Admiralty. It is very irregular and against the known principles
of courts of admiralty to allow, in a libel
in rem and
quasi for possession, the introduction of any other
matters of an entirely different character, such as an account of
the vessels earnings or the claim of the part owner for his wages
and advances as master.
The admiralty has no jurisdiction in matters of account between
part owners. The master, even in a case of maritime services, has
no lien upon the vessel for the payment of them.
The jurisdiction of courts of admiralty in cases of part owners
having unequal interests and shares is not and never has been
applied to direct a sale upon any dispute between them as to the
trade and navigation of the ship engaged in maritime voyages,
properly so called. The majority of the owners have a right to
employ the ship on such voyages as they please, giving a
stipulation to the dissenting owners for the safe return of the
ship if the latter, upon a proper libel filed in the admiralty,
require it, and the minority of the owners may employ the ship in
the like manner if the majority decline to employ her at all.
The admiralty has no jurisdiction over a vessel not engaged in
maritime trade and navigation, though on her voyages she may have
touched at one terminus of them in tidewater, her employment having
been substantially on other waters.
The true test of its jurisdiction in all cases of this sort is
whether the vessel is engaged substantially in maritime navigation
or in interior navigation and trade, not on tidewaters.
The jurisdiction of courts of admiralty is limited in matters of
contract to those and those only which are maritime.
The case of
The Steamboat
Jefferson, 10 Wheat. 429, 6 Cond. 175, cited and
approved.
By the maritime law, the master has no lien on the ship even for
maritime wages. The case of
Peyroux v.
Howard, 7 Pet. 343, cited.
The local laws of a state can never confer jurisdiction on the
courts of the United States. They can only furnish roles to
ascertain the rights of the parties, and thus assist in the
administration of the proper remedies where the jurisdiction is
vested by the laws of the United States.
Thomas Phoebus, who was the owner of one-sixth part of the
steamboat
Orleans, on 30 November 1835, filed a libel in
the District Court of the United States for the District of
Louisiana against the appellants, who were the owners of the other
five-sixths of said
Page 36 U. S. 176
boat alleging that he had been on board of said boat as master
and part owner, but had been dispossessed by the other part owners,
who were navigating, trading with, and using said boat contrary to
his wish, and, as he conceived, to his interest, and therefore he
desired no longer to be part owner with the other proprietors; that
he had amicably demanded the sale of said boat, and that he might
receive his portion of the proceeds; that the other owners refused
to do this, and were about to send her up the Mississippi on
another trip against his wishes; that the boat lay in the port of
New Orleans, where the tide ebbs and flows and within the admiralty
jurisdiction of the court; therefore he prayed that the boat might
be sold and one-sixth part of the proceeds paid to him, and that
the other owners might account to him for the earnings of the boat
to the day of sale.
The appellants filed their claim denying the jurisdiction of the
court over the subject matter of the libel, and denied that said
boat navigated water where the tide ebbs and flows, and alleging
that she navigated only between New Orleans and the interior towns
on the Mississippi and its tributary waters, that she was not a
maritime boat, and was never intended to navigate the high seas,
and if the court should be of opinion it had jurisdiction, then
they denied the merits of the case. At the same time, one of the
crew of the boat, while she was in possession of Phoebus, filed a
libel against her for wages. In that suit, Phoebus filed a claim
against the boat for wages as master, and for necessaries advanced
by him for the boat while he acted in that capacity. These charges
he was permitted by agreement of parties to transfer to his own
suit as though they had made a part of the case stated in his
libel.
On 15 April 1836, the district court rendered a final decree
which directed a public sale of the boat; that the libellant,
Thomas Phoebus, should receive one-sixth of the proceeds; a year's
wages at $1,500 a year and the further sum of $345.60 for
necessaries furnished by him, with costs of suit. The claimants
appealed to this Court.
Page 36 U. S. 181
MR. JUSTICE STORY delivered the opinion of the Court
This is an appeal from the district Court of the District of
Louisiana. Thomas Phoebus, who is the owner of one-sixth part of
the steamboat
Orleans, filed a libel on the admiralty side
of that court against Forsyth and others, who are the owners of the
other five-sixth parts of the same steamboat, alleging himself to
be a part owner and master of the steamboat and that he had been
dispossessed by the other owners, who were navigating, trading
with, and
Page 36 U. S. 182
using the boat contrary to his wishes; that he wished to have an
amicable sale of the boat, but the other owners refused and were
about to send her up the Mississippi on another trip against his
wishes; that the boat then lay at New Orleans, within the ebb and
flow of the tide and within the admiralty jurisdiction of the
court; therefore he prayed admiralty process against the boat and
that the boat might be sold and one-sixth part of the proceeds be
paid to him, and that the other partners might account to him for
the earnings of the boat to the day of the sale.
The appellants (the claimants and owners of the five-sixths)
appeared and in their answer admitted the title of the libellant to
the one-sixth part. But they denied the jurisdiction of the court,
alleging that the boat did not navigate waters where the tide ebbs
and flows, but that she navigated only between New Orleans and the
interior towns on the Mississippi River and its tributary waters.
