Respondents organized an "employee committee" at each of their
numerous plants for the stated purposes of meeting regularly with
management to consider and discuss problems of mutual interest,
including grievances, and of handling grievances at nonunion plants
and departments. In practice, such committees also made proposals
and requests respecting such matters as seniority, job
classification, job bidding, working schedules, holidays,
vacations, sick leave, a merit system, wage corrections, and
improvement of working conditions and facilities. A "central
committee" consisting of the chairmen of the several plant
committees also met annually at the head office with respondents'
Director of Industrial Relations and made proposals and requests
with respect to matters covering nearly the whole scope of the
employment relationship which are commonly considered and dealt
with in collective bargaining. After appropriate administrative
proceedings, the National Labor Relations Board found that both the
"employee committees" and the "central committee" were "labor
organizations" within the meaning of § 2(5) of the National
Labor Relations Act, and that respondents had dominated, interfered
with, and supported them in violation of § 8(a)(2), and it
issued an appropriate cease and desist order.
Held: the order is sustained. Pp.
360 U. S.
204-218.
1. Such committees are "labor organizations" within the meaning
of § 2(5) of the Act. Pp.
360 U. S.
210-218.
(a) Since such committees exist, in part at least, for the
purpose of "dealing with employers concerning grievances . . . or
conditions of work," they are not excluded from the definition of
"labor organizations" in § 2(5) simply because they do not
"bargain with" employers in the usual concept of collective
bargaining. Pp.
360 U. S.
210-213.
(b) Consideration of the declared purposes and actual functions
of these committees shows that they existed for the purpose, in
part at least, of "dealing with employers concerning
grievances,
Page 360 U. S. 204
labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of work, or
conditions of work," and that, therefore, they are "labor
organizations" within the meaning of § 2(5). Pp.
360 U. S.
213-215.
(c) There is nothing in the 1947 amendment of § 9(a) or its
legislative history to indicate that Congress thereby eliminated,
or intended to eliminate, such employee committees from the term
"labor organization" as defined in § 2(5) and used in §
8(a)(2), or that authorizes an employer to engage in "dealing with"
an employer-dominated "labor organization" as the representative of
his employees concerning their grievances. Pp.
360 U.S. 215-218.
2. Since the Board's order does not forbid employers and
employees from discussing matters of mutual interest concerning the
employment relationship, but merely precludes the employers from
dominating, interfering with or supporting the employee committees,
it does not abridge freedom of speech in violation of the First
Amendment. P.
360 U. S.
218.
256 F.2d 281 reversed.
MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question for decision in this case is whether "Employee
Committees" established and supported by respondents at each of
their several plants for the stated purposes of meeting regularly
with management to consider and discuss problems of mutual
interest, including grievances, and of handling "grievances at
nonunion plants and departments," are, in the light of their
declared purposes and actual practices, "labor organizations"
Page 360 U. S. 205
within the meaning of § 2(5) of the National Labor
Relations Act. [
Footnote 1]
Respondents are affiliated corporations under the same general
management, and maintain their principal office at Pampa, Texas.
They are, and for many years have been, engaged in operating a
number of plants, principally in Texas and Louisiana, primarily for
the purposes of manufacturing and selling carbon black and oil
field equipment. Pursuant to a suggestion of the War Production
Board in 1943, respondents decided to establish an Employee
Committee at each of their plants. To that end, respondents
prepared, in collaboration with employee representatives from their
several plants, a set of bylaws, stating the purposes, duties and
functions of the proposed Employee Committees, for transmittal to
and adoption by the employees in establishing such Committees. The
bylaws were adopted by a majority of employees at each plant and by
respondents, and, thus, the Employee Committees were established.
Those bylaws, and certain related company rules, were later
published by respondents in a company manual called "The Guide,"
and are still in effect.
