The Maritime Commission, upon finding that waterfront terminals
in the San Francisco Bay area were engaged in preferential and
unreasonable practices -- resulting from excessive free time and
noncompensatory demurrage charges -- in violation of §§
16 and 17 of the Shipping Act of 1916, as amended, prescribed
schedules of maximum free time and minimum demurrage charges. The
State and a municipality, which operated terminals but which were
not common carriers by water, challenged the validity of the order
as applied to them.
Held:
1. The order was proper under § 17 which authorizes the
Commission, when it finds unjust and unreasonable a regulation or
practice relating to or connected with the receiving, handling,
storing, or delivering of property, to "determine, prescribe, and
order enforced a just and reasonable regulation or practice." P.
320 U. S.
584.
2. It was proper to fix minimum demurrage charges which would
reflect the cost of the service. P.
320 U. S.
583.
3. The phrase "other person subject to this Act" -- defined in
§ 1 as
"any person not included in the term 'common carrier by water'
carrying on the business of forwarding or furnishing wharfage.
dock, warehouse, or other terminal facilities in connection with a
common carrier by water"
-- includes the State and the municipality. P.
320 U. S.
585.
4. Regulation of the activities and instrumentalities here
involved -- whether activities and instrumentalities of private or
public agencies -- was within the power of Congress under the
Commerce Clause. P.
320 U. S.
586.
46 F.
Supp. 474 affirmed.
Appeals from decrees of a District Court of three judges
refusing to set aside an order of the Maritime Commission, 2
U.S.M.C.588.
Page 320 U. S. 578
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The United States Maritime Commission found that terminals along
the commercial waterfront in the Port of San Francisco were engaged
in preferential and unreasonable practices in that they allowed
excessive free time and made noncompensatory charges for their
services, all in violation of §§ 16 and 17 of the
Shipping Act of 1916, as amended. [
Footnote 1] Accordingly, the Commission ordered the
cessation of these proscribed practices, and, in order to assure
lawful practices, it prescribed schedules of maximum
Page 320 U. S. 579
free time periods and of minimum charges to reflect the actual
cost of services. 2 U.S.M.C. 588. Two of the terminal operators in
the San Francisco Bay area were the State of California and the
City of Oakland. They brought these proceedings to set aside the
Commission's order insofar as it applied to them. A district court
of three judges denied relief.
46 F.
Supp. 474. The case is here on direct appeal under § 31 of
the Shipping Act (c. 451, 39 Stat. 738, Ex.Ord. No. 6166, c. 858,
49 Stat. 1987, 2016, 46 U.S.C. § 830) in connection with the
Urgent Deficiencies Act of 1913 (c. 32, 38 Stat. 220, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 47 and 47a) and the Judiciary Act of 1925 (c. 229, 43
Stat. 938, 28 U.S.C. § 345(4)). California and Oakland denied
the power of the Commission to issue the kind of order that it did,
and, in any event, they urged that the authority under which the
Commission acted does not, or, if it does, cannot constitutionally,
cover their operations.
The legal issues depend for their solution upon an understanding
of the situation to which the Commission addressed itself -- the
circumstances as the Commission found them and the appropriate way
of dealing with them. What follows is a rapid summary of a
voluminous record.
Through its Board of State Harbor Commissioners, California
provides facilities for the handling of freight and passengers on
the San Francisco waterfront under a statute which prohibits the
Board from making charges beyond the cost of furnishing such
facilities and administering them. California Harbors and
Navigation Code, §§ 3080, 3084, St.1937, p. 856. Pier and
office space is assigned by the Board to various steamship lines,
and charges fixed by the Board are collected by these assignees for
the Board. Except at two piers, the assignees handle the cargo, but
the Board employs a staff of men to check all cargo and vessel
movements and collect its charges. Oakland, through its Board of
Port Commissioners, operates
Page 320 U. S. 580
piers and terminals which, like those of California, are
designed to accommodate vessels in coastwise, intercoastal,
offshore, and foreign trade. Whether the facilities are operated by
the City directly or leased to another, the City prescribes and
collects the charges.
In thus providing facilities for waterborne traffic, Oakland and
California have for many years competed with privately owned
terminals in San Francisco Bay. Cut-throat competition ensued, with
the inevitable chaos following abnormally low rates. In an attempt
to remedy the situation, the California Railroad Commission
investigated the operations of terminals in San Francisco Bay, and,
more particularly pertinent for present purposes, the prevalent
discrimination among users of the terminal services. The
conclusions from this inquiry were embodied in an order issued by
the Railroad Commission in 1936. 40 Calif. R. Comm'n Decisions 107.
