1. The Emergency Price Control Act applies to the sale by the
Washington of timber growing on lands granted by Congress to the
State "for the support of common schools," notwithstanding a
provision in the Enabling Act providing that these lands shall "be
disposed of only at public sale, and at a price not less than" $10
per acre and a provision of the state constitution that these lands
shall not be sold except "at public auction to the highest bidder"
at a price not less than the full market value found after
appraisal or "the price prescribed in the grant" of these lands. P.
327 U. S.
98.
2. The Emergency Price Control Act applies generally to sales of
commodities by the States. P.
327 U. S.
98.
(a) The definition in § 302(h) making the Act applicable to
the United States "or any other government, or any of its political
subdivisions, or any agency of the foregoing," clearly is broad
enough to include the States. P.
327 U. S.
98.
Page 327 U. S. 93
(b) It would frustrate the purposes of the Act for the courts to
read exemptions into it which Congress did not see fit to put in
the language, since excessive prices for rents or commodities
charged by a State would produce exactly the same conditions as
would be produced were these prices charged by others. P.
327 U. S.
99.
3. A special exemption cannot be read into the Act in order to
permit States holding land granted for school purposes to charge
more than the ceiling price set for timber. P.
327 U. S.
100.
While congressional grants of land to the States for school
purposes transferred exclusive ownership and control over those
lands to the States, no part of all the history concerning these
grants indicates a purpose on the part of Congress to enter into a
permanent agreement with the States under which they would be free
to use the lands in a manner which would conflict with valid
legislation enacted by Congress in the national interest. P.
327 U. S.
100.
4. As thus construed, the Act is constitutional. P.
327 U. S.
100.
(a) While the State does have power to own and control the
school lands here involved and to sell the lands or the timber
growing on them, this power is subordinate to the power of Congress
to fix maximum prices in order to carry on war. P.
327 U. S.
101.
(b) To hold otherwise would impair the constitutional grant of
power to make war, which was a prime purpose of the Federal
Government's establishment. P.
327 U. S.
102.
(c) The Tenth Amendment does not operate as a limitation upon
the powers, express or implied, delegated to the National
Government. P.
327 U. S.
102.
5. Section 201(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act
specifically empowers the Price Administrator to commence suits to
enjoin violations of that Act and authorizes attorneys employed by
him to represent him in such suits. Therefore, 28 U.S.C. §
485, making it the duty of district attorneys to prosecute most
civil actions to which the United States is a party, is not
applicable to such proceedings. P.
327 U. S.
96.
6. Where the complaint in a suit against a state officer to
enjoin violations of the Emergency Price Control Act does not
challenge the constitutionality of the state statute, but merely
alleges that its enforcement would violate the Emergency Price
Control Act, § 266 of the Judicial Code does not require that
the case be tried by a three-judge court. P.
327 U. S.
97.
7. Neither Art. III, § 2, cl. 2, of the Constitution,
giving this Court original jurisdiction of all cases in which a
State is a party, nor
Page 327 U. S. 94
§ 233 of the Judicial Code, giving this Court exclusive
jurisdiction to try cases between a State and the United States,
prevents a district court from having jurisdiction to try suits to
enjoin state officers from violating the Emergency Price Control
Act. P.
327 U. S.
97.
(a) Consistently with Art. III of the Constitution, Congress can
give the district courts jurisdiction to try controversies between
a State and the United States. P.
327 U. S.
97.
(b) Section 205(c) of the Emergency Price Control Act
specifically gives the district courts jurisdiction over all
enforcement suits, and supersedes § 233 of the Judicial Code
to that extent. P.
327 U. S.
97.
8. While the Emergency Price Control Act denies a defendant in
an enforcement proceeding the right to challenge the validity of
the regulation sought to be enforced (since exclusive initial
jurisdiction to determine this question is vested in the Emergency
Court of Appeals), it does not deny him the right to attack the Act
itself on constitutional grounds. P.
327 U. S.
98.
9. In reviewing a judgment in an enforcement proceeding, this
Court ordinarily would not pass on the statutory authority of the
Price Administrator to promulgate a regulation, since Congress has
granted exclusive initial jurisdiction to determine that question
to the Emergency Court of Appeals. P.
327 U. S.
98.
10. It will do so, however, where the right of Congress to
regulate certain prices is challenged on constitutional grounds, if
it is not a device to attack the regulations indirectly. P.
327 U. S.
98.
149 F.2d 777 affirmed.
After litigation instituted in a state court by the bidders for
certain timber on school lands of the Washington had resulted in a
holding by the state supreme court that the Emergency Price Control
Act did not bar the sale of school land timber at a price above the
ceiling fixed pursuant to that Act,
Soundview. Pulp Co. v.
