Respondent corporation was engaged in washing windows within the
State of its incorporation under contracts with its customers. The
greater part of the work was done on premises used by its customers
in the production of goods for interstate commerce. Its employees
were required to work overtime, and were not paid time and a half
except for hours worked in excess of 44 hours per week. This was in
accordance with
bona fide agreements entered into with the
labor union of which its employees were members. In a suit to
enjoin violations of § 15(a) of the Fair Labor Standards Act
and to recover for unpaid overtime compensation under § 16(b)
of the Act,
held:
1. Respondent's employees are engaged "in the production of
goods for [interstate] commerce" so as to bring them within the
coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Roland Electrical Co.
v. Walling, 326 U. S. 657. P.
327 U. S.
176.
2. They are not exempt as employees of a "retail or service
establishment" within the meaning of § 13(a)(2) of the Act.
Roland Electrical Co. v. Walling, supra. P.
327 U. S.
177.
3. The existence and observance of written agreements entered
into in good faith with the labor union of which the employees were
members, providing for overtime pay for fewer hours than required
by the Act, constitute no bar to the right of the employees to
recover under § 16(b) of the Act. P.
327 U. S.
177.
145 F.2d 163, reversed.
Petitioner sued to enjoin violation of § 15(a) of the Fair
Labor Standards Act and to recover under § 16(b) for unpaid
overtime compensation. The district court dismissed the complaint.
51 F. Supp. 505. The circuit court of appeals affirmed. 145 F.2d
163. This Court granted certiorari. 325 U.S. 849.
Reversed, p.
327 U. S. 178.
Page 327 U. S. 174
MR. JUSTICE BURTON delivered the opinion of the Court.
The questions here are the same as those in
Roland
Electrical Co. v. Walling, 326 U. S. 657.
They are (1) whether respondent's employees, under the facts of
this case, are engaged "in the production of goods for commerce"
within the meaning of §§ 6 and 7 of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1060, 1062, 1063, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 206 and 207, and (2) whether, if so engaged, they
nevertheless, are exempted from the Act because they are engaged in
a "retail or service establishment the greater part of whose
selling or servicing is in intrastate commerce" within the meaning
of § 13(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(2). As in the
Roland Electrical Co. case, we answer the first question
in the affirmative and the second in the negative. The respondent
also urges as a defense the written agreements which it had renewed
from year to year with its employees for a higher number of hours
of work per week, before paying overtime, than is prescribed in the
Act.
The petitioner sued the respondent in the District Court of the
United States for the Eastern District of Michigan. He sued for
himself as a former employee of the respondent and also in a
representative capacity for its other employees similarly situated.
He sought to enjoin the respondent from violation of §
15(a)(1)(2)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(1)(2)(3), of the Fair
Labor
Page 327 U. S. 175
Standards Act of 1938, and to recover under § 16(b) of the
Act [
Footnote 1] unpaid
overtime compensation together with a like sum as liquidated
damages, a reasonable attorney's fee and costs.
The District Court heard the case on the pleadings, stipulations
of fact and the petitioner's motion for summary judgment, made
several findings of law, ordered that the petitioners recover
nothing and dismissed the complaint. 51 F. Supp. 505. The Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. 145 F.2d 163. This Court
has granted a writ of certiorari because of divergence of opinions
among the Circuit Courts of Appeals as to the interpretation of
§ 13(a)(2), and now decides this case in favor of petitioners,
upon principles stated in
Roland Electrical Co. v. Walling,
supra.
The respondent, a Michigan corporation with its principal place
of business in Detroit, was engaged in washing windows, painting,
and similar maintenance work. The employees of the respondent were
required in some instances to work longer than 42 hours per week
subsequent to October 24, 1939, and longer than 40 hours per week
subsequent to October 24, 1940, but were not paid time
Page 327 U. S. 176
and a half except for hours worked in excess of 44 hours per
week. [
Footnote 2]
The work of the respondent and of its employees was done within
the Michigan and, for the most part, on the premises of the
respondent's customers. It consisted primarily of cleaning the
windows for those customers, always under contracts between them
and the respondent. The greater part of this work was done on
windows on premises used by respondent's customers in the
production of goods for interstate commerce. [
Footnote 3] Under the circumstances of this case,
the cleaning of the windows of industrial plants by the employees
of the respondent is an occupation necessary to the production of
the goods produced in those plants. [
Footnote 4] If the services rendered in
Page 327 U. S. 177
this case had been rendered by employees of respondent's
customers engaged in the production of goods for interstate
commerce, those employees would have come under the Act.
