1. The District Court for the Territory of Alaska is a "district
court of the United States" within the meaning of § 303(b) of
the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, which authorizes any
person injured in his business or property by reason of any
violation of § 303(a) (relating to secondary boycotts,
jurisdictional strikes, etc.) to sue therefor in any "district
court of the United States." Pp.
342 U. S.
240-243.
2. The right of action under § 303(b) of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 1947, for damages caused by
jurisdictional strikes prohibited by § 303(a)(4) is not
dependent upon any prior determination by the National Labor
Relations Board under §§ 8(b)(4)(D) and 10(k) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended. Pp.
342 U. S.
243-245.
189 F.2d 177 affirmed.
The District Court for the Territory of Alaska awarded
respondent a judgment for $750,000 plus costs against petitioners
for injuries sustained as a result of a violation of § 303(a)
of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 136, 158, 29
U.S.C. § 187(a). The Court of Appeals affirmed. 189 F.2d 177.
This Court granted certiorari. 342 U.S. 857.
Affirmed, p.
342 U. S.
245.
Page 342 U. S. 238
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
In the spring of 1947, respondent purchased certain properties
for the manufacture of lumber, including a sawmill at Juneau,
Alaska, and commenced operations. Shortly thereafter, the
International Woodworkers of America requested negotiation of a
contract with respondent, claiming representation of a majority of
respondent's employees. A bargaining agreement was signed with that
union on November 3, 1947.
Respondent decided to ship its lumber to ports in Canada and the
United States, and acquired barges for that purpose. Respondent's
policy was to utilize its own employees to load its barges. In
October, 1947, petitioner, Local 16 of the International
Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, asked that its men be
allowed to load respondent's barges. This request was denied. The
request was repeated the following spring, and was again denied.
Petitioner Local established a picket line at respondent's plant on
April 10, 1948. Most of respondent's employees refused to cross the
picket line, and the mill shut down. The mill reopened on July 19,
1948, but picketing continued. Petitioner International notified
its Canadian locals that respondent's products were unfair.
Respondent was unable to unload its barges in Canada or Puget Sound
due to the refusal of longshoremen to work respondent's vessels. On
October 11, 1948, the mill again closed down due to lack of storage
facilities to hold the accumulating lumber. Picketing was not
discontinued until May 9, 1949.
On August 3, 1948, respondent filed a charge against Local 16
alleging violations of § 8(b)(4)(D) of the
Page 342 U. S. 239
National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Labor Management
Relations Act, 1947, [
Footnote
1] 61 Stat. 136, 141, 29 U.S.C. (Supp. II) §§ 151, on
the ground that the Local attempted to induce assignment of
particular work to its members. Following a hearing pursuant to
§ 10(k) of the Act, the National Labor Relations Board
determined on April 1, 1949, that longshoremen represented by Local
16 were not entitled to the barge-loading work. 82 N.L.R.B. 650. In
the meantime, respondent had filed suit for damages against both
the Local and the International under § 303(a)(4) of the Labor
Management Relations Act. [
Footnote
2] Respondent asked, pursuant to an
Page 342 U. S. 240
amended complaint, for damages from April 10, 1948, to April 27,
1949. After trial before a jury, respondent was awarded a judgment
of $750,000 plus costs. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed. 189 F.2d 177. The case is here on certiorari. 342 U.S.
857.
First. This suit was brought in the District Court for
the Territory of Alaska. And the question which lies at the
threshold of the case is whether that court is a "district court of
the United States" within the meaning of § 303(b) of the Act.
[
Footnote 3] That court has the
jurisdiction of district courts of the United States by the law
which created it. 48 U.S.C. § 101. Yet vesting it with that
jurisdiction does not necessarily make it a district court for all
the varied functions of the Judicial Code.
See Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U. S. 145,
98 U. S. 154;
McAllister v. United States, 141 U.
S. 174;
United States v.
Burroughs,
Page 342 U. S. 241
289 U. S. 159,
289 U. S. 163;
Mookini v. United States, 303 U.