But publicly owned terminals, and therefore those of California and
Oakland, are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Railroad
Commission. Since these public bodies operated the major portion of
the dock facilities in the area, the Railroad Commission naturally
found it impossible to order adjustments in the practices of the
private terminals unless the competing public bodies agreed to make
similar adjustments. The order of the Commission was so
conditioned. California and Oakland acceded to the recommendations
in some respects, but failed to do so as to practices now to be
described.
When cargo is brought to a wharf for shipment or removed to a
wharf from a ship, it is the custom to allow a period of "free
time" during which the cargo may rest on the wharf without charge.
The length of the free time is fixed, broadly speaking, by
determining the period reasonably necessary for the shipper to
assemble or to remove his goods and for the ship to load or to
discharge. When cargo is left on the wharf beyond the free time
Page 320 U. S. 581
period, a charge called "wharf demurrage or storage" is
assessed. The Railroad Commission recommended free time periods
shorter than was the practice of California and Oakland, and wharf
demurrage charges greater in many instances than those collected by
them. These recommendations California and Oakland rejected. This
impasse, due to the immunity of California and Oakland from state
regulation, was followed by the proceedings before the United
States Maritime Commission which resulted in the order now before
us. Extended hearings were held before the Commission's examiner,
at which the principal witnesses were officials of the Board and
Oakland and an expert of the Railroad Commission. After full
submission of the controversy, the examiner made his report and
findings. On exceptions to some of his findings, the issues were
again thoroughly canvassed before the Commission, and, on September
11, 1941, it made its order.
The Commission found that there was a marked lack of uniformity
in the free time periods allowed by the various terminals, and
that, to the extent that appellants' free time allowances were
greater than those recommended by the Railroad Commission, they
were unreasonable, and led to discrimination against those persons
who did not and could not use extended free time. After
consideration of the cost studies submitted by its experts as well
as of the data introduced by appellants, the Commission further
found that appellants' demurrage charges were less than the cost of
the services and the carrying charges of the facilities which
furnished them. It concluded that, unless those who took advantage
of wharf storage supplied revenue sufficient to meet the cost of
the service, the burden would be shifted to those who paid
appellants for other terminal services, such as docking of vessels,
loading and unloading, and transportation privileges over and
through the terminals. Accordingly,
Page 320 U. S. 582
the Commission ordered appellants to cease and desist from
allowing greater periods of free time than those found reasonable
by the Railroad Commission, and to abstain from collecting wharf
demurrage and storage rates less than those prescribed by the
California authority for private terminals. [
Footnote 2]
Having found violations of §§ 16 and 17, the
Commission was charged by law with the duty of devising appropriate
means for their correction. It could have issued an order generally
prohibiting further preferential and unreasonable practices,
leaving the parties to translate such a generality into
concreteness and to devise their own remedies. The Commission chose
to do otherwise. It can hardly be suggested that the protection of
the national interest in interstate and foreign commerce or even
the convenience of the parties would, as a matter of sensible and
economic administration, limit the Commission to such negative
means of dealing with the evils revealed on this record in one of
our greatest ports.
Cf. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board,
313 U. S. 177,
313 U. S. 194.
Explicit formulation of duties owed by a business subject to legal
regulation is desirable, if indeed not necessary. Only thus can it
avoid the hazards of uncertainty whether its attempted compliance
with an undefined requirement of law is in fact compliance. Neither
industry nor the community which it serves is benefitted by the
explosion of intermittent lawsuits for determining the relative
rights
Page 320 U. S. 583
of conflicting interests. What more natural for the Commission,
having found disobedience of the law against discriminatory and
unreasonable practices, than to define the outer bounds of
practices that would not be unreasonable nor discriminatory.
[
Footnote 3] And so the
Commission fixed a schedule of maximum free time and another
schedule for avoiding discrimination through noncompensatory
charges. It acted on authoritative information and fully canvassed
testimony in fixing the minimum charges that would reflect cost. It
was proper to choose the cost standard, because just as
unreasonably long free time tends to be parasitic on rates for
other services, noncompensatory demurrage results in the same
mischief.
Cf. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United
States, 305 U. S. 507,
305 U. S.
524.
Appellants' objection is that, while §§ 17 and 18
specifically give the Commission ratemaking power over common
carriers by water, [
Footnote 4]
no such power is given over those
Page 320 U. S. 584
who, like California and Oakland, are not common carriers by
water. We fully agree that no ratemaking power such as the
Commission has been given over water carriers is conferred over
other persons subject to the Shipping Act. But the order of the
Commission, though it pertains to demurrage charges, is not an
exercise of conventional ratemaking. By § 17, all those who
are subject to the Act are under a duty to
"establish, observe, and enforce just and reasonable regulations
and practices relating to or connected with the receiving,
handling, storing, or delivering of property."
