One of two producers of natural gas in the same Oklahoma field
was ordered by the State Commission to take gas "ratably" from, and
to connect its pipeline with the well of, the other, on terms and
conditions to be agreed upon by the parties or to be fixed by the
Commission if the parties were unable to agree. The validity under
the Federal Constitution of the order and of the state law which
authorized it were sustained by the State Supreme Court, which
interpreted the order as giving the respondent the choice of taking
and paying for the gas, marketing the gas and accounting therefor,
or shutting down its own wells.
Held: the judgment of the State Supreme Court was not
"final" within the meaning of § 237 of the Judicial Code, and
this Court is therefore without jurisdiction of an appeal
therefrom. Pp.
334 U. S.
62-72.
198 Okla. 350,
180 P.2d 1009,
appeal dismissed.
An order of the State Corporation Commission of Oklahoma,
directing the appellant to take gas ratably from another producer
in the same field, was sustained by the State Supreme Court.
198 Okla. 350,
180 P.2d 1009.
An appeal to this Court is here dismissed for the want of a "final"
judgment p.
334 U. S.
72.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma, arising from an order of the State
Page 334 U. S. 63
Corporation Commission which concerned the correlative rights of
owners of natural gas drawn from a common source.
Since 1913, Oklahoma has regulated the extraction of natural
gas, partly to prevent waste and partly to avoid excessive drainage
as between producers sharing the same pool. The legislation
provided that owners might take from a common source amounts of gas
proportionate to the natural flow of their respective wells, but
not more than 25% of that natural flow without the consent of the
Corporation Commission; that any person taking gas away from a gas
field, except for certain specified purposes, "shall take ratably
from each owner of the gas in proportion to his interest in said
gas;" and that such ratable taking was to be upon terms agreed upon
by the various well owners, or, in the event of failure to agree,
upon terms fixed by the Corporation Commission. [
Footnote 1]
The Hugoton Gas Field is one of the largest in the United
States, covering a vast area in several States, including Oklahoma.
It was discovered in 1924 or 1925,
Page 334 U. S. 64
but the Oklahoma portion was not developed until 1937. Republic,
a Delaware corporation, obtained permission to do business in
Oklahoma in 1938, purchased gas leases in this field, and drilled
wells, removing the gas in its own pipelines. In 1944, the Peerless
Oil and Gas Company completed a well in a portion of the gas field
otherwise tapped only by Republic. It had no market for the gas
obtained from this well, nor means of transporting such gas to any
market. It offered to sell the gas to Republic, which refused it.
Peerless then applied to the
Page 334 U. S. 65
Corporation Commission for an order requiring Republic to take
such gas from it "ratably" -- that is, to take the same proportion
of the natural flow of Peerless' well as Republic took of the
natural flow of its own wells. After a hearing, the Commission
found that the production of natural gas in the Hugoton field was
in excess of the market demand; that Republic had qualified to do
business in Oklahoma with full knowledge of the existing
legislation requiring the ratable taking of natural gas, and that
Republic was taking more than its ratable share
Page 334 U. S. 66
of gas from that portion of the field tapped both by its wells
and that belonging to Peerless, thereby draining gas away from
Peerless' tract and, in effect, taking property belonging to
Peerless. The Commission ordered Republic:
"1. . . . to take gas ratably from applicant's [Peerless'] well
. . and to make necessary connection as soon as applicant lays a
line connecting said well with respondent's [Republic's] line, and
to continue to do so until the further order of this Commission;
provided that, applicant shall lay its line from its well to the
lines of respondent at some point designated by the respondent, but
in said Section 14 in which said well of Peerless Oil and Gas
Company has been drilled, and said respondent is required to make
said designation immediately and without unreasonable delay, and in
event of failure of respondent so to do, respondent shall no longer
be permitted to produce any of its wells located in the Hugoton
Oklahoma Gas Field."
"2. The terms and conditions of such taking of natural gas by
Republic Natural Gas Company from said Peerless Oil and Gas
Company's well shall be determined and agreed upon by and between
applicant and respondent, and in the event said parties are unable
to agree, applicant and respondent are hereby granted the right to
make further application to the Commission for an order fixing such
terms and conditions, and the Commission retains jurisdiction
hereof for said purpose."
On appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed, holding that
Republic, having been given leave to enter the State on the basis
of the legislation governing natural gas production, might not
challenge its validity, and that neither the order nor the
legislation on which it is based
Page 334 U. S. 67
runs counter to asserted constitutional rights. 198 Okl. 350,
180 P.2d 1009.
The court interpreted the Commission's order as giving Republic
"a choice between taking the gas from Peerless and paying
therefor direct, or marketing the gas and accounting to Peerless
therefor, or to shut in its own production from the same common
source of supply."
198 Okl. at 356, 180 P.2d at 1016. Invoking both the Due Process
and the Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Republic appealed to this Court.
This case raises thorny questions concerning the regulation of
fugacious minerals of moment both to States whose economy is
especially involved and to the private enterprises which develop
these natural resources.
Cf. Thompson v. Consolidated Gas
Utilities Corp., 300 U. S. 55;
Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil
Co., 310 U. S. 573,
311 U. S. 311 U.S.
570. Before reaching these constitutional issues, we must determine
whether or not we have jurisdiction to do so.
Ever since 1789, Congress has granted this Court the power of
review in State litigation only after "the highest court of a State
in which a decision in a suit could be had" has rendered a "final
judgment or decree." § 237 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.
§ 344, rephrasing § 25 of the Act of September 24, 1789,
1 Stat. 73, 85. Designed to avoid the evils of piecemeal review,
this reflects a marked characteristic of the federal judicial
system, unlike that of some of the States. This prerequisite for
the exercise of the appellate powers of this Court is especially
pertinent when a constitutional barrier is asserted against a State
court's decision on matters peculiarly of local concern. Close
observance of this limitation upon the Court is not regard for a
strangling technicality. History bears ample testimony that it is
an important factor in securing harmonious State-federal
relations.
No self-enforcing formula defining when a judgment is "final"
can be devised. Tests have been indicated
Page 334 U. S. 68
which are helpful in giving direction and emphasis to decision
from case to case. Thus, the requirement of finality has not been
met merely because the major issues in a case have been decided and
only a few loose ends remain to be tied up -- for example, where
liability has been determined and all that needs to be adjudicated
is the amount of damages.
Bruce v. Tobin, 245 U. S.
18;
Martinez v. International Banking Corp.,
220 U. S. 214,
220 U. S. 223;
Mississippi Central R. Co. v. Smith, 295 U.S. 718. On the
other hand, if nothing more than a ministerial act remains to be
done, such as the entry of a judgment upon a mandate, the decree is
regarded as concluding the case, and is immediately reviewable.
Board of Commissioners v. Lucas, 93 U. S.
108;
Mower v. Fletcher, 114 U.
S. 127.
There have been instances where the Court has entertained an
appeal of an order that otherwise might be deemed interlocutory,
because the controversy had proceeded to a point where a losing
party would be irreparably injured if review were unavailing.
Cf. Clark v. Williard, 294 U. S. 211;
Gumbel v. Pitkin, 113 U. S. 545,
and compare 47 U. S.
Conrad, 6 How. 201,
47 U. S. 204,
with 48 U. S.
Gibson, 7 How. 650,
48 U. S. 657.
For related reasons, an order decreeing immediate transfer of
possession of physical property is final for purposes of review
even though an accounting for profits is to follow. In such cases,
the accounting is deemed a severed controversy, and not part of the
main case.
Forgay v. Conrad, supra; Carondelet Canal &
Navigation Co. v. Louisiana, 233 U. S. 362;
Radio Station WOW v. Johnson, 326 U.
S. 120. But a decision that a taking by eminent domain
is for a public use, where the amount of compensation has not been
determined, is not deemed final, certainly where the property will
not change hands until after the award of compensation.
Grays
Harbor Logging Co. v. Coats-Fordney Logging Co., 243 U.
S. 251;
Page 334 U. S. 69
cf. Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 147 U.
S. 337;
Catlin v. United States, 324 U.
