On a complaint before the National Labor Relations Board
charging that a union had refused to bargain in good faith with an
employer in violation of § 8(b)(3) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, it appeared that the union had conferred
with the employer at the bargaining table for the purpose and with
the desire of reaching an agreement on contract terms, but that,
during the negotiations, it had sponsored concerted on-the-job
activities by its members of a harassing nature designed to
interfere with the conduct of the employer's business, for the
avowed purpose of putting economic pressure on the employer to
accede to the union's bargaining demands.
Held: Such tactics would not support a finding by the
Board that the union had failed to bargain in good faith as
required by § 8(b)(3). Pp.
361 U. S.
478-500.
(1) The basic premise of the duty of collective bargaining
required in the Act is that it is a process in which the parties
deal with each other in a serious, good-faith desire to reach
agreement and to enter into a contract ordering their industrial
relationship. Congress did not intend that the Board control the
substantive terms of collective bargaining contracts through the
administration of this requirement, and it added § 8(d) in the
Taft-Hartley Act to make the proper construction of the duty clear.
Pp.
361 U. S.
483-487.
(2) By adding § 8(b)(3) to the Act through the Taft-Hartley
amendments, Congress intended to require of unions the same
standard of good faith in collective bargaining that it had already
required of employers. P.
361 U. S.
487.
(3) Section 8(b)(3) does not authorize the Board to infer a lack
of good faith in bargaining on the part of a union solely because
the union resorts to tactics designed to exert economic pressure
during the negotiations. Pp.
361 U. S.
488-490.
(4) The use of economic pressure is not inconsistent with the
duty of bargaining in good faith, and the Board is not empowered
under § 8(b)(3) to distinguish among various union
economic
Page 361 U. S. 478
weapons and to brand those here involved inconsistent with good
faith collective bargaining. Pp.
361 U. S.
490-496.
(a) A different conclusion is not required on the theory that a
total strike is a concerted activity protected against employer
interference by §§ 7 and 8(a)(1) of the Act, whereas the
activity here involved is not a protected concerted activity. Even
if an activity is not protected against disciplinary action, that
does not necessarily mean that it amounts to a refusal to bargain
in good faith. Pp.
361 U. S.
492-495.
(b) A different conclusion is not required on the theory that,
because an orthodox "total" strike is "traditional," its use must
be taken as being consistent with § 8(b)(3); whereas the
tactics here involved are not "traditional" or "normal," and
therefore need not be so viewed. Pp.
361 U. S.
495-496.
(5) To construe § 8(b)(3) as authorizing the Board to act
as an arbiter of the sort of economic weapons the parties can use
in seeking to gain acceptance of their bargaining demands would
inject the Board into the substantive aspects of the bargaining
process to an extent that Congress did not intend and has not
authorized. Pp.
361 U. S.
496-500.
104 U.S.App.D.C. 218, 260 F.2d 736, affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents an important issue of the scope of the
National Labor Relations Board's authority under § 8(b)(3) of
the National Labor Relations Act, [
Footnote 1] which
Page 361 U. S. 479
provides that
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
or its agents . . . to refuse to bargain collectively with an
employer, provided it is the representative of his employees. . .
."
The precise question is whether the Board may find that a union,
which confers with an employer with the desire of reaching
agreement on contract terms, has nevertheless refused to bargain
collectively, thus violating that provision, solely and simply
because, during the negotiations, it seeks to put economic pressure
on the employer to yield to its bargaining demands by sponsoring
on-the-job conduct designed to interfere with the carrying on of
the employer's business.
Since 1949, the respondent Insurance Agents' International Union
and the Prudential Insurance Company of America have negotiated
collective bargaining agreements covering district agents employed
by Prudential in 35 States and the District of Columbia. The
principal duties of a Prudential district agent are to collect
premiums and to solicit new business in an assigned locality known
in the trade as his "debit." He has no fixed or regular working
hours, except that he must report at his district office two
mornings a week and remain for two or three hours to deposit his
collections, prepare and submit reports, and attend meetings to
receive sales and other instructions. He is paid commissions on
collections made and on new policies written; his only fixed
compensation is a weekly payment of $4.50 intended primarily to
cover his expenses.
In January, 1956, Prudential and the union began the negotiation
of a new contract to replace an agreement expiring in the following
March. Bargaining was carried on continuously for six months before
the terms of the new contract were agreed upon on July 17, 1956.
[
Footnote 2] It is
Page 361 U. S. 480
not questioned that, if it stood alone, the record of
negotiations would establish that the union conferred in good faith
for the purpose and with the desire of reaching agreement with
Prudential on a contract.
However, in April, 1956, Prudential filed a § 8(b)(3)
charge of refusal to bargain collectively against the union. The
charge was based upon actions of the union and its members outside
the conference room, occurring after the old contract expired in
March. The union had announced in February that if agreement on the
terms of the new contract was not reached when the old contract
expired, the union members would then participate in a "Work
Without a Contract" program -- which meant that they would engage
in certain planned, concerted on-the-job activities designed to
harass the company.
A complaint of violation of § 8(b)(3) issued on the charge
and hearings began before the bargaining was concluded. [
Footnote 3] It was developed in the
evidence that the union's harassing tactics involved activities by
the member agents such as these: refusal for a time to solicit new
business, and refusal (after the writing of new business was
resumed) to comply with the company's reporting procedures; refusal
to participate in the company's "May Policyholders' Month
Campaign"; reporting late at district offices the days the agents
were scheduled to attend them, and refusing to perform customary
duties at the offices, instead engaging there in "sit-in-mornings,"
"doing what comes naturally," and leaving at noon as a group;
absenting themselves from special business conferences arranged by
the company; picketing and distributing leaflets outside the
various offices of the company on specified days and hours as
Page 361 U. S. 481
directed by the union; distributing leaflets each day to
policyholders and others and soliciting policyholders' signatures
on petitions directed to the company; and presenting the signed
policyholders' petitions to the company at its home office while
simultaneously engaging in mass demonstrations there.
The hearing examiner filed a report recommending that the
complaint be dismissed. The examiner noted that the Board in the
so-called
Personal Products case,
Textile Workers
Union, 108 N.L.R.B. 743, had declared similar union activities
to constitute a prohibited refusal to bargain; but, since the
Board's order in that case was set aside by the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit,
Textile Workers Union v.
N.L.R.B., 97 U.S.App.D.C. 35, 227 F.2d 409, he did not
consider that he was bound to follow it.
However, the Board on review adhered to its ruling in the
Personal Products case, rejected the trial examiner's
recommendation, and entered a "cease and desist" order, 119
N.L.R.B. 768. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit also adhered to its decision in the
Personal
Products case, and, as in that case, set aside the Board's
order. 104 U.S.App.D.C. 218, 260 F.2d 736. We granted the Board's
petition for certiorari to review the important question presented.
3 58 U.S. 944.
The hearing examiner found that there was nothing in the record,
apart from the mentioned activities of the union during the
negotiations, that could be relied upon to support an inference
that the union had not fulfilled its statutory duty; in fact,
nothing else was relied upon by the Board's General Counsel in
prosecuting the complaint. [
Footnote 4] The hearing examiner's analysis of the
congressional
Page 361 U. S. 482
design in enacting the statutory duty to bargain led him to
conclude that the Board was not authorized to find that such
economically harassing activities constituted a § 8(b)(3)
violation. The Board's opinion answers flatly "We do not agree,"
and proceeds to say
". . . the Respondent's reliance upon harassing tactics during
the course of negotiations for the avowed purpose of compelling the
Company to capitulate to its terms is the antithesis of reasoned
discussion it was duty-bound to follow. Indeed, it clearly revealed
an unwillingness to submit its demands to the consideration of the
bargaining table where argument, persuasion, and the free
interchange of views could take place. In such circumstances, the
fact that the Respondent continued to confer with the Company and
was desirous of concluding an agreement does not alone establish
that it fulfilled its obligation to bargain in good faith. . .
."