Taylor, 21 Wash. 2d 261, the Price Administrator instituted
suit in a federal district court to enjoin the State Commissioner
of Public Lands and the successful bidder at a public auction from
completing a sale of school land timber at a price above the
ceiling fixed by Maximum Price Regulation No. 460, 8 Fed.Reg.
11850, as amended, 8 Fed.Reg. 13023. The district court denied the
injunction and dismissed the complaint. The circuit court of
Page 327 U. S. 95
appeals reversed. 149 F.2d 777. This Court granted certiorari.
326 U.S. 706.
Affirmed, p.
327 U. S. 103.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Congressional Enabling Act providing for the Washington's
admission to the Union granted certain lands to that State "for the
support of common schools." Section 10, 25 Stat. 676, 679. Section
11 of the Enabling Act provided that these lands should "be
disposed of only at public sale, and at a price not less than ten
dollars per acre. . . ." The State Constitution, art. 16,
§§ 1, 2, provides that these lands shall not be sold
except "at public auction to the highest bidder" at a price which
may not be below both the full market value found after appraisal,
and "the price prescribed in the grant" of these lands. In 1943,
the State Commissioner of Public Lands held a public auction for
the sale of timber on school lands. At that auction, the Soundview
Pulp Company, one of the respondents, bid $86,335.39 for some of
the timber. This amount exceeded by approximately $9,000.00 the
ceiling price fixed by Maximum Price Regulation No. 460. [
Footnote 1] The Price Administrator
advised Soundview that consummation of the sale at the bid price
would constitute a violation of the Regulation
Page 327 U. S. 96
and of the Emergency Price Control Act. [
Footnote 2] Thereafter, Soundview and the unsuccessful
bidder, Coos Bay Pulp Corporation, commenced actions in the State
Courts, seeking an adjudication as to the legality of Soundview's
bid and of the proposed transfer of timber to Soundview. This
resulted in a holding by the State Supreme Court that the Emergency
Price Control Act did not bar the sale of school land timber at
prices above the ceiling.
Soundview Pulp Co. v. Taylor, 21
Wash. 2d 261, 150 P.2d 839. When, after this judgment was rendered,
the parties were about to complete the sale, the Price
Administrator commenced this action in the federal District Court
to enjoin the State Commissioner of Public Lands and Soundview from
completing the timber transaction at a price above the ceiling
fixed by the Regulation. The District Court held that the Emergency
Price Control Act did not grant the Price Administrator authority
to set maximum prices for school land timber sold by the State. The
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 149 F.2d 777. Because the
Circuit Court's decision conflicted with that of the Supreme Court
of Idaho in
Twin Falls County v. Hulbert, 156 P.2d 319, we
granted certiorari in both cases.
Before considering the principal questions raised by the State,
we shall at the outset briefly dispose of certain procedural
contentions. The State urges that the complaint should have been
dismissed because it was signed by attorneys employed by the Price
Administrator, and not by the District Attorney or members of the
Department of Justice. True, 28 U.S.C. § 485 makes it the duty
of every district attorney to prosecute most civil actions to which
the United States is a party. But this section does not prescribe
the procedure under the Emergency Price Control Act, for that Act
specifically empowers the Administrator to commence actions such as
this one, and authorizes
Page 327 U. S. 97
attorneys employed by him to represent him in such actions.
§ 201(a). The State contends further that this case should
have been tried by a district court composed of three judges,
because Section 266 of the Judicial Code requires such a proceeding
whenever enforcement of a state statute is sought to be enjoined on
the ground that the statute is unconstitutional. But here, the
complaint did not challenge the constitutionality of the State
statute, but alleged merely that its enforcement would violate the
Emergency Price Control Act. Consequently a three-judge court is
not required.
Ex parte Bransford, 310 U.
S. 354,
310 U. S.
358-359;
Query v. United States, 316 U.
S. 486,
316 U. S.
488-489. Another procedural point urged by the State is
that, since this is in effect a controversy between the United
States and the Washington, the United States Supreme Court has
exclusive jurisdiction under Article 3, Section 2, Clause 2, of the
United States Constitution, and the District Court lacked power to
try the case. But it is well settled that, despite Article 3,
Congress can give the district courts jurisdiction to try
controversies between a state and the United States. [
Footnote 3] Congress has given the district
court power to try cases such as this one. While Section 233 of the
Judicial Code does give this Court exclusive jurisdiction to try
cases between a state and the United States, section 205(c) of the
Emergency Price Control Act specifically provides that the District
Court shall have jurisdiction over all enforcement suits. To that
extent, section 205(c) of the Price Control Act supersedes section
233 of the Judicial Code.