S. 229. [
Footnote 2]
One thing is clear. The considerations that determine finality are
not abstractions, but have reference to very real interests -- not
merely those of the immediate parties, but, more particularly,
those that pertain to the smooth functioning of our judicial
system.
On which side of the line, however faint and faltering at times,
dividing judgments that were deemed "final" from those found not to
be so does the judgment before us fall? The order of the Oklahoma
Corporation Commission, as affirmed below, terminates some, but not
all, issues in this proceeding. Republic is required to take
ratably from Peerless, but it may do so in any one of three ways.
If, as is most probable, Republic would choose not to close down
its own wells, under the Commission's order, it must allow Peerless
to connect its well to Republic's pipeline. But there has been left
open for later determination, in event of failure to reach
agreement, the terms upon which Republic must take the gas, the
rates which it must pay on purchase, or may charge if it sells as
agent of Peerless. Does either its alternative character or the
fact that it leaves matters still open for determination so qualify
the order as to make it short of "final" for present review?
We turn first to the latter point. Certainly what remains to be
done cannot be characterized as merely "ministerial." Whether or
not the amount of gas to be taken by Republic from Peerless can be
ascertained through application of a formula, the determination of
the
Page 334 U. S. 70
price to be paid for the gas if purchased, or the fees to be
paid to Republic for marketing it if sold on behalf of Peerless,
clearly requires the exercise of judgment. [
Footnote 3] Nor is there any immediate threat of
irreparable damage to Republic, rendering postponed review so
illusory as to make the decree "final" now or never. The
Commission's order requires Republic to designate a point on its
pipeline at which Peerless might attach a line, and, after Peerless
had done so, to connect it immediately. But it does not appear that
the order requires Republic to commence taking Peerless' gas before
the terms of taking have either been agreed upon or ordered by the
Commission. Nor does it appear that Republic would have to bear the
expense of connecting the pipeline, nor that such expense would be
substantial. Indeed, the incurring of some loss, before a process
preliminary to review here is exhausted, is not, in itself,
sufficient to authorize our intervention.
Cf. Myers v.
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S.
41,
303 U. S. 50-52.
But even if the Commission's order were construed to require
Republic to take and dispose of Peerless' gas immediately -- and we
are not so advised by the State Court -- there is no ground for
assuming that any loss that Republic might incur could not be
recovered should the completed direction of the Oklahoma
Commission, on affirmance by that State's Supreme Court, ultimately
be found to be unconstitutional. Merely because a party to a
litigation may be temporarily out of pocket is not sufficient to
warrant immediate review of an incomplete State judgment.
Appellant, of course, has the burden of
Page 334 U. S. 71
affirmatively establishing this Court's jurisdiction.
Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Beeler, 315 U.
S. 649,
315 U. S. 651.
The policy against premature constitutional adjudications demands
that any doubts in maintaining this burden be resolved against
jurisdiction.
See citation of cases in the concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in
Ashwander v. Tennessee
Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288,
297 U. S. 341,
297 U. S. 345,
297 U. S.
348.
The condemnation precedents attract this case more persuasively
than do the accounting cases. Where it is claimed that a decree
transferring property overrides an asserted federal right, as in
Forgay v. Conrad, supra, and
Radio Station WOW v.
Johnson, supra, no disposition of the subsequent accounting
proceeding can possibly make up for the defeated party's loss,
since the party who has lost the property must also pay to his
opponent what the accounting decrees. Hence, his desire to appeal
the issue of the right to the property will almost certainly
persist. On the other hand, in an eminent domain case, as in a case
like this, the fate of the whole litigation may well be affected by
the fate of the unresolved contingencies of the litigation. An
adequate award in an eminent domain case or a profitable rate in
the case before us might well satisfy the losing party to acquiesce
in the disposition of the earlier issue. It is, of course, not our
province to discourage appeals. But, for the soundest of reasons,
we ought not to pass on constitutional issues before they have
reached a definitive stop. Another similarity between this case and
the condemnation cases calls for abstention until what is
organically one litigation has been concluded in the State. It is
that the matters left open may generate additional federal
questions. This brings into vivid relevance the policy against
fragmentary review. In accounting cases, that which still remains
to be litigated can scarcely give rise to new federal
questions.
Page 334 U. S. 72
The policy against fragmentary review has therefore little
bearing. But contests over valuation in eminent domain cases, as
price-fixing in this type of case, are inherently provocative of
constitutional claims. This potentiality of additional federal
questions arising out of the same controversy has led this Court to
find want of the necessary finality of adjudicated constitutional
issues in condemnation decrees before valuation has been made. Like
considerations are relevant here.
In short, the guiding considerations for determining whether the
decree of the court below possesses requisite finality lead to the
conclusion that this case must await its culmination in the
judicial process of the State before we can assume jurisdiction.
"Only one branch of the case has been finally disposed of below;
therefore, none of it is ripe for review by this court."
Collins v. Miller, 252 U. S. 364,
252 U. S. 371.
This makes it unnecessary to consider whether the mere fact that
the decree gave alternative commands precluded it from being final.
Cf. Paducah v. East Tennessee Tel.Co., 229 U.
S. 476;
Jones' Adm'r v. Craig, 127 U.
S. 213; Note, 48 Harv.L.Rev. 302, 305-306. Since the
judgment now appealed from lacks the necessary finality, we cannot
consider the merits. All of Republic's constitutional objections
are, of course, saved.
Appeal dismissed.
[
Footnote 1]
L.1913, c.198, §§ 1-3, Okl.Stat. 1941, tit. 52,
§§ 231-33:
"Section 1. All natural gas under the surface of any land in
this state is hereby declared to be and is the property of the
owners, or gas lessees, of the surface under which gas is located
in its original state."
"Section 2. Any owner or oil and gas lessee, of the surface,
having the right to drill for gas, shall have the right to sink a
well to the natural gas underneath the same and to take gas
therefrom until the gas under such surface is exhausted. In case
other parties, having the right to drill into the common reservoir
of gas, drill a well or wells into the same, then the amount of gas
each owner may take therefrom shall be proportionate to the natural
flow of his well or wells to the natural flow of the well or wells
of such other owners of the same common source of supply of gas,
such natural flow to be determined by any standard measurement at
the beginning of each calendar month; provided that not more than
twenty-five percent of the natural flow of any well shall be taken,
unless for good cause shown, and upon notice and hearing the
Corporation Commission may, by proper order, permit the taking of a
greater amount. The drilling of a gas well or wells by any owner or
lessee of the surface shall be regarded as reducing to possession
his share of such gas as is shown by his well."
"Section 3. Any person, firm or corporation, taking gas from a
gas field, except for purposes of developing a gas or oil field,
and operating oil wells, and for the purpose of his own domestic
use, shall take ratably from each owner of the gas in proportion to
his interest in said gas, upon such terms as may be agreed upon
between said owners and the party taking such, or in case they
cannot agree at such a price and upon such terms as may be fixed by
the Corporation Commission after notice and hearing; provided, that
each owner shall be required to deliver his gas to a common point
of delivery on or adjacent to the surface overlying such gas. . .
."
See also L.1915, c.197, §§ 4, 5, Okl.Stat.
1941, tit. 52, §§ 239, 240:
"Section 4. That whenever the full production from any common
source of supply of natural gas in this state is in excess of the
market demands, then any person, firm, or corporation having the
right to drill into and produce gas from any such common source of
supply may take therefrom only such proportion of the natural gas
that may be marketed without waste, as the natural flow of the well
or wells owned or controlled by any such person, firm or
corporation bears to the total natural flow of such common source
of supply having due regard to the acreage drained by each well, so
as to prevent any such person, firm or corporation securing any
unfair proportion of the gas therefrom; provided, that the
Corporation Commission may, by proper order, permit the taking of a
greater amount whenever it shall deem such taking reasonable or
equitable. The said commission is authorized and directed to
prescribe rules and regulations for the determination of the
natural flow of any such well or wells, and to regulate the taking
of natural gas from any or all such common sources of supply within
the state, so as to prevent waste, protect the interests of the
public, and of all those having a right to produce therefrom, and
to prevent unreasonable discrimination in favor of any one such
common source of supply as against another."