119 N.L.R.B. at 769, 770-771. Thus, the Board's view is that,
irrespective of the union's good faith in conferring with the
employer at the bargaining table for the purpose and with the
desire of reaching agreement on contract terms, its tactics during
the course of the negotiations constituted
per se a
violation of § 8(b)(3). [
Footnote 5] Accordingly, as is said in the Board's
brief,
Page 361 U. S. 483
"The issue here . . . comes down to whether the Board is
authorized under the Act to hold that such tactics, which the Act
does not specifically forbid but Section 7 does not protect,
[
Footnote 6] support a finding
of a failure to bargain in good faith as required by Section
8(b)(3)."
First. The bill which became the Wagner Act included no
provision specifically imposing a duty on either party to bargain
collectively. Senator Wagner thought that the bill required
bargaining in good faith without such a provision. [
Footnote 7] However, the Senate Committee in
charge of the bill concluded that it was desirable to include a
provision making it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
refuse to bargain collectively in order to assure that the Act
would achieve its primary objective of requiring an employer to
recognize a union selected by his employees as their
representative. It was believed that other rights guaranteed by the
Act would not be meaningful if the employer was not under
obligation to confer with the union in an effort to arrive at the
terms of an agreement. It was said in the Senate Report:
"But, after deliberation, the committee has concluded that this
fifth unfair labor practice should be inserted in the bill. It
seems clear that a guarantee of the right of employees to bargain
collectively
Page 361 U. S. 484
through representatives of their own choosing is a mere delusion
if it is not accompanied by the correlative duty on the part of the
other party to recognize such representatives . . . and to
negotiate with them in a
bona fide effort to arrive at a
collective bargaining agreement. Furthermore, the procedure of
holding governmentally supervised elections to determine the choice
of representatives of employees becomes of little worth if after
the election its results are, for all practical purposes, ignored.
Experience has proved that neither obedience to law nor respect for
law is encouraged by holding forth a right unaccompanied by
fulfillment. Such a course provokes constant strife, not
peace."
S.Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 12.
However, the nature of the duty to bargain in good faith thus
imposed upon employers by § 8(5) of the original Act [
Footnote 8] was not sweepingly
conceived. The Chairman of the Senate Committee declared:
"When the employees have chosen their organization, when they
have selected their representatives, all the bill proposes to do is
to escort them to the door of their employer and say, 'Here they
are, the legal representatives of your employees.' What happens
behind those doors is not inquired into, and the bill does not seek
to inquire into it. [
Footnote
9]"
The limitation implied by the last sentence has not been, in
practice, maintained -- practically, it could hardly have been --
but the underlying purpose of the remark has remained the most
basic purpose of the statutory provision. That purpose is the
making effective of the duty of management to extend recognition to
the union; the duty of management to bargain in good faith is
essentially
Page 361 U. S. 485
a corollary of its duty to recognize the union. Decisions under
this provision reflect this. For example, an employer's unilateral
wage increase during the bargaining processes tends to subvert the
union's position as the representative of the employees in matters
of this nature, and hence has been condemned as a practice
violative of this statutory provision.
See Labor Board v.
Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 337 U.
S. 217. And as suggested, the requirement of collective
bargaining, although so premised, necessarily led beyond the door
of, and into, the conference room. The first annual report of the
Board declared:
"Collective bargaining is something more the mere meeting of an
employer with the representatives of his employees; the essential
thing is, rather, the serious intent to adjust differences and to
reach an acceptable common ground. . . . The Board has repeatedly
asserted that good faith on the part of the employer is an
essential ingredient of collective bargaining. [
Footnote 10]"
This standard had early judicial approval,
e.g., Labor Board
v. Griswold Mfg. Co., 106 F.2d 713. Collective bargaining,
then, is not simply an occasion for purely formal meetings between
management and labor, while each maintains an attitude of "take it
or leave it"; it presupposes a desire to reach ultimate agreement,
to enter into a collective bargaining contract.
See Heinz Co.
v. Labor Board, 311 U. S. 514.
This was the sort of recognition that Congress, in the Wagner Act,
wanted extended to labor unions; recognition as the bargaining
agent of the employees in a process that looked to the ordering of
the parties' industrial relationship through the formation of a
contract.
See Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U.
S. 283,
358 U. S.
295.
But, at the same time, Congress was generally not concerned with
the substantive terms on which the parties
Page 361 U. S. 486
contracted.
Cf. Terminal Railroad Ass'n v. Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen, 318 U. S. 1,
318 U. S. 6.
Obviously there is tension between the principle that the parties
need not contract on any specific terms and a practical enforcement
of the principle that they are bound to deal with each other in a
serious attempt to resolve differences and reach a common ground.
And, in fact, criticism of the Board's application of the "good
faith" test arose from the belief that it was forcing employers to
yield to union demands if they were to avoid a successful charge of
unfair labor practice. [
Footnote
11] Thus, in 1947, in Congress, the fear was expressed that the
Board had
"gone very far, in the guise of determining whether or not
employers had bargained in good faith, in setting itself up as the
judge of what concessions an employer must make and of the
proposals and counterproposals that he may or may not make."
H.R.Rep.No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 19. Since the Board
was not viewed by Congress as an agency which should exercise its
powers to arbitrate the parties' substantive solutions of the
issues in their bargaining, a check on this apprehended trend was
provided by writing the good faith test of bargaining into §
8(d) of the Act. That section defines collective bargaining as
follows:
"For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is
the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the
representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement,
or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written
contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either
party, but
Page 361 U. S. 487
such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a
proposal or require the making of a concession. . . . [
Footnote 12]"
The same problems as to whether positions taken at the
bargaining table violate the good faith test continue to arise
under the Act as amended.
See Labor Board v. Truitt Mfg.
Co., 351 U. S. 149;
Labor Board v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp.,
356 U. S. 342,
356 U. S. 349.
But it remains clear that § 8(d) was an attempt by Congress to
prevent the Board from controlling the settling of the terms of
collective bargaining agreements.
Labor Board v. American
National Ins. Co., 343 U. S. 395,
343 U. S.
404.
Second. At the same time as it was statutorily defining
the duty to bargain collectively, Congress, by adding §
8(b)(3) of the Act through the Taft-Hartley amendments, imposed
that duty on labor organizations. Unions obviously are formed for
the very purpose of bargaining collectively; but the legislative
history makes it plain that Congress was wary of the position of
some unions, and wanted to ensure that they would approach the
bargaining table with the same attitude of willingness to reach an
agreement as had been enjoined on management earlier. It intended
to prevent employee representatives from putting forth the same
"take it or leave it" attitude that had been condemned in
management. 93 Cong.Rec. 4135, 4363, 5005. [
Footnote 13]
Page 361 U. S. 488
Third. It is apparent from the legislative history of
the whole Act that the policy of Congress is to impose a mutual
duty upon the parties to confer in good faith with a desire to
reach agreement, in the belief that such an approach from both
sides of the table promotes the over-all design of achieving
industrial peace.
See Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U. S. 1,
301 U. S. 45.
Discussion conducted under that standard of good faith may narrow
the issues, making the real demands of the parties clearer to each
other, and perhaps to themselves, and may encourage an attitude of
settlement through give and take. The mainstream of cases before
the Board and in the courts reviewing its orders, under the
provisions fixing the duty to bargain collectively, is concerned
with insuring that the parties approach the bargaining table with
this attitude. But, apart from this essential standard of conduct,
Congress intended that the parties should have wide latitude in
their negotiations, unrestricted by any governmental power to
regulate the substantive solution of their differences.
See
Teamsters Union v. Oliver, supra, at
358 U. S.
295.
We believe that the Board's approach in this case -- unless it
can be defended, in terms of § 8(b)(3), as resting on some
unique character of the union tactics involved here -- must be
taken as proceeding from an erroneous view of collective
bargaining. It must be realized that collective bargaining, under a
system where the Government does not attempt to control the results
of negotiations, cannot be equated with an academic collective
search for truth -- or even with what might be thought to be the
ideal of one. The parties -- even granting the modification of
views that may come from a realization of economic interdependence
-- still proceed from contrary, and, to an extent, antagonistic,
viewpoints and concepts of self-interest. The system has not
reached the ideal of the philosophic notion that perfect
understanding among
Page 361 U. S. 489
people would lead to perfect agreement among them on values. The
presence of economic weapons in reserve, and their actual exercise
on occasion by the parties, is part and parcel of the system that
the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts have recognized. Abstract logical
analysis might find inconsistency between the command of the
statute to negotiate toward an agreement in good faith and the
legitimacy of the use of economic weapons, frequently having the
most serious effect upon individual workers and productive
enterprises, to induce one party to come to the terms desired by
the other. But the truth of the matter is that, at the present
statutory stage of our national labor relations policy, the two
factors -- necessity for good faith bargaining between parties, and
the availability of economic pressure devices to each to make the
other party incline to agree on one's terms -- exist side by side.