Respondent's employees are not to be excluded from such coverage
merely because their employment to do the same work was under
independent contracts.
Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling,
316 U. S. 517,
316 U. S. 524;
Warren-Bradshaw Co. v. Hall, 317 U. S.
88,
317 U. S.
90.
The respondent was engaged almost exclusively in servicing
customers for whom such services were necessary in their production
of goods for interstate commerce. This took place in the midst of
producing the "flow of goods in commerce" intended to be covered by
the Act. Accordingly, the respondent cannot be classified as a
"retail or service establishment" within the meaning of §
13(a)(2), which contemplates an establishment serving ultimate
consumers beyond the end of such "flow of goods in commerce."
Roland Electrical Co. v. Walling, supra.
Throughout this case, the respondent has urged as a defense
that, in good faith and from year to year, since before 1939, it
has entered into and renewed written agreements with the labor
union of which petitioner and those for whom this suit is brought
were members. Some of these agreements, renewed since the Act
became effective, applied to the periods here in question and
required the respondent to pay overtime for work done in excess of
44 hours a week. This requirement was fully observed. The District
Court made a finding that the existence and observance of such
agreements constituted no bar to the right of the employees to
recover under § 16(b) if the Fair Labor Standards Act applied
to the case and required overtime pay for work done in excess of a
lesser number
Page 327 U. S. 178
of hours per week than were stipulated in the agreements. It was
not necessary for the Circuit Court of Appeals to consider the
effect of this agreement because, in its view, the Act did not
apply to the respondent's employees. However, under the view which
we take, the respondent is entitled to a decision on this further
defense. We agree with the District Court that the agreements
cannot supersede the Act, and are not a bar to this action.
Cf.
Brooklyn Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U. S. 697,
324 U. S. 707
et seq.
For these reasons, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals
is reversed, and this case is remanded to the District Court for
further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
"SEC. 16. . . ."
"
* * * *"
"(b) Any employer who violates the provisions of section 6 or
section 7 of this Act shall be liable to the employee or employees
affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their
unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an
additional equal amount as liquidated damages. Action to recover
such liability may be maintained in any court of competent
jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of
himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated, or
such employee or employees may designate an agent or representative
to maintain such action for and in behalf of all employees
similarly situated. The court in such action shall, in addition to
any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a
reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of
the action."
52 Stat. 1069, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
[
Footnote 2]
"SEC. 7. (a) No employer shall, except as otherwise provided in
this section, employ any of his employees who is engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce --"
"(1) for a workweek longer than forty-four hours during the
first year from the effective date of this section,"
"(2) for a workweek longer than forty-two hours during the
second year from such date, or"
"(3) for a workweek longer than forty hours after the expiration
of the second year from such date,"
unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in
excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and
one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.
52 Stat. 1063, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a).
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 was approved June 25, 1938,
and this section became effective October 24, 1938. 29 U.S.C.
§ 207(d).
[
Footnote 3]
Many of the customers were engaged also in interstate commerce
on those premises.
[
Footnote 4]
". . . an employee shall be deemed to have been engaged in the
production of goods if such employee was employed . . . in any
process or occupation necessary to the production thereof, in any
State."
29 U.S.C. § 203(j).
See 100 Factory Management and Maintenance, March 1942,
p. 101; 74 Architectural Forum, May 1941, pp. 333, 335; 41 National
Safety News, March, 1940, p. 88; Balderston, Karabasz and Brecht,
Management of an Enterprise (1935) p. 145; Canover, Clean Windows
for Safety, 74 Safety Engineering, Sept.1937, pp. 13, 14; 63 The
Foundry, Aug.1935, p. 89; Randall and Martin, Making your Windows
Deliver More Daylight, 22 Transactions of the Illuminating
Engineering Society, March 1927, pp. 239-257.