"Section 5. That every person, firm or corporation now or
hereafter engaged in the business of purchasing and selling natural
gas in this state shall be a common purchaser thereof, and shall
purchase all of the natural gas which may be offered for sale, and
which may reasonably be reached by its trunk lines or gathering
lines without discrimination in favor of one producer as against
another, or in favor of any one source of supply as against another
save as authorized by the Corporation Commission after due notice
and hearing; but if any such person, firm or corporation, shall be
unable to purchase all the gas so offered, then it shall purchase
natural gas from each producer ratably. It shall be unlawful for
any such common purchaser to discriminate between like grades and
pressures of natural gas, or in favor of its own production, or of
production in which it may be directly or indirectly interested,
either in whole or in part, but for the purpose of prorating the
natural gas to be marketed, such production shall be treated in
like manner as that of any other producer or person, and shall be
taken only in the ratable proportion that such production bears to
the total production available for marketing. The Corporation
Commission shall have authority to make regulations for the
delivery, metering, and equitable purchasing and taking of all such
gas, and shall have authority to relieve any such common purchaser,
after due notice and hearing, from the duty of purchasing gas of an
inferior quality or grade."
[
Footnote 2]
In the
Catlin case, our decision was based on the
general rule that condemnation orders prior to determination of
just compensation are not appealable. The wartime statutes there
involved were urged by the claimants as a reason for not applying
the general rule. We rejected this contention.
[
Footnote 3]
This case is unlike those in which a rate had been fixed,
subject to a continuing jurisdiction to modify it later.
Cf.
Market Street R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 324 U.
S. 548;
St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern R.
Co. v. Southern Express Co., 108 U. S. 24. Here,
no rates have been set, and their future establishment has been
left open.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concurring.
The judgment of the Oklahoma court is not "final" merely because
it establishes that Republic has no right to drain away the
Peerless gas without paying for it. I think it would be conceded
that, even so, the judgment would not be "final" if it offered
appellant three alternative ways to comply and there were doubts as
to the constitutionality of any one of them. Then we would wait
Page 334 U. S. 73
to see which of the alternatives was ultimately selected or
imposed before reviewing the constitutionality of any of them. But
there would be no more reason to defer decision on the merits in
that case than in this. For the constitutional questions would be
isolated in each, and we would be as uncertain in one as in the
other which of the alternatives would actually apply to appellant.
And the principle seems to me to be the same even when a majority
of us would sustain the order whatever alternative was chosen as
its sanction.
There is, of course, in the one case, the chance of saving the
order only if one remedy rather than another is chosen, while, in
the other, the order would survive whichever was chosen. But, in
each, we would be giving needless constitutional dissertations on
some points. That is nonetheless true in a case where the
constitutional questions seem to a majority of us simple,
uncomplicated, and of no great dignity. For the single
constitutional question necessary for decision will not be isolated
until the precise pinch of the order on the appellant is known. It
will not be known in the present case at least until appellant
elects or is required (1) to shut down, (2) to become a carrier of
the Peerless gas, or (3) to purchase it.
The legal, as well as the economic, relationship which Republic
will bear to Peerless will vary as one or another choice is made.
To make Republic a "carrier" is to submit it to different business
risks than to make it a "purchaser." The fact that each would raise
only questions of "due process" under the Fourteenth Amendment does
not mean that the questions are identical. Even when reasonableness
is the test, judges have developed great contrariety of opinions.
The point is that, today, the variables are presented only in the
abstract. Tomorrow, the facts will be known, when the precise
impact of the order on appellant will be determined. Thus, to me,
the
Page 334 U. S. 74
policy against premature constitutional adjudication precludes
us from saying the judgment in the present case is "final."
MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK, MR. JUSTICE
MURPHY, and MR. JUSTICE BURTON join, dissenting.
I think the Oklahoma Supreme Court's judgment is final for the
purposes of § 237 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 344,
that the state commission's order is valid, and that deferring
decision on the merits to some indefinite future time will only
prolong an already lengthy litigation unnecessarily, and with
possible irreparable harm to one party or the other.
Appellant, Republic Natural Gas Company, has operated gas wells
in the Hugoton Gas Field for many years. It was the first major
producer to exploit the Oklahoma portion of the field, [
Footnote 2/1] having constructed its own
gathering system and pipelines extending from Oklahoma into Kansas.
With only minor exceptions, Republic has never carried any but its
own gas in its pipelines. [
Footnote
2/2] 198 Okl. at 352,
180 P.2d
1009.
In 1944 appellee, Peerless Company, completed its only well in
Oklahoma, in the Hugoton field. This well is not connected to any
pipeline. It therefore presently lies dormant. Surrounding Republic
wells drilled into the same reservoir concededly are draining gas
constantly from under the Peerless land. [
Footnote 2/3] Except for the part of
Page 334 U. S. 75
Republic's gathering system which runs across the Peerless land,
no market outlet that would take sufficient gas to justify
production of the Peerless well is close enough to make it
financially practical for Peerless to construct its own pipeline.
It is undisputed that the only feasible method of producing the
well is to require Republic to take Peerless gas into its gathering
system. [
Footnote 2/4]
For this reason, Peerless applied to the Oklahoma Corporate
Commission for an order compelling Republic to connect its pipeline
to the Peerless well and to purchase gas from Peerless at a price
to be fixed by the commission. After hearing, the commission
concluded that the applicable Oklahoma statutes [
Footnote 2/5] required it to enforce ratable taking
and ratable production of gas as between Republic and Peerless.
The commission recognized alternative methods of protecting
Peerless from loss due to drainage, first by ordering
Page 334 U. S. 76
all wells in the area to shut down completely, and second by
ordering Republic to purchase from Peerless. Since the first method
was considered harsh, the second was preferred. Accordingly, the
commission issued an order requiring Republic to take gas ratably
from the Peerless well as soon as the necessary connection could be
made, allowing it, however, the alternative of closing down all of
its wells in the Oklahoma portion of the field if it preferred this
to taking the Peerless gas. The terms and conditions of the taking
were to be determined by the parties, but, in the event of failure
to agree, they were "granted the right to make further application
to the Commission for an order fixing such terms and conditions. .
. ." [
Footnote 2/6] The taking,
however, was not to await this agreement or further order; it was
to begin at once. [
Footnote
2/7]
Page 334 U. S. 77
Affirming the order, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma construed the
state statutes to authorize the administrative action. 198 Okl.
350,
180 P.2d 1009.
The case thus presents on the merits the question whether a state,
as a means of adjusting private correlative rights in a common
reservoir, has the power in such circumstances as these to compel
one private producer to share his market with another when
otherwise his production would drain off that other's ratable share
of the gas in place, and thus appropriate it to himself.
I
The majority consider that the proceedings in the state
tribunals have not terminated in a final judgment from which appeal
to this Court lies, and therefore refuse to adjudicate this
question.
In the strictest sense, the state proceedings will not be
completed until the parties have agreed upon the terms and
conditions of Republic's taking of gas from Peerless or, if they do
not agree, until the commission has issued an additional order
fixing those terms. Since it is not certain that the parties will
agree, the possibility remains that a further order may be required
before all phases of the controversy are disposed of. It is this
possibility, as I think, a remote one, which furnishes one of the
grounds for concluding that the Oklahoma court's judgment is not
final within the meaning and policy of § 237.
The fact that all phases of the litigation are not concluded
does not necessarily defeat our jurisdiction. This is true
although, as recently as
Gospel Army v. Los Angeles,
331 U. S. 543, we
reiterated that, for a judgment to be final and reviewable under
§ 237,
"it must end the litigation by fully determining the rights of
the parties, so that nothing remains to be done by the trial court
'except the ministerial act of entering the judgment which the
Page 334 U. S. 78
appellate court . . . directed.'"