One writer recognizes this by describing economic force as "a prime
motive power for agreements in free collective bargaining."
[
Footnote 14] Doubtless one
factor influences the other; there may be less need to apply
economic pressure if the areas of controversy have been defined
through discussion; and at the same time, negotiation positions are
apt to be weak or strong in accordance with the degree of economic
power the parties possess. A close student of our national labor
relations laws writes:
"Collective bargaining is curiously ambivalent even today. In
one aspect, collective bargaining is a brute contest of economic
power somewhat masked by polite manners and voluminous statistics.
As the relation matures, Lilliputian bonds control the opposing
concentrations of economic power; they lack legal sanctions, but
are nonetheless effective to contain the use of power. Initially,
it may be only fear of the economic consequences of disagreement
that turns the parties to facts, reason,
Page 361 U. S. 490
a sense of responsibility, a responsiveness to government and
public opinion, and moral principle; but, in time, these forces
generate their own compulsions, and negotiating a contract
approaches the ideal of informed persuasion."
Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 Harv.L.Rev. 1401,
1409.
For similar reasons, we think the Board's approach involves an
intrusion into the substantive aspects of the bargaining process --
again, unless there is some specific warrant for its condemnation
of the precise tactics involved here. The scope of § 8(b)(3)
and the limitations on Board power which were the design of §
8(d) are exceeded, we hold, by inferring a lack of good faith not
from any deficiencies of the union's performance at the bargaining
table by reason of its attempted use of economic pressure, but
solely and simply because tactics designed to exert economic
pressure were employed during the course of the good faith
negotiations. Thus, the Board, in the guise of determining good or
bad faith in negotiations, could regulate what economic weapons a
party might summon to its aid. And if the Board could regulate the
choice of economic weapons that may be used as part of collective
bargaining, it would be in a position to exercise considerable
influence upon the substantive terms on which the parties contract.
As the parties' own devices became more limited, the Government
might have to enter even more directly into the negotiation of
collective agreements. Our labor policy is not presently erected on
a foundation of government control of the results of negotiations.
See S.Rep.No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2. Nor does
it contain a charter for the National Labor Relations Board to act
at large in equalizing disparities of bargaining power between
employer and union.
Fourth. The use of economic pressure, as we have
indicated, is, of itself, not at all inconsistent with the duty
of
Page 361 U. S. 491
bargaining in good faith. But, in three cases in recent years,
the Board has assumed the power to label particular union economic
weapons inconsistent with that duty.
See the
Personal
Products case, [
Footnote
15]
supra, 108 N.L.R.B. 743,
set aside, Textile
Workers Union v. N.L.R.B., 97 U.S.App.D.C. 35, 227 F.2d 409;
[
Footnote 16] the
Boone
County case,
United Mine Workers, 117 N.L.R.B. 1095,
set aside, International Union, United Mine Workers v.
N.L.R.B., 103 U.S.App.D.C. 207, 257 F.2d 211; [
Footnote 17] and the present case. The
Board freely (and we think correctly) conceded here that a "total"
strike called by the union would not have subjected it to sanctions
under § 8(b)(3), at least if it were called after the old
contract, with its no-strike clause, had expired.
Cf. United
Mine Workers, supra. The Board's opinion in the instant case
is not so unequivocal as this
Page 361 U. S. 492
concession (and therefore perhaps more logical). [
Footnote 18] But, in the light of it and
the principles we have enunciated, we must evaluate the claim of
the Board to power, under § 8(b)(3), to distinguish among
various economic pressure tactics and brand the ones at bar
inconsistent with good faith collective bargaining. We conclude its
claim is without foundation. [
Footnote 19]
(a) The Board contends that the distinction between a total
strike and the conduct at bar is that a total strike is a concerted
activity protected against employer interference by §§ 7
[
Footnote 20] and 8(a)(1)
[
Footnote 21] of the Act,
while the activity at bar is not a protected concerted activity. We
may agree
arguendo with the Board [
Footnote 22] that this Court's decision in the
Briggs-Stratton case,
Automobile Workers v. Wisconsin
Board, 336 U. S. 245,
establishes that
Page 361 U. S. 493
the employee conduct here was not a protected concerted
activity. [
Footnote 23] On
this assumption, the employer could have discharged or taken other
appropriate disciplinary action against the employees participating
in these "slow-down,"
Page 361 U. S. 494
"sit-in," and arguably unprotected disloyal tactics.
See
Labor Board v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.
S. 240;
Labor Board v. Electrical Workers,
346 U. S. 464. But
surely that a union activity is not protected against disciplinary
action does not mean that it constitutes a refusal to bargain in
good faith. The reason why the ordinary economic strike is not
evidence of a failure to bargain in good faith is not that it
constitutes a protected activity, but that, as we have developed,
there is simply no inconsistency between the application of
Page 361 U. S. 495
economic pressure and good faith collective bargaining. The
Board suggests that, since (on the assumption we make) the union
members' activities here were unprotected, and they could have been
discharged, the activities should also be deemed unfair labor
practices, since thus the remedy of a "cease and desist" order,
milder than mass discharges of personnel and less disruptive of
commerce, would be available. The argument is not persuasive. There
is little logic in assuming that, because Congress was willing to
allow employers to use self-help against union tactics, if they
were willing to face the economic consequences of its use, it also
impliedly declared these tactics unlawful as a matter of federal
law. Our problem remains that of construing § 8(b)(3)'s terms,
and we do not see how the availability of self-help to the employer
has anything to do with the matter.
(b) The Board contends that, because an orthodox "total" strike
is "traditional," its use must be taken as being consistent with
§ 8(b)(3); but since the tactics here are not "traditional" or
"normal," they need not be so viewed. [
Footnote 24] Further, the Board cites what it
conceives to be the public's moral condemnation of the sort of
employee tactics involved here. But again we cannot see how these
distinctions can be made under a statute which simply enjoins a
duty to bargain in good faith. Again, these are relevant arguments
when the question is the scope of the concerted activities given
affirmative protection by the Act. But, as we have developed, the
use of economic pressure by the parties to a labor dispute is not a
grudging exception to some policy of completely academic discussion
enjoined by the Act; it is part and parcel of the process of
collective bargaining. On this basis, we
Page 361 U. S. 496
fail to see the relevance of whether the practice in question is
time-honored or whether its exercise is generally supported by
public opinion. It may be that the tactics used here deserve
condemnation, but this would not justify attempting to pour that
condemnation into a vessel not designed to hold it. [
Footnote 25] The same may be said for the
Board's contention that these activities, as opposed to a "normal"
strike, are inconsistent with § 8(b)(3) because they offer
maximum pressure on the employer at minimum economic cost to the
union. One may doubt whether this was so here, [
Footnote 26] but the matter does not turn
on that. Surely it cannot be said that the only economic weapons
consistent with good faith bargaining are those which minimize the
pressure on the other party or maximize the disadvantage to the
party using them. The catalog of union and employer [
Footnote 27] weapons that might thus fall
under ban would be most extensive. [
Footnote 28]
Page 361 U. S. 497
Fifth. These distinctions essayed by the Board here,
and the lack of relationship to the statutory standard inherent in
them, confirm us in our conclusion that the judgment of the Court
of Appeals, setting aside the order of the Board, must be affirmed.
For they make clear to us that, when the Board moves in this area
with only § 8(b)(3) for support, it is functioning as an
arbiter of the sort of economic weapons the parties can use in
seeking to gain acceptance of their bargaining demands. It has
sought to introduce some standard of properly "balanced" [
Footnote 29] bargaining power, or
some new distinction of justifiable and unjustifiable, proper and
"abusive" [
Footnote 30]
economic weapons into the collective bargaining duty imposed by the
Act. The Board's assertion of power under § 8(b)(3) allows it
to sit in judgment upon every
Page 361 U. S. 498
economic weapon the parties to a labor contract negotiation
employ, judging it on the very general standard of that section,
not drafted with reference to specific forms of economic pressure.
