1. The President's Executive Order No. 9809, issued under §
1 of the First War Powers Act of 1941 after the cessation of
hostilities but before the termination of a technical state of war,
validly consolidated the Office of Price Administration and three
other agencies into the Office of Temporary Controls. Pp.
331 U. S.
113-119.
(a) The war powers are adequate to deal with problems of law
enforcement which arise during the period of hostilities, but do
not cease with them. P.
331 U. S.
116.
(b) Section 1 of the First War Powers Act, authorizing the
President to redistribute functions among executive agencies,
authorizes the creation of a new agency and the consolidation
within it of functions and powers previously exercised by one or
more other agencies. P.
331 U. S.
116.
(c) The authority conferred upon the President by § 1 of
the First War Powers Act was not limited to the transfer of
functions from agencies existing when the Act became law. P.
331 U. S.
117.
(d) An incumbent of an office "existing by law," within the
meaning of § 2, at the time of the passage of the First War
Powers Act who has once been confirmed by the Senate need not be
confirmed again in order to exercise powers transferred to him by
the President from another officer appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate. P.
331 U. S.
118.
2. Under Rule 25 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the Temporary
Controls Administrator was properly substituted for the Price
Administrator in pending enforcement proceedings after the lifting
of most price controls -- there being "substantial need" for
continuing and maintaining enforcement proceedings previously
Page 331 U. S. 112
brought by the Price Administrator, since the Emergency Price
Control Act preserved accrued rights and liabilities thereunder. P.
331 U. S.
119.
3. Under § 201 of the Emergency Price Control Act, the
Price Administrator could delegate to district directors authority
to sign and issue subpoenas.
Cudahy Packing Co. v.
Holland, 315 U. S. 357,
distinguished. Pp.
331 U. S.
119-123.
156 F.2d 891, reversed; 81 U.S.App.D.C. 156, 156 F.2d 561,
affirmed.
No. 583. The Price Administrator applied to a District Court for
an order under § 202(e) of the Emergency Price Control Act, 56
Stat. 23, as amended, to enforce a subpoena
duces tecum
issued by a District Director of the Office of Price
Administration. The District Court denied and dismissed the
application. 65 F. Supp. 164. The Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed. 156 F.2d 891. This Court granted certiorari, 329 U.S.
705, and ordered substitution of the Temporary Controls
Administrator for the Price Administrator. 329 U.S. 688.
Reversed, p
331 U. S.
123.
No. 512. The Price Administrator applied to the District Court
of the United States for the District of Columbia for an order to
enforce a subpoena
duces tecum issued by the District
Director of the Office of Price Administration. That Court ordered
compliance with the subpoena. The United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia affirmed. 81 U.S.App.D.C. 156, 156
F.2d 561. This Court granted certiorari, 329 U.S. 705, and ordered
substitution of the Temporary Controls Administrator for the Price
Administrator. 329 U.S. 687.
Affirmed, p.
331 U. S.
123.
Page 331 U. S. 113
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases present the question whether the Emergency Price
Control Act, 56 Stat. 23, as amended, 50 U.S.C. App.Supp. V, §
901
et seq., authorizes the Administrator to delegate to
district directors authority to sign and issue subpoenas. In the
first of these cases, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit held that such authority did not exist, 156 F.2d 891; in
the second, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held
that it did. 156 F.2d 561. The cases are here on petitions for
writs of certiorari which we granted to resolve the conflict.
First. After we granted the petitions, we ordered, on
motion on the Acting Solicitor General, that Philip B. Fleming,
Temporary Controls Administrator, be substituted as a party in each
case in place of Paul A. Porter, Administrator, Office of Price
Administration, resigned. Thereafter, respondents in the first of
these cases filed a motion to vacate the order of substitution, a
motion which we deferred to the hearing on the merits. [
Footnote 1] The question
Page 331 U. S. 114
has now been briefed and argued, and we conclude that the motion
to vacate the order of substitution should be denied.
The Act was amended in 1946 to provide for its termination not
later than June 30, 1947, saving, however, rights and liabilities
incurred prior to the termination date. [
Footnote 2] By November 12, 1946, almost all
commodities (including services) were by administrative order
[
Footnote 3] made exempt from
price control. [
Footnote 4]
Price control had thus entered a temporary transition period. On
December 12, 1946, the President issued an Executive Order "for the
purpose of further effectuating the transition from war to peace
and in the interest of the internal management of the Government."
