of funds -- all to the ultimate but certain detriment of the
public, the employees, and the management. It then proposed -- and,
after hearings, four States approved -- a consolidation of work so
that an agent would have sufficient duties to perform to earn a
full day's pay. This would also permit the railroad, without any
curtailment of its service to the public, to reduce its employee
force over its entire system by several hundred agents. It proposed
to negotiate with the union as to the severance pay and other
perquisites for those agents whose services would no longer be
needed. This the union refused to do, demanding that, before any
agent's position be abolished, the railroad obtain its consent. The
union offered but one alternative: "comply with" its demand or
suffer a "strike." The railroad, in the face of such a ukase,
brought this suit.
Today, the Court tells the railroad that it must bargain with
the union or suffer a strike. The latter would be
Page 362 U. S. 344
the death knell of the railroad. Hence, for all practical
purposes, the Court is telling the railroad that it must secure the
union's approval before severing the hundreds of surplus employees
now carried on its payroll. Everyone knows what the answer of the
union will be. It is like the suitor who, when seeking the hand of
a young lady, was told by her to "go to father." But, as the parody
goes,
"She knew that he knew that her father was dead; she knew that
he knew what a life he had led; and she knew that he knew what she
meant when she said 'go to father.'"
I do not believe that the Congress intended to put the railroads
in such a situation. In fact, its over-all purpose has been to
prevent the devastating effects of strikes from paralyzing our
transportation systems, the efficient operation of which is so
vital to the public welfare. As I read the Interstate Commerce Act
-- the provisions of which were reaffirmed as late as the
Transportation Act of 1958 -- the Congress told the railroads to go
to the States -- not the union -- before abandoning or
consolidating its local stations. Respondent went to the States and
obtained their approval. The Court today gives to the union a veto
power over this action of the States. Until this power is removed,
the railroads will continue to be plagued with this situation -- so
foreign to the concept of a fair day's pay for a fair day's work,
which has been the basis of union labor's great achievements.
For this reason, as well as those so ably enumerated by my
Brother WHITTAKER in his dissent, which I join, I am obliged to
disagree with the Court. Perhaps the Congress will be obliged, in
the face of this ruling, to place the solution of such problems
within the specific power of the Interstate Commerce Commission or
under the Railway Labor Act, each of which, as well as the courts,
is today held impotent.
Page 362 U. S. 345
MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER, with whom MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, MR.
JUSTICE CLARK and MR. JUSTICE STEWART join, dissenting.
The Court concludes, as I read its opinion, that the Union's
demand for a covenant that no existing position may be abolished
without its consent was a lawfully bargainable one under the
Railway Labor Act; that the union did not, by its demand, attempt
unlawfully to "set itself up in defiance of" public regulatory
orders; that the "Union merely asked for a contractual right to
bargain with the railroad about . . . abandon[ing] stations . . .
and thus abolish[ing] jobs"; that,
"[e]ven if a Norris-LaGuardia 'labor dispute' could not arise
out of an unlawful bargaining demand . . . , the union's proposal
here was not unlawful,"
and that the Norris-LaGuardia Act deprived the court of
jurisdiction to enjoin the threatened strike to enforce acceptance
of the Union's demand.
With all deference, I believe that these conclusions are
contrary to the admitted or indubitable facts in the record, to the
provisions and policies of Acts adopted by Congress, and also to
principles established by many decisions of this Court; and, being
fearful that the innovation and reach of the Court's conclusions
will be destructive of congressional policy and injurious to the
public interest, I feel compelled to state my dissenting views.
Inasmuch as I read the record somewhat differently than does the
Court, my first effort will be to make a plain and chronological
statement of the relevant facts.
The Chicago and North Western Railway Company ("North Western")
is a major interstate common carrier by railroad. The Order of
Railroad Telegraphers ("Union") is a railway labor union, certified
by the National Mediation Board as the representative of the
Page 362 U. S. 346
station agents and various other employees of North Western.
North Western's lines extend westerly and northerly from Chicago
into, and serve, nine largely agricultural midwestern States. They
were laid out and constructed near the middle of the last century,
and, to accommodate that day's mode and conditions of rural travel,
stations were established at close intervals along its lines -- one
every seven to 10 miles along its branch lines through rural
sections -- to enable its patrons to travel, by horse or horses and
wagon over dirt roads, from their homes to the station and return
in one day.
Although originally an efficient and profitable railroad, North
Western, in more recent years, failed both to maintain and to
modernize its lines, facilities and equipment, and also permitted
many outmoded, inefficient and wasteful practices to continue --
producing the highest ratio of wage and salary expense to the
revenue dollar of all major American railroads -- resulting
ultimately in its inability effectively to compete with new forms
of transportation, or even with modernized railroads. In
consequence, its net revenues so steadily and extensively declined
that it lost $8,000,000 in the first quarter of 1956, and this so
reduced its cash position that its payrolls of $330,000 per day to
its 18,000 employees were in jeopardy.