S. 201,
303 U. S. 205.
The words "district court of the United States" commonly describe
constitutional courts created under Article III of the
Constitution, not the legislative courts which have long been the
courts of the Territories. [
Footnote 4]
See Mookini v. United States, supra,
at
303 U. S. 205.
But we think that, in the context of this legislation, they are
used to describe courts which exercise the jurisdiction of district
courts. The jurisdiction conferred by § 303(b) [
Footnote 5] is made "subject to the
limitations and provisions of § 301." Section 301 lifts the
limitations governing district courts as respects the amount in
controversy and the citizenship of the parties; it defines the
capacity of labor unions to sue or be sued; it restricts the
enforceability of a money judgment against a labor union to its
assets, and it specifies the jurisdiction of a district court over
a union and defines the service of process. [
Footnote 6] Congress was here concerned with
reshaping labor-management legal relations,
Page 342 U. S. 242
and it was taking precise steps to declared and announced
objectives. One of those was the elimination of obstacles to suits
in the federal courts. It revised the jurisdictional requirements
for suits in the district courts, requirements as applicable to the
trial court as to any court which, in the technical sense, is a
district court of the United States. The Act extends in its full
sweep to Alaska, as well as to the states and the other
territories. [
Footnote 7] The
trial court is indeed the only court in Alaska to which recourse
could be had. Even if it were not a "district court" within the
meaning of § 303(b), it plainly would be "any other court" for
purposes of that section. As such other court, it might or might
not have jurisdiction over this dispute depending on aspects of
territorial law which we have not examined. But, since Congress
lifted the restrictive requirements which might preclude suit in
courts having the district courts' jurisdiction, we think it is
more consonant with the uniform national policy of the Act to hold
that those restrictions were lifted as respects all courts
Page 342 U. S. 243
upon which the jurisdiction of a district court has been
conferred. That reading of the Act does not, to be sure, take the
words "district court of the United States" in their historic,
technical sense. But literalness is no sure touchstone of
legislative purpose. The purpose here is more closely approximated,
we believe, by giving the historic phrase a looser, more liberal
meaning in the special context of this legislation.
Second. The main contention of petitioners in the case
is that § 303(a)(4), read in light of § 8(b)(4)(D),
[
Footnote 8] renders illegal
only such picketing as takes place after and in the face of a
determination by the Board that the acts complained of were unfair
labor practices. If that conclusion is warranted, there must be a
reversal here, since the damages reflected in the present judgment,
for the most part, accrued prior to the decision of the Board,
under § 10(k) of the Act, [
Footnote 9] that petitioners had committed an unfair labor
practice within the meaning of § 8(b)(4)(D).
Section 8(b)(4)(D) and § 303(a)(4) are substantially
identical in the conduct condemned. Section 8(b)(4)(D) gives rise
to an administrative finding; [
Footnote 10] § 303(a)(4),
Page 342 U. S. 244
to a judgment for damages. The fact that the two sections have
an identity of language and yet specify two different remedies is
strong confirmation of our conclusion that the remedies provided
were to be independent of each other. Certainly there is nothing in
the language of § 303(a)(4) which makes its remedy dependent
on any prior administrative determination that an unfair labor
practice has been committed. Rather, the opposite seems to be true.
For the jurisdictional disputes proscribed by § 303(a)(4) are
rendered unlawful "for the purposes of this section only," thus
setting apart for private redress acts which might also be
subjected to the administrative process. The fact that the Board
must first attempt to resolve the dispute by means of a §
10(k) determination before it can move under § 10(b) and (c)
for a cease and desist order [
Footnote 11] is only a limitation on administrative
power, as is the provision in § 10(k) that, upon compliance
"with the decision of the Board or upon such voluntary adjustment
of the dispute," the charge shall be dismissed. These provisions,
limiting and curtailing the administrative power, find no
counterpart in the provision for private redress contained in
§ 303(a)(4). Section 303(a)(4) as explained by Senator Taft,
its author,
"retains simply a right of suit for damages against any labor
organization which undertakes a secondary boycott or a
jurisdictional strike. [
Footnote
12]"
The right to sue in the courts is clear, provided the pressure
on the employer falls in the prescribed category which, so far as
material here, is forcing or requiring him to assign particular
work "to employees in a particular labor organization," rather than
to employees "in another labor organization" or in another "class."
Here, the jurisdictional
Page 342 U. S. 245
row was between the outside union and the inside union. The fact
that the union of mill employees temporarily acceded to the claim
of the outside group did not withdraw the dispute from the category
of jurisdictional disputes condemned by § 303(a)(4).
Petitioners, representing one union and employing outside labor,
were trying to get the work which another union, employing mill
labor, had. That competition for work at the expense of employers
has been condemned by the Act. Whether that condemnation was wise
or unwise is not our concern. It represents national policy which
has both administrative and conventional legal sanctions.
