1. A federal court receiver who, through a private agreement
made prior to the foreclosure sale of the properties, derived a
profit from their subsequent resale
held accountable to
the receivership estate for such profit notwithstanding that he had
been appointed to collect rents and operate the properties and was
without authority in respect of any sale thereof. P.
322 U. S.
416.
2. The fee-splitting arrangement entered into by the receiver in
this case, together with the fact that he engaged in other
misconduct incompatible with his position as an officer of the
court, require that he be denied all fees and compensation as
receiver. P.
322 U. S.
418.
134 F.2d 925 reversed.
Certiorari, 320 U.S. 728, to review a judgment which modified
and affirmed an order of the District Court approving and
confirming receivers' accounts and overruling exceptions
thereto.
MR. JUSTICE MURPHY delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari in this case to determine certain
important questions concerning the proper administration of federal
receiverships.
Henry M. Crites and his wife, May R. Crites, executed mortgages
in 1929 to the Prudential Insurance Company of America upon 22
parcels of adjoining farm property in
Page 322 U. S. 409
Madison and Pickaway Counties, Ohio. Each mortgage, being in
default, was matured by acceleration on December 30, 1931. On
February 17, 1932, Prudential began 22 separate foreclosure
proceedings against the Crites and Crites, Inc., the petitioner.
Only the 11 proceedings relating to the 11 contiguous farms in
Madison County, on which the mortgages aggregated $192,000, are now
before us.
An involuntary petition in bankruptcy had been filed against
Henry M. Crites. Petitioner is an Ohio corporation formed by
Crites' creditors in an effort to salvage something from the farms.
To it had been conveyed all the properties of the Crites, including
the equities of redemption. Prudential requested that a receiver be
appointed to take charge of the mortgaged farms pending the
termination of the foreclosure proceedings. The District Court
accordingly appointed as co-receivers the respondents Simkins and
Florence
"to collect the rents and proceeds of the real estate . . . , to
operate and manage said real estate through tenants, lessees, or
otherwise, to rent and lease said real estate, to pay delinquent
taxes and assessments and insurance premiums, to make such repairs
as may be necessary to preserve the value of the premises and to
produce normal income therefrom, and to do such other acts as may
be from time to time ordered by the court."
Subsequent orders authorized them to borrow money from
Prudential and from the local bank to pay necessary expenses
relating to the farms, and to execute leases of the farms upon a
share or crop rental basis.
No answers to the foreclosure complaints were filed. In the hope
that economic conditions would improve and bring about a higher
sale value, the District Court allowed the receivers to operate the
farms for a year before entering decrees
pro confesso on
May 2, 1933. By these decrees, the mortgages and equities of
redemption were declared foreclosed, and the marshal was directed
to sell each farm
Page 322 U. S. 410
individually on July 1, 1933, at a public sale for cash at not
less than two-thirds of the appraised value. The appraisers set the
value of the 11 Madison County farms at $244,080, making $162,720
the minimum price at which they could be sold. The decree
indebtedness in the 11 cases was $223,742.32. Prudential made the
sole bids at the public sale on July 1, and secured title to the 11
farms for $163,900, slightly more than the upset price. The
District Court confirmed this sale on July 18.
Prudential subsequently objected to the allowance of the
receivers' claims on the ground that they were excessive.
Petitioner also filed objections. Hearings were held before a
special master. The District Court overruled petitioner's
exceptions to the special master's report and its counterclaim,
amended and approved the receivers' accounts, and affirmed the
special master's report. Petitioner alone appealed, the court below
affirming the action of the District Court with a slight
modification as to additional fees for the receivers' attorneys.
134 F.2d 925.
I
Petitioner's first contention is that Simkins' actions in
connection with the foreclosure sales constituted a breach of his
duty as a receiver and rendered him accountable for certain profits
made by him and others.
The evidence indicates that a Col. Proctor of Cincinnati was
interested in purchasing the entire 11 Madison County farms as a
unit, and that he employed a real estate agent, Edwin Jones,
[
Footnote 1] to represent him
in the matter. Several weeks before the foreclosure sales, Jones
visited Simkins and told him that he understood that Simkins was
one of the attorneys in the matter and that he was interested
Page 322 U. S. 411
in buying the farms. Simkins, in addition to being one of the
co-receivers, was an attorney who had represented Prudential in
other foreclosure proceedings in Ohio and who had served Jones in a
professional capacity on other matters. Simkins replied that
"we are in no position to offer it right now, not in position
until after the foreclosure proceedings and the Prudential
Insurance Company acquires title for it, then they will be in
position to offer it to anybody else trying to buy it."