Alarmed by these conditions, North Western's new managers
undertook a number of steps in the spring of 1956 to improve its
physical condition and competitive position, including the
elimination of many outmoded, costly and wasteful practices. It
then had several hundred "one-man" stations, principally located on
branch lines from which -- due to lack of need, occasioned by the
advent of paved roads and motorized vehicles -- all passenger
trains and many freight trains had been removed, and over which the
few remaining freight trains passed at hours when many of the
agents were not even on
Page 362 U. S. 347
duty. [
Footnote 2/1] Its studies
disclosed many instances where such agents were drawing a full
day's pay for as little as 15 to 30 minutes' work. Conceiving this
to be a wasteful practice and violative of the national
transportation policy, [
Footnote
2/2] North Western promulgated a plan -- known as its Central
Agency Plan -- which contemplated the discontinuance of a full-time
agent at most of such stations and provided, instead, for a
centrally located agent to perform the necessary agency services at
the central station and also at the neighboring station or stations
to either side.
Accordingly, North Western filed petitions with the Public
Utility Commissions of South Dakota, Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin
to effectuate its Central Agency Plan. The first of those petitions
was filed with the South Dakota Commission on November 5, 1957,
asking authority to effectuate the Central Agency Plan with respect
to 69 "one-man" stations in that State. Hearings were held by that
Commission beginning November 26, 1957, and ending January 17,
1958. The Union appeared in that proceeding, presented evidence, a
brief and an oral argument, in opposition to the petition. It
contended, among other things, that its existing bargaining
agreement with North Western prohibited abolishment of any agency
jobs without its consent. On May 9, 1958,
Page 362 U. S. 348
the Commission entered its order. It found that the workload of
the agents at the stations involved varied from 12 minutes to 2
hours per day, and averaged 59 minutes per day. It further
found:
"That the maintenance of full-time agency service at all of the
subject stations, because of the lack of public need, constitutes
mismanagement, and a dissipation of carrier's revenues which has
and will impair its capacity to render adequate rail service to the
public at reasonable rates. . . . [
Footnote 2/3]"
Thereupon, the Commission, electing to act under a South Dakota
statute authorizing it to order changes to be made in station
operations where necessary in the public interest, directed North
Western to make the plan (establishing 16 central agency stations
and abolishing 53 full-time agency positions) effective
immediately.
Page 362 U. S. 349
On December 23, 1957, about six weeks after North Western filed
its petition with the South Dakota Commission, the Union,
purporting to act under the provisions of § 6 of the Railway
Labor Act, [
Footnote 2/4] sent a
letter to North Western requesting that their bargaining agreement
be amended by adding the following provision:
"No position in existence on December 3, 1957, will be abolished
or discontinued except by agreement between the carrier and the
Organization."
North Western responded the next day saying that it did not
consider the request to be a proper subject of bargaining,
[
Footnote 2/5] but it offered,
without waiving its position, to meet with the Union's officers and
to discuss the matter further. Conferences were thereafter held by
the parties, but no agreement was reached, and the Union invoked
mediation under the Railway Labor Act. On February 24, 1958, the
National Mediation Board began its efforts to mediate the
controversy, and its representative conducted a number of meetings
between the parties to that end, [
Footnote 2/6] but was not successful, and thereafter
the
Page 362 U. S. 350
Board, acting pursuant to § 5, First, of the Railway Labor
Act, [
Footnote 2/7] wrote the
parties on May 27, requesting them to submit the controversy to
arbitration under the provisions of § 8 of the Railway Labor
Act. [
Footnote 2/8] But both
parties declined -- the Union on May 28 and North Western on June
12 -- and, on June 16, the Board terminated its services, and so
advised the parties in writing.
On July 10, the Union sent to its members a strike ballot under
an accompanying letter. [
Footnote
2/9] The vote was almost unanimous in favor of a strike, and,
on August 18, the Union called a strike of its members to begin at
6 a.m. on August 21. [
Footnote
2/10] A renewed proffer of
Page 362 U. S. 351
mediation services by the Board was accepted by the parties,
and, through it, further efforts were made on August 19 to compose
the controversy, but without success, and, on August 20, the Board
again advised the parties that it had terminated its services.
