1. The scope of the word "seaman," as used in the Jones Act, was
not extended by the 1939 Amendment to the Federal Employers'
Liability Act to include one who was not a "seaman" before. Pp.
342 U. S.
189-190.
2. Whether an injured person was a "seaman" entitled to the
benefits of the Jones Act depends largely on the facts of the
particular case and the activity in which he was engaged at the
time of injury. P.
342 U. S.
190.
3. Decedent had been employed as an operator of one of a fleet
of motorboats carrying sightseers on a river during the summer
months only. His employment had terminated in December, after he
had helped to lay the boats up for the winter. He was reemployed
the next March, and injured in April while helping to paint, clean,
and waterproof the boats, preparing them for navigation. At that
time, none of the boats was afloat, none had a captain or crew, and
the work being done was of the kind that, in the case of larger
vessels, would customarily be done exclusively by shore-based
personnel.
Held: At the time of his injury, decedent was not a
"seaman" within the purview of the Jones Act. Pp.
342 U. S.
188-192.
4. The fact that decedent had been, or expected in the future to
be, a seaman did not render maritime work which was not maritime in
its nature. P.
342 U. S.
191.
188 F.2d 177, affirmed.
The District Court awarded petitioner a judgment under the Jones
Act for the death of her son from injuries sustained in his
employment by respondent. The Court of Appeals reversed. 188 F.2d
177. This Court granted certiorari. 342 U.S. 847.
Affirmed, p.
342 U. S.
192.
Page 342 U. S. 188
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner brought suit under the Jones Act [
Footnote 1] to recover damages for the death of
her intestate son from injuries sustained during the course of his
employment by respondent. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit reversed the judgment of the District Court entered on a
jury's verdict in petitioner's favor. [
Footnote 2] This Court granted certiorari. [
Footnote 3]
Respondent operates a small fleet of sightseeing motorboats on
the Illinois River in the vicinity of Starved Rock. The boats are
navigated under Coast Guard regulations by personnel licensed by
the Department of Commerce. Operations are necessarily restricted
to summer months. Each fall, the boats are beached and put up on
blocks for the winter. In the spring, each is overhauled before
being launched for the season. The decedent, Thomas J. Desper, Jr.,
was first employed by respondent in April, 1947, to help prepare
the boats for their seasonal launching. In June of the same year,
he acquired the necessary operator's license from the Department of
Commerce and, for the remainder of that season, he was employed as
a boat operator. When the season closed, he helped take the boats
out of the water and block them up for the winter. His employment
terminated December 19, 1947.
Desper was reemployed March 15, 1948. There was testimony that
he was then engaged for the season, and was to resume his
operator's duties when the boats were back in the water. For the
time being, however, he was put to cleaning, painting, and
waterproofing the boats, preparing them for navigation. On the date
of the accident,
Page 342 U. S. 189
April 26th, the boats were still blocked up on land. Several
men, Desper among them, were on board a moored barge, maintained by
respondent as a machine shop, warehouse, waiting room, and ticket
office, engaged in painting life preservers for use on the boats.
One man was working on a fire extinguisher. It exploded, killing
him and Desper.
The Jones Act confers a cause of action on "any seaman."
[
Footnote 4] In opposition to
petitioner's suit under the Act, respondent contended that Desper,
at the time of his death, was not a "seaman" within the meaning of
the Act. Whether he was such a "seaman" is the critical issue in
the case which reached this Court.
Petitioner contends that the 1939 Amendment to the Federal
Employers' Liability Act [
Footnote
5] extended the scope of the word "seaman," as used in the
Jones Act, to include those whose work "substantially affects"
navigation. The Amendment provides that:
"Any employee of a carrier, any part of whose duties as such
employee shall be the furtherance of interstate or foreign
commerce; or shall, in any way
Page 342 U. S. 190
directly or closely and substantially, affect such commerce as
above set forth shall . . . be considered as being employed by such
carrier in such commerce and shall be considered as entitled to the
benefits of this chapter."
Petitioner reads with that Amendment the provision of the Jones
Act that statutes "modifying or extending the common law right or
remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees" shall
apply in a seaman's action. We agree with the court below that the
Amendment has no effect on the "right or remedy" of railway
employees, but merely redefines, for the purposes of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, the scope of the word "employee" to
include certain persons not theretofore covered because they were
not directly engaged in interstate or foreign commerce. It does not
extend the meaning of "seaman" in the Jones Act to include one who
was not a "seaman" before. Seamen were given the rights of railway
employees by the Jones Act, but the definition of "seaman" was
never made dependent on the meaning of "employee" as used in
legislation applicable to railroads.