We have expressed our belief that this amounts to the Board's
entrance into the substantive aspects of the bargaining process to
an extent Congress has not countenanced.
It is one thing to say that the Board has been afforded
flexibility to determine, for example, whether an employer's
disciplinary action taken against specific workers is permissible
or not, or whether a party's conduct at the bargaining table
evidences a real desire to come into agreement. The statute in such
areas clearly poses the problem to the Board for its solution.
Cf. Labor Board v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U. S.
87. And specifically, we do not mean to question in any
way the Board's powers to determine the latter question, drawing
inferences from the conduct of the parties as a whole. It is quite
another matter, however, to say that the Board has been afforded
flexibility in picking and choosing which economic devices of labor
and management shall be branded as unlawful. Congress has been
rather specific when it has come to outlaw particular economic
weapons on the part of unions.
See § 8(b)(4) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as added by the Taft-Hartley Act, 61
Stat. 141, and as supplemented by the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 542; § 8(b)(7), as added
by the latter Act, 73 Stat. 544. But the activities here involved
have never been specifically outlawed by Congress. [
Footnote 31] To
Page 361 U. S. 499
be sure, the express prohibitions of the Act are not exclusive
-- if there were any questions of a stratagem or device to evade
the policies of the Act, the Board hardly would be powerless.
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U.
S. 177,
313 U. S. 194.
But it is clear to us that the Board needs a more specific charter
than § 8(b)(3) before it can add to the Act's prohibitions
here.
We recognize without hesitation the primary function and
responsibility of the Board to resolve the conflicting interests
that Congress has recognized in its labor legislation. Clearly,
where the "ultimate problem is the balancing of the conflicting
legitimate interests," it must be remembered that
"The function of striking that balance to effectuate national
labor policy is often a difficult and delicate responsibility,
which the Congress committed primarily to the National Labor
Relations Board, subject to limited judicial review."
Labor Board v. Truck Drivers Union, supra, at
353 U. S. 96.
Certainly a
"statute expressive of such large public policy as that on which
the National Labor Relations Board is based must be broadly phrased
and necessarily carries with it the task of administrative
application."
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, supra, at
313 U. S. 194.
But recognition of the appropriate sphere of the administrative
power here obviously cannot exclude all judicial review of the
Board's actions. On the facts of this case, we need not attempt a
detailed delineation of the respective functions of court and
agency in this area. We think the Board's resolution of the issues
here amounted not to a resolution of interests which the Act had
left to it for case-by-case adjudication, but to a movement into a
new area of regulation which Congress had not committed to it.
Where Congress has in the statute given the Board a question to
answer, the courts will give respect to that answer; but they must
be sure the question has been asked. We see no indication here that
Congress
Page 361 U. S. 500
has put it to the Board to define, through its processes, what
economic sanctions might be permitted negotiating parties in an
"ideal" or "balanced" state of collective bargaining.
It is suggested here that the time has come for a reevaluation
of the basic content of collective bargaining as contemplated by
the federal legislation. But that is for Congress. Congress has
demonstrated its capacity to adjust the Nation's labor legislation
to what, in its legislative judgment, constitutes the statutory
pattern appropriate to the developing state of labor relations in
the country. Major revisions of the basic statute were enacted in
1947 and 1959. To be sure, then, Congress might be of opinion that
greater stress should be put on the role of "pure" negotiation in
settling labor disputes, to the extent of eliminating more and more
economic weapons from the parties' grasp, and perhaps it might
start with the ones involved here; or in consideration of the
alternatives, it might shrink from such an undertaking. But
Congress' policy has not yet moved to this point, and, with only
§ 8(b)(3) to lean on, we do not see how the Board can do so on
its own. [
Footnote 32]
Affirmed.
Page 361 U. S. 501
[
Footnote 1]
As added by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (the
Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 141, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3).
[
Footnote 2]
A stenographic record of the discussions at the bargaining table
was kept, and the transcription of it fills 72 volumes.
[
Footnote 3]
The hearings on the unfair labor practice charge were recessed
in July to allow the parties to concentrate on the effort to
negotiate the settlement which was arrived at in the new contract
of July 17, 1956.
[
Footnote 4]
Examining the matter
de novo without the
Personal
Products decision of the Board as precedent, the examiner
called repeatedly upon the Board's General Counsel for some
evidence of failure to bargain in good faith, besides the harassing
tactics themselves. When such evidence was not forthcoming, he
commented,
"It may well be that the Board will be able to 'objectively
evaluate' the 'impact' of activities upon 'collective bargaining
negotiations' from the mere 'nature of the activities,' but the
Trial Examiner is reluctant even to attempt this feat of mental
pole vaulting with only presumption as a pole."
119 N.L.R.B. at 781-782.
[
Footnote 5]
The Board observed that the union's continued participation in
negotiations and desire to reach an agreement only indicated that
it
"was prepared to go through the motions of bargaining while
relying upon a campaign of harassing tactics to disrupt the
Company's business to achieve acceptance of its contractual
demands."
119 N.L.R.B. at 771. The only apparent basis for the conclusion
that the union was only going through the "motions" of bargaining
is the Board's own postulate that the tactics in question were
inconsistent with the statutorily required norm of collective
bargaining, and the Board's opinion, and its context, reveal that
this was all that it meant. This
per se rule amounted to
the "pole vaulting" that the examiner said he was "reluctant even
to attempt."
See note
4 supra.
[
Footnote 6]
We will assume without deciding that the activities in question
here were not "protected" under § 7 of the Act.
See
p.
361 U. S. 492,
and
note 22
infra.
[
Footnote 7]
See Hearings before the Senate Committee on Education
and Labor on S.1958, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 43:
"Therefore, while the bill does not state specifically the duty
of an employer to recognize and bargain collectively with the
representatives of his employees, because of the difficulty of
setting forth this matter precisely in statutory language, such a
duty is clearly implicit in the bill."
[
Footnote 8]
49 Stat. 453. The corresponding provision in the current form of
the Act is § 8(a)(5), 61 Stat. 141, 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(5).
[
Footnote 9]
Senator Walsh at 79 Cong.Rec. 7660.
[
Footnote 10]
1 N.L.R.B.Ann.Rep., pp. 85-86.
[
Footnote 11]
This Court related the history in
Labor Board v. American
National Ins. Co., 343 U. S. 395,
343 U. S.
404.
[
Footnote 12]
61 Stat. 142, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
[
Footnote 13]
Senator Ellender was most explicit on the matter at 93 Cong.Rec.
4135.
The legislative history seems also to have contemplated that the
provision would be applicable to a union which declined to identify
its bargaining demands while attempting financially to exhaust the
employer.
See the remark by Senator Hatch at 93 Cong.Rec.
5005.
Cf. note 15
infra. A closely related application is developed in
American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. Labor Board, 193
F.2d 782, 804-805,
affirmed as to other issues on limited grant
of certiorari, 345 U. S. 100.
[
Footnote 14]
G. W. Taylor, Government Regulation of Industrial Relations, p.
18.
[
Footnote 15]
The facts in
Personal Products did, in the Board's
view, present the case of a union which was using economic pressure
against an employer in a bargaining situation without identifying
what its bargaining demands were -- a matter which can be viewed
quite differently in terms of a § 8(b)(3) violation from the
present case.
See note
13 supra. The Board's decision in
Personal
Products may have turned on this to some extent,
see
108 N.L.R.B. at 746; but its decision in the instant case seems to
view
Personal Products as turning on the same point as
does the present case.
[
Footnote 16]
This Court granted certiorari, 350 U.S. 1004, on the Board's
petition, to review that judgment; but, in the light of intervening
circumstances which at least indicated that the litigation had
become less meaningful to the parties,
cf. The Monrosa v.
Carbon Black Export, Inc., 359 U. S. 180, the
order granting certiorari was vacated, and certiorari was denied.
352 U.S. 864.
[
Footnote 17]
The court there displayed a want of sympathy to the Board's
theory that a strike in breach of contract violated § 8(b)(3),
see 103 U.S.App.D.C. at 210-211, 257 F.2d at 214-215.
