1. A suit in a federal court to enjoin enforcement of a state
agricultural proration program, in which the validity of the
program is challenged as in conflict with federal antitrust laws,
is a suit "arising under" a "law regulating commerce" and is
maintainable without regard to the amount in controversy. 28 U.S.C.
§ 41(1), (8). P.
317 U. S.
349.
2. A majority of the Court are of opinion that this suit to
enjoin enforcement of a marketing plan adopted under the California
Agricultural Prorate Act is within the equity jurisdiction of the
district court, since the complaint alleges and the evidence shows
threatened irreparable injury to the complainant's business and
threatened prosecutions by reason of his having marketed his crop
under the protection of the district court's injunction. P.
317 U. S.
349.
3. A prorate marketing program under the California Agricultural
Prorate Act, adopted by the State for regulating the handling,
disposition, and prices of raisins produced in California, a large
part of which go into interstate and foreign commerce,
held not within the intended scope of, and not a violation
of, the Sherman Act. P.
317 U. S.
350.
Page 317 U. S. 342
4. A program pursuant to the California Agricultural Prorate Act
for marketing the 1940 raisin crop, adopted with the collaboration
of officials of the U.S. Department of Agriculture and aided by
loans from the Commodity Credit Corporation recommended by the
Secretary of Agriculture,
held not in conflict with the
federal Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, where the
Secretary had not proposed or promulgated any order under that Act
applicable to the marketing of raisins. Pp.
317 U. S. 352,
317 U. S.
358.
5. The marketing program for the 1940 raisin crop, adopted
pursuant to the California Agricultural Prorate Act, the declared
purpose of which is to "conserve the agricultural wealth of the
State" and to "prevent economic waste in the marketing of
agricultural products" of the State, and which operates to
eliminate competition among producers in respect of the terms of
sale (including the price) of the crop and to impose restrictions
on the sale and distribution to buyers who subsequently sell and
ship in interstate commerce,
held a regulation of state
industry of local concern which, in the circumstances detailed in
the opinion, is not prohibited by the commerce clause in the
absence of Congressional legislation prohibiting or regulating
transactions affected by the state program. Pp.
317 U. S. 359,
317 U. S.
368.
(1) The restrictions which the state program imposes upon the
intrastate sale of a commodity by its producer to a processor who
contemplates doing, and, in fact, does, work upon the commodity
before packing it and shipping it in interstate commerce do not
violate the Commerce Clause. P.
317 U. S.
359.
(2)
Lemke v. Farmers Grain Co., 258 U. S.
50, and
Shafer v Farmers Grain Co.,
268 U. S. 189,
distinguished. P.
317 U.S.
361.
(3) When Congress has not exerted its power under the Commerce
Clause, and state regulation of matters of local concern is so
related to interstate commerce that it also operates as a
regulation of that commerce, the reconciliation of such power of
Congress with that reserved to the State is to be attained by the
accommodation of the competing demands of the state and national
interests involved. P.
317 U. S.
362.
(4) State regulations affecting interstate commerce are to be
sustained not because they are "indirect", rather than "direct,"
not because they affect, rather than command the operations of
interstate commerce, but because, upon a consideration of all the
relevant facts
Page 317 U. S. 343
and circumstances, the matter appears an appropriate one for
local regulations, for which there may be wide scope without
materially obstruction the free flow of commerce. P.
317 U. S.
362.
(5) Examination of the evidence in this case and of available
data of the raisin industry in California, of which the Court may
take judicial notice, leaves no doubt that the evils attending the
production and marketing of raisins in that State present a problem
local in character and urgently demanding state action for the
economic protection of those engaged in one of its important
industries. P.
317 U. S.
363.
(6) Where the Secretary of Agriculture, who could have adopted a
marketing program for raisins under the federal Agricultural
Marketing Agreement Act, has instead, as that Act authorizes,
cooperated in promoting the state marketing program, the court
cannot say that the effect of the state program on interstate
commerce is one which the Commerce Clause forbids. And particularly
should state regulation of local matters be sustained where its
effect on commerce is one which it has been the policy of Congress,
by its legislation, to encourage. P.
317 U. S.
368.
39 F.
Supp. 895, reversed.
APPEAL from a decree of a district court of three judges
enjoining the enforcement, against the appellee, of a marketing
program adopted pursuant to the California Agricultural Prorate
Act.
Page 317 U. S. 344
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE STONE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The questions for our consideration are whether the marketing
program adopted for the 1940 raisin crop under the California
Agricultural Prorate Act [
Footnote
1] is rendered invalid (1) by the Sherman Act, or (2) by the
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, as amended, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 601,
et seq., or (3) by the Commerce Clause
of the Constitution.
Appellee, a producer and packer of raisins in California,
brought this suit in the district court to enjoin appellants -- the
State Director of Agriculture, Raisin Proration Zone No. 1, the
members of the State Agricultural Prorate Advisory Commission and
of the Program Committee for Zone No. 1, and others charged by the
statute with the administration of the Prorate Act -- from
enforcing, as to appellee, a program for marketing the 1940 crop of
raisins produced in "Raisin Proration Zone No. 1." After a trial
upon oral testimony, a stipulation of facts and certain exhibits,
the district court held that the 1940 raisin marketing program was
an illegal interference with and undue burden upon interstate
commerce, and gave judgment for appellee granting the injunction
prayed for.