331 U.S. at
331 U. S. 546.
This is the general rule, grounded in a variety of considerations
reflected in the statutory command [
Footnote 2/8] and coming down to the sum that, in
exercising the jurisdiction conferred by § 237, this Court is
not to be concerned with reviewing inconclusive, piecemeal, or
repetitious determinations. The
Gospel Army case
represents a typical instance for applying the terms and the policy
of § 237. [
Footnote 2/9] But
not every decision by a state court of last resort leaving the
controversy open to further proceedings and orders is either
inconclusive of the issues or premature for purposes of review
under § 237. This appears most recently from the decision in
Radio Station WOW v. Johnson, 326 U.
S. 120, which applied a settled line of authorities to
that effect.
Cf. Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board of
Equalization, 329 U. S. 69.
In such cases, the formulation of the test of finality made in
the
Gospel Army and like decisions has not been followed.
Instead, that question, in the special circumstances, has been
treated as posing essentially a practical problem, not one to be
determined either by the label attached to the state court judgment
by local law,
Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board of
Equalization, supra, or by the merely mechanical inquiry
whether some further order or proceeding beyond "the ministerial
act of entering the judgment" may be had or necessary after our
decision is rendered.
Radio Station WOW v. Johnson, supra,
at
326 U. S.
125.
The
WOW opinion noted that the typical case for
applying the broader, less mechanical approach to the
Page 334 U. S. 79
question of finality had involved judgments directing the
immediate delivery of property, to be followed by an accounting
decreed in the same order. It stated, with reference to these and
like situations:
"In effect, such a controversy is a multiple litigation allowing
review of the adjudication which is concluded because it is
independent of, and unaffected by, another litigation with which it
happens to be entangled."
326 U.S. at
326 U. S. 126.
Accordingly, since the two phases of the controversy were separate
and distinct, we exercised our jurisdiction to determine the
federal questions involved in the phase concluded by the state
court's decision. This was done although the judgment required
further and possibly extensive judicial proceedings before the
other and separable phase of the accounting could reach a final
determination. [
Footnote 2/10]
Those further proceedings involved very much more than "ministerial
acts;" indeed, the determination of a complicated accounting
requires the highest order of judicial discretion.
Notwithstanding this, and despite the want of strict finality,
jurisdiction was sustained because a number of factors were felt to
require that action in order to give effect to the policy of §
237 providing for review, rather than to a merely mechanical
application of its terms for denying review.
There was nothing tentative or inconclusive about the Nebraska
court's judgment for immediate delivery of the property. Nor was it
necessary to execution of that phase of the judgment to have
contemporaneous conclusion
Page 334 U. S. 80
of the accounting phase. Except for the latter, the judgment was
ripe for review. Indeed, immediate execution without review of the
federal questions affecting the delivery phase until after the
accounting had been completed, offered the possibility of
irreparable harm to one or possibly both of the parties. This
factor obviously tended to make later full review partly or wholly
futile. Moreover, until the delivery phase had been settled, it
could not be known whether the accounting would be necessary, for
that need was consequentially incident to, and dependent upon,
determination of the core of the litigation, which was the right to
delivery.
In these circumstances, it was rightly considered more
consistent with the intent and purpose of § 237 to allow
immediate review, notwithstanding the possibility of a later
further review in the accounting phase, than to deny review with
the chance that a later one might not fully save the parties'
rights. The section's policy to furnish full, adequate, and prompt
review outweighed any design to secure absolute and literal
"finality."
In all these respects, this case presents a parallel to the
WOW case too close, in my opinion, for distinguishing
between them. Republic is not directed to negotiate terms and, on
completing the negotiation, to make its facilities available to
Peerless. It is ordered to make a connection with Peerless and to
begin carrying gas at once. That phase of the order, like the
delivery phase in the accounting cases, does not await the fixing
of the terms whether by agreement or by further order. [
Footnote 2/11] It is a present
obligation, effective immediately and without qualification.
[
Footnote 2/12]
See Knox Loan
Assn. v. Phillips, 300 U. S. 194,
300 U. S.
198.
Page 334 U. S. 81
Moreover, there is nothing tentative or inconclusive about this
phase of the order or the state judgment sustaining it. That phase
not only is separable from the matter of fixing the terms; like the
order for delivery in the
WOW case, it is the main core of
the controversy to which the aspect of fixing terms is both
consequential and incidental. The
WOW order required
immediate delivery of property, with consequent possibility of
irreparable harm. Here, the order required immediate acceptance of
delivery, with similar possibility of injury for one party or the
other. [
Footnote 2/13]
Neither is there greater likelihood of piecemeal consideration
of constitutional and other questions than in the
WOW
case.
Cf. 326 U.S. at
326 U. S. 127.
The matter of fixing terms here hardly can be more difficult
practically or more complex legally than making the accounting in
the
WOW case. [
Footnote
2/14] It is hard also to see how one would be either more or
less likely to throw up new constitutional issues than
Page 334 U. S. 82
the other. Nor can the
WOW case be taken to rule that
this Court could not or would not consider constitutional issues
arising on the accounting phase, unlikely though the necessity for
its doing so may have been. There is thus a substantially complete
parallel between the situation now presented and that in the
WOW line of cases.
In one respect, this case is stronger for finding appealable
finality. For here, no further order may be necessary or made,
since present resolution of the basic constitutional problem in all
probability will end the entire controversy. That certainly would
be the result if the decision should go against Peerless, or if
Republic should elect to shut down production. And if the decision
should be in Peerless' favor, it is hardly likely that the parties
will be unable to agree upon terms since, in case of failure to
agree, the commission will prescribe them. [
Footnote 2/15] The case, indeed, is not basically a
controversy over terms at all. They present only a contingent,
collateral matter. What is fundamentally at stake is the right of
Republic to take the gas from beneath Peerless' land and market it
without paying Peerless for it. Once that question is finally
determined, as it can be only by this Court's decision of the
constitutional question, the need for a further order will become
highly improbable.
This case, therefore, is one in which the need for further
proceedings may never arise, and almost certainly would not do so
if the constitutional question were now determined. Indeed, in a
closer factual application that the
WOW case, it presents
in the jurisdictional aspect an almost exact parallel to the order
reviewed in
Pierce Oil Corp. v. Phoenix Refining Co.,
259 U. S. 125,
where the Oklahoma commission required the appellant to carry oil
for the appellee at unspecified rates.
Cf. 269 U.
S. S. 83� Co. v. United States,
269 U. S.
125; Clark v. Williard,@
292 U.
S. 112.
The parallel to the
WOW line of decisions, however, is
put aside, and this case is decided by analogy to condemnation
cases, particularly
Grays Harbor Logging Co. v. Coats-Fordney
Co., 243 U. S. 251. The
analogy is inapposite. It is true that, in such cases, this Court
generally, though not uniformly, [
Footnote 2/16] has held that the trial court judgment
is not final until after the award of compensation is made. The
decisions were properly rendered, but for reasons not applicable
here. In the
Grays Harbor case, the state constitution and
controlling legislation prohibited the transfer of the condemned
property until after the compensation had been determined and paid.
Thus, the issue of the right to take was necessarily dependent for
final resolution on the determination of the amount of
compensation. [
Footnote 2/17] The
controversy was not separable into distinct phases, as in the
WOW case and here. 243 U.S. at
243 U. S. 256.
[
Footnote 2/18] Nor had the state
judgment already affected the appellant's property rights, as was
true in the
WOW case and is true here.
In
Catlin v. United States, 324 U.
S. 229, the question of the right to take was settled
conclusively below before the award of damages was fixed. But
there, to have permitted an appeal from the order transferring
possession would have produced delays inconsistent with the
overriding
Page 334 U. S. 84
purpose and policy of the War Purposes and Declaration of Taking
Acts. 26 Stat. 316, as amended by 40 Stat. 241, 518; 46 Stat. 1421.
324 U.S. at
324 U. S. 235,
324 U. S. 238,
324 U. S. 240.
Here, the converse is true, for to refuse to pass on the merits can
serve only to prolong the litigation without compensating advantage
for the policy of § 237 or other enactment. There is no
overriding policy of independent legislation, comparable to that of
the War Purposes and Declaration of Taking Acts, dictating denial
or deferring of review.
