The widow and child of a bus driver applied for compensation
under the Arizona Workmen's Compensation Act for his accidental
death while driving an interstate bus in Arizona. He was a resident
of California, and was covered by the California Workmen's
Compensation Act. The bus line operated exclusively in interstate
commerce, and was not insured in Arizona.
Held: the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution
did not preclude Arizona from awarding compensation, even if the
effect were to force the bus line to obtain insurance against
liabilities arising in Arizona. Pp.
350 U. S.
528-531.
79 Ariz. 220,
286 P.2d 214,
reversed and remanded.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Adolphus Henry Collins was killed in an accident near Ehrenburg,
Arizona, on September 30, 1953. The accident resulted from the
blowout of a tire on an American Buslines' vehicle which Collins
was driving on a regular run from Phoenix to Los Angeles. Collins
had been employed as a bus driver for American since 1944. He had
done his driving on various routes in the Southwest, and, from 1952
until the time of his death, he was regularly employed on the Los
Angeles to Phoenix and return route. He and his wife and minor
child -- the petitioners in this proceeding -- made their home in
Los Angeles, California,
Page 350 U. S. 529
in which State Collins was covered by workmen's
compensation.
Petitioners applied on October 14, 1953, to the Industrial
Commission of Arizona for compensation in accordance with the terms
of the Arizona Workmen's Compensation Act. In an award dated
November 30, 1953, that agency made,
inter alia, the
following findings:
"That the defendant employer maintained workmen's compensation
coverage in the State of California, and that payroll premium on
the said Adolphus Henry Collins was reported to the State of
California. That no reporting of such was made at any time to the
Industrial Commission of Arizona."
"That the said Adolphus Henry Collins, at the time of his death,
was not regularly employed in the State of Arizona as said term has
been defined by the Supreme Court of Arizona in the case of
Industrial Commission v. Watson Brothers Transportation
Company [75 Ariz. 357,
256 P.2d 730].
*"
"That the Industrial Commission of Arizona does not have
jurisdiction in the premises, and that said . . . claim on file
herein should be denied for lack of jurisdiction."
On certiorari to the Supreme Court of Arizona, the construction
of the Arizona statute on which the Commission based its award was
rejected, but its disposition of petitioners' claim was affirmed.
After concluding that American Buslines "operated exclusively in
interstate
Page 350 U. S. 530
commerce," the court held that the Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution precluded recovery under the Arizona Workmen's
Compensation Act because Collins was covered by the California
statute, and to require his interstate employer to insure also in
Arizona would place an undue burden on interstate commerce. 79
Ariz. 220, 286, P.2d 214. We granted certiorari because of the
important federal question thus presented. 350 U.S. 931.
The only respondent here is the Arizona Industrial Commission.
It is not at all clear from the record before us what the interest
of the state agency is in this litigation. If the employer were
actively before the Court, it could claim, we assume, that an award
in the circumstances of the present case burdens the interstate
commerce in that the consequences of such an award would to be
require it in the future to obtain insurance sufficiently
comprehensive to cover potential awards in the various States
through which it passes. The apparent interest of the Commission is
different, namely, that, as a result of an award in this case,
interstate carriers will seek insurance from a single private
insurance carrier capable of giving coverage in all States through
which they run. The desire by interstate carriers for such
insurance will cause a defection from the state compensation fund,
and it is this potential defection which leads to the Commission's
claim that the Arizona Act cannot be applicable in an interstate
situation. But this asserted burden upon interstate commerce -- the
disadvantageous effect upon the state compensation fund -- is too
intangible and elusive to be deemed a constitutionally disallowable
burden.
We have been advised, however, that American Buslines has been a
nonparticipating defendant throughout this litigation; that it is
in receivership in Nebraska; that an order has been issued by the
Nebraska court barring
Page 350 U. S. 531
claims against it except in that court; and that petitioners'
claim is against the state compensation fund, administered by the
Industrial Commission, which will in a separate proceeding be put
to such recourse as it may have against American Buslines. This is
not controverted. The Commission therefore appears to have an
immediate interest of the same character and extent that American
Buslines would have were it here. Thus, the Commission can invoke
the employer's claim under the Commerce Clause. But that claim --
of an increased insurance burden imposed as a practical matter upon
an interstate carrier -- while perhaps less tenuous than the
defection argument directly pertinent to the Commission's case, is
hardly more substantial. Whatever dollars and cents burden an
eventual judgment for claimants in the position of petitioners may
cast either upon a carrier or the State's fund is insufficient,
compared with the interest of the State in affording remedies for
injuries committed within its boundaries,
see Carroll v.
Lanza, 349 U. S. 408, to
dislodge state power. The State's power is not dislodged so long as
the Federal Government has not taken over the field of remedies for
injuries of employees on interstate buses, as it has done in the
case of employees of interstate railroad carriers.
New York
Central R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 147.
The court below and the Commission here rely on
Southern
Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761. It
is too slender a reed. Two less similar situations in which shelter
from an exercise of state power is sought under the Commerce Clause
would be difficult to find than that presented by the circumstances
of this case compared with the circumstances of the
Southern
Pacific case.
The judgment of the Supreme Court or Arizona is reversed, and
the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
* Section 56-928 of the Arizona Code Annotated, 1939 (Cum.Supp.
1952), provides:
"Employers subject to the provisions of this article are: . . .
3. Every person who has in his employ three (3) or more workmen or
operatives regularly employed. . . . For the purposes of this
section, 'regularly employed' includes all employments, whether
continuous throughout the year, or for only a portion of the year,
in the usual trade, business, profession, or occupation of an
employer."