1. Under the Government construction contract here involved, the
Government was not entitled to recover liquidated damages for delay
in completion where, though subsequently to the specified
completion date, the Government terminated the contractor's right
to proceed. P.
322 U. S.
100.
2. A Government construction contract may validly provide for
liquidated damages in limited situations only. Act of June 6, 1902,
§ 21. P.
322 U. S.
101.
136 F.2d 437 affirmed.
Certiorari, 320 U.S. 729, to review a judgment which reversed in
part a Judgment for the United States in a suit upon a construction
contract, 44 F. Supp. 871.
MR. JUSTICE MURPHY delivered the opinion of the Court.
On June 24, 1931, one John V. Grogan entered into a contract
[
Footnote 1] with the United
States to construct certain public buildings at the United States
Inspection Station at
Page 322 U. S. 97
Babb-Piegan, Montana. Respondent became the surety on Grogan's
performance bond to the United States. The completion date of the
contract was March 4, 1932, but this was extended to June 20, 1933.
Grogan failed to complete the work by the extended date. The
Government, however, allowed him to continue with the construction.
On July 20, 1934, thirteen months later, the work was still
uncompleted. Pursuant to its authority under Article 9 of the
construction contract, the Government thereupon terminated Grogan's
right to proceed with the work because of his continuing default.
The Government finished the work through another contractor,
expending $2,044.04 more than it would have been required to expend
had Grogan completed the work.
The United States brought this suit in the District Court to
recover the excess cost and also to recover liquidated damages of
$9,875 for the delay occasioned by Grogan's default. The liquidated
damages were computed on the basis of an agreed $25 per day for the
395 days between June 20, 1933, the extended date for completion,
and July 20, 1934, when the contract right to proceed was
terminated. Grogan was not served, and never appeared. The District
Court denied respondent's motion to strike from the complaint the
paragraph alleging a right to liquidated damages.
United States
v. Grogan, 39 F. Supp. 819. The court subsequently rendered
judgment, after trial without a jury, for the United States for
$2,044.04 as excess cost of completion and $9,875 as liquidated
damages for delay.
See United States v. Grogan, 44 F.
Supp. 871. On appeal, the court below affirmed the judgment as to
the excess cost, but reversed as to the liquidated damages.
American Surety Co. v. United States, 136 F.2d 437. The
public importance of the issue of the Government's right to
liquidated damages under these circumstances led us to grant
certiorari. 320 U.S. 729.
Page 322 U. S. 98
Section 21 of the Act of June 6, 1902, [
Footnote 2] provides that all contracts for the
construction of any public building under the control of the
Treasury Department shall contain a stipulation calling for
liquidated damages for delay in completion of the work, and that
such stipulation shall be conclusive and binding upon all parties.
Proof of actual damages is rendered unnecessary. This statute,
however, does not purport to require liquidated damages to be paid
in amounts or under circumstances beyond those stipulated by the
parties.
Robinson v. United States, 261 U.
S. 486,
261 U. S. 488.
It was pursuant to this statutory command that Article 9 of the
construction contract in issue was inserted. Thus, this article is
determinative of the Government's right to liquidated damages under
the circumstances of this case.
Article 9, set out in the margin, [
Footnote 3] provides in effect that: (1) if the contractor
refuses or fails to prosecute the work
Page 322 U. S. 99
with proper diligence or to complete his work within the
specified time, the Government may at any time terminate his right
to proceed and prosecute the same to completion by contract or
otherwise, in which case the Government may recover from the
contractor or his surety any excess cost occasioned thereby;
(2)
"if the Government does not terminate the right of the
contractor to proceed, the contractor shall continue the work, in
which event the actual damages for the delay will be impossible to
determine and in lieu thereof the contractor shall pay to the
Government as fixed, agreed, and liquidated damages for each
calendar day of delay until the work is completed or accepted the
amount set forth in the specifications."
In this instance, paragraph 5 of the accompanying specifications
provides that
"the contractor shall pay to the government the amount of
Twenty-Five Dollars ($25.00) as fixed, agreed, and liquidated
damages for each calendar day's delay in the completion of the
contract."
This paragraph merely provides the agreed rate of the
per
diem liquidated damages to be paid in the situations
contemplated by Article 9. It is obviously not intended to spell
out the situations where liquidated damages are to be paid and
cannot, contrary
Page 322 U. S. 100
to the Government's contention, control the language of Article
9. [
Footnote 4]
The impact of Article 9 on the facts of this case is clear. The
contractor having failed to complete his work within the specified
time, the Government exercised its option under the first part of
Article 9 to terminate his right to proceed. This power to
terminate could be exercised before or on the stipulated completion
date or, as in this case, at any date thereafter. The Government
then made other arrangements to complete the construction work, and
was entitled to, and did, recover the excess cost occasioned
thereby. It thus waived its right to liquidated damages under the
second part of Article 9. That right is conditioned upon the
Government's not terminating the contractor's right to proceed.
Where there is such a termination, even though it be subsequent to
the stipulated completion date, the right to liquidated damages
disappears. Such has been the uniform and correct result heretofore
reached in the application of this type of contract provision.
