Appellant, a private corporation, entered into a contract with
the Federal Government, under which, for a fee, appellant stored
government-owned gasoline in tanks in Tennessee owned by appellant
or leased by appellant from another private corporation. The
Government agreed to assume liability for all state taxes.
Tennessee levied on appellant a "special privilege tax" of six
cents per gallon "for engaging in and carrying on such business" in
the State.
Held: Sovereign immunity does not prohibit this tax.
Pp.
345 U. S.
496-501.
(a)
United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.
S. 174, distinguished. Pp.
345 U. S.
498-499.
(b) The Constitution does not extend sovereign exemption from
state taxation to corporations or individuals, contracting with the
United States, merely because their activities are useful to the
Government or because the tax would burden the Government
financially. P.
345 U. S.
500.
(c) Tennessee has not discriminated against the Federal
Government by denying immunity in this case after recognizing the
immunity of a public body from the same tax in
Tennessee Oil
Co. v. McCanless, 178 Tenn. 683, 157 S.W.2d 267, where the
facts were different. Pp.
345 U. S.
500-501.
194 Tenn. 377, 250 S.W.2d 659, affirmed.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee sustained the validity of a tax
levied on appellant under 2 Williams Tenn.Code §§
1126-1147, for the privilege of storing government-owned gasoline
in the State for the Government. 194 Tenn. 377, 250 S.W.2d 659. On
appeal, to this Court, affirmed, p.
345 U. S.
501.
Page 345 U. S. 496
MR. JUSTICE REED delivered the opinion of the Court.
These are appeals from the Supreme Court of Tennessee, affirming
a Chancery Court judgment for some $196,000 in favor of the State
Commissioner of Finance and Taxation, against Esso Standard Oil
Co., the party of record in No. 330. Ultimately liable, the United
States intervened in that litigation and brought a separate appeal
here, No. 378. It contended that the State tax involved in barred
by principles of sovereign immunity. This is a test case. We are
told that, if the tax is sustained, a liability for upwards of
$4,000,000 will result.
The facts are these. During World War II, the Government was
actively engaged in the production and procurement of high octane
aviation fuel. All such gasoline produced was purchased before it
left the refinery and, by formal passage of title, became
immediately the property of the Defense Supplies Corporation, a
corporation wholly owned by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation,
6 Fed.Reg. 2972, as amended 6 Fed.Reg. 3363, and specifically
exempt from state storage and use taxes, 55 Stat. 248. Release from
storage by the producing companies occurred only on notification by
the Petroleum Administration for War, in accordance with allocation
of specific lots of fuel to various official consumers,
including
Page 345 U. S. 497
the Services and the Allies. The Air Force, in particular, then
arranged for transportation of its various allotments -- sometimes
by government carrier -- from the refineries to the nearest
consuming point.
We are concerned with certain lots of Air Force fuel produced in
the South at various plants and shipped through Memphis, Tennessee.
It appears that, in 1943, a shortage of storage facilities
developed in the area, forcing resort to privately owned tanks.
Appellant Esso and the Lion Oil Company were able to provide such
service through tanks at various points near Memphis. As a result,
the Government entered into extensive contracts with Esso, which,
in turn, rented the Lion tanks, providing that the Company would
"render services . . . in receiving, storing, handling and loading
Government-owned fuel." The Company's service charge ranged from
18/100 of a cent to 6 3/10 cents per gallon. The United States
agreed to assume liability for all state taxes. Pursuant thereto,
allotments of gasoline were moved by barge from refineries to these
private tanks, stored there pending need, and later reshipped by
truck to consuming air fields on order of the Air Force. The
operations continued from 1943 through 1946 under several contracts
of similar import.
August 2, 1949, the State, after investigation, demanded that
Esso pay taxes in connection with these operations under the
Tennessee gasoline tax, 2 Williams' Tenn.Code §§
1126-1147. This statute, in material part, provided:
"Every distributor, when engaged in such business in this state,
shall pay to the state comptroller, through commissioner of finance
and taxation, for the exclusive use of the state, a special
privilege tax, in addition to all other taxes, for engaging in and
carrying on such business in this state, in an amount equal to six
cents for each gallon of gasoline, and six
Page 345 U. S. 498
cents for each gallon of distillate refined, manufactured,
produced, or compounded by such distributor and sold, stored or
distributed by him in this state, or shipped, transported or
imported by such distributor into, and distributed, stored or sold
by him within this state, during such year. . . ."
§ 1127. And § 1126 defines distribution as
"every person who engages in the business in the state of
refining, manufacturing, producing, or compounding gasoline or
distillate, and selling or storing the same in this state, and also
every person who engages in the business in this state of
transporting, importing, or causing to be imported, gasoline or
distillate into this state, and distributing, storing, or making
original sales of the same in this state, for any purpose
whatsoever."
