Respondent was ordered by his local draft board to report to the
board on November 11, 1918, at 9 a.m., for "immediate military
service," and was informed that, from that day and hour, he would
be "a soldier in the military service of the United States." He
reported as ordered, and as made the leader of a group of draftees
awaiting entrainment for a mobilization camp. Later that day, he
was told that, because of the Armistice, the draft call had been
canceled, and that he would not go to camp, but could return home
and await further orders. Four days later, he received a notice
from the board that all registrants who had been inducted but had
not entrained were discharged from the Army, and that the
cancellation of the induction orders would have the effect of an
honorable discharge from the Army.
Held: the War Department acted within its power in
later granting to the respondent a "discharge from draft," rather
than a certificate of honorable discharge from the Army. P.
329 U. S.
544.
81 U.S.App.D.C. ___, 154 F.2d 319, reversed.
Respondent brought suit in the District Court against the
Secretary of War and The Adjutant General of the Army praying a
mandatory injunction to compel issuance to him of a certificate of
honorable discharge from the Army. The District Court dismissed the
complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed. 81 U.S.App.D.C. ___, 154
F.2d 319. This Court granted certiorari. 329 U.S. 695.
Reversed, p.
329 U. S. 545.
Page 329 U. S. 540
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
On October 28, 1944, respondent brought this action in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia against
the then Secretary of War and Adjutant General of the Army.
[
Footnote 1] He prayed for a
judgment declaring that he had served in the United States Army
from November 11, 1918 (Armistice Day) until November 14, 1918, and
that, for this service, he was entitled to a certificate of
honorable discharge from the Army, instead of the certificate of
"Discharge from the Draft" which had been issued to him. He also
prayed for a mandatory injunction to compel issuance to him of a
certificate of honorable discharge from the Army.
The complainant alleged that, on November 9, 1918, he received a
communication from his local draft board directing him to report to
the board at Davenport, Iowa, for "immediate military service" at 9
a.m., November 11, 1918, and stating that, from that day and hour,
he would be "a soldier in the military service of the United
States;" that he reported as ordered, and was made the leader of
the drafted group there assembled which was to board a train that
day for a mobilization camp at Camp Dodge, Iowa; that, during the
day, he was told that, because of the Armistice, the draft call had
been canceled; that he and the other draftees would not go to Camp
Dodge, but could return home, still soldiers, and await further
orders; that, four days later, he received a notice from his board
that, by telegraphic order of the Provost Marshal, acting under
instructions of the President, all induction orders throughout
Page 329 U. S. 541
the Nation had been canceled, and all registrants who, like
himself, had been inducted but not entrained, were discharged from
the Army, and that cancellation of their induction orders would
have the effect of the honorable discharge from the Army. He
further alleged that, in January, 1919, he received a certificate
dated November 14, 1918, entitled "Discharge from Draft,"
accompanying which was a check for four dollars ($4.00) bearing the
notation "Final Pay;" that, because of the foregoing circumstances,
he had always assumed that his discharge had the effect of an
honorable discharge from the Army; that he had obtained certain tax
exemptions from the Iowa on the ground that he had such a
discharge, but was later authoritatively denied exemptions by
reason of a decision of the State supreme court,
Lamb v.
Kroeger, 233 Iowa 730, 8 N.W.2d 405; that it was after this
decision that he applied for and was denied an honorable discharge
by the Secretary and Adjutant General.
The District Court sustained petitioner's motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause of act on
for which relief could be granted. Other grounds of the motion, not
passed on by the District Court, were that the alleged cause of
action was not justiciable, was barred by laches, and that the type
of certificate to be issued draftees under the circumstances
alleged was a matter solely within the discretion of the Secretary
of War and not a subject for judicial review. The Court of Appeals
reversed, rejecting all the grounds set up in the motion to
dismiss. 154 F.2d 319. This holding not only decided important
questions concerning the power of the War Department, but also
upset twenty-five years of important War Department rulings and
practices which have affected, and will hereafter affect, the
status and claims of thousands of draftees of the First World War.
This called for our review, and we granted certiorari.
Page 329 U. S. 542
Whether and to what extent the courts have power to review or
control the War Department's action in fixing the type of discharge
certificates issued to soldiers [
Footnote 2] is a question that we need not here determine;
nor need we decide whether the action should have been dismissed
because of laches. For we are satisfied that the War Department was
within its power in granting a discharge from draft, rather than
the type of discharge it granted soldiers who performed military
service after having become fully and finally absorbed into that
service.
The only statute which directly bears upon "certificates of
discharge" for enlisted men, Article of War 108, set out below,
[
Footnote 3] does not
particularly prescribe the types or contents of certificates
authorized to be granted. But, pursuant to authority granted by
Congress, [
Footnote 4] the War
Department many years ago promulgated Army Regulation No. 150,
which provided for three types of certificates of discharge:
honorable, dishonorable, and unclassified. [
Footnote 5] An honorable discharge was one granted to a
soldier whose conduct in service had been such as to warrant his
reenlistment.