On August 20, North Western filed a complaint against the Union
and various of its officials in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, alleging that the Union's
contract demand was not a lawfully bargainable subject under the
Railway Labor Act; that the impending strike, called to force
acceptance of that demand by North Western, would be illegal; that
North Western had a right arising under the laws of the United
States, particularly the Interstate Commerce Act and the Railway
Labor Act, to be free of such an illegal strike, and it prayed that
it be enjoined. The court entered a temporary restraining order on
that date. Thereafter, following full hearing, the court held that
the Union's demand "relates to "rates of pay, rules and working
conditions," and is a bargainable issue under the Railway Labor
Act"; that a strike to force acceptance of that demand would not be
unlawful; and, on September 8, 1958, the court entered its decree
restraining the strike until midnight, September 19, denying any
further injunctive relief, [
Footnote
2/11] and dismissing the complaint. The Court of Appeals,
holding that the Union's contract demand was not a lawfully
bargainable one and that its acceptance could not legally be forced
by a strike, reversed and remanded with directions to enter an
injunction as prayed in the complaint. 264 F.2d 254. This Court
granted certiorari, 361 U.S. 809, and now reverses the judgment of
the Court of Appeals upon grounds which, with deference, I think
are not only injurious to the public interest
Page 362 U. S. 352
but also demonstrably legally erroneous, as I shall endeavor to
show.
Congress, in comprehensively providing for the regulation of
railroads, their transportation services, and their
employer-employee relations, has declared its policies in several
related Acts, including Part 1 of the Interstate Commerce Act,
[
Footnote 2/12] the Railway Labor
Act, [
Footnote 2/13] and the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, [
Footnote
2/14] and, at least in cases such as this, none of them may
meaningfully be read in isolation, but only together as, for they
are in fact, an integrated plan of railroad regulation. And if, as
is frequently the case in such undertakings, there be
overlappings,
"[w]e must determine here how far Congress intended activities
under one of these policies to neutralize the results envisioned by
the other."
Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union, 325 U.
S. 797,
325 U. S.
806.
By Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act, Congress has provided
a pervasive scheme of regulation of all common carriers engaged in
transportation by railroad in interstate commerce. The declared
policy of that Act was to promote economical and efficient
transportation services at reasonable charges, [
Footnote 2/15] and, as this Court has said,
"It is a primary aim of that policy to secure the avoidance of
waste. That avoidance, as well as the maintenance of service, is
viewed as a direct concern of the public."
Texas v. United States, 292 U.
S. 522,
292 U. S.
530.
"Congress has long made the maintenance and development of an
economical and efficient railroad system a matter of primary
national concern. Its legislation must be read with this purpose in
mind."
"
Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Daniel, 333 U. S.
118,
333 U. S. 124-125. "
Page 362 U. S. 353
To aid in effectuating that policy, Congress has contemplated
the abandonment of railroad lines, stations, depots, and other
facilities and services when found by designated public regulatory
bodies to be burdensome and no longer required to serve the public
convenience and necessity. To this end, it has empowered the
Interstate Commerce Commission, upon application and after notice
and public hearing, to issue a certificate authorizing the
abandonment of "all or any portion of a line of railroad," and it
has provided that,
"[f]rom and after issuance of such certificate . . . , the
carrier by railroad may,
without securing approval other than
such certificate . . . proceed with the . . . abandonment covered
thereby. [
Footnote
2/16]"
(Emphasis added.) And in the Transportation Act of 1958 (72
Stat. 568), Congress has empowered the Commission, under stated
conditions, to authorize the abandonment of "any train or ferry."
[
Footnote 2/17] However, Congress
has not sought completely to accomplish its abandonment policies
through the Commission. Rather, it has sought to make use of state
regulatory commissions, as additional instruments for the
effectuation of its policies, in respect to the abandonment of some
railroad facilities and services. Among others, it has long left to
state regulatory commissions abandonments of railroad stations and
station agency service; and, in 1958, after extensive review of
that subject in the process of enacting the Transportation Act of
1958, it deliberately reaffirmed that policy. [
Footnote 2/18]
Page 362 U. S. 354
Moreover, in its report on S. 3778, which culminated in the
Transportation Act of 1958, the Senate Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce critically attributed a major part of the
financial plight of the railroads to their failure to apply to
regulatory bodies for permission to abandon burdensome and needless
services in accordance with congressional policy, and strongly
advocated that such be done. [
Footnote 2/19]
For the fair and firm effectuation of these policies, Congress
has provided that issues respecting the propriety of an abandonment
shall be determined by a public regulatory body. It has
contemplated that the carrier shall propose to the proper
regulatory body the abandonment of particular facilities or
services and that, after notice and hearing -- at which all persons
affected, including employees and their union representatives, may
appear and be heard -- the public regulatory body shall determine
whether the proposal is in the public interest, and its order,
unless reversed on judicial review, shall be binding upon all
persons. These procedures plainly exclude any right or power of a
carrier, at its will alone, to effectuate, or of a labor union
representing its employees
Page 362 U. S. 355
to veto, any proposed abandonment. Although both may be heard,
neither of them, nor the two in agreement, even if their agreement
be evidenced by an express contract, may usurp the Commission's
decisional function by dictating the result or thwarting its
effect. It is obvious that any abandonment, authorized by a proper
regulatory body, will result in abolishment of the jobs that were
involved in the abandoned service. And inasmuch as the maintenance
of these jobs constituted at least a part of the wasteful burden
that necessitated the abandonment, it is equally obvious that
Congress intended their abolishment. Yet, here, the Union has
demanded, and threatens to force by a strike, acceptance by the
carrier of a covenant that no job in existence on December 3, 1957,
will be abolished without its consent. Certainly that demand runs
in the teeth of the recited provisions and policies of the
Interstate Commerce Act. It plainly would destroy the public
regulation of abandonments, provided and contemplated by Congress
in the public interest, and render them subject to the Union's will
alone. A demand for such a contractual power surely is an unlawful
demand.