They further alleged that she was not a maritime boat, and was
never intended to navigate the high seas. They further answered,
and in case their objection to the jurisdiction should be
overruled, they alleged certain matters to the merits upon which it
is unnecessary to dwell, as our present discussion will be confined
exclusively to the questions of jurisdiction.
It seems that subsequently a libel was filed against the same
boat by one of her crew for wages. In that suit, Phoebus also filed
a claim for wages as master and for necessaries advanced by him for
the boat while he acted as master. These charges were, by the
agreement of the parties, allowed to be transferred to the present
suit, and of course were to be treated as if they had been alleged
in the original libel. It may be here proper to state that it is
very irregular, and against the known principles of the courts of
admiralty, to allow in a libel
in rem and
quasi-
for possession (as the present libel assumes in some sort to be)
the introduction of any other matters of an entirely different
character, such as an account of the vessel's earnings or the claim
of the part owner for his wages and advances as master. In the
first place, the admiralty has no jurisdiction at all in matters of
account between part owners. In the next place, the master, even in
case of maritime services, has no lien upon the vessel for the
payment of them. So that in both respects these matters belonged
ad alium examen.
But to return to the question of jurisdiction. There is no
doubt
Page 36 U. S. 183
that the boat was employed exclusively in trade and navigation
upon the waters of the Mississippi and its tributary streams and
that she was not employed or intended to be employed in navigation
and trade on the sea or on tidewaters. And the wages of the master,
and the advances made by him, for which he now claims recompense
out of the proceeds of the steamboat, are on account of voyages
made on such interior waters. Under these circumstances, the
question arises whether the district court had jurisdiction, as a
court of admiralty, to entertain either the original libel or the
claims in the supplementary proceedings. We shall shortly give our
opinions on both points.
And in the first place, in respect to the original libel. The
jurisdiction of courts of admiralty in cases of part owners, having
unequal interests and shares, is not and never has been applied to
direct a sale, upon any dispute between them as to the trade and
navigation of a ship engaged in maritime voyages, properly so
called. The majority of the owners have a right to employ the ship
in such voyages as they may please, giving a stipulation to the
dissenting owners for the safe return of the ship, if the latter,
upon a proper libel filed in the admiralty, require it. And the
minority of the owners may employ the ship, in the like manner, if
the majority decline to employ her at all. So the law is laid down
in Lord Tenterden's excellent Treatise on Shipping. Abbott on Ship.
part 1, ch. 3, § 4-7. If, therefore, this were a vessel
engaged in maritime navigation, the libel for a sale could not be
maintained.
But the case is not one of a steamboat engaged in maritime trade
or navigation. Though in her voyages she may have touched at one
terminus of them in tidewaters, her employment has been
substantially on other waters. The admiralty has not any
jurisdiction over vessels employed on such voyages in cases of
disputes between part owners. The true test of its jurisdiction in
all cases of this sort is whether the vessel be engaged
substantially in maritime navigation or in interior navigation and
trade not on tidewaters. In the latter case, there is no
jurisdiction. So that in this view, the district court had no
jurisdiction over the steamboat involved in the present
controversy, as she was wholly engaged in voyages on such interior
waters.
Secondly, in respect to the wages and advances claimed by the
libellant. They are for services not maritime and for disbursements
not maritime.
Under such circumstances, the admiralty has no jurisdiction,
Page 36 U. S. 184
for its jurisdiction is limited, in matters of contract, to
those and those only which are maritime. This was expressly decided
by this Court in the case of
The Steamboat
Jefferson, 10 Wheat. 429, which substantially on
this point decides the present case.
There is another ground equally fatal to the claim of the master
for wages, which has been already alluded to. By the maritime law,
the master has no lien on the ship even for maritime wages;
a
fortiori the claim would be inadmissible for services on
voyages not maritime.
But it is said that the law of Louisiana creates a lien in favor
of the master of a vessel engaged in voyages like the present, and
if so it may, upon the principles recognized by this Court in
Peyroux v.
Howard, 7 Pet. 343, be enforced in the admiralty.
That decision does not authorize any such conclusion. It that case,
the repairs of the vessel for which the state laws created a lien,
were made at New Orleans, on tidewaters. The contract was treated
as a maritime contract; and the lien under the state laws was
enforced in the admiralty, upon the ground, that the court, under
such circumstances, had jurisdiction of the contract, as maritime;
and then the lien, being attached to it, might be enforced,
according to the mode of administering remedies in the admiralty.
The local laws can never confer jurisdiction on the courts of the
United States; they can only furnish rules to ascertain the rights
of parties, and thus assist in the administration of the proper
remedies, where the jurisdiction is vested by the laws of the
United States. In this view of the point of jurisdiction, we do not
think it necessary to decide whether, by the local law of
Louisiana, the master had a lien on the steamboat for his wages or
not, nor whether, if such a lien existed by that law, it could be
applied to any steamboats not belonging to citizens of that state
for services not rendered in that state.
Upon the whole, our judgment is that the district court had no
jurisdiction of the libel or its incidents, and therefore that the
decree of the district court must, upon this ground, be
Reversed and a mandate awarded to the district court to dismiss
the suit for want of jurisdiction.
Decree reversed.