The asserted analogy to the
Grays Harbor, Catlin, and
Luxton (
see 334 U.S.
62fn2/17|>note 17) cases therefore does not hold for the
entirely different situations now presented. In them, either there
was no separable phase of the litigation or statutory policy
independent of § 237 or other like requirement of finality
forbade review before ultimate disposition of every phase of the
litigation in the state or inferior federal courts. The
condemnation cases, therefore, though generally uniform in denying
review of orders for condemnation prior to award of damages, are
not uniform in resting this result wholly on the requirement of
"finality" made by § 237 and like provisions for review, but
frequently rest on other and independent grounds pertinent to the
application of those provisions.
The "penumbral area" of appealable finality,
see 326
U.S. at
326 U. S. 124,
may not be sweeping in its scope. It is nevertheless one essential
to prevent the letter of the section from overriding its reason.
For this purpose, it would seem to comprehend any situation
presenting separable phases of litigation, one involving the core
or crux of the controversy between the parties, the other
collateral matters dependent for the necessity of their
consideration and decision upon final and unqualified disposition
of the hub of the dispute. If a merely mechanical application of
§ 237 is to be avoided, it cannot be taken that the practical
approach of the
WOW line of decisions must
Page 334 U. S. 85
be limited exclusively to cases where an accounting is ordered
to follow delivery of property decreed at the same time. The reason
of the exception, indeed of § 237 itself, is not so limited.
Because the delivery and accounting cases are not the only ones
presenting such problems, judgment must be given some play in other
situations as well to decide whether the vices excluded by the
policies underlying § 237 are present, as they may be or not
according to the character and effects of the particular
determination sought to be reviewed.
Finally, it hardly can be that merely the alternative character
of the order,
per se, deprives it of finality, regardless
of whether any of the alternatives presents a substantial federal
question. Because Republic is allowed to choose between shutting
down its wells and carrying or purchasing the Peerless gas, it
seems to be thought that the order lacks finality until that choice
is made, even though, when made, either course would be clearly
within the state's power to require.
The argument would have more force if the difference between the
alternatives were great enough to make it likely that contrary
results might be reached on the different alternatives. But where,
as here, the difference emphasized,
e.g., is merely
between the passage of title before and after the carriage, it is
hard to see how there could be more difficulty with one alternative
than with the other.
See 334 U. S.
also 334 U. S. So
minor a distinction hardly furnishes a substantial basis for
contrariety of judicial opinion on due process questions. Nor is it
suggested that allowing the choice between either of those two
courses and shutting down presents greater difficulty. Given
constitutionality of all alternatives, it no more transcends state
power to permit the party affected to select the course least
onerous than to require him to follow the one most burdensome. It
is equally hard to see how giving the choice destroys the
order's
Page 334 U. S. 86
finality, unless again a wholly mechanical conception of that
term as used in § 237 is to control.
The section's policy is against hypothetical, premature, and
piecemeal constitutional decision, not against a choice of
alternatives presenting no such problem. Here, the question is
whether Oklahoma can offer Republic the choice of shutting down
production or taking and paying for the Peerless gas. Either course
will protect the latter's rights against drainage by Republic.
Either, standing alone in the order's terms, would not affect
finality. Neither, merely upon the premise that alternative
character
per se destroys finality, presents a doubtful
question of constitutionality. And finally, the alternative of
shutting down, realistically considered, is more nearly sanction
than alternative mode of compliance. [
Footnote 2/19]
In such circumstances, to say that coupling the two courses
alternatively deprives the order of finality seems to me to be
giving to the terms of § 237 a mechanical application out of
harmony with the section's policy, just as does refusing to decide
the case before it is known whether a further order may be
necessary for fixing the price of the Peerless gas. Such a view can
only handicap administrative action, either by forcing orders to
specify a single course of compliance when alternatives may be much
more desirable, or by delaying review, and thus
Page 334 U. S. 87
effective administrative action until one or perhaps all of the
alternatives in turn are tried out, first in election and then in
review. A decision now would settle every substantial pending phase
of the controversy. At the most, but a minor consequential and
separable aspect would remain for remotely possible further action
in the state tribunals. It is to the interest of both parties, and
the state authorities as well, that their rights be determined and
the controversy be ended. And, on the facts, the question of
jurisdiction is closely related to the merits.
In view of all these considerations, to deny the parties our
judgment now is to make a fetish of technical finality without
securing any of the substantial advantages for constitutional
adjudication which § 237, in the light of its underlying
policies, was designed to attain. Instead, that section becomes an
instrument of sheer delay for the performance of our function, for
executing those of state agencies, and for settling parties'
rights. The section has no such office. By declaring now that the
state may follow either of two clearly permissible courses and
allow those with whom it deals to choose between them, we would not
speak hypothetically or prematurely, or violate any other policy
underlying § 237.
II
Beyond the matter of jurisdiction, there is in this case no such
question concerning its exercise as arose in
Rescue Army v.
Municipal Court, 331 U. S. 549. The
constitutional issues are not speculative, premature, or presented
abstractly
en masse. The "alternative character" of the
state judgment does not prevent the federal questions from being
sufficiently precise and concrete for purposes of decision here,
although various ambiguities have been suggested.
Page 334 U. S. 88
Thus, it is said that we cannot tell whether the order compels
Republic to share its market or merely requires it to carry gas to
a market which Peerless must obtain for itself.
Cf. Thompson v.
Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U. S.
55. The order here is not subject to such an ambiguity.
It, in terms, commands Republic to take Peerless gas and to pay for
it. [
Footnote 2/20]
It is also suggested that we cannot tell whether Republic will
have to purchase gas from Peerless, or just transport the gas to
market and account for the profits. But whether legal title passes
at one end of the Republic line or at the other is, as we have
noted, wholly immaterial as a matter of constitutional law.
Cf.
The Pipe Line Cases, 234 U. S. 548. In
either event, under the order and judgment, Republic must take
Peerless gas into its system, must pay for it and, unless its
market should expand suddenly far beyond present expectations, must
therefore share its market with Peerless.
It is said further that we cannot be sure whether the commission
intends to make Republic act as a common carrier. The only basis
for this doubt is the fact that the commission's findings state
that Republic is a common carrier and common purchaser. But the
state supreme court upheld the order on the assumption that those
findings were incorrect. The justification for requiring
Page 334 U. S. 89
Republic to carry Peerless gas is based primarily on the fact of
drainage caused by Republic's production.
III
It has been noted previously that the question on the merits is
not unrelated to the issue of finality. To it, accordingly,
attention is now directed. The real fight, as has been stated, is
over the right of Republic to drain away the Peerless gas without
paying for it. The question, as cast in legal terms, is whether the
due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment deny Oklahoma the power to give one private producer from
a common pool the option to shut down production altogether or to
purchase gas from another for the purpose of adjusting their
correlative rights in the pool when that is the only practical or
feasible alternative consistent with production by both to protect
the latter from drainage by the former.
Republic denies the state's power to do this. Its basic position
is that it has a federal constitutional right to drain off all the
gas in the field unless other owners of producing rights can supply
their own facilities for marketing their production, regardless of
varying conditions in different competitive situations and
regardless of all consequent practical considerations affecting
feasibility of furnishing such facilities.
Republic has no such right. The Constitution did not impress
upon the states in a rigid mold either the common law feudal system
of land tenures or any of the modified and variant forms of tenure
prevailing in the states in 1789. Rather, it left them free to
devise and establish their own systems of property law adapted to
their varying local conditions and to the peculiar needs and
desires of their inhabitants. The original constitution placed no
explicit limitation upon the powers of the states in
Page 334 U. S. 90
this respect. [
Footnote 2/21]
Not until the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, nearly eight
decades later, was one introduced.
The Fourteenth Amendment was not designed to nullify state power
to create institutions of property in accord with local needs and
policies. Whether or not it was intended to secure substantive
individual rights as well as procedural ones, [
Footnote 2/22] it was not a straitjacket
immobilizing state power to change or alter institutions of
property in the public interest. [
Footnote 2/23] Almost innumerable decisions have
demonstrated this, even though the Amendment has been effective to
create substantial limitations upon the methods by which the
changes deemed necessary may be made.
