Maximum Price Regulation No. 133, promulgated by the Office of
Price Administration pursuant to the Emergency Price Control Act,
applies to a sale of a tractor by a county.
Case v. Bowles,
ante p.
327 U. S. 92. P.
327 U. S.
104.
66 Idaho ___, 156 P.2d 319, reversed.
An Idaho district court held the sale of a farm tractor by a
county to be subject to the Emergency Price Control Act and Maximum
Price Regulation No. 133 promulgated pursuant thereto. The Supreme
Court of Idaho reversed. 66 Idaho ___, 156 P.2d 319. This Court
granted certiorari. 326 U.S. 707.
Reversed, p.
327 U. S.
105.
Page 327 U. S. 104
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner Hulbert bid $1,050 for a used farm-type gasoline
tractor which Twin Falls County, Idaho, offered for sale at an
auction. His was the highest bid. Upon being informed by the Office
of Price Administration that the amount bid was above the ceiling
price of $723.56, Petitioner refused to pay the full amount. He
tendered $723.56, which the County refused to accept. Thereupon,
the County sued the Petitioner in the State District Court for
$1,050. Petitioner tendered $1,050 to be disposed of according to
the outcome of the case. He defended on the ground that he had been
advised by the Office of Price Administration that the regulation
setting a ceiling price was applicable, and stated that he was
willing to pay any sum up to $1,050 which was not prohibited by
this regulation. The Administrator intervened, alleging that the
bid price exceeded the ceiling price fixed by Maximum Price
Regulation 133,
* and that the
regulation was applicable to the sale of a tractor by the County.
The County stated that, prior to the sale, it had been advised by
the County Prosecuting Attorney that the sale would be controlled
by § 30-708 of the Idaho Code, Ann., and that the Office of
Price Administration Regulations were inapplicable. The Idaho
District Court held the sale subject to the Emergency Price Control
Act, and to Regulation No. 133. The Court gave judgment for the
County for the ceiling price of $723.56, holding that the sale as
to the amount above that ceiling price was void. The Supreme Court
of Idaho reversed. 156 P.2d 319. We granted certiorari because the
Supreme Court's decision conflicted with that of the Circuit Court
for the Ninth Circuit in
Bowles v. Case, 149 F.2d 777.
The only question properly before us is whether Maximum Price
Regulation No. 133 applies to sales of tractors
Page 327 U. S. 105
by a county. In defining the term "person," the Regulation uses
the same language as § 302(h) of the Emergency Price Control
Act. In
Case v. Bowles, 327 U. S. 92,
decided this day, we held that that language makes the Act
applicable to sales by states and their subdivisions such as this
one. For the reasons set out in that opinion, this language as
employed in Regulation No. 133 makes that Regulation applicable to
the sale of the tractor by the County.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
* 7 F.R. 3185, 6936, 7599; 8 F.R. 234.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting.
I think Judge Givens, writing for the Supreme Court of Idaho (66
Idaho ___,156 P.2d 319), has shown that it is at least doubtful if
Congress meant to include the States as sellers under this Act.
[
Footnote 1] I think there is
little to add to his analysis except to say that the doubt for me
is increased when the whole scheme of regulation is considered.
While § 302(h) would relieve the States from the criminal
sanctions of the Act, [
Footnote
2] they would be subject to the treble damage provisions of
§ 205(e), which are remedial, not punitive, in nature.
Bowles v. American Stores, 139 F.2d 377, 379. And the
Administrator would have the power under § 205(f)(1) to
require a State to get a license from him in order to sell its
commodities -- a license which would be subject to suspension.
§ 205(f)(2). These are substantial
Page 327 U. S. 106
intrusions on the sovereignty of the States, involving matters
of great delicacy. And they raise for me serious constitutional
questions.
Cf. New York v. United States, 326 U.
S. 572,
326 U. S. 590,
dissenting opinion. Since the Act is, at best, ambiguous, I would
choose the construction [
Footnote
3] which avoided the constitutional issue. Only in the event
that the language of the Act was explicit would I assume that
Congress intended, even in days of war, to interfere with the
traditional sovereignty of the States to the extent indicated.
[
Footnote 1]
Sec. 302(h) defines the term "person" as including
"an individual, corporation, partnership, association, or any
other organized group of persons, or legal successor or
representative of any of the foregoing, and includes the United
States or any agency thereof, or any other government, or any of
its political subdivisions, or any agency of any of the foregoing:
Provided, That no punishment provided by this Act shall
apply to the United States, or to any such government, political
subdivision, or agency."
[
Footnote 2]
See note 1
supra.
[
Footnote 3]
A permissible construction is that the phrase "the United States
. . . or any other government" means the United States or other
comparable national sovereignties --
i.e., foreign
governments.