The Union argues, and the Court seems to find, that there is a
basis for the claimed legality of the Union's demand in the
provision of § 5(2)(f) of the Interstate Commerce Act
[
Footnote 2/20] that the
Commission, in approving railroad mergers or consolidations, "shall
require a fair and equitable arrangement to protect the interests
of the railroad employees affected." Instead of supporting legality
of the Union's demand, I think the provisions of that section and
its legislative history are further proof of its illegality. While
that section authorizes the Commission to require temporary
mitigation of hardships to employees displaced by such
unifications, nothing in it authorizes the Commission to freeze
existing jobs. However, in the
Page 362 U. S. 356
course of its enactment, an effort was made to amend it to that
end. On the floor of the House, Representative Harrington advocated
the following proviso:
"
Provided, however, That no such transaction shall be
approved by the Commission if such transaction will result in
unemployment
or displacement of employees of the carrier
or carriers, or in the impairment of existing employment rights of
said employees. [
Footnote
2/21]"
(Emphasis added.) While the bill was in Conference, the
Legislative Committee of the Interstate Commerce Commission sent a
communication to Congress condemning the principle of the
Harrington amendment in the following words:
"As for the [Harrington] proviso,
the object of unifications
is to save expense, usually by the saving of labor. Employees
who may be displaced should, in the case of railroad unifications,
be protected by some such plan as is embodied in the so-called
'Washington agreement' of 1936 between the railroad managements and
labor organizations [providing for the mitigation of hardships by
the payment of certain monetary benefits for a limited period to
employees whose jobs are abolished by such approved unifications].
The proviso, by prohibiting any displacement of employees, goes
much too far, and, in the long run, will do more harm than
good to the employees. [
Footnote
2/22]"
(Emphasis added.) Congress rejected the Harrington proviso in
the form proposed. Yet the Union's demand here is designed to
accomplish the very purpose that Congress rejected. Of the
Harrington proviso, this Court said in
Railway
Labor
Page 362 U. S. 357
Executives' Ass'n v. United States, 339 U.
S. 142, that it
"threatened to prevent all consolidations to which it related .
. . , [but Congress] . . . made it workable by putting a time limit
upon its otherwise prohibitory effect."
339 U.S. at
339 U. S. 151,
339 U. S. 153.
But Congress actually did more. It eliminated any power to freeze
existing jobs. It is not to be doubted that a carrier and a labor
union representing the carrier's employees, lawfully may bargain
about and agree upon matters in mitigation of hardships to
employees who are displaced by railroad unifications or
abandonments; but they may not agree, nor may any regulatory body
order, that no jobs shall be abolished, and thus defeat
unifications or abandonments required in the public interest.
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. United States, supra;
Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n,
315 U. S. 373;
United States v. Lowden, 308 U. S. 225.
There is no dispute in the record that the carrier sought to
bargain and agree with the Union upon matters in mitigation of
hardships to employees displaced by the station abandonments. It
offered to bargain about (1) transferring the agents affected to
productive jobs, (2) limiting the job abolishments to an agreed
number per year, and (3) paying supplemental unemployment benefits
to the employees affected. [
Footnote
2/23] Short of foregoing the station abandonments, this is all
it lawfully could do. It is not suggested that it should have done
more in this respect. Indeed, the Union refused even to discuss
these proposals. [
Footnote 2/24]
Instead, as its president testified at the trial, the only
"alternative" the Union "offered the North Western Railroad was to
comply with this rule or strike." [
Footnote 2/25]
This also answers the Court's argument that there is nothing in
the Interstate Commerce Act
"making it unlawful for unions to want to discuss with
railroads
Page 362 U. S. 358
actions that may vitally and adversely affect the security,
seniority, and stability of railroad jobs."