In essence, the bylaws state: that the purpose of the Committees
is to provide a procedure for considering employees' ideas and
problems of mutual interest to employees and management; [
Footnote 2] that each plant
Committee
Page 360 U. S. 206
shall consist of a stated number of employees (ranging from 2 to
3) whose terms shall be one year, and that retiring members, with
the help of plant clerks, will conduct the nomination and election
of their successors; that each plant Committee shall meet with the
plant management at regular monthly meetings and at all special
meetings called by management, shall assist the plant management in
solving problems of mutual interest, and that time so spent will be
considered time worked; and that
"It shall be the Committee's responsibility to: . . . Handle
grievances at nonunion plants and departments according to
procedure set up for these plants and departments. [
Footnote 3]"
After a hearing, the trial examiner issued his intermediate
report containing detailed findings of fact. The relevant findings,
mainly based on undisputed evidence, may be summarized as follows:
the Committees' bylaws were prepared and adopted in the manner, and
contain the provisions, above stated. During the period here
involved (from May, 1954, to the date of the hearing before the
Board in June, 1956), the Employee Committees, in addition to
considering and discussing with respondents' plant officials
problems of the nature covered by the bylaws, made and discussed
proposals and requests respecting many other aspects of the
employee relationship, including seniority, job classifications,
job bidding, makeup time, overtime records, time cards, a merit
system, wage corrections, working schedules, holidays, vacations,
sick leave, and improvement of working facilities and conditions.
Respondents' plant officials participated in those discussions,
and, in some instances, granted the Committees'
Page 360 U. S. 208
requests. [
Footnote 5]
Although not provided for in the bylaws, a "Central Committee,"
consisting of the chairmen of the several plant Committees, met
annually with respondents' Director of Industrial Relations in
Pampa, Texas, where, during the 1955 and 1956 meetings, the Central
Committee made proposals and requests with respect to many matters
covering nearly the whole scope of the employment relationship.
[
Footnote 6] The Director of
Industrial Relations discussed those proposals and requests, their
feasibility and economic consequences from respondents' point of
view, and sought to reach some solution. In some instances, he
expressed approval of requests or promised to see what could be
done toward meeting them; in other instances, he suggested that the
matter be taken up with local management; and in still other
instances, he rejected the proposals and requests and explained his
reasons for doing so.
Page 360 U. S. 209
The trial examiner also found that the Employee Committees have
no membership requirements, collect no dues, and have no funds;
that plant clerks assist the Committees in conducting their
elections and do all of their clerical work; and that respondents
pay all of the necessary expenses of the Committees. None of the
Committees has ever attempted to negotiate a collective bargaining
contract with respondents. From time to time, the Board has
certified independent labor organizations as the exclusive
bargaining agents for certain bargaining units of employees in
approximately one-third of respondents' plants, and, as such agents
for those bargaining units, the respective certified labor
organizations have entered into collective bargaining contracts
with respondents which, as they may have been amended, are still in
effect. Since the respective dates of those collective bargaining
contracts, the certified labor organizations and the Employee
Committees have coexisted in those plants, but the functions of
those Employee Committees have generally been reduced to plant
efficiency, production promotion, and the handling of grievances
for employees who are not included in the bargaining units.
"as the representative of any of [their] employees for the
purpose of dealing with Respondents concerning grievances, labor
disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions
of work."
The Board adopted the findings, conclusions and
recommendations
Page 360 U. S. 210
of the trial examiner and entered its order accordingly. 117
N.L.R.B. 1633.
We turn first to the Court of Appeals' holding that an employee
committee which does not "bargain with" employers in "the usual
concept of collective bargaining" does not engage in "dealing with"
employers, and is therefore not a "labor organization" within the
meaning of § 2(5). Our study of the matter has convinced us
that there is nothing in the plain words of § 2(5), in its
legislative history, or in the decisions construing it, that
supports that conclusion.
Section 2(5) includes in its definition of "labor organization"
any
"employee representation committee or plan . . . which exists
for the purpose, in whole or in part, of
dealing with
employers concerning grievances,
Page 360 U. S. 211
labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or
conditions of work. [
Footnote
7]"
(Emphasis added.) Certainly nothing in that section indicates
that the broad term "dealing with" is to be read as synonymous with
the more limited term "bargaining with."
See e.g., Labor Board
v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 156 F.2d 706, 708, and
Indiana Metal Products Corp. v. Labor Board, 202 F.2d 613,
620-621. The legislative history of § 2(5) strongly confirms
that Congress did not understand or intend those terms to be
synonymous. When the original print of the 1935 Wagner bill
(S.1958) was being considered in the Senate, the then Secretary of
Labor proposed an amendment to § 2(5) which, if adopted, would
have given that section the meaning now ascribed to it by the Court
of Appeals. The proposal was that the term "bargaining
collectively" be substituted for the term "dealing." [
Footnote 8] But the proposal was not adopted.