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
Section 8(b)(4)(D) provides:
"(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization or its agents --"
"
* * * *"
"(4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of
any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the
course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport,
or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or
commodities or to perform any services, where an object thereof is:
. . . (D) forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular
work to employees in a particular labor organization or in a
particular trade, craft, or class, rather than to employees in
another labor organization or in another trade, craft, or class,
unless such employer is failing to conform to an order or
certification of the Board determining the bargaining
representative for employees performing such work:
Provided, That nothing contained in this subsection (b)
shall be construed to make unlawful a refusal by any person to
enter upon the premises of any employer (other than his own
employer), if the employees of such employer are engaged in a
strike ratified or approved by a representative of such employees
whom such employer is required to recognize under this Act. . .
."
[
Footnote 2]
Section 303(a)(4) provides:
"(a) It shall be unlawful, for the purposes of this section
only, in an industry or activity affecting commerce, for any labor
organization to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees
of any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in
the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process,
transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles,
materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an
object thereof is --"
"
* * * *"
"(4) forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work
to employees in a particular labor organization or in a particular
trade, craft, or class, rather than to employees in another labor
organization or in another trade, craft, or class unless such
employer is failing to conform to an order or certification of the
National Labor Relations Board determining the bargaining
representative for employees performing such work. Nothing
contained in this subsection shall be construed to make unlawful a
refusal by any person to enter upon the premises of any employer
(other than his own employer), if the employees of such employer
are engaged in a strike ratified or approved by a representative of
such employees whom such employer is required to recognize under
the National Labor Relations Act."
[
Footnote 3]
Section 303(b) provides:
"Whoever shall be injured in his business or property by reason
(of) any violation of subsection (a) may sue therefor in any
district court of the United States subject to the limitations and
provisions of section 301 hereof without respect to the amount in
controversy, or in any other court having jurisdiction of the
parties, and shall recover the damages by him sustained and the
cost of the suit."
[
Footnote 4]
The new Judicial Code creates judicial districts for the
District of Columbia, 28 U.S.C. § 88; for Hawaii, 28 U.S.C.
§ 91, and for Puerto Rico, 28 U.S.C. § 119, but none for
the Canal Zone, the Virgin Islands, or for Alaska.
[
Footnote 5]
See note 3
supra.
[
Footnote 6]
Section 301 provides:
"(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a
labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this Act, or between any such labor
organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties."
"(b) Any labor organization which represents employees in an
industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act and any employer
whose activities affect commerce as defined in this Act shall be
bound by the acts of its agents. Any such labor organization may
sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom it
represents in the courts of the United States. Any money judgment
against a labor organization in a district court of the United
States shall be enforceable only against the organization as an
entity and against its assets, and shall not be enforceable against
any individual member or his assets."
"(c) For the purposes of actions and proceedings by or against
labor organizations in the district courts of the United States,
district courts shall be deemed to have jurisdiction of a labor
organization (1) in the district in which such organization
maintains its principal office, or (2) in any district in which its
duly authorized officers or agents are engaged in representing or
acting for employee members."
"(d) The service of summons, subpoena, or other legal process of
any court of the United States upon an officer or agent of a labor
organization, in his capacity as such, shall constitute service
upon the labor organization."
"(e) For the purposes of this section, in determining whether
any person is acting as an 'agent' of another person so as to make
such other person responsible for his acts, the question of whether
the specific acts performed were actually authorized or
subsequently ratified shall not be controlling."
[
Footnote 7]
Section 2(6) defines commerce to include trade, etc., between a
state and a territory or within any territory.
[
Footnote 8]
See notes
1 and |
1 and S. 237fn2|>2,
supra.
[
Footnote 9]
Section 10(k) provides:
"Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair
labor practice within the meaning of paragraph (4)(D) of section
8(b), the Board is empowered and directed to hear and determine the
dispute out of which such unfair labor practice shall have arisen,
unless, within ten days after notice that such charge has been
filed, the parties to such dispute submit to the Board satisfactory
evidence that they have adjusted, or agreed upon methods for the
voluntary adjustment of, the dispute. Upon compliance by the
parties to the dispute with the decision of the Board or upon such
voluntary adjustment of the dispute, such charge shall be
dismissed."
[
Footnote 10]
The administrative finding under § 10(k) can be the basis
for a cease and desist order under § 10(b) and (c). A cease
and desist order was issued in the present dispute. 90 N.L.R.B.
1753.
[
Footnote 11]
Juneau Spruce Corp., 82 N.L.R.B. 650, 655.
[
Footnote 12]
93 Cong.Rec. 4858; 2 Legislative History of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 1947, p. 1371.