Cf. Feinsinger, The National Labor Relations Act and
Collective Bargaining, 57 Mich.L.Rev. 806-807. However, the court
turned its decision on its ruling,
contra the Board, that
there was no breach of the contract involved. On this point,
contra is
United Mine Workers v. Benedict Coal
Corp., 259 F.2d 346, 351, affirmed this day by an equally
divided Court, p.
361 U. S. 459.
[
Footnote 18]
Said the Board:
"Consequently, whether or not an inference of bad faith is
permissible where a union engages in a protected strike to enforce
its demands, there is nothing unreasonable in drawing such an
inference where, as here, the union's conduct is not sanctioned by
the Act."
119 N.L.R.B. at 771-772.
[
Footnote 19]
Our holding on this ground makes it unnecessary for us to pass
on the other grounds for affirmance of the Court of Appeals'
judgment urged by respondent. These we take to include the argument
that the Board's order violated the standards of § 8(c) of the
Act, 61 Stat. 142, 29 U.S.C. § 158(c), and the points touched
upon in notes
22 and |
22 and S. 477fn23|>23,
infra.
[
Footnote 20]
"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection. . . ."
49 Stat. 452, as amended, 61 Stat. 140, 29 U.S.C. §
157.
[
Footnote 21]
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer --"
"(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7. . . ."
49 Stat. 452, as amended, 61 Stat. 140, 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(1).
[
Footnote 22]
Respondent cites a number of specific circumstances in the
activities here that might distinguish them from the
Briggs-Stratton case as to protection under § 7. We
do not pass on the matter.
[
Footnote 23]
Briggs-Stratton held, among other things, that employee
conduct quite similar to the conduct at bar was neither protected
by § 7 of the Act nor prohibited (made an unfair labor
practice) by § 8. The respondent urges that the holding there
that the conduct was not prohibited by § 8, in and of itself,
requires an affirmance of the judgment here, since, in this case,
the Board's order found a violation of § 8. In fact, the
Board's General Counsel, on oral argument, made the concession that
Briggs-Stratton would have to be overruled for the Board
to prevail here.
But, regardless of the status today of the other substantive
rulings in the
Briggs-Stratton case, we cannot say that
the case's holding as to § 8 requires a judgment for the
respondent here.
Briggs-Stratton was a direct review on
certiorari here of a state board order, as modified and affirmed in
the State Supreme Court, against the union conduct in question. The
order was assailed by the union here primarily as being beyond the
competence of the State to make, by reason of the federal labor
relations statutes. This Court held that the activities in question
were neither protected by § 7 nor prohibited by § 8, and
allowed the state order to stand. The primary focus of attention
was whether the activities were protected by § 7; there seems
to have been no serious contention made that they were prohibited
by § 8. The case arose long before the line of cases,
beginning with
Personal Products, in which the Board began
to relate such activities to § 8(b)(3). But of special
significance is the fact that the approach to preemption taken in
Briggs-Stratton was that the state courts, and this Court
on review, were required to decide whether the activities were
either protected by § 7 or prohibited by § 8. This
approach is "no longer of general application,"
San Diego
Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.
S. 236,
359 U. S. 245,
note 4, as this Court has since developed the doctrine in
preemption cases that questions of interpretation of the National
Labor Relations Act are generally committed in the first instance
to the Board's administrative processes,
San Diego Building
Trades Council v. Garmon, supra, except in the atypical
situation where those processes are not relevant to an answer to
the question.
See Teamsters Union v. Oliver, supra.
Therefore to view
Briggs-Stratton as controlling on the
§ 8 issue here would be to compound the defects of a now
discarded approach to preemption; it would amount to saying that
the Board would be foreclosed in its adjudicative development of
interpretation of the Act by a decision rendered long ago, not
arising in review of one of its own orders at a time when its own
views had not come to what they now are, and in which the precise
issue (as to § 8(b)(3)) was not litigated at all, and the
general § 8 issue not litigated seriously. Hence, we construe
§ 8 here uninfluenced by what was said in
Briggs-Stratton.
However, we will not here reexamine what was said in
Briggs-Stratton as to §§ 13 and 501. The union
here contends that the definition of "strike" in § 501(2) of
the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 161, 29 U.S.C. § 142(2), which
is broad enough to include the activities here in question, must be
applied here under § 13 of the NLRA, which provides that
"Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for
herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede
or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the
limitations or qualifications on that right."
49 Stat. 457, as amended, 61 Stat. 151, 29 U.S.C. § 163.
And if it is so applied, the union argues that § 13 would
prevent the Board from considering the conduct in question as an
unfair labor practice. The issue was tendered in much the same
light in
Briggs-Stratton, and the Court quite plainly
indicated that the definition in § 501(2) was only to be
considered in connection with § 8(b)(4), and not with §
13,
see 336 U.S. at
336 U. S.
258-263, especially the last page; at the very least,
this was a holding alternative to a holding, 336 U.S. at
336 U. S.
263-264, that, however defined, § 13, unlike §
7, was not an inhibition on state power. Perhaps this element of
the
Briggs-Stratton decision has become open also, but
certainly this is not so clear as is the fact that the § 8
point is open. In any event, we shall not consider the matter
further, since our affirmance of the Court of Appeals' reversal of
the Board's order is, we believe, more properly bottomed on a
construction of § 8(b)(3).
[
Footnote 24]
The Board quotes, in support of this, general language from a
decision of this Court,
Order of Railroad Telegraphers v.
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.
S. 342,
321 U. S. 346,
dealing with a wholly different matter -- the scope of subjects
appropriate for collective bargaining.
[
Footnote 25]
"To say
there ought to be a law against it' does not
demonstrate the propriety of the NLRB's imposing the prohibition."
Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 Harv.L.Rev. 1401,
1437.
[
Footnote 26]
Though it is much urged in the Board's brief here as a general
proposition, the Board's opinion (following its
per se
approach) contains no discussion of this point at all insofar as
the facts of the case were concerned; it did not discuss the
economic effect of the activities on the agents themselves, and
expressly declined to pass on their effect on the employer. 119
N.L.R.B. at 771. Respondent here urges that the evidence
establishes quite the opposite conclusion.
[
Footnote 27]
"If relative power be the proper test, surely one who believed
the unions to be weak would come to the opposite conclusion. Is it
an abuse of 'bargaining powers' to threaten a strike at a
department store two weeks before Easter instead of engaging in
further discussion, postponing the strike until after Easter, when
the employer will feel it less severely? Is it unfair for an
employer to stall negotiations through a busy season or while he is
building up inventory so that he can stand a strike better than the
workers?"
Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 Harv.L.Rev. 1401,
1440-1441.
[
Footnote 28]
There is a suggestion in the Board's opinion that it regarded
the union tactics as a unilateral setting of the terms and
conditions of employment, and hence also on this basis violative of
§ 8(b)(3), just as an employer's unilateral setting of
employment terms during collective bargaining may amount to a
breach of its duty to bargain collectively.
Labor Board v.
Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 337 U.
S. 217.
See 119 N.L.R.B. at 772. Prudential, as
amicus curiae here, renews this point, though the Board
does not make it here. It seems baseless to us. There was no
indication that the practices that the union was engaging in were
designed to be permanent conditions of work. They were, rather,
means to another end. The question whether union conduct could be
treated, analogously to employer conduct, as unilaterally
establishing working conditions, in a manner violative of the duty
to bargain collectively, might be raised, for example, by the case
of a union, anxious to secure a reduction of the working day from
eight to seven hours, which instructed its members, during the
negotiation process, to quit work an hour early daily.
Cf.
Note, 71 Harv.L.Rev. 502, 509. But this situation is not presented
here, and we leave the question open.
[
Footnote 29]
The Board's opinion interprets the National Labor Relations Act
to require, in this particular, "a background of balanced
bargaining relations." 119 N.L.R.B. at 772.
[
Footnote 30]
The Board, in
Personal Products, condemned the union's
tactics as an "abuse of the Union's bargaining powers." 108
N.L.R.B. at 746.
[
Footnote 31]
It might be noted that the House bill, when the Taft-Hartley Act
was in the legislative process, contained a list of "unlawful
concerted activities" one of which would quite likely have reached
some of the union conduct here, but the provision never became law.