Esso paid the required tax for the privilege of storing gasoline
measured by the amount stored during the month of January 1944 --
the statute of limitations having run in regard to 1943 operations
-- and sued to recover. The Government intervened in the trial
court and entered its plea, echoed by Esso, that the tax was barred
by the constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental immunity; that
to construe the Tennessee statute as applicable to storage off
gasoline owned by the United States makes it repugnant to the
Constitution and void. Both the Chancery Court and the Court or
Appeals rejected the claimed immunity and held the statute valid as
applied. We noted our probable jurisdiction on appeal. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257(2).
The appellants take a firm stand on
United States v.
Allegheny County, 322 U. S. 174,
which they contend is an analogous case that compels reversal of
this decision. They say, in effect, that the tax here is no less
"on" the
Page 345 U. S. 499
property of the Federal Government than it was in that case,
and, in support of this claimed similarity, they point to the
following factors: that the statute grew out of the state's effort
to tax sales to the final consumer, that the tax is paid but once,
and this by the first producer or importer, and that refunds when
the fuel is subsequently exported are provided. Thus, the "true
character" of the tax, as one "on property of the United States,"
it is claimed, is precisely the same as that, in
Allegheny
County.
Allegheny County, however, was quite different. The
United States had leased certain machinery to the Mesta Machine
Company. In imposing the state
ad valorem property tax,
Pennsylvania included in the Mesta assessment both the privately
owned land and buildings and the government machinery.
Id.
at
322 U. S.
179-180,
322 U. S. 186.
So the value of the federal property was, in part, the measure of
the tax. We held the substance of this procedure was "to lay an
ad valorem general property tax on property owned by the
United States,"
Id. at
322 U. S. 185,
and therefore invalid. Our holding was not "dependent upon the
ultimate resting place of the economic burden of the tax."
Id. at
322 U. S.
189.
This tax was imposed because Esso stored gasoline. It is not, as
the
Allegheny County tax was, based on the worth of the
government property. Instead, the amount collected is graduated in
accordance with the exercise of Esso's privilege to engage in such
operations; so it is not "on" the federal property, as was
Pennsylvania's. Federal ownership of the fuel will not immunize
such a private contractor from the tax on storage. It may
generally, as it did here, burden the United States financially.
But, since
James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.
S. 134,
302 U. S. 151,
this has been no fatal flaw. We must look further, and find either
a stated immunity created by Congress in
Page 345 U. S. 500
the exercise of a constitutional power, [
Footnote 1] or one arising by implication from our
constitutional system of dual government. [
Footnote 2]
Neither condition applies to the kind of governmental operations
here involved. There is no claim of a stated immunity. And we find
none implied. The United States, today, is engaged in vast and
complicated operations in business fields, and important
purchasing, financial, and contract transactions with private
enterprise. The Constitution does not extend sovereign exemption
from state taxation to corporations or individuals, contracting
with the United States, merely because their activities are useful
to the Government. We hold, therefore, that sovereign immunity does
not prohibit this tax.
Appellants press a further point, that the Tennessee courts have
discriminated against the Federal Government by the result in this
case. They point to the fact that heretofore, specifically in
Tennessee Oil Co. v. McCanless, 178 Tenn. 683, 157 S.W.2d
267, 162 S.W.2d 1081, a claim of immunity by a public body was
sustained where the public body had leased the tanks from the
private dealer. Apparently, appellants feel that the distinction
between that case and this is so fine as to require similar results
from any fair-minded court. We do not agree. Had the United States
similarly rented the tanks from Esso, and thus stood firmly in its
shoes as the organization exercising the privilege of storage, it
would have fallen within the
McCanless precedent. It did
not do so, but instead paid Esso to receive, store, handle and load
the fuel. The
Page 345 U. S. 501
different results in the two cases thus accord with our
conception of the operation of the Tennessee statute as a privilege
tax.
Affirmed.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE JACKSON
dissent.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, not having heard the argument, took no
part in the consideration or decision of this case.
*Together with No. 378,
United States v. Evans, Commissioner
of Finance and Taxation, et al., also on appeal from the same
court.
[
Footnote 1]
Pittman v. Home Owners Loan Corporation, 308 U. S.
21;
Carson v. Roane Anderson Co., 342 U.
S. 232;
Dameron v. Brodhead, 345 U.
S. 322.
[
Footnote 2]
Mayo v. United States, 319 U.
S. 441,
319 U. S. 447;
United States v. Allegheny County, supra.