The claimants of eighty-four boxes of sugar, seized in the port
of New Orleans, for an alleged breach of the revenue laws and
condemned as forfeited to the United States for having been entered
as brown instead of white sugar, claimed an appeal from the
district Court of the United States to the Supreme Court. The
sugars, while under seizure, were appraised at $2,602.51, and after
condemnation they were sold for $2,338.48; leaving, after deducting
the expenses and costs of sale, the sum of $2,150.06. The duties on
the sugars, considering them as white or brown, being deducted from
the amount, reduced the net proceeds below two thousand dollars,
the amount upon which an appeal could be
taken.
Held that the value in controversy was the value
of the property at the, time of the seizure, exclusive of the
duties, and that the claimant had a right to appeal to this
Court.
The statute under which these sugars were seized and condemned
is a highly penal law, and should, in conformity with the rule on
the subject, be construed strictly. If either through accident or
mistake the sugars were entered by a different denomination from
what their quality required, a forfeiture is not incurred.
In the port of New Orleans, eighty-four boxes of sugar, imported
from Matanzas, were entered as brown sugar and were seized by the
officers of the customs for having been so entered, the same being
alleged to be white sugar, and therefore forfeited to the United
States; a libel was filed against the whole importation, but
afterwards, a part of the cargo was released and the proceedings in
the libel were against the remaining eighty-four boxes. The whole
parcel had consisted of one hundred and fifty-five boxes, of which
seventy-one were marked B, and eighty-four marked C. The
seventy-one boxes released were marked C, and of the eighty-four
remaining, seventy were marked B, and fourteen were marked C.
In the answer of the claimants, all fraudulent intention was
denied, and the character of the sugar, as entered, was
asserted,
Page 32 U. S. 454
and the claimants also alleged that if the contrary should be
adjudged by the court, the just conclusion should be that a mistake
had been committed, and not that a fraud was meditated.
The sugars, while under seizure, were appraised by two officers
of the customs, at $2,602.51. After their condemnation, they were
sold by the marshal of the United States at a public sale for
$2,338.48, leaving $2,150.06, after deducting the costs and charges
attending the suits and sale. Upon the sugars, whether white or
brown, the duties amounted to a sum sufficient to reduce the net
proceeds below $2,000; considering the sugars as white sugars,
these proceeds would be $1,388.36.
Testimony was taken as to the real nature and description of the
sugars, all of which was set forth in the record of the proceedings
in the district court, and which is particularly referred to in the
opinion of this Court. The district court condemned the sugars as
forfeited to the United States, for having been entered under a
false denomination; the entry stating them to have been brown
sugars, and the court having adjudged them to have been white
sugars.
The claimants prayed an appeal, which the district court refused
to allow, taking the ground, that the value of the property in
dispute was not above $2,000, and insisting, that to ascertain the
value, the duties must be deducted from the amount of sales, which
deduction would leave a sum much below $2,000. Upon this refusal,
notice was given to the district judge and district attorney, of an
application to this Court for a mandamus, for the allowance of
appeal. And the case came before the court upon a motion for such
mandamus. The record in court being full, it was, to avoid delay,
agreed that if this Court shall consider that the case admits of an
appeal, it might, on the present transcript, proceed to decide the
merits of the cause.
Page 32 U. S. 458
MR. JUSTICE McLEAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case is brought before the court, by an application for a
mandamus, to be directed to the judge of the court of the United
States for the District of Louisiana, requiring him to allow an
appeal from the judgment of that court.
Page 32 U. S. 459
In their petition, the claimants state that the eighty-four
boxes of sugar were consigned to them at New Orleans, and that on
their arrival, they were libeled by the United States for an
alleged breach of the revenue laws; that the sugars were valued by
the two custom house appraisers at $2,602.51; that they were
afterwards condemned and sold by the marshal, at public sale, for
$2,338.48, leaving $2,150.06, after deducting the costs and charges
of the sale. From the judgment of condemnation, the claimants
prayed an appeal to the Supreme Court; which was refused, on the
ground, that the value of the sugars, exclusive of duties, is less
than $2,000. By consent of parties, if the claimants shall, in the
judgment of this Court, be entitled to an appeal, the merits of the
case shall be considered as regularly before the Court for a final
decision.
Whether the claimants were entitled to an appeal is the first
point to be considered. The decision of this question depends on
the amount in controversy. If it be less than $2,000, the judgment
of the district court was final, and cannot be revised by an
appeal. The judgment of condemnation was entered on 9 April, 1831,
and on the 28th of the same month, under the order of the court,
the marshal sold the property. On 19 April, an appeal was prayed,
and an order was made, that the district attorney should show cause
on the 23d of the same month, why an appeal should not be
granted.
In his opinion against the right of the claimants to an appeal,
the district judge said that
"The Supreme Court has lately, in the case of
Gordon v.
Ogden, decided that the defendant cannot support an appeal,
from a judgment obtained against him in the court below for a less
sum than $2,000, because that judgment is the only matter in
dispute."
"In this case," the judge says,
"the thing demanded on one side was the forfeiture of a specific
quantity of sugar, and
Page 32 U. S. 460
on the other the restoration of the same article, the value of
which did not amount to $2,000. . . . There was no demand of
duties, nor could such demand have been taken into consideration in
the case then before the court. There was no contest about the
duties."