The basic question here is really one of substantive due
process. It relates primarily to whether Oklahoma can curtail the
unqualified right of capture which appellant conceives it acquired
by virtue of, and as an unalterable incident to, its acquisition of
surface rights including the right to drill for gas. For, in
denying that the state
Page 334 U. S. 91
can enforce the only feasible method of limitation consistent
with production by Peerless, Republic in effect is saying that the
state cannot restrict its right to take all gas in the common
reservoir, including all that can be drained from beneath Peerless'
lease and the lands of other owners similarly situated. This is,
for the particular circumstances, a denial of the state's power to
protect correlative rights in the field or to regulate appellant's
taking in the interest of others having equal rights proportionate
to their surface holdings. For, though Republic concedes it is
bound by Oklahoma's statutory requirement of
pro rata
production, that requirement becomes merely a time factor affecting
the rate and length of the period of Republic's drainage, not the
total quantity eventually to be taken, if Republic can defy the
commission's order, and thus leave Peerless in its present helpless
condition.
The contention is bold and far-reaching, more especially when
account is taken of the nature of the industry. Natural gas in
place is volatile and fugitive, once a single outlet is opened.
When extracted, it cannot be stored in quantity, but must be
marketed ultimately at burner tips in the time necessary for
conveyance to them from the well mouth. The competitive struggle
for the industry's rewards is particularly intense in the initial
stage of developing a field. By the industry's very nature, large
outlays of capital are required for successful continuing
production and marketing. All those factors, however, tend toward
monopoly once success has been achieved in a particular field.
These peculiar qualities, moreover, have been reflected in the
legal rights relating to the ownership of gas in place, as well as
its extraction. They have been adapted to its nature and to that of
the competitive struggle regarding it. Only a specialist in this
branch of the law, which varies from state to state, can undertake
to say
Page 334 U. S. 92
with any reliable degree of precision what rights may be in
particular situations. These difficulties, intensified by the
competitive struggle for the product and the inadequacy of common
law ideas to control it, have forced both the states and the
federal government to adopt extensive regulatory measures in recent
years. This has been necessary both to conserve the public interest
in this rapidly depleting natural resource [
Footnote 2/24] and to secure fair adjustment of private
rights in the industry. Rather than being a sacred, untouchable
enclave of the common law, the field, by its very nature, lends
itself especially to governmental intervention for such purposes.
In this respect, it is hardly comparable to situations
comprehending only conventional manufacturers and merchants of
consumable goods.
In accordance with Oklahoma's law, appellant does not assert
title to the gas in place. It asserts only the right to capture
what it can produce. But that right, unqualified, would include the
right to take gas from beneath others' lands. So taken, it defies
their rights to a proportionate share and the state's power to
secure them if, for reasons rendering marketing through their own
facilities unfeasible, they cannot join in the unrestrained
competitive draining.
So far as the federal Constitution is concerned, there is no
such unrestricted fee simple in the right to drain gas from beneath
an adjacent owner's land. It is far too late, if it ever was
otherwise, to urge that the states are impotent to restrict this
unfettered race, or to put it upon terms of proportionate equality
by whatever measures may be reasonably necessary to that end.
Indeed, our constitutional history is replete with instances where
the states have altered and restricted schemes of property
Page 334 U. S. 93
rights in response to the public interest and the states' local
needs. In some cases, this has gone to the extent of abolishing
basic common law conceptions entirely and substituting new ones
indigenous to their areas and the problems they present. Perhaps
the most extensive and obvious illustrations are to be found in the
systems developed in our arid and mountainous western states for
governing rights in the waters of flowing streams and mining rights
in respect to precious metals. [
Footnote 2/25] Others are not lacking. [
Footnote 2/26]
It hardly can be maintained that the creation and control of
rights respecting the ownership, extraction, and marketing of
natural gas are less broadly subject to state control than those
relating to waters for irrigation and other uses or to the
extraction of precious metals in the regions where those matters
have called into play the states' authority to act in the manner
best suited to local conditions and the needs of their inhabitants.
The similarities of the situations and the problems, for purposes
of constitutionality in the exercise of those powers, are so
obvious they do not need to be specified.
Historically, the states' freedom to exercise broad powers in
defining and regulating rights of ownership and production of
natural gas has been recognized almost as long and quite as
completely as their similar freedoms to act in relation to water
rights and mining rights. In
Page 334 U. S. 94
a line of cases beginning a half century ago with
Ohio Oil
Co. v. Indiana, 177 U. S. 190,
this Court has upheld various types of state regulatory schemes
designed to prevent waste and to protect the "coequal rights" of
the several owners of a common source of supply. [
Footnote 2/27] These cases clearly recognize that
the state regulation may be justified on alternative grounds either
to prevent waste or to adjust private correlative rights. [
Footnote 2/28]
It is true, as appellant points out, that none of those cases
presented the specific issue of whether the state may adjust
correlative rights independently of a conservation program. But it
is not true that this power is merely incidental to the fundamental
right of the state to preserve its natural resources. In fact, if
one power were incidental to the other, the
Ohio Oil case
would support the view that waste prevention is justifiable because
it serves "the purpose of protecting all the collective owners. . .
." 177 U.S. at
177 U. S. 210.
[
Footnote 2/29] Moreover, it is
significant that the opinion in
Bandini Petroleum Co. v.
Superior Court specifically states that the California
regulation
Page 334 U. S. 95
is valid on its face, even if viewed as a measure designed
purely for the protection of correlative rights.
284 U. S. 284 U.S.
8,
284 U. S. 22.
[
Footnote 2/30]
Oklahoma's power to regulate correlative rights in the Hugoton
field therefore does not stem from her interest merely in the
preservation of natural resources. It stems, rather, from the basic
aim and authority of any government which seeks to protect the
rights of its citizens and to secure a just accommodation of them
when they clash. [
Footnote 2/31]
That authority is constantly exercised in our system in relation to
other types of property. [
Footnote
2/32] In view of this
Page 334 U. S. 96
fact and of what has been said concerning conditions in this
industry, it would be incongruous for us to hold that oil and gas
law is the one phase of property law that cannot be modified except
for conservation purposes. Especially in the light of its origin
and development in a
laissez faire atmosphere appropriate
for fostering intense competitive expansions,
see Merrill,
The Evolution of Oil and Gas Law, 13 Miss.L.J. 281, the states
should be allowed certainly not less freedom to evolve new property
rules to keep pace with changing industrial conditions than they
possess in nearly every other branch of the law. [
Footnote 2/33] Here, as elsewhere in considering
the proper scope for state experimentation, it is important that we
indulge every reasonable presumption in favor of the states'
action. They should be free to improve their regulatory techniques
as scientific knowledge advances, for here, too, experimentation is
the lifeblood of progress.
See Mr. Justice Brandeis
dissenting in
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.
S. 262,
285 U. S.
280.
IV
The remaining narrow issue is whether the most practical method
of achieving a fair accommodation of the
Page 334 U. S. 97
correlative rights of the parties is invalid because Republic is
required to take and to pay for gas that it does not want -- at
least does not want if it must pay for it.
Appellant relies heavily on
Thompson v. Consolidated Gas
Utilities Corp., 300 U. S. 55, where
this Court invalidated an order limiting respondent's production so
severely that it would have had to purchase gas from unconnected
wells in its vicinity in order to satisfy its commitments. Thus,
the necessary effect of that order was comparable to the effect of
the order under review here.
But there is a crucial difference between the cases. In deciding
the
Thompson case, the Court explicitly assumed that the
order could be upheld if reasonably designed either to prevent
waste or "to prevent undue drainage of gas from the reserves of
well owners lacking pipeline connections." [
Footnote 2/34] Because of a geological anomaly, there
was a general drainage in the gas field away from the connected
wells toward the unconnected wells, 300 U.S. at
300 U. S. 71-73,
so that the producing wells, rather than draining gas away from the
dormant wells, would only reduce their own loss by producing as
much as possible. Therefore, the limitation on their production
could not be justified, since it was neither for the purpose of
preventing waste nor a reasonable regulation of correlative rights.