That order consolidated the Office of Price Administration and
three other agencies into the Office of Temporary Controls
[
Footnote 5] -- an agency in
the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the
President. The latter had previously been established pursuant to
the Reorganization
Page 331 U. S. 115
Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 561. [
Footnote 6] The Executive Order provided a Temporary
Controls Administrator, appointed by the President, to head the
Office of Temporary Controls, and vested in him,
inter
alia, the functions of the Price Administrator, including the
authority to maintain in his own name civil proceedings, whether or
not then pending, relating to matters theretofore under the
jurisdiction of the Price Administrator. Petitioner is the
Temporary Controls Administrator appointed by the President.
It is argued that the President had no authority to transfer the
functions of the Price Administrator to another agency and to vest
in an officer appointed by the President the power which the
Emergency Price Control Act, § 201, had conferred upon an
Administrator appointed by the President by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate. And it is said that, even though such
authority existed, it came to an end with the cessation of
hostilities.
By § 1 of the First War Powers Act of 1941, 55 Stat. 838,
50 U.S.C. App.Supp. V, § 601, the President is
"authorized to make such redistribution of functions among
executive agencies as he may deem necessary, including any
functions, duties, and powers hitherto by law conferred upon any
executive department, commission, bureau, agency, governmental
corporation, office, or officer, in such manner as in his judgment
shall seem best fitted to carry out the purposes of this title, and
to this end is authorized to make such regulations and to issue
such orders as he may deem necessary. . . ."
That power may be exercised "only in matters relating to the
conduct of the present war," § 1, and expires six months after
"the termination of the war." § 401.
Page 331 U. S. 116
On December 31, 1946, after the creation of the Office of
Temporary Controls, the President, while recognizing that "a state
of war still exists," by proclamation declared that hostilities had
terminated. [
Footnote 7] The
cessation of hostilities does not necessarily end the war power. It
was stated in
Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & W.
Co., 251 U. S. 146,
251 U. S. 161,
that the war power includes the power "to remedy the evils which
have arisen from its rise and progress," and continues during that
emergency.
Stewart v.
Kahn, 11 Wall. 493,
78 U. S. 507.
Whatever may be the reach of that power, it is plainly adequate to
deal with problems of law enforcement which arise during the period
of hostilities, but do not cease with them. No more is involved
here.
Section 1 of the First War Powers Act does not explicitly
provide for creation of a new agency which consolidates the
functions and powers previously exercised by one or more other
agencies. But the Act has been repeatedly construed by the
President to confer such authority. [
Footnote 8] Such construction by the Chief Executive,
being both contemporaneous and consistent, is entitled to great
weight.
See United States v. Jackson, 280 U.
S. 183,
280 U. S. 193;
Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U. S. 542,
321 U. S.
552-553. And the appropriation by Congress of funds for
the use of such agencies stands as confirmation and ratification of
the action of the Chief Executive.
Brooks v. Dewar,
313 U. S. 354,
313 U. S.
361.
Page 331 U. S. 117
Nor do we think there is merit in the contention that the First
War Powers Act gave the President authority to transfer functions
only from agencies in existence when that Act became law. It is
true that § 1 authorizes the President
"to make such redistribution of functions among executive
agencies as he may deem necessary, including any functions, duties,
and powers hitherto by law conferred upon"
any agency. But the latter clause is only an illustration of the
authority granted, not a limitation on it. It makes clear that the
authority extends to existing agencies, as well as to others. That
construction is supported by § 5 of the Act, which states
that, upon its termination, all executive and administrative
agencies
"shall exercise the same functions, duties, and powers as
heretofore or as hereafter by law may be provided, any
authorization of the President under this title to the contrary
notwithstanding."
As stated by the Emergency Court of Appeals, unless § 1
authorizes the President to redistribute functions of agencies
created after the passage of the Act, the reference in § 5 to
functions "hereafter" provided by law is "wholly meaningless."
California Lima Bean Growers Assn. v. Bowles, 150 F.2d
964, 967. Nor is that result affected by the subsequent enactment
of the Emergency Price Control Act, which, in § 201(b),
authorized the President to transfer any of the powers and
functions of the Office of Price Administration "with respect to a
particular commodity or commodities" to any government agency
having other functions relating to such commodities. Whatever
effect that provision may have, it does not purport to deal with
general enforcement functions, and so restricts in no way the
authority of the President under the First War Powers Act to
transfer them. Yet enforcement functions are all that are involved
in the present cases.