It will be observed that at the time the judgment of
condemnation was entered and also when the appeal was prayed, the
sugars remained in the hands of the proper officer. Suppose the
judgment had been given for the restoration of the property, in
what form should it have been entered? Could any part of the
property have been detained for the payment of the duties? The
duties were not then due, and could the court have directed them to
be paid, by the sale of a part of the property? A judgment in favor
of the complainants in the district court should have directed the
property to be restored to them on the payment of the duties, or
securing them to be paid, according to law. This would have given
to the claimants the whole amount of their property, as though no
seizure of it had been made. Under the law, they were entitled to a
credit for the payment of the duties on the condition of giving
bond and security.
Does it not thus appear that the whole of the property was the
amount in dispute, and would have gone into the possession of the
claimants had the judgment of the court been in their favor? How
then could it be said in the court below, that the duties must be
deducted from the value of the sugars, as forming no part of the
controversy, and that, by such deduction, the value of the property
was reduced below the amount which entitles the claimants to an
appeal? If the claimants had given bond for the payment of the
duties, and a judgment of restoration had been entered by the court
before any part of the duties became payable, should the court have
directed them to be paid? Such an order, under such circumstances,
would be oppressive and unjust. The duties having been secured to
the government as the law requires, no wrongful act on the part of
the officers of the government could lessen the term of credit
fixed by the law and stated in the bond. And if no bond had been
given,
Page 32 U. S. 461
because of the seizure of the property, or its restoration, the
claimants would have been at least entitled to credit for the
unexpired term allowed by law for the payment of the duties, on
their giving the requisite bond and security.
The case must stand before this Court on the appeal as it stood
before the district court at the time the appeal was prayed. No
subsequent action of the court in the sale of the property can
affect the question. Before this Court, therefore, the case must
stand, on the judgment of condemnation, and this before the duties
were payable by law. Was not the entire property, and consequently
its full value, in dispute between the parties at the time judgment
was entered? On the one side, a condemnation of the property is
claimed on the ground that the revenue law has been violated, and
on the other a restoration of the property is demanded. In this
view, this Court thinks the right of appeal from the judgment of
the district court was clear, as the value of the property in
controversy exceeded $2,000.
The next inquiry is whether the sugars were entered for the
payment of duties under a false denomination, with a view to
defraud the revenue? The sugars were entered as brown, on which a
duty of three cents per pound is paid, and the libellants contend
that they should have been entered as white, on which a duty of
four cents per pound is paid. The quality of the sugars can only be
ascertained by a reference to the proof in the case. The witnesses
differ in their opinion as to the quality of these sugars. Bertrand
and Smelser, two of the custom house officers, say the sugars were
white, and their testimony is corroborated by five other witnesses.
But a still greater number of witnesses, embracing the largest
importers of sugars at New Orleans, are of the opinion that the
sugars were properly denominated brown by the importers. Some of
the boxes appeared to be whiter than others, but by far the greater
number, as it would seem from a majority of the witnesses, were
brown.
J. W. Zacharie says that he is engaged in the importation of
Havana sugars, and that had he been ordered to purchase white
sugar, he would not have purchased the sugars in question. That if
he had entered these sugars as brown for the
Page 32 U. S. 462
payment of duties, he would not have considered himself as
practicing a fraud on the government. A. Fiske states that he knew
sugar of superior quality imported as brown sugar, and that it is
very difficult beforehand for an importer to know how his sugar
will be classed. He says when the qualities of superior brown and
inferior white approximate, a very fair difference of opinion may
exist as to the quality. Mr. Grant states that he has had great
experience in white Havana sugar, and after examining the samples
of the sugars shown him, says that a majority of them are brown,
though there may be a few boxes of white. He would not purchase
them as white on an order for sugar of that quality. A. R. Taylor
and Joseph Cockayne state substantially the same facts as Mr.
Grant. Mr. Suarez says that a portion of the sugar shown him has
been white, but being very old, it has become worse than brown, and
that he would not purchase it as white sugar. He considers the
entire lot brown. J. H. Shepherd states substantially the same
facts.
It appears that the planters in Havana mark their white sugars
with the letter B, and that the mark for brown is Q, and it appears
from the testimony of Bertrand, one of the custom house officers,
that he suspected a fraud was designed by the importers, as he
discovered the marks on the boxes had been changed from B to Q. Two
of the boxes had the letter B still on them. Whether these changes
were made by the planter or the importer does not appear, but Fiske
and other witnesses state that the marks which are placed on sugars
in Havana depend very much on the fancy of the planters, and that
they are sometimes marked B with the view of selling them higher.
There does not appear to be anything in these marks which shows
that a fraud was contemplated by the importers. Any such inference
is rebutted by many respectable witnesses in the case who state
that the sugars are of the quality denominated in the entry.
The statute under which these sugars were seized and condemned
is a highly penal law, and should, in conformity with
Page 32 U. S. 463
the rule on the subject, be construed strictly. If, either
through accident or mistake, the sugars were entered by a different
denomination from what their quality required, a forfeiture is not
incurred. Under all the circumstances of this case, the court
thinks that the evidence not only fails to convict the claimants of
fraud in the entry of these sugars by a false denomination, but
they think that the weight of testimony is in favor of the quality
of the sugars, as stated in the entry. They therefore reverse the
decree of the district court, and direct said court to enter a
decree, that the proceeds of these sugars be restored to the
complainants if the duties shall have been paid, and if they shall
not have been paid, as they are now due, that the restoration be of
the balance of proceeds after deducting the duties. The court
thinks there was probable cause of seizure, and it direct the fact
to be certified.
On consideration of the motion of the claimants and of the
arguments of counsel as well for the United States as for the
claimants thereupon had, it is now here considered, ordered,
adjudged, and decreed by this Court that a writ of mandamus as
prayed for be and the same is hereby awarded, directed to the judge
of the District Court of the United States, for the Eastern
District of Louisiana ordering him to grant an appeal in the
premises.