Instead of protecting one party from loss, it operated to aggravate
the effect of the drainage away from the owners of connected wells.
They suffered, not only by an increased drainage loss, but also by
the consequence that they were forced to share their facilities and
market with the very parties who profited by their loss. The Court
held that such an order requiring one company to share its market
with another was unconstitutional inasmuch
Page 334 U. S. 98
as it was not justified either as a conservation measure or as a
reasonable adjustment of correlative rights. The latter
justification is present in this case.
The fact that Republic is compelled either to purchase Peerless'
gas or to carry it to market and account for the profits does not
make the regulation unreasonable. If that were the sole cause for
complaint, the state could take the more drastic step of requiring
all the well owners to shut down completely until all were able to
produce on a ratable basis or came to some agreement effective to
make this possible. It is clearly within the state's power to
require Republic to compensate Peerless for the gas drained from
under the Peerless land.
Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas
Co., 305 U. S. 376.
Here, instead of requiring Republic to make a cash payment based on
the estimated amount of drainage, the commission has selected what
is unquestionably a more accurate method of adjusting the
correlative rights. Even if it could be assumed that this method
imposed a somewhat heavier burden on Republic than possible
alternatives, it does not follow that the method selected by the
commission is unconstitutional. For we have constantly recognized
the propriety of allowing wide discretion to the administrative
agencies who are best qualified to select the most reasonable
solutions to the thorny problems that accompany regulation in this
highly technical field.
Railroad Commission v. Rowan &
Nichols Oil Co., 310 U. S. 573.
Keeping in mind the fact that property law is peculiarly a matter
of local concern, the special difficulty of defining and regulating
property rights in natural gas, the respect due to experts in this
field, and the rather unusual facts this record presents, I cannot
say that the state is without power to enter this order.
It is suggested that the order, since it includes the
requirement of purchase, and not merely of transportation
Page 334 U. S. 99
and accounting for profits, becomes invalid because it shifts
from Peerless to Republic the business risk incident to ownership
and sale of the gas. Possibly this might furnish a more serious
basis for objection in materially different circumstances. But,
apart from what has already been said, in those now presented I
conceive no substantially greater harm to be possible from the
order's operation than depriving Republic of the right to drain gas
from beneath Peerless' lease without liability to pay for the gas
so drained.
This assumes that, if the parties should be unable to agree upon
terms, the commission will fix them in a manner taking due account
of prevailing market conditions relevant to the price to be paid,
as well as reasonable compensation for the use of Republic's
facilities. With those limitations properly applied, it is hard to
see what great business risk will be shifted to Republic. For, as
we have already noted, the commodity is one not subject to storage,
must be sold as soon as it is transported to the point of
consumption, and therefore cannot be subject to possible wide
fluctuation in selling price between the times of purchase and sale
by Republic.
The facts here, it seems to me, justify the commission's action.
Whether others materially different may do so should be left to be
considered when they arise.
I would affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Republic has 92 wells in Kansas and 38 in Oklahoma.
[
Footnote 2/2]
The Oklahoma Supreme Court found it unnecessary to consider
whether Republic was either a common carrier or a common purchaser
of gas. 198 Okl. at 353,
180 P.2d 1009.
The term "common purchaser" is explained in Okl.Stat., tit. 52,
§ 240.
[
Footnote 2/3]
Appellant concedes that the "operation of the Republic wells is
draining gas from under the dormant Peerless well." The findings of
the commission state:
"(d) Republic . . . is taking and will continue to take more
than its proportionate part of the natural gas in said field unless
required to take ratably from said well of Peerless. . . ."
"(e) Republic . . . is draining gas from underneath said Section
14 into which said Peerless Oil and Gas Company's well has been
drilled, and will continue to drain gas from underneath said
Section 14 until all the gas thereunder has been drained, and
Peerless . . . will be prevented from taking its proportionate
share of the natural gas in the field unless Republic . . . is
required to take gas ratably from [Peerless]."
[
Footnote 2/4]
The Report of the commission states:
"It is evident from all the facts and circumstances in this case
that, if the Peerless Company is to be allowed to produce gas from
its well, this gas must be by it transported fifteen to thirty
miles, unless said gas is transported or disposed of by the
Republic Natural Gas Company."
"It would be impractical from a financial standpoint to
construct a pipeline to any city or other market outlet that would
take sufficient gas to justify the production of this well, and it
would be impossible to economically operate the well under present
conditions existing in that field unless the gas is taken into the
pipeline of the Republic Natural Gas Company."
[
Footnote 2/5]
Okl.Stat., tit. 52, §§ 232, 233, 239, 240, 243.
[
Footnote 2/6]
The order required Republic
"1. . . .
to take gas ratably from [Peerless] and to make
necessary connection as soon as applicant lays a line
connecting said well with respondent's line, and to continue
to do so until the further order of this Commission; provided that
applicant shall lay its line from its well to the lines of
respondent at some point designated by the respondent, but in said
Section 14 in which said well of Peerless . . . has been drilled,
and said respondent is required to make said designation
immediately and without unreasonable delay, and in event of
failure of respondent so to do, respondent shall no longer be
permitted to produce any of its wells located in the Hugoton Gas
Field."
(Emphasis added.)
"2. The terms and conditions of such taking of natural gas by
[Republic] from [Peerless] shall be determined and agreed upon by
and between applicant and respondent, and in the event said parties
are unable to agree, applicant and respondent are hereby granted
the right to make further application to the Commission for an
order fixing such terms and conditions, and the Commission retains
jurisdiction hereof for said purpose."
[
Footnote 2/7]
See 334 U.S.
62fn2/6|>note 6. The order's language leaves no room for the
inference, which appears to be injected here, that the taking was
not required to begin until the terms had been agreed upon or
determined by further order.
[
Footnote 2/8]
Some of the considerations are enumerated in
Radio Station
WOW v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120,
326 U. S.
123-124.
[
Footnote 2/9]
Under California procedure, the state supreme court's
unqualified order for reversal was "effective to remand the case
for a new trial and [place] the parties in the same position as
if the case had never been tried.'" 331 U.S. at 331 U. S. 546,
and authorities cited. The effect was thus to leave all issues
inconclusively determined pending further proceedings in the trial
court.
[
Footnote 2/10]
The two prior decisions deemed decisive against mechanical
determination of finality in such situations were
Forgay v.
Conrad, 6 How. 201, and
Carondelet Canal &
Navigation Co. v. Louisiana, 233 U. S. 362, the
former of which we noted had
"stood on our books for nearly a hundred years in an opinion
carrying the authority, especially weighty in such matters, of
Chief Justice Taney."
326 U.S.
120,
326 U. S.
125.
[
Footnote 2/11]
See notes
334 U.S.
62fn2/6|>6-7,
supra, and text.
[
Footnote 2/12]
In the remote event that Republic should elect to shut down
production, there would be no need for a further order or agreement
of the parties, and the presently erected obstacle to finality
would be completely removed.
[
Footnote 2/13]
To permit Republic to continue drainage from beneath Peerless'
land for the indefinite period required for sending the case back
to the Oklahoma tribunals and then bringing it back here a second
time will be to deprive Peerless of that gas unless the state law
allows compensation for such continued taking from the date of the
present order. It is at least highly doubtful that the state law
allows such a remedy, even if the order is eventually held
valid.
On the other hand, if the order should be invalidated on the
deferred review, Republic will have been put to further and
unnecessary delay, uncertainty, and expense in ascertaining its
rights, merely to secure a determination which cannot possibly
affect them. If this may not be irreparable injury, it certainly is
not the policy of § 237.
[
Footnote 2/14]
In view of marketing conditions in this industry, no such
problem of valuation or of reaching agreement upon it would be
presented as, for instance, in the case of seeking to place a value
upon real estate taken by condemnation for public use or valuation
of property for ratemaking purposes. The idea that determining the
value of the gas taken here would present all the difficulties of
valuing a railroad for ratemaking purposes blows the matter up
beyond all the practicalities of the situation.