Page 331 U. S. 118
We need not decide whether, under the First War Powers Act, the
President had authority to transfer functions of an officer who
need be confirmed by the Senate to one appointed by the President
without Senate confirmation. For § 2 of that Act provides:
"That, in carrying out the purposes of this title, the President
is authorized to utilize, coordinate, or consolidate any executive
or administrative commissions, bureaus, agencies, governmental
corporations, offices, or officers now existing by law, to transfer
any duties or powers from one existing department, commission,
bureau, agency, governmental corporation, office, or officer to
another, to transfer the personnel thereof or any part of it either
by detail or assignment, together with the whole or any part of the
records and public property belonging thereto."
The authority to "utilize . . . offices, or officers now
existing by law" is sufficient to sustain the transfer of functions
under the Executive Order from Porter, resigned, to Fleming. For,
prior to the Act, Fleming had been appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate as Federal Works Administrator. [
Footnote 9] He thus was the incumbent
of an office "existing by law" at the time of the passage of the
Act, and, by virtue of § 2, could be the lawful recipient
through transfer by the President of the functions of other
agencies as well. To hold that an officer, previously confirmed by
the Senate, must be once more confirmed in order to exercise the
powers transferred to him by the President would be quite
inconsistent with the broad grant of power given the President by
the First War Powers Act. Any doubts on this score would, moreover,
be removed by the recognition by Congress in a recent appropriation
of the status of the Temporary Controls Administrator. [
Footnote 10]
Page 331 U. S. 119
That recognition was an acceptance or ratification by Congress
of the President's action in Executive Order No. 9809.
Swayne
& Hoyt, Ltd. v. United States, 300 U.
S. 297,
300 U. S.
301-302;
Brooks v. Dewar, supra.
For these reasons, Fleming is a successor in office of Porter,
and may be substituted as a party under Rule 25, Rules of Civil
Procedure. The rule requires a showing of "substantial need" for
continuing and maintaining the action. Though most of the controls
have been lifted, the Act is still in effect. Liabilities incurred
prior to the lifting of controls are not thereby washed out.
United States v. Hark, 320 U. S. 531,
320 U. S. 536;
Utah Junk Co. v. Porter, 328 U. S. 39,
328 U. S. 44;
Collins v. Porter, 328 U. S. 46,
328 U. S. 49.
And Congress has explicitly provided that accrued rights and
liabilities under the Emergency Price Control Act are preserved,
whether or not suit is started prior to the termination date of the
Act. [
Footnote 11] If
investigation were foreclosed at this stage, such rights as may
exist would be defeated, contrary to the policy of the Act.
Second. We come then to the merits. The Administrator,
by order, delegated the function of signing and issuing
Page 331 U. S. 120
subpoenas to regional administrators and district directors.
[
Footnote 12] Section 201(a)
of the Emergency Price Control Act provides in part:
"The Administrator, may subject to the civil service laws,
appoint such employees as he deems necessary in order to carry out
his functions and duties under this Act, and shall fix their
compensation in accordance with the Classification Act of 1923, as
amended."
Section 201(b) of the Act provides:
"The principal office of the Administrator shall be in the
District of Columbia, but he or any duly authorized representative
may exercise any or all of his powers in any place."
Practically identical provisions were included in § 4(b)
and (c) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 Stat. 1060, 1061, 1062,
29 U.S.C. § 204. The Court held in
Cudahy Packing Co. v.
Holland, 315 U. S. 357,
that the latter provisions did not authorize the Administrator
under that Act to delegate his power to sign and issue subpoenas.
Accordingly, the main controversy here is whether the
Cudahy decision controls this case. We do not think it
does.
The legislative history of the Act involved in the
Cudahy case showed that a provision granting authority to
delegate the subpoena power had been eliminated when the bill was
in Conference. On the other hand, the Senate Committee, in
reporting the bill that became the Emergency Price Control Act,
described § 201(a) as authorizing the Administrator to
"perform his duties through such employees or agencies by
delegating to them any of the powers given to him by the bill." And
it said that § 201(b) authorized him or "any representative or
other agency
Page 331 U. S. 121
to whom he may delegate any or all of his powers to exercise
such powers in any place." S.Rep. No.931, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., pp.