H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., § 12.
[
Footnote 32]
After we granted certiorari, we postponed to the consideration
of the case on the merits a motion by the Board to join as a party
here Insurance Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, the style of a
new union formed by merger of respondent and another union after
the decision of this case in the Court of Appeals, and a contingent
motion by respondent that it be deleted as a party. 361 U.S. 872.
In the light of our ruling on the merits, there is little point in
determining here and now what the legal status of the predecessor
and successor union is, and, if the issue ever becomes important,
we think that the matter is best decided then. For what it is
worth, we shall treat both as parties before us in this proceeding.
The Board's motion is granted, and respondent's is denied.
See
Labor Board v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U. S. 282.
Separate opinion of MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, which MR. JUSTICE
HARLAN and MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER join.
The sweep of the Court's opinion, with its far-reaching
implications in a domain of lawmaking of such nationwide importance
as that of legal control of collective bargaining, compels a
separate statement of my views.
The conduct which underlies this action was the respondent
union's "Work Without a Contract" program, which it admittedly
initiated after the expiration of its contract with the Prudential
Insurance Company on March 19, 1956. In brief, the union directed
its members at various times to arrive late to work; to decline, by
"sitting-in" the company offices, to work according to their
regular schedule; to refuse to write new business or, when writing
it, not to report it in the ordinary fashion; to decline to attend
special business meetings; to demonstrate before company offices;
and to solicit petitions in the union's behalf from policyholders
with whom they dealt. Prudential was given notice in advance of the
details of this program and of the demands which the union sought
to achieve by carrying it out.
This action was commenced by a complaint issued on June 5, 1956,
alleging respondent's failure to bargain in good faith. After a
hearing, the Trial Examiner recommended that the complaint be
dismissed, finding that,
"[f]rom the 'circumstantial evidence' [of the union's state of
mind] of the bargaining itself . . . , but one inference is
possible . . . -- the Union's motive was one of good faith . . .
;"
and that "whatever inference may be as reasonably drawn from the
Union's concurrent
unprotected' activities" is not sufficient
to outweigh this evidence of good faith.
The Board sustained exceptions to the Trial Examiner's report,
concluding that respondent failed to bargain in good faith. The
only facts relied on by the Board were based on the "Work Without a
Contract" program. The
Page 361 U. S. 502
Board found that such tactics on respondent's part "clearly
revealed an unwillingness to submit its demands to the
consideration of the bargaining table," and that respondent
therefore failed to bargain in good faith. In support of its
conclusion of want of bargaining in good faith, the Board stated
that
"[h]arassing activities are plainly 'irreconcilable with the
Act's requirement of reasoned discussion in a background of
balanced bargaining relations upon which good faith bargaining must
rest.' . . ."
The Board made no finding that the outward course of the
negotiations gave rise to an inference that respondent's state of
mind was one of unwillingness to reach agreement. It found from the
character of respondent's activities in carrying out the "Work
Without a Contract" program that what appeared to be good faith
bargaining at the bargaining table was, in fact, a sham:
"[T]he fact that the Respondent continued to confer with the
Company and was desirous of concluding an agreement does not,
alone, establish that it fulfilled its obligation to
bargain in good faith, as the Respondent argues and the Trial
Examiner believes. At most, it demonstrates that the Respondent was
prepared to go through the motions of bargaining while relying upon
a campaign of harassing tactics to disrupt the Company's business
to achieve acceptance of its contractual demands."
The Board issued a "cease and desist" order, [
Footnote 2/1] and sought its enforcement in the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Respondent
cross-petitioned to set it aside.
Page 361 U. S. 503
The Court of Appeals, relying exclusively on its prior decision
in
Textile Workers Union v. Labor Board, 97 U.S.App.D.C.
35, 227 F.2d 409 (1955), denied enforcement and set aside the
order. In the
Textile Workers case, the court had held
(one judge dissenting) that the Board could not consider the
"harassing" activities of the union there involved as evidence of
lack of good faith during the negotiations.
"There is not the slightest inconsistency between genuine desire
to come to an agreement and use of economic pressure to get the
kind of agreement one wants."
97 U.S.App.D.C. 35, 36, 227 F.2d 409, 410.
The record presents two different grounds for the Board's action
in this case. The Board's own opinion proceeds in terms of an
examination of respondent's conduct as it bears upon the
genuineness of its bargaining in the negotiation proceedings. From
the respondent's conduct, the Board drew the inference that
respondent's state of mind was inimical to reaching an agreement,
and that inference alone supported its conclusion of a refusal to
bargain. The Board's position in this Court proceeded in terms of
the relation of conduct such as respondent's to the kind of
bargaining required by the statute, without regard to the bearing
of such conduct on the proof of good faith revealed by the actual
bargaining. The Board maintained that it
"could appropriately determine that the basic statutory purpose
of promoting industrial peace through the collective bargaining
process would be defeated by sanctioning resort to this form of
industrial warfare as a collective bargaining technique. "
Page 361 U. S. 504
The opinion of this Court, like that of the Court of Appeals,
disposes of both questions by a single broad stroke. It concludes
that conduct designed to exert pressure on the bargaining situation
with the aim of achieving favorable results is to be deemed
entirely consistent with the duty to bargain in good faith. No
evidentiary significance, not even an inference of a lack of good
faith, is allowed to be drawn from the conduct in question as part
of a total context.
I agree that the position taken by the Board here is not
tenable. In enforcing the duty to bargain, the Board must find the
ultimate fact whether, in the case before it and in the context of
all its circumstances, the respondent has engaged in bargaining
without the sincere desire to reach agreement which the Act
commands. I further agree that the Board's action in this case is
not sustainable as resting upon a determination that respondent's
apparent bargaining was, in fact, a sham, because the evidence is
insufficient to justify that conclusion even giving the Board, as
we must, every benefit of its right to draw on its experience in
interpreting the industrial significance of the facts of a record.
See Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Board, 340 U.
S. 474. What the Board has, in fact, done is lay down a
rule of law that such conduct as was involved in carrying out the
"Work Without a Contract" program necessarily betokens bad faith in
the negotiations.
The Court's opinion rests its conclusion on the generalization
that
"the ordinary economic strike is not evidence of a failure to
bargain in good faith . . . , [because] there is simply no
inconsistency between the application of economic pressure and good
faith collective bargaining."
This large statement is justified solely by reference to §
8(b)(3) and to the proposition that inherent in bargaining is room
for the play of forces which reveal the strength of one party, or
the weakness of
Page 361 U. S. 505
the other, in the economic context in which they seek agreement.
But, in determining the state of mind of a party to collective
bargaining negotiations, the Board does not deal in terms of
abstract "economic pressure." It must proceed in terms of specific
conduct which it weighs as a more or less reliable manifestation of
the state of mind with which bargaining is conducted. No conduct in
the complex context of bargaining for a labor agreement can
profitably be reduced to such an abstraction as "economic
pressure." An exertion of "economic pressure" may, at the same
time, be part of a concerted effort to evade or disrupt a normal
course of negotiations. Vital differences in conduct, varying in
character and effect from mild persuasion to destructive, albeit
"economic," violence, [
Footnote
2/2] are obscured under cover of a single abstract phrase.
While § 8(b)(3) of course contemplates some play of
"economic pressure," it does not follow that the purpose in
engaging in tactics designed to exert it is to reach agreement
through the bargaining process in the manner which the statute
commands, so that the Board is precluded from considering such
conduct, in the totality of circumstances, as evidence of the
actual state of mind of the actor. Surely to deny this scope for
allowable judgment to the Board is to deny it the special function
with which it has been entrusted.
See Universal Camera Corp. v.
Labor Board, supra. This Court has in the past declined to
preempt by broad proscriptions the Board's competence in the first
instance to weigh the significance of the raw facts of conduct and
to draw from them an informed judgment as to the ultimate fact. It
has recognized that the significance of conduct, itself apparently
innocent and evidently insufficient to sustain a findings of
Page 361 U. S. 506
an unfair labor practice, "may be altered by imponderable
subtleties at work which it is not our function to appraise," but
which are, first, for the Board's consideration upon all the
evidence.