The quoted statement is literally true. But the further truth is
that the carrier offered to bargain and agree with the United about
those matters, but the Union refused even to discuss them.
362
U.S. 330fn2/6|>Note 6,
ante. The Union's demand was
not for a right "to discuss" such matters with the carrier, but
was, rather, that the carrier agree that no jobs in existence on
December 3, 1957, be abolished without the Union's consent. And the
only "alternative" it offered was: "comply with this rule or
strike."
Ibid. The foregoing likewise answers the Court's
argument that the Union
"merely asked for a contractual right to bargain with the
railroad about any voluntary steps it might take to abandon
stations . . . , and thus abolish jobs."
Plainly the Union's demand was not for a right "to bargain with"
the carrier about "abolish[ing] jobs," but was for a unilateral
right to prohibit the abolishment of any job without its
consent.
The Court fails to find any testimony in the record "that this
union has set itself up in defiance of any state mandatory order."
Although, in my view, the question is not whether it has set itself
up in defiance of any valid existing state mandatory order, but
rather is whether it lawfully may demand, and force by a strike,
acceptance of a covenant in derogation of the law; yet, in very
truth, it "has set itself up in defiance," or at least, in
derogation, of a "state mandatory order." As earlier noted, the
order of the South Dakota Commission -- the validity of which
cannot be questioned here -- was a mandatory one. It directed the
carrier to make the Central Agency Plan effective in that State
and, thereunder, forthwith to abolish 53 full-time agency jobs.
That order was entered on May 9, 1958, and if the Union's demand,
that no job in existence on December 3, 1957, may be abolished
without its consent, is a lawful one and may be enforced by a
strike, then the South Dakota order is not only defied,
Page 362 U. S. 359
but defied successfully. Moreover, while such orders of state
commissions, like those of the Interstate Commerce Commission, are,
in the nature of things, usually permissive in character, they are
nevertheless binding administrative determinations made, as
Congress contemplated and Mr. Justice Brandeis said, "to protect
interstate commerce from undue burdens,"
Colorado v. United
States, 271 U. S. 153,
271 U. S. 162,
and may not be overridden or thwarted by private veto.
Section 2, First, of the Railway Labor Act makes it the duty of
carriers and their employees to exert every reasonable effort
"to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules,
and working conditions, and to settle all disputes, whether arising
out of the application of such agreements or otherwise. [
Footnote 2/26]"
Here, the Union's demand was simply for a covenant that no
existing jobs may be abolished without its consent. It thus seems
plain that the demand did not relate to the "rates" of compensation
to be paid to employees, nor to their "working conditions," but,
rather, it related solely to whether the employment relation, as to
any existing job, might be severed altogether. It therefore seems
clear enough that the demanded covenant was, in terms, beyond the
purview of § 2, First. But even if this conclusion may be
doubted, surely it must be agreed that Congress did not contemplate
that agreements might be made, under the aegis of that section, in
derogation of the commands, policies, and purposes of related Acts
which it has promulgated for the regulation of carriers and their
employer-employee relations in the public interest. Here, as has
been shown, the Union's demand was in derogation of the provisions
and policies of the Interstate Commerce Act. It could not therefore
be a lawfully bargainable subject within the purview of § 2,
First, of the Railway Labor Act.
Page 362 U. S. 360
The carrier could not lawfully accept it, [
Footnote 2/27] and hence a strike to force its
acceptance would be one to force a violation of the law.
Surely, in such circumstances, the carrier, in discharging its
duty to safeguard the public interest, [
Footnote 2/28] has a legal right to be free of a strike
to force it to accept a demand which Congress has made unlawful.
But there is no administrative remedy in such a case, and hence the
legal right will be sacrificed, and Congress' policies will be
thwarted, unless a preventive judicial remedy is available.
Certainly Congress did not intend to create and "to hold out to
[the carrier and the public] an illusory right for which it was
denying them a remedy."
Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen, 338 U. S. 232,
338 U. S.
240.
Nor does the Norris-LaGuardia Act render federal courts impotent
to enjoin unlawful conduct or strikes to force acceptance of
unlawful demands. That Act, in terms, permits federal courts to
enjoin "unlawful acts [that] have been threatened and will be
committed unless restrained." [
Footnote 2/29] This Court has consistently held that
the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not prevent a federal court from
enjoining an unlawful abuse of power conferred upon a labor union
by the Railway Labor Act or a threatened strike to force acceptance
of an unlawful demand.