20, 21. In the
Cudahy case, the Act made expressly
delegate the power to gather data and make investigations, thus
lending support to the view that, when Congress desired to give
authority to delegate, it said so explicitly. In the present Act,
there is no provision which specifically authorizes delegation as
to a particular function. In the
Cudahy case, the Act made
applicable to the powers and duties of the Administrator the
subpoena provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
§§ 9 and 10, 38 Stat. 722, 723, 15 U.S.C. §§ 49
and 50, which only authorized either the Commission or its
individual members to sign subpoenas. The subpoena power under the
present Act is found in § 202(b), [
Footnote 13] and is not dependent on the provisions of
another Act having a history of its own. The Act involved in the
Cudahy case granted no broad rulemaking power. Section
201(d) of the present Act, however, provides:
"The Administrator may, from time to time, issue such
regulations and orders as he may deem necessary or proper in order
to carry out the purposes and provisions of this Act."
Such a rulemaking power may itself be an adequate source of
authority to delegate a particular function unless, by express
provision of the Act or by implication, it has been withheld.
See Plapao Laboratories, Inc. v. Farley, 67 App.D.C. 304,
92 F.2d 228. There is no provision in the present Act negativing
the existence of such authority so far as the subpoena power is
concerned. Nor can the
Page 331 U. S. 122
absence of such authority be fairly inferred from the history
and content of the Act. Thus, the presence of the rulemaking power,
together with the other factors differentiating this case from the
Cudahy case, indicates that the authority granted by
§ 201(a) and (b) should not be read restrictively.
As stated by the court in
Porter v. Murray, 156 F.2d
781, 786, 787, the overwhelming nature of the price control program
entrusted to the Administrator suggests that the Act should be
construed so as to give it the administrative flexibility necessary
for prompt and expeditious action on a multitude of fronts. The
program of price control inaugurated probably the most
comprehensive legal controls over the economy ever attempted. We
would hesitate to conclude that all the various functions granted
the Administrator need be performed personally by him or under his
personal direction. Certainly, so far as the investigative
functions were concerned, he could hardly be expected, in view of
the magnitude of the task, [
Footnote 14] to exercise
Page 331 U. S. 123
his personal discretion in determining whether a particular
investigation should be launched. Delay might do injury beyond
repair. The pyramiding in Washington of all decisions on law
enforcement would be apt to end in paralysis. To tempt the
Administrator to solve the problem by supplying all his offices
with subpoenas signed in blank would not further the development of
orderly and responsible administration. These considerations
reinforce the construction of the Act which allows the
Administrator authority to delegate his subpoena power.
The other objections to the subpoenas are without merit.
We reverse the judgment in
Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking and
Lumber Co., and affirm the judgment in
Raley v.
Fleming.
So ordered.
* Together with No. 512,
Raley et al., trading as Raley's
Food Store v. Fleming, Temporary Controls Administrator, on
certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia.
[
Footnote 1]
Compare Porter v. American Distilling
Co., 71 F. Supp.
483;
Porter v. Bowers, 70 F.
Supp. 751, and
Bowles v. Ell-Carr Co.,
Inc., 71 F. Supp.
482,
with Porter v. Wilson, 69 F. Supp.
447, and
Porter v. Hirahara, 69 F. Supp. 441.
[
Footnote 2]
Pub.L. 548, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. Section 1(b) now provides:
"The provisions of this Act, and all regulations, orders, price
schedules, and requirements thereunder, shall terminate on June 30,
1947, or upon the date of a proclamation by the President, or upon
the date specified in a concurrent resolution by the two Houses of
the Congress, declaring that the further continuance of the
authority granted by this Act is not necessary in the interest of
the national defense and security, whichever date is the earlier;
except that as to offenses committed, or rights or liabilities
incurred, prior to such termination date, the provisions of this
Act and such regulations, orders, price schedules, and requirements
shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of
sustaining any proper suit, action, or prosecution with respect to
any such right, liability, or offense."
[
Footnote 3]
Express provisions for decontrol where added by the 1946
amendments.
See, for example, § 1a(b-h).
[
Footnote 4]
See Supplementary Order 193, November 12, 1946, 11
Fed.Reg.13464, as amended November 19, 1946, 11 Fed.Reg.13637.
[
Footnote 5]
Exec.Order No. 9809, 11 Fed.Reg.14281.
[
Footnote 6]
See Reorganization Plan I, 5 U.S.C. § 133t note; 4
Fed.Reg. 3864; 6 Fed.Reg.192.
[
Footnote 7]
Proclamation 2714, 12 Fed.Reg. 1.