Simkins agreed, however, to intercede on Jones' behalf. They
then drew up a contract whereby Simkins was to assist Jones in
securing title to the 11 farms from Prudential after the latter had
secured title by purchase at the public sale. The compensation of
Simkins was dependent upon the success of the deal. Simkins did not
know at this time the name of Jones' principal, or how much the
principal was willing to pay for the farms as a unit. Simkins then
informed petitioner's counsel and the district judge that there
"might be some parties interested" in the 11 farms as a unit, but
was informed that they could not be sold as a group. It does not
appear that he told counsel or the court that he had accepted
employment from Jones. [
Footnote
2]
At Jones' request, Simkins conferred, on June 25, 1933, with
Prudential representatives concerning the possibility of purchasing
the 11 farms from Prudential. No definite arrangements were then
made, the representatives stating that they could not discuss terms
until Prudential had bought the farms at the sale. On June 27,
Jones submitted through Simkins a written offer of $249,106 to
Prudential for the 11 farms, including "the company's undivided
one-half interest in the growing corn crop thereon." The offer was
witnessed by Simkins and another person, and was
Page 322 U. S. 412
enclosed in a letter which was addressed to one of Prudential's
representatives and which was signed by Simkins. In this letter,
Simkins vouched for the responsibility of "Mr. Jones' buyer." Jones
also enclosed a $3000 certified check in support of his offer.
Simkins by this time clearly was aware of the identity of Jones'
principal and of the terms of the offer to Prudential. But he made
no effort to inform either the district judge or petitioner of
these facts prior to or at the sale.
At the public sale held by the marshal on July 1, Prudential
made the sole bids and secured title to the 11 farms for a total
sum of $163,900. Jones attended the sale, but Col. Proctor had not
authorized Jones to bid, since he desired to buy only when he could
be assured of securing all the 11 farms at once and when title to
them was supported by a warranty deed from Prudential. Two days
later, on July 3, Prudential accepted Jones' offer of $249,106.
Prudential then moved to confirm the public sales, giving due
notice to petitioner of the hearing on the motion. At this hearing
on July 18, objections to the motion "were suggested by reason of
alleged commitments made by the plaintiff [Prudential] for the sale
of certain of said properties, prior to public sale." It does not
appear who made these objections or whether the petitioner's
counsel was present. Harrison, one of the attorneys for the
receivers, thereupon orally advised the judge of the terms and
amount of Jones' offer and its acceptance by Prudential. At the
judge's suggestion, Harrison set forth these facts in the form of
an affidavit, which was later introduced at the hearing on the
receivers' accounts. The court was not informed, however, as to
Simkins' participation in the matter or as to the fact that Col.
Proctor was the actual purchaser of the farms. Simkins was present
in the court room at this time, but said nothing. The judge
confirmed the sales on the same day, July 18. Soon afterwards,
Prudential executed a warranty deed to Col. Proctor's nominee,
Page 322 U. S. 413
the deed reciting a consideration of $249,106 but bearing tax
stamps apparently indicating a substantially greater price.
[
Footnote 3]
Simkins received a total of $2,797 from Jones, nearly all of
which was in payment for his aid in consummating the purchase of
the farms from Prudential.
On the basis of these facts, petitioner seeks to have Simkins
surcharged with (a) all payments received by him from Jones for his
assistance in consummating the resale of the farms to Col. Proctor;
(b) the commission or profit received by Jones, and (c) the amount
received by Prudential in excess of the decree indebtedness or, in
the alternative, the amount by which the appraised value of the
farms exceeded the decree indebtedness. Petitioner claims that
Simkins must be surcharged with these amounts because he breached
his duty as co-receiver by accepting employment from Jones in
advance of the foreclosure sales to help bring about a resale of
the farms from Prudential to Col. Proctor. Respondents, on the
other hand, resist this claim on the ground that Simkins was
appointed co-receiver only to collect the rents and to operate the
farms, and had no fiduciary duty with respect to the foreclosure
sales.
It is true that Simkins' official duties as co-receiver were
limited to those conferred upon him by the court, and that he had
no authority to sell or to cause a sale of the farms in question.
The foreclosure sales were conducted by the marshal under the
direct supervision of the District Court, and there was no evidence
that Simkins unduly influenced the actual execution of the sales in
any way. It
Page 322 U. S. 414
is obvious, moreover, that Simkins was bound to perform his
delegated duties with the high degree of care demanded of a trustee
or other similar fiduciary. He was not free to deal with the
property under his control as co-receiver in such a way as to
benefit himself or his associates. Any profits that might have
resulted from a breach of these high standards, including the
profits of others who knowingly joined him in pursuing an illegal
course of action, would have to be disgorged and applied to the
estate.
Michoud v.
Girod, 4 How. 503;
Magruder v. Drury,
235 U. S. 106;
Jackson v. Smith, 254 U. S. 586.