Page 329 U. S. 543
This regulation was well suited to fit cases of soldiers who had
enlisted under ordinary conditions, had seen service, and had been
discharged in the course of regular Army routine. On its face,
however, it shows how poorly it was adapted to fit the
extraordinary circumstances bound to develop in connection with a
nationwide program for passing upon acceptances, rejections, and
discharges of draftees in the course of their progress from their
homes to their complete and final integration into the Army. So,
after the passage of the 1917 Draft Act, 40 Stat. 76, the War
Department, on January 12, 1918, issued its Circular No. 651, in
which it made provision for men discharged from draft as
distinguished from men discharged from the Army. This provision, in
effect when respondent reported for induction, had particular,
though not necessarily exclusive, reference to draftees rejected
for one reason or another at mobilization camps after their
induction at their local draft boards. But, despite the fact that
draftees became subject to military law and duty from the moment of
their arrival for entrainment at the local board, Selective Service
Regulation 174-176 provided that they nevertheless were not finally
accepted for military service, and could be rejected after arrival
at camp. [
Footnote 6] And it
was not until
Page 329 U. S. 544
they had been finally accepted that they could or would be
assigned to full-fledged duty as soldiers.
The Discharge from Draft Form No. 638, referred to in Circular
No. 651, was originally prepared for draftees rejected at camp
after induction "on account of physical unfitness, dependency,
etc." Form No. 638 had been in use long prior to the respondent's
rejection on the ground that the Government did not need his
services after the Armistice. Had the Armistice not been declared,
had respondent gone on to Camp Dodge, and had he then been rejected
for any reason there, he would have received not an honorable
discharge from the Army, but a "Discharge from Draft." Yet we are
asked to give the regulations and certificates a judicial
construction, contrary to the Army's construction, whereby
respondent, who got no farther than his local board, would stand in
a better status than the tens of thousands of other draftees who
came much closer to complete integration into the Army than he ever
did.
An argument to support this contention is that the telegraphic
order issued from Army headquarters on Armistice Day, which
canceled entrainment orders for respondent and about 155,000 other
draftees then ready for entrainment, provided that all of them were
"discharged from the Army." But that same order stated that "[t]he
issue of formal papers of discharge will be considered and
determined later," and that the purpose of the telegraphic order
was "merely to cancel outstanding calls and stop the entrainment
thereunder of men for the Army." And, when "the issue of formal
papers of discharge" was "later" considered, it resulted in War
Department Circular No. 111 of 1918. That circular was the
follow-up of the President's Armistice Day draft cancellation
order, and, as foreshadowed by the Armistice Day order, this
circular prescribed with definiteness the type of "formal papers of
discharge" which this respondent and others like him would later
receive. It was a "Discharge from Draft."
Page 329 U. S. 545
No statute or previous Army Regulation had provided for the
extraordinary situation which developed on Armistice Day, and which
made it necessary for the President to halt the processing of these
thousands of men and direct that they return to their homes. When
this new situation arose, it was certainly within the province of
the War Department to provide for its solution by, among other
things, issuing to those returned home an appropriate form of
certificate, whether of the honorable discharge variety, a
"discharge from the draft," or some special form designed
specifically for the occasion. Respondent was inducted into the
Army and was discharged before he reached a mobilization camp for
final processing. His discharge adequately indicates these facts.
The law demands no more.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
The Secretary of War and The Adjutant General against whom the
action was originally instituted are no longer in office; their
successors have been properly substituted as parties.
[
Footnote 2]
See Denby v. Berry, 51 App.D.C. 335, 279 F. 317,
263 U. S. 263 U.S.
29;
Davis v. Woodring, 72 App.D.C. 83, 111 F.2d 523;
Palmer v. United States, 72 Ct.Cl. 401;
Wilbur v.
United States, 281 U. S. 206;
cf. 58 Stat. 286, 38 U.S.C.Supp. IV, § 693h.
[
Footnote 3]
"No enlisted man, lawfully inducted into the military service of
the United States, shall be discharged from said service without a
certificate of discharge signed by a field officer of the regiment
or other organization to which the enlisted man belongs. . . ."
39 Stat. 619, 668.
[
Footnote 4]
18 Stat. 337, 10 U.S.C. § 16;
See also United States v.
Eliason, 16 Pet. 291,
41 U. S.
301-302.
[
Footnote 5]
Paragraph 150 of the Army Regulations of 1913, corrected to
April 15, 1917, was as follows:
"150. Blank forms for discharge and final statements will be
furnished by The Adjutant General's Department, and will be
retained in the personal custody of company commanders. Discharge
certificates will be used in the discharge of enlisted men and for
no other purpose, and will be of three classes: for honorable
discharge, for discharge, and for dishonorable discharge."
"They will be used as follows:"
"1. The blank for honorable discharge, when the soldier's
conduct has been such as to warrant his reenlistment and his
service has been honest and faithful."
"2. The blank for dishonorable discharge, for dishonorable
discharge by sentence of a court martial or a military
commission."
"3. The blank for discharge when the soldier is discharged
except as specified under sections 1 and 2 of this paragraph
(C.A.R. Nos. 14 and 34)."
[
Footnote 6]
Cf. Gibson v. United States and Dodgez v. United
States, 329 U. S. 338.