In
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River &
Indiana R. Co., 353 U. S. 30, a
union threatened a strike to force a carrier to accept demands
which Congress had placed within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Railroad Adjustment Board. Holding that the demands were in
Page 362 U. S. 361
derogation of that Act of Congress, and therefore illegal, a
federal court enjoined the threatened strike to enforce them. The
union contended here that the Court was without jurisdiction to
issue the injunction because
"the Norris-LaGuardia Act has withdrawn the power of federal
courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes, [and that the]
limitation . . . applies with full force to all railway labor
disputes."
353 U.S. at
353 U. S. 39-40.
In rejecting that contention, this Court said:
"We hold that the Norris-LaGuardia Act cannot be read alone in
matters dealing with railway labor disputes. There must be an
accommodation of that statute and the Railway Labor Act, so that
the obvious purpose in the enactment of each is preserved. We think
that the purposes of these Acts are reconcilable."
353 U.S. at
353 U. S. 40.
And, finding that the union's demands violated the provisions of
the Railway Labor Act, this Court held "that the specific
provisions of the Railway Labor Act take precedence over the more
general provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act," and, reaffirming
its decision in
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v.
Howard, 343 U. S. 768, it
further held
"that the District Court [had] jurisdiction and power [to enjoin
the threatened strike] notwithstanding the provisions of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act."
353 U.S. at
353 U. S.
41-42.
There, as here, the union's demand was in derogation of the
specific provisions of an Act of Congress, and here, as there,
those specific provisions must "take precedence over the more
general provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act."
In
Virginia Railway Co. v. System Federation No. 40,
300 U. S. 515,
this Court held that a federal court could lawfully issue an
injunction in a labor dispute that was governed by the specific
provisions of a federal statute,
Page 362 U. S. 362
and that "[s]uch provisions cannot be rendered nugatory by the
earlier and more general provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act."
300 U.S. at
300 U. S.
563.
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co.,
323 U. S. 192,
involved the unlawful misuse by a union of the powers conferred
upon it by the Railway Labor Act. Observing that "there is no mode
of enforcement [of the rights that were being denied by such misuse
of powers] other than resort to the courts," this Court held that a
federal court had the "jurisdiction and duty to afford a remedy for
a breach of statutory [rights]." 323 U.S. at
323 U. S. 207.
On almost identical facts, this Court reaffirmed that principle in
Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen &
Enginemen, 323 U. S. 210. In
a similar factual situation, this Court held in
Graham v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen,
338 U. S. 232,
that a federal court may enjoin a labor union from unlawfully using
or abusing powers conferred upon it by the Railway Labor Act,
notwithstanding the Norris-LaGuardia Act. And, after reviewing the
then-existing cases, the Court concluded:
"If, in spite of the
Virginian, Steele, and
Tunstall cases,
supra, there remains any illusion
that, under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the federal courts are
powerless to enforce these rights, we dispel it now."
338 U.S. at
338 U. S.
240.
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard,
343 U. S. 768, was
an action to enjoin a union and a carrier from enforcing the
provisions of a contract, made under the threat of a strike, that
unlawfully deprived a class of railroad employees of legal rights
which this Court held had been impliedly vouchsafed to them by the
Railway Labor Act. Finding that the questioned provisions of that
contract were "unlawful," and that the injured persons
"must look to a judicial remedy to prevent the sacrifice or
obliteration of their rights under the [Railway Labor] Act
[inasmuch as] no adequate administrative
Page 362 U. S. 363
remedy can be afforded by the National Railroad Adjustment or
Mediation Board[s],"
this Court concluded
"that the District Court has jurisdiction and power to issue
necessary injunctive orders notwithstanding the provisions of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. We need add nothing to what was said about
inapplicability of that Act in the
Steele case and in
Graham v. Brotherhood of Firemen & Enginemen,
338 U. S.
232,
338 U. S. 239-240."
343 U.S. at
343 U.S.
774.
Resting upon its conclusion that the Union's demand here was a
lawful one, the Court relegates the
Virginian, Steele,
Tunstall, Graham, and
Howard cases to a footnote, and
says,
"None of these cases, however, enjoined conduct which the
Norris-LaGuardia Act withdrew from the injunctive power of the
federal courts."
Does the Court mean by this statement that, although it enjoined
enforcement of the illegal provisions of the contract which had
been forced upon the carrier by "the threat of a strike" in the
Howard case, it would not, if asked, have enjoined the
strike which forced acceptance by the carrier of that unlawful
contract? At all events, it cannot be denied, and the Court
concedes, that the
Chicago River case holds that a
threatened strike to force compliance with unlawful demands may be
enjoined. There, just as here, a threatened strike was enjoined.
