In his 1944 income tax return, respondent reported $22,000
received that year as an employee's bonus, which he claimed in good
faith and used unconditionally as his own. In subsequent
litigation, it was decided that the bonus had been computed
improperly, and, under compulsion of a judgment, respondent
returned $11,000 to his employer in 1946. He then sued in the Court
of Claims for refund of an alleged overpayment of his 1944 income
tax.
Held: under the "claim of right" doctrine announced in
North American Oil v. Burnet, 286 U.
S. 417, the entire $22,000 was income in 1944, and
respondent was not entitled to recompute his 1944 tax. Pp.
340 U. S.
590-592.
117 Ct.Cl. 336, 91 F. Supp. 1017, reversed.
The case is stated in the opinion. The judgment below is
reversed, p.
340 U. S.
592.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent Lewis brought this action in the Court of Claims
seeking a refund of an alleged overpayment of his 1944 income tax.
The facts found by the Court of Claims are: in his 1944 income tax
return, respondent reported about $22,000 which he had received
that year as an employee's bonus. As a result of subsequent
litigation in a state court, however, it was decided that
respondent's bonus had been improperly computed; under compulsion
of the state court's judgment, he returned approximately $11,000 to
his employer. Until payment
Page 340 U. S. 591
of the judgment in 1946, respondent had at all times claimed and
used the full $22,000 unconditionally as his own, in the good faith
though "mistaken" belief that he was entitled to the whole
bonus.
On the foregoing facts, the Government's position is that
respondent's 1944 tax should not be recomputed, but that respondent
should have deducted the $11,000 as a loss in his 1946 tax return.
See G.C.M. 16730, XV-1 Cum.Bull. 179 (1936). The Court of
Claims, however, relying on its own case,
Greenwald v. United
States, 102 Ct.Cl. 272, 57 F. Supp. 569, held that the excess
bonus received "under a mistake of fact" was not income in 1944,
and ordered a refund based on a recalculation of that year's tax.
117 Ct.Cl. 336, 91 F. Supp. 1017, 1022. We granted certiorari, 340
U.S. 903, because this holding conflicted with many decisions of
the courts of appeals,
see, e.g., Haberkorn v. United
States, 173 F.2d 587, and with principles announced in
North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet, 286 U.
S. 417.
In the
North American Oil case, we said:
"If a taxpayer receives earnings under a claim of right and
without restriction as to its disposition, he has received income
which he is required to return, even though it may still be claimed
that he is not entitled to retain the money, and even though he may
still be adjudged liable to restore its equivalent."
286 U.S. at
286 U. S. 424.
Nothing in this language permits an exception merely because a
taxpayer is "mistaken" as to the validity of his claim. Nor has the
"claim of right" doctrine been impaired, as the Court of Claims
stated, by
Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U. S.
35, or
Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.
S. 404. The
Freuler case involved an entirely
different section of the Internal Revenue Code, and its holding is
inapplicable here. 291 U.S. at
291 U. S. 43.
And in
Commissioner v. Wilcox, supra, we held that
receipts from embezzlement did not constitute income,
distinguishing
North American Oil on the ground
Page 340 U. S. 592
that an embezzler asserts no "
bona fide legal or
equitable claim." 327 U.S. at
327 U. S.
408.
Income taxes must be paid on income received (or accrued) during
an annual accounting period.
Cf. I.R.C. §§ 41,
42,
and see Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co.,
282 U. S. 359,
282 U. S. 363.
The "claim of right" interpretation of the tax laws has long been
used to give finality to that period, and is now deeply rooted in
the federal tax system.
See cases collected in 2 Mertens,
Law of Federal Income Taxation, § 12.103. We see no reason why
the Court should depart from this well settled interpretation
merely because it results in an advantage or disadvantage to a
taxpayer.
*
Reversed.
* It has been suggested that it would be more "equitable" to
reopen respondent's 1944 tax return. While the suggestion might
work to the advantage of this taxpayer, it could not be adopted as
a general solution, because, in many cases, the three-year statute
of limitations would preclude recovery. I.R.C. § 322(b).
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting.
The question in this case is not whether the bonus had to be
included in 1944 income for purposes of the tax. Plainly it should
have been, because the taxpayer claimed it as of right. Some years
later, however, it was judicially determined that he had no claim
to the bonus. The question is whether he may then get back the tax
which he paid on the money.
Many inequities are inherent in the income tax. We multiply them
needlessly by nice distinctions which have no place in the
practical administration of the law. If the refund were allowed,
the integrity of the taxable year would not be violated. The tax
would be paid when due, but the government would not be permitted
to maintain the unconscionable position that it can keep the tax
after it is shown that payment was made on money which was not
income to the taxpayer.