The next question is whether, without reference to this 1939
Amendment, decedent was a "seaman" at the time of his death. The
many cases turning upon the question whether an individual was a
"seaman" demonstrate that the matter depends largely on the facts
of the particular case and the activity in which he was engaged at
the time of injury. The facts in this case are unique. The work in
which the decedent was engaged at the time of his death quite
clearly was not that usually done by a "seaman." The boats were not
afloat, and had neither captain nor crew. They were undergoing
seasonal repairs, the work being of the kind that, in the case of
larger vessels, would customarily be done by exclusively
shore-based personnel. For a number of reasons, the ships might not
be launched, or he might not operate one. To be sure,
Page 342 U. S. 191
he was a probable navigator in the near future, but the law does
not cover probable or expectant seamen, but seamen in being. It is
our conclusion that, while engaged in such seasonal repair work,
Desper was not a "seaman" within the purview of the Jones Act. The
distinct nature of the work is emphasized by the fact that there
was no vessel engaged in navigation at the time of the decedent's
death. All had been "laid up for the winter."
Hawn v. American
S.S. Co., 107 F.2d 999, 1000;
cf. Seneca Washed Gravel
Corp. v. McManigal, 65 F.2d 779, 780. In the words of the
court in
Antus v. Interocean S.S. Co., 108 F.2d 185, 187,
where it was held that one who had been a member of a ship's crew
and was injured while preparing it for winter quarters could not
maintain a Jones Act suit for his injuries:
"The fact that he had been, or expected in the future to be, a
seaman does not render maritime work which was not maritime in its
nature."
Both petitioner and respondent filed applications with the
Industrial Commission of Illinois seeking the benefits provided by
the Workmen's Compensation Act of that State. The Commission
rendered an award in petitioner's favor, but she states that she
has taken an appeal to the appropriate state court on the ground
that the Commission was "without jurisdiction." She does not
specify why she thinks so, but we surmise that her reason is to
avoid conflict with her contention that exclusive jurisdiction in
the premises is vested in the federal courts by the Jones Act. We
do not understand her to have taken the position that, if the Jones
Act is not applicable, the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act [
Footnote 6]
is, and that the state Commission therefore is without jurisdiction
in any event. The question of the applicability of the
Longshoremen's Act
Page 342 U. S. 192
does not appear from the record to have been raised by either
party in the courts below. [
Footnote 7] Neither has raised it in this Court. We
therefore find it inappropriate to resolve the conflict, if any,
between the Illinois Compensation Act and the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.
Cf. Southern Pacific Co. v.
Jensen, 244 U. S. 205;
Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, 314 U.
S. 244;
Davis v. Department of Labor,
317 U. S. 249.
We think the court below properly disposed of the question
presented. Accordingly, its judgment is
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS dissent, and would
affirm the judgment of the District Court.
[
Footnote 1]
38 Stat. 1185, 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U.S.C. § 688.
[
Footnote 2]
188 F.2d 177.
[
Footnote 3]
342 U.S. 847.
[
Footnote 4]
38 Stat. 1185, 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U.S.C. § 688, entitled
"Recovery for injury to or death of seaman" provides that:
"Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of
his employment may at his election, maintain an action for damages
at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all
statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common-law
right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees
shall apply, and, in case of the death of any seaman as a result of
any such personal injury, the personal representative of such
seaman may maintain an action for damages at law with the right of
trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States
conferring or regulating the right of action for death in the case
of railway employees shall be applicable. Jurisdiction in such
actions shall be under the court of the district in which the
defendant employer resides or in which his principal office is
located."
[
Footnote 5]
53 Stat. 1404, 45 U.S.C. § 51.
[
Footnote 6]
44 Stat. 1424 as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 901
et
seq.
[
Footnote 7]
The Court of Appeals, however, in phrasing the question
presented in the case, advanced the proposition that, if petitioner
was not entitled to recovery under the Jones Act she "is restricted
to the remedy afforded by the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act. . . ." We take that as meaning that petitioner's
only federal remedy, if she cannot prevail under the Jones Act, is
in the Longshoremen's Act. It was not intended to decide whether
she could proceed under the state compensation act.