Respondents sued in the District of Columbia for a declaration
of a resulting trust in certain New Jersey realty and for "other
relief." The District Court granted petitioner's motion for a
summary judgment, on the ground that New Jersey law would not
permit the imposition of a resulting trust in the circumstances
disclosed in the complaint and accompanying documents. The Court of
Appeals sustained this action but remanded the cause to the
District Court with directions to enter a personal money judgment
for respondents.
Held: the Court of Appeals erred in directing entry of
a personal money judgment and in thus depriving petitioner of an
opportunity to dispute the facts material to that claim. Pp.
336 U. S.
681-683.
84 U.S.App.D.C. ___, 171 F.2d 999, reversed.
On appeal from a summary judgment of a district court denying a
declaration of a resulting trust in realty, the Court of Appeals
sustained this action but remanded the case to the District Court
with directions to enter a personal money judgment. 84 U.S.App.D.C.
___, 171 F.2d 999. On petition for certiorari, this Court grants
certiorari,
reverses the decision of the Court of Appeals,
and remands the cause to the District Court for further
proceedings, p.
336 U. S.
683.
PER CURIAM.
Mr. and Mrs. Filson brought this suit in the District Court for
the District of Columbia, claiming a $6,000 interest in certain New
Jersey realty. The complaint alleged that Mr. and Mrs. Fountain,
the defendants, acquired title to this realty subject to a
resulting trust
Page 336 U. S. 682
in favor of the Filsons in that amount. The Fountains answered.
They denied the existence of a resulting trust, and also denied the
existence of any obligation to the Filsons. The documents covering
the transfer of the realty and certain depositions of the parties
were filed. Mrs. Fountain, her husband having died, them moved for
summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The sole basis of the motion was the claim that New
Jersey law would not permit the imposition of a resulting trust
under the circumstances disclosed in the complaint and the
accompanying documents. The motion was granted, and judgment for
Mrs. Fountain was entered.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
came to three conclusions. First, it agreed that, under New Jersey
law, no resulting trust could arise. Second, it concluded that the
summary judgment in Mrs. Fountain's favor was nevertheless
erroneous, because the complaint contained a general prayer for
"other relief" and alleged facts on the basis of which a personal
judgment for $6,000 could have been recovered even in the absence
of a resulting trust in the realty. Finally, the Court of Appeals
proceeded to examine the depositions which had been taken in
advance of trial. The court concluded that they showed the
existence of a personal obligation, and the case was therefore
remanded to the District Court with instructions to enter a
personal judgment in favor of the Filsons for $6,000. Mrs.
Fountain's timely motion for a modification of this order in order
to permit a trial as to the existence of the personal obligation
was denied.
Mrs. Fountain's petition for certiorari, which attacks only the
third portion of the Court of Appeals' ruling above stated, is
granted and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. 171
F.2d 999. We need not pass on the propriety of an order for summary
judgment by a district
Page 336 U. S. 683
court in favor of one party after the opposite party has moved
for summary judgment in its favor, where it appears that there is
no dispute as to any fact material to the issue being litigated.
For here, the order was made on appeal on a new issue as to which
the opposite party had no opportunity to present a defense before
the trial court. In
Globe Liquor Co. v. San Roman,
332 U. S. 571
(1948), and
Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co.,
330 U. S. 212
(1947), we held that judgment notwithstanding the verdict could not
be given in the Court of Appeals in favor of a party who had lost
in the trial court and who had not there moved for such relief. One
of the reasons for so holding was that otherwise the party who had
won in the trial court would be deprived of any opportunity to
remedy the defect which the appellate court discovered in his case.
He would have had such an opportunity if a proper motion had been
made by his opponent in the trial court. The same principle
interdicts,
a fortiori, the appellate court order for
summary judgment here. Summary judgment may be given, under Rule
56, only if there is no dispute as to any material fact. There was
no occasion in the trial court for Mrs. Fountain to dispute the
facts material to a claim that a personal obligation existed, since
the only claim considered by that court on her motion for summary
judgment was the claim that there was a resulting trust. When the
Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court should have
considered a claim for personal judgment, it was error for it to
deprive Mrs. Fountain of an opportunity to dispute the facts
material to that claim by ordering summary judgment against her.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed, and the
cause remanded to the District Court for further proceedings in
accordance with the opinion of the Court of Appeals as here
modified.
Reversed.