[
Footnote 9] It is therefore
quite clear that Congress, by adopting the broad term "dealing" and
rejecting the more limited term "bargaining collectively," did not
intend that the broad term "dealing with" should be limited to and
mean only "bargaining with" as held by
Page 360 U. S. 212
the Court of Appeals. [
Footnote 10] Construing § 2(5) of the original
Wagner Act, the Courts of Appeals uniformly held that employee
committees or plans, under whatever name called, that functioned
similarly to those here, were "labor organizations" as defined in
that statute. [
Footnote 11]
With full knowledge of the terms of § 2(5) of the original
Wagner Act, [
Footnote 12]
and of its legislative history and judicial interpretation,
Congress, in the Taft-Hartley Act, reenacted the section without
change. [
Footnote 13] Since
that time, as before, the several Courts of Appeals have uniformly
held that employee committees or plans, functioning similarly to
those here, were "labor organizations" within the definition of
§ 2(5). [
Footnote
14]
The Court of Appeals was therefore in error in holding that
company-dominated Employee Committees, which exist for the purpose,
in part at least (256 F.2d 285), "
of dealing with
employers concerning grievances . . . or conditions of
Page 360 U. S. 213
work," are not "labor organizations," within the meaning of
§ 2(5), simply because they do not "bargain with" employers in
"the usual concept of collective bargaining." (Emphasis added.)
Consideration of the declared purposes and actual functions of
these Committees shows that they existed for the purpose, in part
at least, "of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor
disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions
of work." It cannot be, and is not, disputed that, by the terms of
the bylaws, which were accepted both by the employees and by
respondents, the Employee Committees undertook the "responsibility
to," and did,
"[h]andle grievances [with respondents on behalf of employees]
at nonunion plants and departments according to grievance procedure
set up [by respondents] for these plants and departments"
In 1947, the House passed H.R. 3020, known as the "Hartley
Bill," which, among other things, proposed a new section, to be
designated 8(d)(3), providing:
"(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the
following shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor
practice under any of the provisions of this Act:"
"
* * * *"
"(3) Forming or maintaining by an employer of a committee of
employees and discussing with it matters of mutual interest,
including grievances, wages, hours of employment, and other working
conditions, if the Board has not certified or the employer has not
recognized a representative as their representative under section
9. [
Footnote 16]"
The Senate amended H.R. 3020 by substituting its own bill, S.
1126, known as the "Taft Bill." [
Footnote 17] The Senate bill contained no provision
corresponding to the new § 8(d)(3) proposed by the House, but
it did propose an amendment to § 9(a) of the original Wagner
Act (49 Stat. 453) by adding to the proviso of that section which
read:
"
Provided, That any individual employee or a group of
employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to
their employer"
the words
"and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention
of the bargaining representative, as long
Page 360 U. S. 216
as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a
collective bargaining contract or agreement then in effect:
Provided further, That the bargaining representative has
been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment. [
Footnote 18]"
Thereupon, the Senate requested a conference. [
Footnote 19] The conferees later reported a
new measure, taken partly from the House bill and partly from the
Senate bill and containing some entirely new provisions. [
Footnote 20] That bill, as finally
agreed upon by the conferees, did not contain the House's proposed
new § 8(d)(3) or any similar language, but it did contain the
Senate's proposed amendment to § 9(a).
In reporting to the House, the House conferees stated with
respect to the elimination of its proposed new § 8(d)(3)
that:
"Section 8(d)(3) . . . in the House bill provided that nothing
in the act was to be construed as prohibiting an employer from
forming or maintaining a committee of employees and discussing with
it matters of mutual interest, if the employees did not have a
bargaining representative. This provision is omitted from the
conference agreement, since the act, by its terms, permits
individual employees and groups of employees to meet with the
employer and section 9(a) of the conference agreement permits
employers to answer their grievances. [
Footnote 21] "
Page 360 U. S. 217
The bill so agreed upon by the conferees was passed by both
Houses, and eventually became the law. [
Footnote 22]
Notwithstanding the fact that Congress rejected the House
proposal of a new section, to be designated § 8(d)(3), which,
if adopted, would have permitted an employer to form or maintain a
committee of employees and to discuss with it matters of mutual
interest, including grievances, wages, hours of employment, and
other working conditions, if there was no employee representative,
respondents contend that Congress intended to accomplish the same
purposes by its amendment to § 9(a), and that, in consequence,
an employer whose employees have no bargaining representative may
now legally form or maintain a committee of employees and discuss
with it the matters referred to in the proposed § 8(d) (3)
advocated by the House.