But Simkins' conduct is not to be measured solely by the
arbitrary dichotomy of functions relating to the conservation and
liquidation of the farm properties. As a co-receiver in charge of
collecting the rents and operating the farms, Simkins was also an
officer or arm of the court. He was appointed to assist the court
in protecting and preserving, for the benefit of all parties
concerned, the properties in the court's custody pending the
foreclosure proceedings.
Booth v.
Clark, 17 How. 322,
58 U. S. 331;
Davis v. Gray,
16 Wall. 203,
83 U. S.
217-218;
Stuart v. Boulware, 133 U. S.
78,
133 U. S. 81;
Porter v. Sabin, 149 U. S. 473,
149 U. S. 479;
Atlantic Trust Co. v. Chapman, 208 U.
S. 360,
208 U. S.
370-371. The court's authority and duties, however,
covered all phases of the foreclosure proceedings. They included
not only the conservation but the liquidation of the farm
properties. The court had discretion to delegate these duties as it
saw fit. But whatever the functional distribution, all the court
officers were bound to act fairly and openly with respect to every
aspect of the proceedings before the court. The mere fact that any
one aspect did not fall within the delegated function of a
particular court officer did not give that officer free rein to act
in a secret, nonjudicial manner as to that aspect. The court, as
well as all the interested parties, had the right to expect that
its officers would not make undisclosed private agreements, fail to
reveal any
Page 322 U. S. 415
pertinent information, or use their official position for their
own profit or to further the interests of themselves or any
associates.
It is impossible to reconcile the activities of Simkins relating
to the foreclosure sales with the basic standard of conduct
demanded of him as an officer of the court. One of the prime
purposes of the foreclosure proceedings was to obtain enough money
from the farm properties to pay in full the mortgage indebtedness,
with any surplus going to the owner of the equities of redemption.
All information to that end which came to Simkins or to any other
court officer belonged to the court and to the parties interested
in the foreclosure proceedings. Here, Simkins had knowledge of a
prospective purchaser of the farms who was willing to pay more than
the mortgage indebtedness on the properties. Yet he made no effort
to reveal this important information prior to the foreclosure sales
other than to state that there "might be some parties interested"
in buying the 11 farms as a unit. He was told that the court could
not order a public sale of the farms as a unit. But it is clear
that the court and petitioner might well have profited if Simkins
had more fully revealed to them in advance of the sales that there
was a prospect of selling all 11 farms to a responsible buyer at an
advantageous price. Petitioner could well have been given the
opportunity to bargain directly with Col. Proctor for a private
sale of the farms as a unit. [
Footnote 4] This suppression of vital information was in
no way mitigated by the partial revelation of the facts at the
hearing on the motion to confirm the sales to
Page 322 U. S. 416
Prudential, after Prudential had accepted the resale offer, or
by any subsequent knowledge obtained by petitioner. The information
was most valuable prior to the foreclosure sales, when the
prospects were greater for successful bargaining, and it should
have been divulged at that time.
Moreover it was inconsistent with his position as an officer of
the court for Simkins to make a secret arrangement with Jones to
bring about, by active intervention, a resale of the properties in
the custody of the court. The fact that he was not a liquidating
receiver did not absolve him of the duty to act openly at all times
with respect to the subject matter of the proceedings. Due regard
for his official position demanded that he at least notify and
obtain the approval of the court and of the interested parties
before entering into an employment contract with a third party
wherein his compensation was dependent upon a particular bidder's
being successful at the foreclosure sales. This arrangement brought
out in even bolder relief the reprehensibleness of Simkins' failure
to disclose all the facts regarding Col. Proctor's interest in
purchasing the farms. Had such facts been revealed prior to the
public foreclosure sales, Prudential might not have obtained title
to the farms, and Simkins would not have earned any compensation
under his contract with Jones. It was thus to Simkins' personal
benefit not to disclose all the pertinent facts.
Since the course taken by Simkins was one which he, as an
officer of the court, could not legally pursue, and since profits
resulted to him, the law makes him accountable to the trust estate
for all such profits.
Cf. Magruder v. Drury, supra; Jackson v.
Smith, supra. We need not speculate as to whether his conduct
operated to dampen the foreclosure sales to any appreciable degree,
or whether the estate was in any other way injured. It is enough
that his activities had a tendency to dampen the sales. For that
reason alone, he may be held to forfeit all profits he derived
Page 322 U. S. 417
from his misconduct, regardless of whether it actually had an
adverse effect or not. In this type of situation, "the incidence of
a particular conflict of interest can seldom be measured with any
degree of certainty."
Woods v. City National Bank Co.,
312 U. S. 262,
312 U. S. 268.
Proof of profits resulting from an irregular or conflicting course
of conduct is sufficient. Simkins was thus accountable for the
payments received by him from Jones for his assistance in
consummating the resale of the farms from Prudential to Col.