[
Footnote 8]
Each of the following agencies was a new agency created by
Executive Order to exercise powers formerly vested in other
agencies or to perform new functions: National Housing Agency,
Exec.Order No. 9070, 7 Fed.Reg.1529; War Food Administration,
Exec.Order No. 9334, 8 Fed.Reg.5423; Office of War Mobilization,
Exec.Order No. 9347, 8 Fed.Reg.7207; Office of Economic Warfare,
Exec.Order No. 9361, 8 Fed.Reg.9861; Foreign Economic
Administration, Exec.Order No. 9380, 8 Fed.Reg.13081; Surplus War
Property Administration, Exec.Order No. 9425, 9 Fed.Reg. 2071.
[
Footnote 9]
December 4, 1941.
See 87 Cong.Rec. 9413.
[
Footnote 10]
Pub.L. 20, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 61 Stat. 14, under the heading
"Executive Office Of The President Office for Emergency
Management," the following:
"
Office of Temporary Controls"
"Salaries and expenses: For an additional amount, fiscal year
1947, for the Office of Price Administration transferred by
Executive Order 9809 of December 12, 1946, to the Office of
Temporary Controls, $7,051,752, to be available for the payment of
terminal leave only:
Provided, That it is the intent of
the Congress that the funds heretofore and herein appropriated
shall include all expenses incident to the closing and liquidation
of the Office of Price Administration and the Office of Temporary
Controls by June 30, 1947."
[
Footnote 11]
See § 1(b)
supra, note 2 And, for the general statute preventing the
extinguishment of liability under a repealed statute, unless the
repealing act expressly provides for it,
see Rev.Stat.
§ 13, as amended, 58 Stat. 118, 1 U.S.C.Supp. V, §
29.
[
Footnote 12]
Revised General Order 53, May 13, 1944, 9 Fed.Reg. 5191.
[
Footnote 13]
Section 202(b) provides in part:
"The Administrator may administer oaths and affirmations and
may, whenever necessary, by subpoena require any such person to
appear and testify or to appear and produce documents, or both at
any designated place."
[
Footnote 14]
The following statistics indicate the volume of litigation and
investigations involved:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
1943 1944 1945 1946
Civil Cases commenced by
United States in District
Courts under Emergency
Price Control Act.* (Fiscal
years ending June 30) 2,219 6,524 28,283 31,094
Investigations completed by
Office of Price
Administration.**
(Calendar years) 652,851 333,151 193,348 106,240***
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
* (Rep.Dir.Adm.Off.U.S.Courts (1943) Table 7;
Id. 1944
Table 7;
Id. (1945) Table C3;
Id. (1946) Table
C3.)
** (Quarterly Rep.O.P.A.: Eighth, p. 71; Twelfth, p. 75;
Seventeenth, p. 104; Eighteenth, p. 82; Nineteenth, p. 95.)
*** First nine months only.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON, concurring.
I concur in the opinion and result. But the issue here is so
related to other problems that I desire to state my grounds.
I would be reluctant to adopt a construction of an Act such as
the Emergency Price Control Act which would certainly impede its
administration unless it were necessary to carry out the intent of
Congress or to protect fundamental individual rights.
If the Administrator may not delegate his power to sign
subpoenas, but must personally sign all subpoenas issued in the
process of enforcement throughout the United States, one of two
practices would be certain to result. He might sign large batches
of blank subpoenas and turn them over to subordinates to be filled
in over his signature. Or he might sign batches of subpoenas
already made out by subordinates, probably without reading them and
certainly without examining the causes for their issuance or
Page 331 U. S. 124
the scope of the information required. The personal signature of
the Administrator on the subpoena under those circumstances is no
protection to individual rights.
Of all the subpoenas issued by administrative authority, a very
small percentage are contested. The important thing for protection
of the individual is that, when he does have reasons for resisting
obedience, he can obtain a hearing. I am in doubt as to whether
under this Act and the regulations for its administration a person
who has reasons for resisting the subpoena has any administrative
review or remedy. But, in any event, he cannot be punished for
contempt until a court order for its enforcement has issued and has
been disobeyed.
Enforcement of such subpoenas by the courts is not, and should
not be, automatic. So long as they are subject to full inquiry at
this point, it does not seem to me important to the individual or
inconsistent with the policy of Congress that the subpoena issue by
a subordinate of the Administrator. If the courts were to be shorn
of their power of independent inquiry before enforcement, and I
have thought we were tending that way,
cf. dissent in
Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U. S. 585, I
should expect Congress to intend greater responsibility at the
point of original issue. I concur only because I think adequate
judicial safeguards exist.