There, as here, the injunction issued because the Union's demand
was not a lawfully bargainable one under the Railway Labor Act. The
demands in the
Chicago River case were unlawful because
jurisdiction over their subject matter had been exclusively vested
by Congress in the Railroad Adjustment Board, while, in this case,
the demand is unlawful because jurisdiction over its subject matter
has been exclusively vested partly in the Interstate Commerce
Commission and partly in state regulatory commissions. Today's
attempted distinctions of that case were advanced in that case, but
were found "inapposite," 353 U.S. at
353 U. S. 42.
Being "inapposite" there, they are so here. I submit that, on the
point in
Page 362 U. S. 364
issue, the
Chicago River case is indistinguishable from
this one, and that, if the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not prohibit a
federal court from issuing an injunction in that case, it does not
do so in this one.
It is to be noted that the Court does not say that the
Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibits federal courts from enjoining
threatened strikes to force acceptance of illegal demands. It says,
rather, that,
"Even if a Norris-LaGuardia 'labor dispute' could not arise out
of an unlawful bargaining demand . . . , the union's proposal here
was not unlawful."
If it fairly may be inferred from that statement that the Court
would have sustained jurisdiction had it found the demand to be
unlawful, then my disagreement with the Court would be reduced to,
and turn on, that simply issue. And as to it, I respectfully submit
that the admitted facts show that the demand was in derogation of
the provisions and policies of the Interstate Commerce Act.
Believing that the demand was not a lawfully bargainable one under
the Railway Labor Act, and that the District Court had jurisdiction
to enjoin the threatened strike, called to force acceptance of that
illegal demand, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.
[
Footnote 2/1]
The fact that many of these agents were not on duty when the
freight trains passed their stations was due to a union requirement
that their day's work must begin at 8:30 a.m.
[
Footnote 2/2]
Act of Sept. 18, 1940, c. 722, Title I, § 1, 54 Stat. 899
-- preceding Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C.
§ 1 -- titled "National Transportation Policy." In pertinent
part, it provides
"It is hereby declared to be the national transportation policy
of the Congress to provide for fair and impartial regulation of all
modes of transportation subject to the provisions of this Act . . .
to promote safe, adequate, economical, and efficient service and
foster sound economic conditions in transportation and among the
several carriers. . . ."
[
Footnote 2/3]
The South Dakota Commission further found that the expenses of
operating the 69 stations involved exceeded related revenues by
$170,399 in 1956, and that, if the Central Agency Plan had been in
effect during that period, there would have been a surplus of
$58,884.
Hearings were afterwards conducted upon the similar petitions
before the Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin Commissions. The Union
appeared in each of those proceedings and presented evidence,
briefs and arguments in opposition to the petitions, but each was
granted.
The Iowa Commission found that the agents at the stations there
involved worked an average of 1 hour and 14 minutes per day, a
decrease of 28% since 1951, and that the estimated average workload
under the Central Agency Plan would be 3 hours and 15 minutes per
day. It said,
inter alia,
"Savings must be made by reducing or eliminating service no
longer needed. The case before us is a proposal to reduce agency
service to the level of actual need."
And it found that such was necessary "to insure efficiency,
economy and adequate rail transportation."
The Union appealed from the orders of the respective Commissions
to the courts of the respective States, but the Commission action
was affirmed in each instance.
[
Footnote 2/4]
48 Stat. 1197, 45 U.S.C. § 156.
[
Footnote 2/5]
North Western's reply stated,
inter alia, that, in its
view, the Union's request was
"not a proper subject for a Section 6 notice in that it does not
in fact concern rules, rates of pay or working conditions, but
instead constitutes an attempt to freeze assignments regardless of
the controlling agreement and regardless of the necessity or
justification for such assignments."
[
Footnote 2/6]
In the mediation meetings and other meetings between the
parties, North Western suggested several means of cushioning the
effects of discontinuing these "one-man" agency jobs, including (1)
the transfer of the agents affected to productive jobs; (2) the
limiting of job abolishments to an agreed number per year; and (3)
the payment of supplemental unemployment benefits to the employees
affected. The Union refused to discuss these proposals.
At a meeting between North Western's chief executive officer and
the Union's president and its general counsel at Madison,
Wisconsin, during the period of the mediation efforts, North
Western's official asked if there was any "possibility" of "working
out these station closing matters and the discontinuance of the
position of these station agents" either on a South Dakota or a
system basis. The Union's president asked his general counsel for
his views on the matter. The latter replied "I think we are too far
apart," and North Western's official then said "I want you to know
that my door is always open."
The Union's president testified at the subsequent District Court
trial that ". . . the only alternative which, up to the present, I
have offered the North Western Railroad was to comply with this
rule or strike."