This argument treats the amendment to § 9(a) as though
Congress had adopted, rather than rejected as it did, the proposed
§ 8(d)(3) advocated by the House. And it overlooks the facts
that the House Conference Report itself declared that "[t]he
conference agreement does not make any change" in the definition of
"labor organization," [
Footnote
23] and that, as pointed out by Senator Taft, the conferees
specifically rejected all attempts to "amend . . . the provisions
in subsection 8(2) [of the original Wagner Act] relating to
company-dominated unions," and had left its prohibitions
"unchanged." [
Footnote 24]
The amendment to § 9(a) does not say that an employer may form
or maintain an employee committee for the purpose of "dealing with"
the employer, on behalf of employees, concerning grievances. On the
contrary the amendment to § 9(a) simply provides, in
substance, that
Page 360 U. S. 218
any individual employee or group of employees shall have the
right personally to present their own grievances to their employer,
and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of
any bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not
inconsistent with the terms of any collective bargaining contract
then in effect, provided that the bargaining representative, if
there is one, has been given an opportunity to be present. It is
thus evident that there is nothing in the amendment of § 9(a)
that authorizes an employer to engage in "dealing with" an
employer-dominated "labor organization" as the representative of
his employees concerning their grievances.
We therefore conclude that there is nothing in the amendment of
§ 9(a), or in its legislative history, to indicate that
Congress thereby eliminated or intended to eliminate such employee
committees from the term "labor organization" as defined in §
2(5) and used in § 8(a)(2).
Respondents argue that to hold these employee committees to be
labor organizations would prevent employers and employees from
discussing matters of mutual interest concerning the employment
relationship, and would thus abridge freedom of speech in violation
of the First Amendment of the Constitution. But the Board's order
does not impose any such bar; it merely precludes the employers
from dominating, interfering with, or supporting such employee
committees which Congress has defined to be labor
organizations.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cause
is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
[
Footnote 1]
Section 2(5) of the National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 138,
29 U.S.C. § 152(5):
"The term 'labor organization' means any organization of any
kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan,
in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in
whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances,
labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or
conditions of work."
[
Footnote 2]
Examples of the problems of mutual interest to employees and
management to be considered at the Committee-Management meetings
were stated in the bylaws to be, but were not limited to, safety;
increased efficiency and production; conservation of supplies,
materials, and equipment; encouragement of ingenuity and
initiative; and grievances at nonunion plants or departments.
[
Footnote 3]
As published in The Guide the established grievance procedure
applicable to nonunion plants and departments provides, in summary,
that in handling an employee's grievance it shall be the
Committee's duty to consult with the Foreman, the Assistant Plant
Superintendent and the Plant Superintendent, and consider all the
facts. If, after having done so, the Committee believes that the
employee has a just grievance it shall prepare in writing a formal
statement of its supporting reasons and present it to the Plant
Superintendent, who shall send copies of it, attaching his own
report and recommendations, to the District Superintendent, the
department head and Industrial Relations Department of the company.
Within five days after receipt of such grievance, the District
Superintendent or the department head, or both, shall meet with the
Committee and plant management and discuss the problem and announce
their decision. If the Committee still feels that the grievance has
not been fairly settled, it may appeal to the General Manager, who,
within five days, shall meet with the Committee and plant
management and announce his decision.
[
Footnote 4]
Section 8(a)(2) of the Act, 61 Stat. 140, 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(2), provides:
"(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employe --"
"
* * * *"
"(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or
administration of any
labor organization or contribute
financial or other support to it;
Provided, That subject
to rules and regulations made and published by the Board pursuant
to section 6, an employer shall not be prohibited from permitting
employees to confer with him during working hours without loss of
time or pay. . . ."
(Emphasis added.)
[
Footnote 5]
Among other things, respondents' plant officials agreed to
Employee Committee requests to change from a company to a plant
seniority system in several plants where employees desired the
change; to provide longer notice periods concerning jobs up for
bid; to permit employees to report early and leave early on week
ends; to establish an annual basis for allocating overtime; and to
install vents in the roofs of warehouses.