Labor Board v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co.,
314 U. S. 469,
314 U. S. 479.
Activities in isolation may be wholly innocent, lawful and
"protected" by the Act, but that ought not to bar the Board from
finding, if the record justifies it, that the isolated parts "are
bound together as the parts of a single plan [to frustrate
agreement]. The plan may make the parts unlawful."
Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.
S. 375,
196 U. S. 396.
See also Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.
S. 194,
195 U. S.
206.
Moreover, conduct designed to exert and exerting "economic
pressure" may not have the shelter of § 8(b)(3) even in
isolation. Unlawful violence, whether to person or livelihood, to
secure acceptance of an offer, is as much a withdrawal of included
statutory subjects from bargaining as the "take it or leave it"
attitude which the statute clearly condemns. [
Footnote 2/3] One need not romanticize the community of
interest between employers and employees, or be unmindful of the
conflict between them, to recognize that utilization of what in one
set of circumstances may only signify resort to the traditional
weapons of labor may in another and relevant context offend the
attitude toward bargaining commanded by the statute. Section
8(b)(3) is not a specific direction, but an expression of a
governing viewpoint or policy to which, by the process of specific
application, the Board and the courts must give concrete, not
doctrinaire content.
The main purpose of the Wagner Act was to put the force of law
behind the promotion of unionism as the legitimate and necessary
instrument "to give laborers opportunity to deal on equality with
their employer."
Page 361 U. S. 507
Mr. Chief Justice Taft for the Court, in
American Steel
Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.
S. 184,
257 U. S. 209.
Equality of bargaining power between capital and labor, to use the
conventional terminology of our predominant economic system, was
the aim of this legislation. The presupposition of collective
bargaining was the progressive enlargement of the area of reason in
the process of bargaining through the give-and-take of discussion
and enforcing machinery within industry, in order to substitute, in
the language of Mr. Justice Brandeis, "processes of justice for the
more primitive method of trial by combat."
Duplex Printing
Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443,
254 U. S. 488
(dissenting). Promotion of unionism by the Wagner Act, with the
resulting progress of rational collective bargaining, has been
gathering momentum for a quarter of a century. In view of the
economic and political strength which has thereby come to unions,
interpretations of the Act ought not to proceed on the assumption
that it actively throws its weight on the side of unionism in order
to redress an assumed inequality of bargaining power. For the Court
to fashion the rules governing collective bargaining on the
assumption that the power and position of labor unions and their
solidarity are what they were twenty-five years ago is to fashion
law on the basis of unreality. Accretion of power may carry with it
increasing responsibility for the manner of its exercise.
Therefore, in the unfolding of law in this field, it should not
be the inexorable premise that the process of collective bargaining
is, by its nature, a bellicose process. The broadly phrased terms
of the Taft-Hartley Act should be applied to carry out the broadly
conceived policies of the Act. At the core of the promotion of
collective bargaining, which was the chief means by which the great
social purposes of the National Labor Relations Act were sought to
be furthered, is a purpose to discourage, more
Page 361 U. S. 508
and more, industrial combatants from pressing their demands by
all available means to the limits of the justification of
self-interest. This calls for appropriate judicial construction of
existing legislation. The statute lays its emphasis upon reason and
a willingness to employ it as the dominant force in bargaining.
That emphasis is respected by declining to take as a postulate of
the duty to bargain that the legally impermissible exertions of
so-called economic pressure must be restricted to the crudities of
brute force.
Cf. Labor Board v. Fansteel Metallurgical
Corp., 306 U. S. 240.
However, it of course does not follow because the Board may find
in tactics short of violence evidence that a party means not to
bargain in good faith that every such finding must be sustained.
Section 8(b)(3) itself, as previously construed by the Board and
this Court and as amplified by § 8(d), provides a substantial
limitation on the Board's becoming, as the Court fears, merely "an
arbiter of the sort of economic weapons the parties can use in
seeking to gain acceptance of their bargaining demands." The
Board's function in the enforcement of the duty to bargain does not
end when it has properly drawn an inference unfavorable to the
respondent from particular conduct. It must weigh that inference as
part of the totality of inferences which may appropriately be drawn
from the entire conduct of the respondent, particularly its conduct
at the bargaining table. The state of mind with which the party
charged with a refusal to bargain entered into and participated in
the bargaining process is the ultimate issue upon which alone the
Board must act in each case, and on the sufficiency of the whole
record to justify its decision the courts must pass.
Labor
Board v. American National Ins. Co., 343 U.
S. 395.
The Board urges that this Court has approved its enforcement of
§ 8(b)(3) by the outlawry of conduct
per se, and
without regard to ascertainment of a state of
Page 361 U. S. 509
mind. It relies upon four cases:
H. J. Heinz Co. v. Labor
Board, 311 U. S. 514;
Labor Board v. Crompton-Highland Mills, 337 U.
S. 217;
Labor Board v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 352
U.S. 938; and
Labor Board v. Borg-Warner Corp.,
356 U. S. 342.
These cases do not sustain its position. While it is plain that the
per se proscription of an employer's refusal to reduce a
collective agreement to writing was approved in the
Heinz
case, it is equally plain from its opinion in that case, as well as
its argument before this Court, that the Board itself regarded the
act of refusal to agree to the integration of the agreement in a
writing as a manifestation that the employer's state of mind was
hostile to agreement with the union. This Court so regarded the
evidence. 311 U.S. at
311 U. S.
525-526. Decision in the
Borg-Warner case
proceeded from a similar premise. By forcing a deadlock upon a
nonstatutory subject of bargaining, the employer manifested his
intention to withdraw the statutory subjects from bargaining. The
Crompton-Highland decision rested not on approval of a per se rule
that unilateral changes of the conditions of employment by an
employer during bargaining constitute a refusal to bargain, but
upon the inferences of a lack of good faith which arose from the
facts, among others, that the employer instituted a greater
increase than it had offered the union and that it did so without
consulting the union. Finally, no such conclusion as the Board
urges can be drawn from the summary disposition of the
Woolworth case here. [
Footnote
2/4] To the extent that, in any of these cases,
Page 361 U. S. 510
language referred to a
per se proscription of conduct
it was in relation to facts strongly indicating a lack of a sincere
desire to reach agreement.
Moreover, in undertaking to fashion the law of collective
bargaining in this case in accordance with the command of §
8(b)(3), the Board has considered § 8(b)(3) in isolation, as
if it were an independent provision of law, and not a part of a
reticulated legislative scheme with interlacing purposes. It is the
purposes to be drawn from the statute in its entirely, with due
regard to all its interrelated provisions, in relation to which
§ 8(b)(3) is to be applied.
Cf. Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448,
353 U. S. 456.
A pertinent restraint on the Board's power to consider as inimical
to fair bargaining the exercise of the "economic" weapons of labor
is expressed in the Act by § 13: [
Footnote 2/5]
"Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for
herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede
or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the
limitations or qualifications on that right."
Section 501(2) of the Labor Management Relations Act provides a
definition of "strike": [
Footnote
2/6]
"When used in this Act -- . . . (2) The term 'strike' includes
any strike or other concerted stoppage of
Page 361 U. S. 511
work by employees (including a stoppage by reason of the
expiration of a collective-bargaining agreement) and any concerted
slowdown or other concerted interruption of operations by
employees."
As the last clause of § 13 makes plain, the section does
not recognize an unqualified right, free of Board interference, to
engage in "strikes," as respondent contends. The Senate Report
[
Footnote 2/7] dealing with the
addition of the clause to the section confirms that its purpose was
to approve the elaboration of limitations on the right to engage in
activities nominally within the definition of § 501(2) which
this Court had heretofore developed in such cases as
Labor
Board v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., supra; Labor Board v. Sands
Mfg. Co., 306 U. S. 332; and
Southern S.S. Co. v. Labor Board, 316 U. S.
31. But "limitations and qualifications" do not
extinguish the rule. For the Board to proceed, as it apparently
claims
Page 361 U. S. 512
power to do, against conduct which, but for the bargaining
context in which it occurs, would not be within those limitations,
[
Footnote 2/8] it must rely upon
the specific grant of power to enforce the duty to bargain which is
contained in § 8(b)(3). In construing that section, the policy
of the rule of construction set forth by § 13,
see
Automobile Workers v. Wisconsin Board, 336 U.