39 F. Supp.
895. The case was tried by a district court of three
judges,
Page 317 U. S. 345
and comes here on appeal under §§ 266 and 238 of the
Judicial Code as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 380, 345.
As appears from the evidence and from the findings of the
district court, almost all the raisins consumed in the United
States, and nearly one-half of the world crop, are produced in
Raisin Proration Zone No. 1. Between 90 and 95 percent of the
raisins grown in California are ultimately shipped in interstate or
foreign commerce.
The harvesting and marketing of the crop in California follows a
uniform procedure. The grower of raisins picks the bunches of
grapes and places them for drying on trays laid between the rows of
vines. When the grapes have been sufficiently dried, he places them
in "sweat boxes" where their moisture content is equalized. At this
point, the curing process is complete. The growers sell the raisins
and deliver them in the "sweat boxes" to handlers or packers whose
plants are all located within the Zone. The packers process them at
their plants and then ship them in interstate commerce. Those
raisins which are to be marketed in clusters are sometimes merely
packed, unstemmed, in suitable containers, but are more often
cleaned, fumigated, and, when necessary, steamed to make the stems
pliable. Most of the raisins are not sold in clusters; such raisins
are stemmed before packing, and most packers also clean, grade and
sort them. One variety is also seeded before packing.
The packers sell their raisins through agents, brokers, jobbers
and other middlemen, principally located in other states or foreign
countries. Until he is ready to ship the raisins, the packer stores
them in the form in which they have been received from producers.
The length of time that the raisins remain at the packing plants
before processing and shipping varies from a few days up to two
years, depending upon the packer's current supply of raisins and
the market demand. The packers frequently place orders with
producers for fall delivery, before the
Page 317 U. S. 346
crop is harvested, and at the same time enter into contracts for
the sale of raisins to their customers. In recent years, most
packers have had a substantial "carry over" of stored raisins at
the end of each crop season, which are usually marketed before the
raisins of the next year's crop are marketed.
The California Agricultural Prorate Act authorizes the
establishment, through action of state officials, of programs for
the marketing of agricultural commodities produced in the state, so
as to restrict competition among the growers and maintain prices in
the distribution of their commodities to packers. The declared
purpose of the Act is to "conserve the agricultural wealth of the
State" and to "prevent economic waste in the marketing of
agricultural products" of the state. It authorizes ( § 3) the
creation of an Agricultural Prorate Advisory Commission of nine
members, of which a state official, the Director of Agriculture, is
ex officio a member. The other eight members are appointed
for terms of four years by the Governor and confirmed by the
Senate, and are required to take an oath of office. § 4.
Upon the petition of ten producers for the establishment of a
prorate marketing plan for any commodity within a defined
production zone (§ 8), and after a public hearing (§ 9),
and after making prescribed economic findings (§ 10) showing
that the institution of a program for the proposed zone will
prevent agricultural waste and conserve agricultural wealth of the
state without permitting unreasonable profits to producers, the
Commission is authorized to grant the petition. The Director, with
the approval of the Commission, is then required to select a
program committee from among nominees chosen by the qualified
producers within the zone, to which he may add not more than two
handlers or packers who receive the regulated commodity from
producers for marketing. §§ 11, 14, 15.
Page 317 U. S. 347
The program committee is required (§ 15) to formulate a
proration marketing program for the commodity produced in the zone,
which the Commission is authorized to approve after a public
hearing and a "finding that the program is reasonably calculated to
carry out the objectives of the Act." The Commission may, if so
advised, modify the program and approve it as modified. If the
proposed program, as approved by the Commission, is consented to by
65 percent in number of producers in the zone owning 51 percent of
the acreage devoted to production of the regulated crop, the
Director is required to declare the program instituted. §
16.
Authority to administer the program, subject to the approval of
the Director of Agriculture, is conferred on the program committee.
§§ 6, 18, 22. Section 22.5 declares that it shall be a
misdemeanor, which is punishable by fine and imprisonment (Penal
Code § 19), for any producer to sell or any handler to receive
or possess without proper authority any commodity for which a
proration program has been instituted. Like penalty is imposed upon
any person who aids or abets in the commission of any of the acts
specified in the section, and it is declared that each "infraction
shall constitute a separate and distinct offense." Section 25
imposes a civil liability of $500 "for each and every violation" of
any provision of a proration program.
The seasonal proration marketing program for raisins with which
we are now concerned became effective on September 7, 1940. This
provided that the program committee should classify raisins as
"standard," "substandard," and "inferior"; "inferior" raisins are
those which are unfit for human consumption, as defined in the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301
et seq. The committee is required to establish receiving
stations within the zone to which every producer must deliver all
raisins which he desires to market. The raisins are graded at these
stations. All inferior raisins are to be placed in the
Page 317 U. S. 348
"inferior raisin pool," to be disposed of by the committee "only
for assured by-product and other diversion purposes." All
substandard raisins, and at least 20 percent of the total standard
and substandard raisins produced, must be placed in a "surplus
pool." Raisins in this pool may also be disposed of only for
"assured byproduct and other diversion purposes," except that,
under certain circumstances, the program committee may transfer
standard raisins from the surplus pool to the stabilization pool.