When the Commission finds a breach of this duty, the same
section authorizes it to "determine, prescribe, and order enforced
a just and reasonable regulation or practice." The withholding of
ratemaking power for services other than water carriage does not
qualify the unlimited grant to the Commission of the power to stop
effectively all unjust and unreasonable practices in receiving,
handling, storing or delivering property. Finding a wrong which it
is duty-bound to remedy, the Maritime Commission, as the expert
body established by Congress for safeguarding this specialized
aspect of the national interest, may, within the general framework
of the Shipping Act, fashion the tools for so doing.
Cf. United
States Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.
S. 474,
284 U. S. 487;
Merchants' Warehouse Co. v. United States, 283 U.
S. 501,
283 U. S. 513.
The only way to correct the preferential and unreasonable results
of noncompensatory charges was to require compensatory charges. All
that the Commission did was to translate that requirement from a
generality into dollars and cents. That the phrase
Page 320 U. S. 585
"regulation or practice" extends to such discrimination as that
which resulted from noncompensatory demurrage charges is amply
demonstrated by the application of the concept "practice" in
comparable situations under the Interstate Commerce Act.
Adams
v. Mills, 286 U. S. 397,
286 U. S. 409;
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, 305 U.
S. 507,
305 U. S.
524.
We have disposed of the only serious question raised. The
numerous other questions call for only summary treatment.
Since Oakland and California are not common carriers by water,
they are subject to the authority of the Commission only if they
come within the designation "other person subject to this Act" as
defined in § 1 of the Shipping Act. c. 451, 39 Stat. 728, c.
152, 40 Stat. 900, 46 U.S.C. § 801. The phrase covers "any
person not included in the term "common carrier by water," carrying
on the business of forwarding or furnishing wharfage, dock,
warehouse, or other terminal facilities in connection with a common
carrier by water." And "person" "includes corporations,
partnerships, and associations. . . ." We need not waste time on
useless generalities about statutory construction in order to
conclude that entities other than technical corporations,
partnerships and associations are "included" among the "persons" to
whom the Shipping Act applies if its plain purposes preclude their
exclusion. The crucial question is whether the statute, read in the
light of the circumstances that gave rise to its enactment and for
which it was designed, applies also to public owners of wharves and
piers. California and Oakland furnished precisely the facilities
subject to regulation under the Act, and with so large a portion of
the nation's dock facilities, as Congress knew (53 Cong.Rec. 8276),
owned or controlled by public instrumentalities, it would have
defeated the very purpose for which Congress framed the scheme for
regulating waterfront terminals to exempt
Page 320 U. S. 586
those operated by governmental agencies. We need not rest on
inference to avoid a construction that would have such dislocating
consequences. The manager of the bill which became the Shipping Act
of 1916, speaking on the floor of the House, left no doubt that the
legislation was designed to prevent discrimination no less by
public than by private owners. 53 Cong.Rec. 8276. And whatever may
be the limitations implied by the phrase "in connection with a
common carrier by water" which modifies the grant of jurisdiction
over those furnishing "wharfage, dock, warehouse, or other terminal
facilities," there can be no doubt that wharf storage facilities
provided at shipside for cargo which has been unloaded from water
carriers are subject to regulation by the Commission. Finally, it
is too late in the day to question the power of Congress under the
Commerce Clause to regulate such an essential part of interstate
and foreign trade as the activities and instrumentalities which
were here authorized to be regulated by the Commission, whether
they be the activities and instrumentalities of private persons or
of public agencies.
United States v. California,
297 U. S. 175,
297 U. S.
184-185.
Due consideration has been given to other objections, referring
to the sufficiency of the evidence before the Commission, the
adequacy of its findings, and its competence, but they require no
discussion.
Affirmed.
* Together with No. 22,
Oakland v. United States et
al., also on appeal from the District Court of the United
States for the Northern District of California.
[
Footnote 1]
Section 16, so far as here relevant, provides:
"That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier by water, or
other person subject to this Act, either alone or in conjunction
with any other person, directly or indirectly -- First. To make or
give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any
particular person, locality, or description of traffic in any
respect whatsoever, or to subject any particular person, locality,
or description of traffic to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or
disadvantage in any respect whatsoever."
C. 451, 39 Stat. 734, c. 581, 49 Stat. 1518, 46 U.S.C. §
815.
