Petitioner was discharged from his position in the Regional
Office of the Veterans' Administration in New Orleans, and this
action was sustained by the Civil Service Commission in Washington.
He brought suit in a federal district court in Louisiana against
the Manager of the Regional Office and the Civil Service Commission
(
eo nomine) to have these actions set aside.
Held: the suit was properly dismissed. Pp.
342 U. S.
513-516.
1. Defendants' challenges to the venue and jurisdiction of the
district court were properly presented by motion and answer.
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. 12(b). P.
342 U. S.
514.
2. Congress has not constituted the Civil Service Commission a
body corporate or authorized it to be sued
eo nomine. Pp.
342 U. S.
514-516.
(a) The present suit against the Commission
eo nomine
is not authorized by the Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. § 118k(c). Pp.
342 U. S.
514-515.
(b) Nor was this suit authorized by the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1009, which provides for review of agency
action only in a court of "competent jurisdiction." The courts of
the District of Columbia are the only courts of "competent
jurisdiction" to reach the members of the Civil Service Commission.
Pp.
342 U. S.
515-516.
3. The only defendant before the court was the Regional
Director, and it is obvious that no relief could be granted against
him in this suit. Pp.
342 U. S.
515-516.
190 F.2d 427, affirmed.
Page 342 U. S. 513
MR. JUSTICE MINTON delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner, a veteran employed as authorization officer in the
Regional Office of the Veterans' Administration in New Orleans, was
removed from his position. He appealed under § 14 of the
Veterans' Preference Act of 1944, 5 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) § 863,
to the Tenth Regional Office of the United States Civil Service
Commission in New Orleans. The Regional Board found that his
discharge was not warranted, and recommended that he be reinstated
to his position. The Veterans' Administration appealed to the Board
of Appeals and Review of the Civil Service Commission in
Washington. The Commission reversed the Tenth Regional Board, and
so notified petitioner.
Petitioner then instituted this suit in the District Court for
the Eastern District of Louisiana, naming as defendants Guerre, the
Regional Manager of the Veterans' Administration, who had first
discharged him, and the United States Civil Service Commission.
Guerre was served personally. Service on the Commission was sought
through personal service on Weinstein, the United States District
Attorney, and on Leach, the Regional Director of the Tenth United
States Civil Service Region. Both Weinstein and Leach resided
within the Eastern District of Louisiana. Service by registered
mail was made in the District of Columbia upon the Attorney General
of the United States and the United States Civil Service
Commission.
Petitioner prayed for a judgment of the District Court setting
aside and annulling his discharge by Guerre and the action of the
Civil Service Commission confirming
Page 342 U. S. 514
Guerre's action and declaring that
"plaintiff is entitled to an order from the United States Civil
Service Commission directing . . . Guerre . . . to restore
plaintiff to his aforesaid position"
with back pay. Respondents appeared and filed a motion to
dismiss because of improper venue and lack of jurisdiction. After
this motion was overruled, respondents filed an answer raising,
among other things, the same issues. On motions of both parties for
summary judgment, the court sustained that of respondents, holding
that it lacked jurisdiction over the persons of the Commissioners,
who were not residents of the Eastern District of Louisiana and who
were indispensable parties. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the
ground that there was no venue in the District Court, without
prejudice to further proceedings by petitioner in the proper venue.
190 F.2d 427. We granted certiorari.
342
U. S. 884.
We do not reach the merits in this proceeding. We are met at the
threshold with a challenge by motion and answer as to the venue and
jurisdiction of the District Court of Louisiana to entertain this
action. These defenses as to law and fact were properly presented
in this manner. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. Rule 12(b).
If the Commission could be sued
eo nomine, we would be
confronted with the question of whether service as here made would
be sufficient to bring the Commission into court; but Congress has
not constituted the Commission a body corporate, or authorized it
to be sued
eo nomine.
It is suggested that such authorization is given by the Hatch
Act. [
Footnote 1] Not so. While
§ 118k(c) of 5 U.S.C. does provide that a state officer or
employee found to have violated § 118k(b) may obtain review in
the District Court of the district in which he resides, this is not
authorization for a new proceeding against the Civil Service
Commission.
Page 342 U. S. 515
It is authorization only for a transfer of the case from the
Commission to the District Court -- a continuation of the same
proceeding before another tribunal. Review is instituted by
petition and notice to the Commission, which is directed by the Act
to file a transcript of the record in the case in the District
Court. The court reviews the case on the old record, with the right
to hear further evidence. Even this limited review is not afforded
federal employees found to have violated § 118i. Thus, by no
stretch of the imagination can the limited review granted state
employees by the Hatch Act be deemed an authorization by Congress
for the present suit against the Commission. When Congress
authorizes one of its agencies to be sued
eo nomine, it
does so in explicit language, or impliedly because the agency is
the offspring of such a suable entity.
See Keifer & Keifer
v. Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 306 U.
S. 381,
306 U. S.
390.
Since the Civil Service Commission is not a corporate entity
which Congress has authorized to be sued, a suit involving the
action of the Commission generally must be brought against the
individual Commissioners as members of the United States Civil
Service Commission. No such suit was brought here, and no service
was had upon the individuals comprising the Civil Service
Commission. Therefore, neither the individuals comprising the Civil
Service Commission nor the Commission as a suable entity was before
the District Court.
We do not have a question of venue as to defendants until we
have defendants before the court. The only defendant before the
court was Guerre. The venue as to him was all right, but it is
obvious no relief can be granted against him.
It is further suggested that judicial review is authorized by
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1001
et
seq. Certainly there is no specific authorization in that Act
for suit against the Commission as an entity. Still
Page 342 U. S. 516
less is the Act to be deemed an implied waiver of all
governmental immunity from suit. If the Commission's action is
reviewable under § 1009, [
Footnote 2] it is reviewable only in a court of "competent
jurisdiction." Assuming, without deciding, that Commission action
is reviewable by court action under § 1009, it must follow
that review must be in that district where the Commissioners can be
served. Since we have held that the Civil Service Commission is not
an entity that may be sued anywhere it may be functioning, but only
the Commissioners may be sued where they can be served, § 1009
does not aid petitioner in an action brought in Louisiana. The
courts of the District of Columbia are the only courts of
"competent jurisdiction" to reach the members of the Civil Service
Commission.
Since the members of the Civil Service Commission were never
served, and could not be served, in the District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana, and the Civil Service Commission is
not a corporate entity, it follows that the only defendant before
the court was Guerre, and, as we have pointed out, no relief could
possibly be granted against him in these proceedings, the judgment
is
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK dissents.
[
Footnote 1]
53 Stat. 1147, as amended, 54 Stat. 767, § 12(c), 5 U.S.C.
(Supp. IV) § 118k(c).
[
Footnote 2]
"§ 1009.
Judicial review of agency action."
"Except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2)
agency action is by law committed to agency discretion --"
"(a)
Right of review."
"Any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency action,
or adversely affected or aggrieved by such action within the
meaning of any relevant statute, shall be entitled to judicial
review thereof."
"(b)
Form and venue of proceedings."
"The form of proceeding for judicial review shall be any special
statutory review proceeding relevant to the subject matter in any
court specified by statute or, in the absence or inadequacy
thereof, any applicable form of legal action . . . in any court of
competent jurisdiction. . . ."