[
Footnote 6]
The subjects discussed by the Central Committee with
respondents' Director of Industrial Relations at those meetings
included Committee proposals and requests for: a vacation of 3
weeks for employees with 10 years' service; annual sick leave; a
disability benefit plan; amendments in the practice of working on
holidays; the establishment and financing by respondents of an
employee educational program; the granting of leaves of absence to
employees wishing to attend college; the furnishing to certain
employees of work clothing; a change in policy to permit shiftmen
to make up work days lost; the creation of more job
classifications, with resulting higher wages; more opportunities
for employees to transfer from one plant or department to another;
payment of wages to employees while attending National Guard camps;
making the working day of shiftworkers the same as that of the
gangs with which they work; and a general wage increase.
[
Footnote 7]
"The term 'labor organization' is phrased very broadly in order
that the independence of action guaranteed by section 7 . . . and
protected by section 8 shall extend to all organizations of
employees that deal with employers in regard to 'grievances, labor
disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions
of work.' This definition includes employee representation
committees and plans in order that the employers' activities in
connection therewith shall be equally subject to the application of
section 8."
S.Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in 2
Legislative History of the National Labor Relations Act, 1935, p.
2306. (The latter publication will hereafter be cited, for example,
as 2 Leg.Hist. (1935) 2306.)
[
Footnote 8]
Hearings before Senate Committee on Education and Labor on
S.1958, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 66-67, reprinted in 1 Leg.Hist.
(1935) 1442-1443.
[
Footnote 9]
S.1958 (2d print), 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in 2
Leg.Hist. (1935) 2287.
[
Footnote 10]
See comparison of S. 2926 (73d Cong.) and S. 1958 (74th
Cong.), pp. 1, 22-23, reprinted in 1 Leg.Hist. (1935) 1320,
1347.
[
Footnote 11]
Labor Board v. American Furnace Co., 158 F.2d 376, 378;
Labor Board v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 156 F.2d 706,
707-708;
Labor Board v. C. Nelson Mfg. Co., 120 F.2d 444,
445.
Compare Labor Board v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines,
303 U. S. 261,
303 U. S.
268-269;
Labor Board v. Newport News Shipbuilding
& Dry Dock Co., 308 U. S. 241,
308 U. S.
246-248.
[
Footnote 12]
49 Stat. 450.
[
Footnote 13]
61 Stat. 138, 29 U.S.C. § 152(5).
[
Footnote 14]
Pacemaker Corp. v. Labor Board, 260 F.2d 880, 883
(where the Seventh Circuit expressly disagreed with the ruling
below);
Labor Board v. Standard Coil Products Co., 224
F.2d 465, 467-468;
Labor Board v. Stow Mfg. Co., 217 F.2d
900, 903-904;
Labor Board v. Sharples Chemicals, Inc., 209
F.2d 645, 651 652;
Indiana Metal Products Corp. v. NLRB,
202 F.2d 613, 621;
Harrison Sheet Steel Co. v. Labor
Board, 194 F.2d 407, 410;
Labor Board v. General Shoe
Corp., 192 F.2d 504, 507.
But see Labor Board v.
Associated Machines, 219 F.2d 433.
[
Footnote 15]
In
Labor Board v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., the court
said:
"Respondent says that this Junior Board did not deal, it only
recommended, and that final decision was with management. Final
decision is always with management, although, when a claim is made
by a well organized, good sized union, management is doubtless more
strongly influenced in its decision than it would be by a
recommendation of a board which it, itself, has selected, and which
has been provided with no fighting arms."
156 F.2d at 708.
[
Footnote 16]
H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 26, reprinted in 1 Leg.Hist.
(1947) 183.
[
Footnote 17]
S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1 Leg.Hist. (1947)
99.
[
Footnote 18]
H.R. 3020, as amended by the Senate, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 86,
reprinted in 1 Leg.Hist. (1947) 244; now 61 Stat. 143, 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(a).
[
Footnote 19]
93 Cong.Rec. 5298, reprinted in 2 Leg.Hist. (1947) 1522.
[
Footnote 20]
H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1
Leg.Hist. (1947) 505.
[
Footnote 21]
H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 45, reprinted in 1
Leg.Hist. (1947) 549.
[
Footnote 22]
61 Stat. 136
et seq., 29 U.S.C. § 151
et
seq.
[
Footnote 23]
H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 33, 1 Leg.Hist.
(1947) 537.
[
Footnote 24]
93 Cong.Rec. 6600, reprinted in 2 Leg.Hist. (1947) 1539.