[
Footnote 2/15]
See 334 U.S.
62fn2/14|>note 14.
[
Footnote 2/16]
Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co. v. Wheeling Bridge
Co., 138 U. S. 287.
[
Footnote 2/17]
The same was said to be true of
Luxton v. North River Bridge
Co., 147 U. S. 337.
See id., 147 U. S.
341.
[
Footnote 2/18]
Moreover, under state practice, review of the condemnation order
by the state supreme court was by certiorari, not by appeal, which
lay only from the order fixing damages. As a matter of state law,
therefore, the judgment on the condemnation order was
interlocutory.
See, however, as to this,
Catlin v.
United States, 324 U. S. 229,
324 U. S. 234;
Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 147 U.
S. 337.
[
Footnote 2/19]
Cf. 66 U. S. Beers,
1 Black 54;
Milwaukee & Minnesota R.
Co. v. Soutter, 2 Wall. 440.
Control of production, of course, is the core of state
conservation programs. In
Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation
Commission, 286 U. S. 210,
proration orders limiting production of oil wells to as little as
six percent of capacity were sustained.
See 286 U.S. at
286 U. S. 229.
Cf. Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.
S. 300;
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,
220 U. S. 61. The
power of a state to protect correlative rights hardly can be
regarded as furnishing a less solid basis for control of production
than the power to prevent waste.
See 334 U.S.
62fn2/29|>note 29 and text,
infra.
[
Footnote 2/20]
In its report, the commission concluded that Republic should be
required to " . . . allow the Peerless gas to enter the Republic
pipeline, and pay the Peerless Company for the gas." The order
itself in unqualified terms directs Republic "to take gas ratably
from [Peerless] . . . as soon as applicant lays a line connecting
said well with respondent's line. . . ."
See 334 U.S.
62fn2/6|>notes 6-7.
Since neither the commission's report nor the state supreme
court's opinion suggests that the command was qualified by the
condition that Peerless obtain its own market, we need not read
such a condition into the order. The commission report states that
"Republic offers to transport the Peerless gas if market can be
obtained by [Peerless]. . . ."
[
Footnote 2/21]
The nearest approximations, perhaps, were in the prohibitions
against state legislation impairing the obligation of contracts and
against
ex post facto legislation before the latter was
limited to criminal and penal consequences.
Calder v.
Bull, 3 Dall. 386.
See Hale, The Supreme
Court and the Contract Clause, 57 Harv.L.Rev. 512, 621, 852.
[
Footnote 2/22]
See MR. JUSTICE BLACK dissenting in
McCart v.
Indianapolis Water Co., 302 U. S. 419,
302 U. S. 423;
Boudin, Truth and Fiction about the Fourteenth Amendment, 16
N.Y.U.L.Q.Rev.19.
[
Footnote 2/23]
It is precisely in cases where the Amendment has been made thus
effective, often by giving expansive scope to the idea of
"property," that its interpretations have failed to withstand the
test of time.
Compare Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.
S. 350,
with Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.
S. 236;
Adair v. United States, 208 U.
S. 161,
and Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S.
1,
with Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board,
313 U. S. 177,
313 U. S. 187;
Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45,
and Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.
S. 525,
with West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U. S. 379.
[
Footnote 2/24]
Cf. Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,
320 U. S. 591,
dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE JACKSON, 320 U.S. at
320 U. S.
628.
[
Footnote 2/25]
See Clark v. Nash, 198 U. S. 361;
Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U.
S. 112;
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S.
46,
206 U. S. 93-94;
United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co.,
174 U. S. 690,
174 U. S.
702-703;
Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining
Co., 200 U. S. 527;
Parley's Park Silver Mining Co. v. Kerr, 130 U.
S. 256;
Butte City Water Co. v. Baker,
196 U. S. 119;
Kendall v. San Juan Silver Mining Co., 144 U.
S. 658;
Clason v. Matko, 223 U.
S. 646.
[
Footnote 2/26]
Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U. S.
9;
Wurts v. Hoagland, 114 U.
S. 606;
Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.
S. 311;
cf. Ferry v. Spokane, P. & S. R.
Co., 258 U. S. 314;
Campbell v. California, 200 U. S. 87.
[
Footnote 2/27]
Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.
S. 190;
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,
220 U. S. 61;
Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.
S. 300;
Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior
Court, 284 U. S. 8;
Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission,
286 U. S. 210;
Hunter Co. v. McHugh, 320 U. S. 222.
[
Footnote 2/28]
See Hardwicke, The Rule of Capture, 13 Tex.L.Rev. 391,
414-422; Marshall and Meyers, Legal Planning of Petroleum
Production, 41 Yale L.J. 33, 48-52; Ely, The Conservation of Oil,
51 Harv.L.Rev. 1209, 1222-1225; Ford, Controlling the Production of
Oil, 30 Mich.L.Rev. 1170, 1181, 1192.
[
Footnote 2/29]
Independently of any statute, several states have granted
equitable relief against waste in order to protect the correlative
rights of common owners of a reservoir of gas or oil.
Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating Co., 117 Ky. 71, 77
S.W. 368;
Manufacturers Gas & Oil Co. v. Indiana Natural
Gas & Oil Co., 155 Ind. 461, 474-475;
Ross v.
Damm, 278 Mich. 388, 270 N.W. 722;
Higgins Oil & Fuel
Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co., 145 La. 233, 82 So. 206;
Atkinson
v. Virginia Oil & Gas Co., 72 W.Va. 707, 79 S.E. 647.
[
Footnote 2/30]
The Supreme Court of Texas has recently upheld administrative
action designed solely to protect correlative rights.
Corzelius
v. Harrell, 143 Tex. 509, 186 S.W.2d 961. Note, 24 Tex.L.Rev.
97.
[
Footnote 2/31]
Oklahoma can prevent agents of Republic from going on Peerless'
land by force of arms and there drilling a well and stealing gas.
The state's power to prevent larceny and trespass and to enjoin any
use of property that creates a nuisance for a neighboring property
owner also justifies the regulation of common property for the
mutual advantage of its several owners.
Head v. Amoskeag Mfg.
Co., 113 U. S. 9;
Bacon v. Walker, 204 U. S. 311.
Under certain circumstances, a state may compel one individual
to surrender private property solely to enable another to exploit
the potential resources of his private property. Thus, in
Clark
v. Nash, 198 U. S. 361, the
plaintiff's land could be made productive only by enlarging an
irrigation ditch across defendant's land, and in
Strickley v.
Highland Boy Gold Mining Company, 200 U.
S. 527, the mining company could deliver its ore to
market only by constructing an aerial bucket line across
defendant's land. Here, Peerless can exploit its property only if
Republic is compelled to take its gas to market. Moreover, until
Peerless is able to produce the gas under its land, this gas will
continue to be withdrawn by Republic. In effect, Republic is now
exploiting Peerless' property.
[
Footnote 2/32]
E.g., Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U. S.
9;
Wurts v. Hoagland, 114 U.
S. 606;
Fallbrook Irrigation District v.
Bradley, 164 U. S. 112;
Bacon v. Walker, 204 U. S. 311;
Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.
S. 531;
Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U. S.
22.
[
Footnote 2/33]
"It is submitted that, through the judicial and legislative
processes, correlative right-duty relations against injury and
noncompensated and preventable drainage do exist, but the
difficulty of finding and proving the facts in a particular
situation is such that the usual remedies of damages and injunction
might not be practicable. It seems more advisable that legislatures
enact statutes expressly declaring the existence of these
correlative right-duty relations in landowners, apart from public
rights against waste, and authorize an administrative agency, after
a finding of facts, to promulgate rules and regulations for their
protection and authorize the Commission or private owners to
enforce such rules and regulations through actions in the
courts."
Summers, Legal Rights against Drainage of Oil and Gas, 18
Tex.L.Rev. 27, 47.
[
Footnote 2/34]
300 U.S. at
300 U. S. 76-77.
This assumption is repeated several times in the opinion.
See 300 U.S. at
300 U. S. 58,
300 U. S. 67,
300 U. S. 69 and
300 U. S.
72-73.