See United States v. Cunningham, 125 F.2d 28;
United
States v. Maryland Casualty Co., 25 F. Supp. 778;
Maryland
Casualty Co. v. United States, 93 Ct.Cls. 247.
See also
Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. United States, 81
Ct.Cls. 495;
Commercial Casualty Insurance Co. v. United
States, 83 Ct.Cls. 367;
American Employer's Insurance Co.
v. United States, 91 Ct.Cls. 231.
The Government has urged us to read the second part of Article 9
as though the right to liquidated damages were
Page 322 U. S. 101
based not upon a condition precedent that the Government not
terminate, but upon a continuing condition under which liquidated
damages would accrue "so long as the Government does not terminate"
the contractor's right to proceed. This is said to be the only way
to give full effect to the prime purpose of Section 21 of the 1902
Act to eliminate the uncertainties and difficulties of establishing
actual damages to the Government by delay in obtaining the use of a
public building. Otherwise, proof is required of actual damages for
the delay where termination occurs before completion in the teeth
of a statute which dispenses with such proof in suits on a
construction contract containing a stipulation "for liquidated
damages for delay." The Government also claims that failure to
allow it liquidated damages under these circumstances leaves it
entirely to the contractor whether liquidated damages will ever be
paid, since he can relieve himself of such liability at any time
short of completion simply by abandoning the work or provoking the
Government to terminate his right to proceed. The Government
contracting officers, in turn, would be induced to allow the
contractor to proceed to completion despite inexcusable delays, so
as not to forfeit mounting liquidated damages, thus precluding
prompt completion and occupancy of needed structures.
But we are confronted here with an unambiguous contract that
clearly limits the right to liquidated damages to situations where
the Government does not at any time terminate the contractor's
right to proceed. That it may be wiser to expand the right to such
damages to every case of delay, regardless of whether there is a
termination is, of course, not relevant in interpreting and
applying clear words of limitation in the contract. We find
nothing, moreover, in Section 21 of the 1902 Act that fills in
interstices deliberately left open by the parties. No statutory
language of policy forbids the Government and a contractor from
stipulating for liquidated damages in
Page 322 U. S. 102
limited situations only. Indeed, the statute makes any such
stipulation "conclusive and binding upon all parties," thereby
foreclosing the Government's right to object to its own failure to
insist upon liquidated damages in other situations. Since we are
not justified in rewriting the clear provisions of the contract to
include what might well have been, but was not, inserted, the
judgment below must be
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
The form of contract used was U.S. Standard Form No. 23
construction contract, approved by the President on November 19,
1926, and used between 1926 and 1935.
[
Footnote 2]
C. 1036, 32 Stat. 310, 326; 40 U.S.C. § 269. This
provides:
"In all contracts entered into with the United States . . . for
the construction or repair of any public building or public work
under the control of the Treasury Department, a stipulation shall
be inserted for liquidated damages for delay, and the Secretary of
the Treasury is hereby authorized and empowered to remit the whole
or any part of such damages as in his discretion may be just and
equitable, and in all suits hereafter commenced on any such
contracts or on any bond given in connection therewith it shall not
be necessary for the United States, whether plaintiff or defendant,
to prove actual or specific damages sustained by the Government by
reason of delays, but such stipulation for liquidated damages shall
be conclusive and binding upon all parties."
See H.Sep.No.1794, p. 8 (57th Cong., 1st Sess.); 35
Cong.Rec. 4935.
[
Footnote 3]
"
Delays -- Damages. -- If the contractor refuses or
fails to prosecute the work, or any separable part thereof, with
such diligence as will insure its completion within the time
specified in Article 1, or any extension thereof, or fails to
complete said work within such time, the Government may, by written
notice to the contractor, terminate his right to proceed with the
work or such part of the work as to which there has been delay. In
such event, the Government may take over the work and prosecute the
same to completion by contract or otherwise, and the contractor and
his sureties shall be liable to the Government for any excess cost
occasioned the Government thereby. If the contractor's right to
proceed is so terminated, the Government may take possession of and
utilize in completing the work such materials, appliances, and
plant as may be on the site of the work and necessary therefor. If
the Government does not terminate the right of the contractor to
proceed, the contractor shall continue the work, in which event the
actual damages for the delay will be impossible to determine, and
in lieu thereof, the contractor shall pay to the Government as
fixed, agreed, and liquidated damages for each calendar day of
delay until the work is completed or accepted the amount as set
forth in the specifications or accompanying papers and the
contractor and his sureties shall be liable for the amount thereof.
. . ."
[
Footnote 4]
The directions for the preparation of construction contracts
upon the form here involved state that
"The specifications should include a paragraph stating the
amount of liquidated damages that will be paid by the contractor
for each calendar day of delay, as indicated in Article 9 of the
contract."
It was pursuant to this direction that paragraph 5 of the
specifications in the instant case was inserted. This instruction
indicates that the specifications are to include no more than "the
amount" or rate of
per diem damages that are to be applied
"as indicated in Article 9 of the contract."