Proctor. [
Footnote 5]
Under the circumstances of this case, however, Simkins was not
surchargeable with the commission received by Jones, with any
amount received by Prudential, or with the amount by which the
appraised value of the farms exceeded the decree indebtedness. We
perceive no basis in this record for holding Simkins responsible
for any possible misconduct on the part of Jones or Prudential, or
for any profits that they may have obtained thereby. We do not, of
course, determine in this proceeding whether petitioner could
recover any such profits in a direct action against either Jones or
Prudential.
II
Petitioner also claims that Simkins should be surcharged with
all his receivership fees because of a fee-splitting arrangement
which he made with Harrison and Ingalls, the attorneys for the
co-receivers as well as for Prudential. The three agreed to pool
the fees allowed
Page 322 U. S. 418
them by the District Court and to divide them equally, although
this arrangement apparently was not completely carried out.
Petitioner excepted to all credits in the receivers' accounts
for fees to either Simkins or Ingalls because of this arrangement.
The court below allowed credit to the receivers for the $250 fees
received by Harrison and Ingalls from the court as preliminary
compensation and for all out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the two
attorneys on behalf of the estate. But all credits were denied for
additional attorney fees paid to them. Petitioner objects to the
failure to disallow the $250 fee allowed Simkins by the District
Court and the additional $1,800 fee which he paid to himself on
account of his services as co-receiver.
A fee-splitting arrangement of this nature is clearly
unenforceable and void as against public policy.
Weil v.
Neary, 278 U. S. 160. But
whether the parties to such a contract should be allowed any fees
at all, and if so the amount thereof, are normally matters within
the sound discretion of the District Court and are not reviewable
except where a clear abuse of discretion is apparent. In this case,
however, the fact that Simkins entered into a fee-splitting
contract so patently illegal, plus the fact that he engaged in
other misconduct and indiscretions incompatible with his position
as an officer of the court, compel the conclusion that all fees and
compensation as co-receiver should have been denied him.
Cf.
Woods v. City National Bank & Trust Co., supra,
312 U. S.
268.
The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the cause is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
Jones was familiar with the 11 Madison County farms, having made
an offer of $500,000 for them "a year or more" prior to 1933 on
behalf of a New York principal. Crites rejected this offer,
however.
[
Footnote 2]
Simkins testified that the fact of his employment by Jones "was
no secret," and that "I may have told Judge Hough. I would not have
hesitated in telling him."
[
Footnote 3]
Petitioner claims that the stamps indicate that Col. Proctor
paid approximately $281,000, "presumably, $249,106 net to
Prudential . . . and the difference of $31,894 to Jones." There was
no proof, however, that Jones received that amount. He testified
merely that he received $15,000 and an additional amount that he
did not remember, from which amounts he paid Simkins.
[
Footnote 4]
The special master and the court below found that Col. Proctor
was interested in purchasing the 11 farms as a unit only if he
could obtain a warranty deed from Prudential. But there was no
evidence that petitioner could not have furnished muniments of
title equally satisfactory to Col. Proctor or that he would not
have been satisfied with a warranty deed from petitioner. According
to Jones, Col. Proctor "said a general warranty deed from the
Prudential Insurance Company was good enough for him."
[
Footnote 5]
It is unnecessary to consider petitioner's argument relating to
the sale to Prudential of the growing crops on the farm lands,
inasmuch as petitioner seeks to surcharge Simkins with the same
amounts as in connection with the sale of the lands, and no
different considerations are present. Respondents' claim that
petitioner is barred from relief because of laches is without
merit. Nothing in the record indicates that petitioner discovered
the full facts concerning Simkins' activities until several years
after the foreclosure sales. Petitioner then made timely exceptions
to the receivers' accounts.
MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS.
I am of the opinion that certiorari should not have been granted
in this case, and that the writ should be dismissed.
Page 322 U. S. 419
The Circuit Court of Appeals recognized established principles
in determining to what extent the respondent Simkins should be
denied compensation for services by reason of his acting in
inconsistent relations. That court canvassed the authorities which
this court cites in its opinion and not only did not refuse to
follow and apply them but, as I think, in perfect good faith,
proceeded to examine and appraise the facts and circumstances in
order to apply the relevant legal principles.
There is not a suggestion of any conflict amongst the federal
courts respecting the law which should govern decision, nor is
there any suggestion that, on an identical set of facts, any
federal court has reached a result contrary to that reached by the
court below. In essence, the case presents the question whether the
action taken by the Circuit Court of Appeals was sufficiently
drastic in the circumstances disclosed.
I think it plain that this case falls within the category to
which I referred in
Bailey v. Central Vermont R. Co.,
319 U. S. 350,
319 U. S. 354.
All the considerations there mentioned apply equally here. If this
court is to spend its time correcting mistakes in the appraisal of
facts in individual cases by courts below the performance of its
essential functions, necessarily will suffer.