The pertinent portion of § 17 reads:
"Every such carrier and every other person subject to this Act
shall establish, observe, and enforce just and reasonable
regulations and practices relating to or connected with the
receiving, handling, storing, or delivering of property. Whenever
the commission finds that any such regulation or practice is unjust
or unreasonable, it may determine, prescribe, and order enforced a
just and reasonable regulation or practice."
C. 451, 39 Stat. 734, Ex. Ord. No. 6166, c. 858, 49 Stat. 1987,
2016, 46 U.S.C. § 816.
[
Footnote 2]
The City of Oakland asks this Court to determine whether the
Maritime Commission properly found that § 15 of the Shipping
Act required Oakland to submit certain lease agreements for the
Commission's approval. C. 451, 39 Stat. 733, Ex. Ord. No. 6166, c.
858, 49 Stat. 1987, 2016, 46 U.S.C. § 814. The Commission's
order does not appear to require such filing. If this be an
inadvertent or clerical omission, since Oakland's objection is
founded on its basic contention that it is not subject to the
Shipping Act, we need not further consider this subsidiary
question.
[
Footnote 3]
Booth S.S. Co. v. United States, 29 F. Supp. 221, is an
object lesson. In that case, the order of the Maritime Commission
as to the charges to be imposed after free time was in general
terms. Attempted compliance with that order led to conflict, and
the Commission found it necessary to undertake new proceedings and
to issue a new, more definite, order.
[
Footnote 4]
The following are the rate provisions in §§ 17 and 18.
Section 17:
"That no common carrier by water in foreign commerce shall
demand, charge, or collect any rate, fare, or charge which is
unjustly discriminatory between shippers or ports, or unjustly
prejudicial to exporters of the United States as compared with
their foreign competitors. Whenever the commission finds that any
such rate, fare, or charge is demanded, charged, or collected, it
may alter the same to the extent necessary to correct such unjust
discrimination or prejudice and make an order that the carrier
shall discontinue demanding, charging, or collecting any such
unjustly discriminatory or prejudicial rate, fare, or charge."
Section 18:
"That every common carrier by water in interstate commerce shall
establish, observe, and enforce just and reasonable rates, fares,
charges, classifications, and tariffs, and just and reasonable
regulations and practices relating thereto. . . . Whenever the
commission finds that any rate, fare, charge, classification,
tariff, regulation, or practice, demanded, charged, collected, or
observed by such carrier is unjust or unreasonable, it may
determine, prescribe, and order enforced a just and reasonable
maximum rate, fare, or charge, or a just and reasonable
classification, tariff, regulation, or practice."
C. 451, 39 Stat. 735, Ex. Ord. No. 6166, c. 858, 49 Stat. 1987,
2016, 46 U.S.C. § 817.
MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS
I dissent. I pass the contentions of the appellants respecting
the power of Congress to regulate the State's activities under
consideration, the scope of the term "person" as used in the
Shipping Act, and the alleged absence of any grant of power to the
Commission to fix minimum rates for water carriers or others. This
for the reason that, in my opinion, Congress has withheld from the
Commission
Page 320 U. S. 587
authority to fix or regulate the rates or charges of those
furnishing wharfage facilities.
The Shipping Act of 1916, in all parts here relevant, has
remained as it was originally adopted, though amended in other
respects by later legislation. In § 1, [
Footnote 2/1] after defining carriers by water, which
are the primary subject of its regulatory provisions, the Act
adds:
"The term 'other person subject to this Act' means any person
not included in the term 'common carrier by water,' carrying on the
business of forwarding or furnishing wharfage, dock, warehouse, or
other terminal facilities in connection with a common carrier by
water."
Section 16 [
Footnote 2/2]
provides:
"That it shall be unlawful
for any common carrier by water,
or other person subject to this Act, either alone or in
conjunction with any other person, directly or indirectly "
"First. To make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or
advantage to and particular person, locality, or description of
traffic in any respect whatsoever, or to subject any particular
person, locality, or description of traffic to any undue or
unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect
whatsoever."
(Italics supplied.)
Section 17, [
Footnote 2/3] in
pertinent part, provides:
"
No common carrier by water in foreign commerce shall
demand, charge, or collect any rate, fare, or charge which is
unjustly discriminatory between shippers or ports, or unjustly
prejudicial to exporters of the United States as compared with
their foreign competitors. Whenever the commission finds that any
such rate, fare, or charge is demanded, charged, or collected, it
may alter the same to the extent necessary to correct such unjust
discrimination
Page 320 U. S. 588
or prejudice and make an order that the carrier shall
discontinue demanding, charging, or collecting any such unjustly
discriminatory or prejudicial rate, fare, or charge."