[
Footnote 2/7]
45 U.S.C. § 155, First.
[
Footnote 2/8]
45 U.S.C. § 158.
[
Footnote 2/9]
The Union's letter of July 10, 1958, after referring to the
efforts of North Western to abolish many of the "one-man" agency
jobs and to the Union's efforts in opposition, stated among other
things:
"However, it became evident at an early date that to meet this
onslaught effectively would require strengthening of our
Agreements. . . . We must prevent a continuance of such a
program."
"While we hope the commissions in other states will be more
reasonable than the South Dakota Commission, we have no assurance
that we will not soon see a repetition in other states of what has
happened in South Dakota. . . ."
[
Footnote 2/10]
The strike call, after referring to the Union's efforts to
prevent the abolishment of jobs at "one-man" stations said,
inter alia, that:
"The need for the proposed rule has again been tragically
demonstrated in the last few days. What happened in South Dakota
was repeated in Iowa, except that this time 70 positions were
abolished and 27 assignments enlarged."
[
Footnote 2/11]
By order of Sept. 16, 1958, the District Court further
restrained the impending strike pending determination of North
Western's appeal.
[
Footnote 2/12]
49 U.S.C. §§ 1-27.
[
Footnote 2/13]
45 U.S.C. §§ 151-164.
[
Footnote 2/14]
29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115.
[
Footnote 2/15]
See 362
U.S. 330fn2/2|>note 2 for the pertinent provisions of the
National Transportation Policy.
[
Footnote 2/16]
49 U.S.C. §§ 1(18), 1(19), 1(20).
[
Footnote 2/17]
Act of Aug. 12, 1958, Pub.L. 85-625, § 5, 72 Stat. 571, 49
U.S.C. § 13a.
[
Footnote 2/18]
The Transportation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 568.
See
Hearings Before Subcommittee on Surface Transportation of Senate
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on Problems of the
Railroads, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 1816, 1817, 1821, 2027, 2028;
104 Cong.Rec., pp. 10850, 12522, 12537, 15528; S.Rep. No. 1647 on
S. 3778, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.; H.R.Rep. No. 1922 on H.R. 12832,
85th Cong., 2d Sess.; H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 2274, 85th Cong., 2d
Sess.
[
Footnote 2/19]
"The railroad industry has not, in the subcommittee's opinion,
been sufficiently interested in self-help in such matters as
consolidations and mergers of railroads; joint use of facilities in
order to eliminate waste, such as multiple terminals and yards that
require expensive interchange operations; reduction of duplications
in freight and passenger services by pooling and joint operations;
abandonment or consolidation of nonpaying branch and secondary
lines; abolishing of unnecessarily circuitous routes for freight
movements; improved handling of less than carload traffic;
coordination of transportation services and facilities by
establishment of through routes and joint rates with other forms of
transportation; and modernization of the freight rate structure,
including revision of below cost freight rates to levels that cover
cost and yield some margin of profit as well as adjustment of rates
excessively above cost to attract traffic and yield more
revenue."
S.Rep. No. 1647, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 11.
[
Footnote 2/20]
49 U.S.C. § 5(2)(f).
[
Footnote 2/21]
84 Cong.Rec. (1939), Pt. 9, p. 9882.
[
Footnote 2/22]
Interstate Commerce Commission Report on S. 2009, Omnibus
Transportation Legislation, p. 67 (76th Cong., 3d Sess., House
Committee Print), transmitted Jan. 29, 1940.
[
Footnote 2/23]
See 362
U.S. 330fn2/6|>note 6.
[
Footnote 2/24]
Ibid.
[
Footnote 2/25]
Ibid.
[
Footnote 2/26]
45 U.S.C. § 152, First.
[
Footnote 2/27]
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard,
343 U. S. 768.
[
Footnote 2/28]
Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation No. 40,
300 U. S. 515.
"Courts of equity may, and frequently do, go much farther both
to give and withhold relief in furtherance of the public interest
than they are accustomed to go when only private interests are
involved."
300 U.S. at
300 U. S.
552.
[
Footnote 2/29]
29 U.S.C. § 107(a).
Memorandum of MR. JUSTICE STEWART.
I have strong doubt as to the existence of federal jurisdiction
in this case, for reasons well expressed by then Circuit Judge
Minton, dissenting in
Toledo, P. & W. R.R. v. Brotherhood
of Railroad Trainmen, 132 F.2d 265, 272-274.
See
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. New York Central R. Co.,
246 F.2d 114 at 122 (dissenting opinion). If, however, the Federal
District Court had jurisdiction, as all my Brethren seem to believe
or at least assume, MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER's dissenting opinion
convincingly demonstrates for me that the District Court had power
to issue an injunction.