United States v. California,
297 U. S. 175,
297 U. S.
186.
The State's principal contention is that sales by a state, such
as the one here involved, are not and cannot be made subject to
price control. Maximum Price Regulation No. 460, which the State's
sale of timber allegedly violated,
Page 327 U. S. 98
specifically provides that it is applicable to sales by states.
The State makes the following contentions: (1) Insofar as the
Regulation applies to state sales, it is unauthorized by the
Emergency Price Control Act, since Congress did not intend that Act
to apply to states. (2) Even if the Act was intended to apply to
state sales, the Act should not be construed as authorizing the
Price Administrator to fix a maximum price at which timber on
school land grants can be sold by states. (3) If the Act is so
construed, it violates the Fifth and Tenth Amendments to the
Constitution.
We ordinarily would not pass on the statutory authority of the
Administrator to promulgate the Regulation in a proceeding such as
this one. For Congress has granted exclusive initial jurisdiction
to determine this question to the Emergency Court of Appeals.
Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U. S. 182.
But, while the Act thus denies a defendant in an enforcement
proceeding the right to challenge the validity of the Regulation,
it does not deny him the right to attack the Emergency Price
Control Act itself on Constitutional grounds.
Yakus v. United
States, 321 U. S. 414,
321 U. S. 430.
Of course, this right may not be utilized as a means of indirectly
attacking the regulations themselves, instead of the statute. But
here, petitioner's third contention that Congress lacks authority
to regulate the prices of state school land timber extends beyond
the implementing regulation and strikes at the Act itself. In order
to reach this Constitutional question, we first have to decide
whether the Act, properly interpreted, is applicable to sales by
states, including sales of timber on school grant lands.
The Emergency Price Control Act grants to the Price
Administrator broad powers to set maximum prices for commodities
and rents, and makes it unlawful for "any person" to violate these
maximum price regulations. Section 302(h) defines a "person" as
including
"an individual,
Page 327 U. S. 99
corporation, partnership, association, or any other organized
group of persons, or legal successor or representative of any of
the foregoing, and includes the United States or any agency
thereof, or any other government, or any of its political
subdivisions, or any agency of any of the foregoing."
This language on its face and given its ordinary meaning, would
appear to be broad enough to include any person, natural or
artificial, or any group or agency, public or private, which sells
commodities [
Footnote 4] or
charges rents. The argument that the Act should not be construed so
as to include a state within the enumerated list made subject to
price regulation rests largely on the premise that Congress does
not ordinarily attempt to regulate state activities, and that we
should not infer such an intention in the absence of plain and
unequivocal language. Petitioner presses this contention so far as
to urge us to accept as a general principle that, unless Congress
actually uses the word "state," courts should not construe
regulatory enactments as applicable to the states. This Court has
previously rejected similar arguments, [
Footnote 5] and we cannot accept such an argument now.
We think it too plain to call for extended discussion that
Congress meant to include states and their political subdivisions
when it expressly made the Act applicable to the United States "or
any other government, or any of its political subdivisions, or any
agency of any of the foregoing. . . ." Congress clearly intended to
control all commodity prices and all rents, with certain specific
exceptions which it declared. It would frustrate this purpose
for
Page 327 U. S. 100
courts to read exemptions into the Act which Congress did not
see fit to put in the language. Excessive prices for rents or
commodities charged by a state or its agencies would produce
exactly the same conditions as would be produced were these prices
charged by other persons. We therefore have no doubt that Congress
intended the Act to apply generally to sales of commodities by
states. [
Footnote 6]
Nor can we accept the contention that a special exemption could
be read into the Act in order to permit states holding land granted
for school purposes to charge more than the ceiling price set for
timber. In reaching this conclusion, we are not unaware of the
difficulties which confronted the Commissioner of Public Lands of
the Washington, nor of the importance of protecting the public
interest in those school lands. Both the Act of Congress which
granted the land to Washington and the Constitution of the State
had provided for safeguards in connection with the disposition of
school lands. We do not question the wisdom of these precautions.
We are mindful also of the fact that this Court has declared that
grants of land to the state, like those here involved, transferred
exclusive ownership and control over those lands to the state.
Cooper v.
Roberts, 18 How. 173. No part of all the history
concerning these grants, however, indicates a purpose on the part
of Congress to enter into a permanent agreement with the states
under which states would be free to use the lands in a manner which
would conflict with valid legislation enacted by Congress in the
national interest. Here again, the sale of school land timber at
above-ceiling prices could be just as disturbing to the national
inflation control program as the charging of excess prices for
timber located on any other lands.