S. 245,
336 U. S. 259,
must be taken into account. In the light of that policy, there is
no justification for divorcing from the total bargaining situation
particular tactics which the Board finds undesirable, without
regard to the actual conduct of bargaining in the case before
it.
The scope of the permission embodied in § 13 must be
considered by the Board in determining, under a proper rule of law,
whether the totality of the respondent's conduct justifies the
conclusion that it has violated the "specific" command of §
8(b)(3). When the Board emphasizes tactics outside the negotiations
themselves as the basis of the conclusion that the color of
illegitimacy is imparted to otherwise apparently
bona fide
negotiations, § 13 becomes relevant. A total, peaceful strike
in compliance with the requirements of § 8(d) would plainly
not suffice to sustain the conclusion; prolonged union-sponsored
violence directed at the company to secure compliance
Page 361 U. S. 513
as plainly would. Here, as in so many legal situations of
different gradations, drawing the line between them is not an
abstract, speculative enterprise. Where the line ought to be drawn
should await the decision of particular cases by the Board. It
involves experienced judgment regarding the justification of the
means and the severity of the effect of particular conduct in the
specialized context of bargaining.
Section 8(d), which was added in the amendments of 1947, is also
inconsistent with the Board's claim of power to proscribe conduct
without regard to the state of mind with which the actor
participated in negotiations. The 1935 Act did not define the
"practice and procedure of collective bargaining" which it purposed
to "encourage." Act of July 5, 1935, § 1, 49 Stat. 449. That
definition, until 1947, was evolved by the Board and the courts in
the light of experience in the administration of the Act.
See,
e.g., H. J. Heinz Co. v. Labor Board, supra. In 1947, after
considerable controversy over the need to objectify the elements of
the duty to bargain, § 8(d) was enacted. We have held that the
history of that enactment demonstrates an intention to restrain the
Board's power to regulate, whether directly or indirectly, the
substantive terms of collective agreements.
Labor Board v.
American National Ins. Co., supra, at
343 U. S. 404.
In the same case, we recognized that implicit in that purpose is a
restraint upon the Board's proceeding by the proscription of
conduct
per se, and without regard to inferences as to
state of mind to be drawn from the totality of the conduct in each
case.
Id. at
343 U. S.
409.
Finally, it is not disputed that the duty to bargain imposed on
unions in 1947 was the same as that previously imposed on
employers, and it is therefore not without significance for its
present assertion of power that, for 25 years of administration of
the employer's duty
Page 361 U. S. 514
to bargain, which was imposed by the Act of 1935 and preserved
by the amendments of 1947, the Board has not found it necessary to
assert that it may proscribe conduct as undesirable in bargaining
without regard to the actual course of the negotiations.
See
Federal Trade Comm'n v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.
S. 349,
312 U. S.
351-352.
These considerations govern the disposition of the case before
the Court. Viewed as a determination upon all the evidence that the
respondent bargained without the sincere desire to compose
differences and reach agreement which the statute commands, the
Board's conclusion must fall for want of support in the evidence as
a whole.
See Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Board, supra.
Apart from any restraint upon its conclusion imposed by § 13,
a matter which the Board did not consider, no reason is manifest
why the respondent's nuisance tactics here should be thought a
sufficient basis for the conclusion that all its bargaining was in
reality a sham. On this record, it does not appear that respondent
merely stalled at the bargaining table until its conduct outside
the negotiations might force Prudential to capitulate to its
demands, nor does any other evidence give the color of pretence to
its negotiating procedure. From the conduct of its counsel before
the Trial Examiner, and from its opinion, it is apparent that the
Board proceeded upon the belief that respondent's tactics were,
without more, sufficient evidence of a lack of a sincere desire to
reach agreement to make other consideration of its conduct
unnecessary. For that reason, the case should be remanded to the
Board for further opportunity to introduce pertinent evidence, if
any there be, of respondent's lack of good faith.
Viewed as a determination by the Board that it could, quite
apart from respondent's state of mind, proscribe its tactics
because they were not "traditional," or were
Page 361 U. S. 515
thought to be subject to public disapproval, or because
employees who engaged in them may have been subject to discharge,
the Board's conclusion proceeds from the application of an
erroneous rule of law.
The decision of the Court of Appeals should be vacated, and the
case remanded to the Board for further proceedings consistent with
these views.
[
Footnote 2/1]
The order in part provided:
"[T]he Respondent . . . shall: 1. Cease and desist from refusing
to bargain collectively in good faith with The Prudential Insurance
Company of America . . . by authorizing, directing, supporting,
inducing or encouraging the Company's employees to engage in
slowdowns, harassing activities or other unprotected conduct, in
the course of their employment and in disregard of their duties and
customary routines, for the purpose of forcing the Company to
accept its bargaining demands, or from engaging in any like or
related conduct in derogation of its statutory duty to bargain. . .
."
[
Footnote 2/2]
"There are plenty of methods of coercion short of actual
physical violence." Senator Taft at 93 Cong.Rec. 4024.
[
Footnote 2/3]
As the Court states, the prevention of union conduct designed to
enforce such an attitude was a primary purpose of the enactment of
§ 8(b)(3).
See, e.g., 93 Cong. Rec. 4135.
[
Footnote 2/4]
The Court held that
"The Board acted within its allowable discretion in finding
that, under the circumstances of this case, failure to furnish the
wage information constituted an unfair labor practice."
It cited
Labor Board v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.
S. 149; and, in
Truitt, the entire Court was in
agreement both that the withholding of wage information by the
employer was weighty evidence of a lack of willingness to bargain
sincerely and that the judgment of the Board had to be predicated
on all the facts pertinent to state of mind. 351 U.S. at
351 U. S. 153,
351 U. S. 155.
Moreover, the lower court in the
Woolworth case found that
the Board had not proceeded by a
per se determination, 235
F.2d 319, 322, but that there was no basis for its conclusion that
the information requested was relevant to administration of the
agreement.
[
Footnote 2/5]
While the Board does consider these sections in connection with
respondent's assertion that they afford protection to its conduct
from Board regulation,
see 361
U.S. 477fn2/8|>n. 8,
infra, it does not consider
their application as a rule of construction of § 8(b)(3).
[
Footnote 2/6]
Although I am in sympathy with the Court's conclusion that the
construction of § 8 in this case is to be uninfluenced by what
was said in
Automobile Workers v. Wisconsin Board,
336 U. S. 245, I
do not agree that the case held that the definitions of §
501(2) are inapplicable to § 13. The question which the Court
there considered was whether § 13, as defined in §
501(2), independently rendered activities within its terms immune
from state regulation. The Court's observation that for §
501(2) to have so extended the force of § 13 would have been
inconsistent with the purpose of the inclusion of the definition,
which was to extend the Board's power with reference to the unfair
labor practice defined by § 8(b)(4), 336 U.S. at
336 U. S. 263,
was made in light of the contention that § 13 itself had the
effect of precluding the States. The crux of the decision with
regard to § 13 was that it announced no more than a rule of
construction of the Federal Act. It was neither argued nor decided
that § 501(2) does not apply to § 13. There appears to be
no support for such a conclusion either in the text of the Act or
in its legislative history. It is hardly conceivable that such a
word as "strike" could have been defined in these statutes without
congressional realization of the obvious scope of its
application.
[
Footnote 2/7]
S.Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) at p. 28. This
provision of the Taft bill was adopted by the Conference.
H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) at p. 59.
[
Footnote 2/8]
The Board urges that respondent's activities are not within the
"dispensation or protection" of § 13, because
Automobile
Workers v. Wisconsin Board, 336 U. S. 245,
held "slowdowns" to be "unprotected" activities subject to state
regulation. The argument misreads the significance of that case as
regards § 13.
See 361
U.S. 477fn2/6|>n. 6,
supra. Nor is it valid to
assume that all conduct loosely described as a "slowdown" has the
same legal significance, or that union sponsorship of such conduct
falls within the "limitations or qualifications" on the right to
strike incorporated in § 13 in every case in which employee
participation in it would be "unprotected" by § 7, and
therefore subject to economic retaliation by the employer.
See the portions of the Board's order quoted in
361
U.S. 477fn2/1|>n. 1,
supra.