(Italics supplied.)
"
Every such carrier and every other person subject to this
Act shall establish, observe, and enforce just and reasonable
regulations and practices relating to or connected with the
receiving, handling, storing, or delivering of property. Whenever
the commission finds that any such regulation or practice is unjust
or unreasonable, it may determine, prescribe, and order enforced a
just and reasonable regulation or practice."
(Italics supplied.)
Section 18, [
Footnote 2/4] so
far as relevant, is:
"
Every common carrier by water in interstate commerce
shall establish, observe, and enforce just and reasonable
rates, fares, charges, classifications, and tariffs, and just
and reasonable regulations and practices relating thereto and
to the issuance, form, and substance of tickets, receipts, and
bills of lading, the manner and method of presenting, marking,
packing, and delivering property for transportation, the carrying
of personal, sample, and excess baggage, the facilities for
transportation, and all other matters relating to or connected with
the receiving, handling, transporting, storing, or delivering of
property."
(Italics supplied.)
The Commission concedes, as it must, that, whereas the Act
definitely deals with the rates of water carriers, and places those
rates under the regulatory jurisdiction of the Commission, it
contains no such specific mandate to the Commission concerning the
rates or charges of wharfingers. It must equally be conceded that
the order of the Commission under review does establish minimum
rates and charges for services rendered by those maintaining and
operating wharves used by water carriers. In the absence of
specific authority in this behalf, the Commission turned to that
portion of § 16 which prohibits not only water carriers, but
other persons subject to the Act from
Page 320 U. S. 589
granting preferences or practicing discrimination, and that
portion of § 17 which comprehends both water carriers and
other persons subject to the Act and enjoins just and reasonable
regulations and practices respecting receiving, handling, storage
or delivery of property.
The oversimplified argument in support of this position is that
a rate or charge is, in a broad sense, a regulation or practice.
The difficulty with the argument is that, in the Interstate
Commerce Act and elsewhere, Congress has always sharply
distinguished, as it did in the present Act, between rates and
charges, on the one hand, and regulations and practices, on the
other. The legislative history of the Shipping Act indicates that
Congress well understood that states and municipalities, in order
to encourage the flow of commerce through their ports, had
established public wharves, and that Congress intended that, as
respects such public facilities, preferences and discriminations
should not be permitted. But there is nothing in the legislative
history to indicate that, in the teeth of the plain words of the
statute as enacted, Congress had in mind conferring power to
regulate the rates and charges for such publicly owned facilities,
much less that, if a state or its agency deemed it advisable and in
the public interest to operate such facilities at low rates, to
encourage the flow of commerce through its ports, the Commission
could put a floor under its rates and compel it in effect to aid
competing private enterprise.
Little need be, or can be, added to the clearly expressed words
of the statute. It speaks for itself, and I think the court ought
not to permit the use of a prohibition against practices to be
availed of to write additional provisions into the section dealing
with rates and charges.
The attempt to bolster this process, on the part of the
Commission, by reference to the decisions of this court seems to me
futile. The Commission and the Government rely principally upon
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co.
v.
Page 320 U. S. 590
United States, 305 U. S. 507. The
case obviously not only fails to support the order, but seems to me
to be an authority against it. The case arose under the Interstate
Commerce Act. It dealt with a practice of carriers which was to
maintain warehouses in respect of which low-cost storage was
afforded to persons who would ship over the carrier's lines. In
essence, the practice of warehousing at such low rates operated as
a rebate or discrimination in the carrier's transportation rate
favoring any shipper who would use the carrier's lines and
disfavoring those who would not, or could not, do so. Here we are
not concerned with water carriers' rates, fares, or charges. The
Commission's order is directed at services rendered by privately
and publicly owned wharves, applicable to all seeking to avail
themselves of the services which are proffered to all alike. If any
discrimination by the appellants as between shippers were pointed
out, it may well be that the Commission might order the
discontinuance of such discrimination. That is not this case. The
Commission purports to order the discontinuance of a
discrimination, but, in reality, orders a rise in the level of
rates applicable without discrimination to all those who can and do
use the proffered services. Its order is a thinly veiled attempt to
cloak a rate order under the guise of a regulation. I think it
plain that Congress granted no such power.
I would reverse the judgment.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, and MR. JUSTICE MURPHY
join in this dissent.
[
Footnote 2/1]
46 U.S.C. § 801.
[
Footnote 2/2]
46 U.S.C. § 815.
[
Footnote 2/3]
46 U.S.C. § 816.
[
Footnote 2/4]
46 U.S.C. § 817.