Page 327 U. S. 101
We now turn to petitioner's Constitutional contention. Though,
as we have pointed out, petitioners have alleged that the Act
applied to setting a maximum price for school land timber violates
the Fifth and Tenth Amendments, the argument here seems to spring
from implications of the Tenth Amendment only. The contention rests
on the premise that there is a
"doctrine implied in the Federal Constitution that the two
governments, national and state, are each to exercise its power so
as not to interfere with the free and full exercise of the powers
of the other."
It is not contended, and could not be under our prior decisions,
that the ceiling price fixed by the Administrator is
Constitutionally invalid as applied to privately owned timber.
Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414;
Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503. Nor
is it denied that the Administrator could have fixed ceiling prices
if the state had engaged in a sales business "having the incidents
of similar enterprises usually prosecuted for private gain."
Allen v. Regents, 304 U. S. 439,
304 U. S. 452.
But it is argued that the Act cannot be applied to this sale
because it was "for the purpose of gaining revenue to carry out an
essential governmental function -- the education of its citizens."
Since the Emergency Price Control Act has been sustained as a
Congressional exercise of the war power, the petitioners' argument
is that the extent of that power as applied to state functions
depends on whether these are "essential" to the state government.
The use of the same criterion in measuring the Constitutional power
of Congress to tax has proved to be unworkable, [
Footnote 7] and we reject it as a guide in
the field here involved.
Cf. United States v. California,
supra, 297 U.S. at
297 U. S.
183-185.
The State of Washington does have power to own and control the
school lands here involved, and to sell the lands
Page 327 U. S. 102
or the timber growing on them, subject to the limitations set
out in the Enabling Act. And our only question is whether the
state's power to make the sales must be in subordination to the
power of Congress to fix maximum prices in order to carry on war.
For reasons to which we have already adverted, an absence of
federal power to fix maximum prices for state sales or to control
rents charged by a state might result in depriving Congress of
ability effectively to prevent the evil of inflation at which the
Act was aimed. The result would be that the Constitutional grant of
the power to make war would be inadequate to accomplish its full
purpose. And this result would impair a prime purpose of the
federal government's establishment.
To construe the Constitution as preventing this would be to read
it as a self-defeating charter. It has never been so interpreted.
Since the decision in
McCulloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316,
17 U. S. 420,
it has seldom if ever been doubted that Congress has power in order
to attain a legitimate end -- that is, to accomplish the full
purpose of a granted authority -- to use all appropriate means
plainly adapted to that end, unless inconsistent with other parts
of the Constitution. And we have said that the Tenth Amendment
"does not operate as a limitation upon the powers, express or
implied, delegated to the national government." [
Footnote 8]
Where as here, Congress has enacted legislation authorized by
its granted powers, and where, at the same time, a state has a
conflicting law which, but for the Congressional Act, would be
valid, the Constitution marks the course for courts to follow.
Article VI provides that "This Constitution and the Laws of the
United States . . .
Page 327 U. S. 103
made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the
Land. . . ." [
Footnote 9]
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS would reverse the judgment for the reasons
act forth in his dissenting opinion in
Hulbert v. Twin Falls
County, 327 U. S. 103.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
8 Fed.Reg. 11850, as amended.
[
Footnote 2]
56 Stat. 23, 58 Stat. 640; c. 214, 59 Stat. 306.
[
Footnote 3]
Ames v. Kansas, 111 U. S. 449;
United States v. Louisiana, 123 U. S.
32;
United States v. California, 297 U.
S. 175.
[
Footnote 4]
Section 302(c) of the Act defines "commodity" as including
"services rendered otherwise than as an employee in connection
with the processing, distribution, storage, installation, repair,
or negotiation of purchases or sales of a commodity, or in
connection with the operation of any service establishment for the
servicing of a commodity."
[
Footnote 5]
Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360,
292 U. S. 370;
United States v. California, 297 U.
S. 175,
297 U. S. 186;
California v. United States, 320 U.
S. 577,
320 U. S.
585.
[
Footnote 6]
The Emergency Court of Appeals recently considered the same
question and reached the same conclusion.
Dallas v.
Bowles, 152 F.2d 464.
[
Footnote 7]
See the several opinions in
Saratoga Springs Co. v.
United States, 326 U. S. 572.
[
Footnote 8]
Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U. S. 340;
United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100,
312 U. S. 124;
California v. United States, supra; United States v.
California, supra; Oklahoma v. Atkinson Co., 313 U.
S. 508,
313 U. S.
534-535.
[
Footnote 9]
For application of this principle
see Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52;
Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U. S.
94,
309 U. S.
104.
