1. The decision of this case on the merits is governed by
Utah Junk Co. v. Porter, ante p.
328 U. S. 39. P.
328 U. S.
49.
2. While a suit for treble damages under § 205(e) of the
Emergency Price Control Act was pending in the District Court
against petitioners, they filed with the Price Administrator a
protest under 203(a) seeking to have the regulation on which the
enforcement proceeding was based declared invalid or inapplicable.
The protest was dismissed by the Price Administrator, and
petitioners' ensuing complaint in the Emergency Court of Appeals
was dismissed by that court without opinion. Upon a complaint filed
by leave of the District Court under § 204(e) of the Act, the
Emergency Court of Appeals sustained the validity of the regulation
but refused to pass on its applicability to petitioners.
Held that the judgment of the Emergency Court of Appeals
dismissing the complaint in the protest proceeding under §
203(a) was not rendered moot by its judgment sustaining the
validity of the regulation in the proceeding under § 204(e).
P.
328 U. S.
48.
3. The fact that Congress, by the 1944 amendment of the
Emergency Price Control Act, granted a limited opportunity for
review of a regulation by the Emergency Court of Appeals by leave
of a district court in which an enforcement proceeding is pending,
neither repealed nor qualified the protest proceeding originally
authorized by § 203(a). The two methods of securing a hearing
on the validity and applicability of a price regulation are
cumulative, and not alternative. P.
328 U. S.
49.
4. A person against whom a treble damage suit for violation of a
regulation under the Emergency Price Control Act is pending, is a
"person subject to . . . such regulation" within the meaning of
§ 203(a) of the Act, although the regulation has since been
revoked or superseded.
United States v. Hark, 320 U.
S. 531. P.
328 U. S.
49.
Reversed.
Page 328 U. S. 47
Petitioners filed with the Price Administrator a protest under
the Emergency Price Control Act. The Price Administrator denied the
protest. The Emergency Court of Appeals dismissed the petitioners'
complaint. This Court granted certiorari. 326 U.S. 710.
Reversed, p.
328 U. S.
49.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners were stockholders in a distilling corporation on the
dissolution of which in December, 1942, they received as their
share of the assets warehouse receipts covering the bulk whiskey
owned by the corporation. Early in January, 1943, they sold these
receipts at a price above that fixed by the Administrator for bulk
whiskey, Maximum Price Regulation 193, 7 Fed.Reg. 6006 (August 4,
1942), on the assumption that the receipts constituted "securities"
expressly exempt from the pricing provisions.
On the basis of the sale of these certificates, the
Administrator, under § 205(e) of the Emergency Price Control
Act, 56 Stat. 23, 34, 50 U.S.C. App. § 925(e), brought a suit
for treble damages against the petitioner to recover approximately
$6,800,000. That suit is still pending. In May, 1945, petitioners,
invoking the authority of § 203(a), 56 Stat. 23, 31, 58 Stat.
632, 638, 50 U.S.C. App. § 923(a), sought to have the
regulation on which the enforcement proceedings against them were
based declared
Page 328 U. S. 48
invalid or inapplicable by a protest filed with the
Administrator. He dismissed it on the authority of
Thomas Paper
Stock Co. v. Bowles,148 F.2d 831, the ruling of which we have
reversed in
Utah Junk Co. v. Porter, decided this day,
ante, p.
328 U. S. 39.
Petitioners then went to the Emergency Court, which dismissed the
complaint without opinion, and we granted certiorari. 326 U.S. 710.
Prior to the petition for certiorari, petitioners obtained leave of
the trial court in the treble damage action to file a complaint
with the Emergency Court under § 204(e) of the Act, 58 Stat.
632, 639, 50 U.S.C. App. § 924(e), and, on January 10, 1946,
that court sustained the validity of the regulation.
Collins v.
Bowles,152 F.2d 760.
The Government contends that the latter decision of the
Emergency Court renders moot the judgment of that Court dismissing
the complaint, which is the only judgment now before us. This Court
is powerless to decide a case if its decision "cannot affect the
rights of the litigants in the case before it."
St. Pierre v.
United States, 319 U. S. 41,
319 U. S. 42.
The decision of this case may affect the rights of the litigants.
The Emergency Court sustained the challenged regulation. It refused
to pass on the applicability of the regulation to the petitioners.
It left that question to the District Court before which the treble
damage suit is pending. Had petitioners' contentions come before
the Emergency Court through the protest proceedings under §
203(a), that court would have adjudicated both issues.
Conklin
Pen Co. v. Bowles,152 F.2d 764;
Collins v. Bowles,
supra. And, in the event that the Emergency Court had found
the regulation inapplicable and such decision had been made before
a judgment was rendered in the District Court, its ruling would be
binding upon the District Court. Under § 204(e)(2)(ii),
consideration of a protest under § 203(a) is not a ground for
staying the
Page 328 U. S. 49
proceedings in the District Court, since the protest proceeding
did not precede the suit in the District Court, and under the same
provisions of the Act, determination of the protest proceeding
under § 203(a) can have no retroactive effect once the
District Court has entered its judgment. But the opportunity for
securing a decision from the Emergency Court through the protest
proceeding before
a judgment in the District Court is entered has practical
significance, and makes this a living, and not a hypothetical,
controversy.
On the merits, the case is governed by our decision in
Utah
Junk Co. v. Porter. The petitioner in this case had a right to
have his protest considered by the Administrator and, in case of
denial, to resort to the Emergency Court of Appeals. The fact that
Congress, in 1944, gave a limited opportunity to go to the
Emergency Court by leave of the District Court before which an
enforcement proceeding is pending, § 204(e), neither repealed
nor qualified the protest proceeding originally designed by §
203(a). The two modes of securing a hearing on the validity and
applicability of the price regulation are cumulative, and not
alternative. The Administrator advances no argument to distinguish
the case from that of
Utah Junk Co. v. Porter. His
contention that the petitioner is not a "person subject to . . .
[the] regulation," § 203(a), is amply refuted by the
continuing liability of the petitioners,
United States v.
Hark, 320 U. S. 531, for
some $6,800,000, should their arguments as to the invalidity and
inapplicability of the regulation be rejected when the case is
considered on the merits.
It is superfluous to discuss other issues raised in this
case.
Judgment reversed.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