Fifty percent of the crop must be placed in a "stabilization
pool."
Under the program, the producer is permitted to sell the
remaining 30 percent of his standard raisins, denominated "free
tonnage," through ordinary commercial channels, subject to the
requirement that he obtain a "secondary certificate" authorizing
such marketing and pay a certificate fee of $2.50 for each ton
covered by the certificate. Certification is stated to be a device
for controlling "the time and volume of movement" of free tonnage
into such ordinary commercial channels. Raisins in the
stabilization pool are to be disposed of by the committee "in such
manner as to obtain stability in the market and to dispose of such
raisins," but no raisins (other than those subject to special
lending or pooling arrangements of the Federal Government) can be
sold by the committee at less than the prevailing market price for
raisins of the same variety and grade on the date of sale. Under
the program, the committee is to make advances to producers of from
$25 to $27.50 a ton, depending upon the variety of raisins, for
deliveries into the surplus pool, and from $50 to $55 a ton for
deliveries into the stabilization pool. The committee is authorized
to pledge the raisins held in those pools in order to secure funds
to finance pool operations and make advances to growers.
Appellee's bill of complaint challenges the validity of the
proration program as in violation of the Commerce
Page 317 U. S. 349
Clause and the Sherman Act; in support of the decree of the
district court, he also urges that it conflicts with and is
superseded by the Federal Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of
1937. The complaint alleges that he is engaged within the marketing
zone both in producing and in purchasing and packing raisins for
sale and shipment interstate; that, before the adoption of the
program, he had entered into contracts for the sale of 1940 crop
raisins; that, unless enjoined, appellants will enforce the program
against appellee by criminal prosecutions, and will prevent him
from marketing his 1940 crop, from fulfilling his sales contracts,
and from purchasing for sale and selling in interstate commerce
raisins of that crop.
Appellee's allegations of irreparable injury are in general
terms, but it appears from the evidence that he had produced 200
tons of 1940 crop raisins; that he had contracted to sell 762 1/2
tons of the 1940 crop; that he had dealt in 2,000 tons of raisins
of the 1939 crop, and expected to sell, if the challenged program
were not in force, 3,000 tons of the 1940 crop at $60 a ton; that
the pre-season price to growers of raisins of the 1940 crop, before
the program became effective, was $45 per ton, and that immediately
afterward it rose to $55 per ton or higher. It also appears that,
the district court having awarded the final injunction prayed,
appellee has proceeded with the marketing of his 1940 crop and has
disposed of all except twelve tons, which remain on hand. Although
the district court found that the amount in controversy exceeds
$3,000, we are of opinion that as the complaint assails the
validity of the program under the antitrust laws, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-33, the suit is one "arising under" a "law
regulating commerce", and allegation and proof of the
jurisdictional amount are not required. 28 U.S.C. §§
41(1), (8);
Peyton v. Railway Express Agency, 316 U.
S. 350. The majority of the Court is also of opinion
that the suit is within the equity jurisdiction of the court, since
the complaint
Page 317 U. S. 350
alleges, and the evidence shows, threatened irreparable injury
to respondent's business and threatened prosecutions by reason of
his having marketed his crop under the protection of the district
court's decree.
Validity of the Prorate Program under the Sherman
Act
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, makes unlawful
"every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States." And § 2, 15
U.S.C. § 2, makes it unlawful to
"monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States."
We may assume for present purposes that the California prorate
program would violate the Sherman Act if it were organized and made
effective solely by virtue of a contract, combination or conspiracy
of private persons, individual or corporate. We may assume also,
without deciding, that Congress could, in the exercise of its
commerce power, prohibit a state from maintaining a stabilization
program like the present because of its effect on interstate
commerce. Occupation of a legislative "field" by Congress in the
exercise of a granted power is a familiar example of its
constitutional power to suspend state laws.
See Adams Express
Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491,
226 U. S. 505;
Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line, 272 U.
S. 605,
272 U. S. 607;
Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Porter, 273 U.
S. 341;
Illinois Gas Co. v. Public Service Co.,
314 U. S. 498,
314 U. S. 510.
But it is plain that the prorate program here was never intended
to operate by force of individual agreement or combination. It
derived its authority and its efficacy from the legislative command
of the state, and was not intended to operate or become effective
without that command. We find nothing in the language of the
Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that its purpose was
to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities
directed by its
Page 317 U. S. 351
legislature. In a dual system of government in which, under the
Constitution, the states are sovereign save only as Congress may
constitutionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed
purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents
is not lightly to be attributed to Congress.
The Sherman Act makes no mention of the state as such, and gives
no hint that it was intended to restrain state action or official
action directed by a state. The Act is applicable to "persons,"
including corporations ( § 7), and it authorizes suits under
it by persons and corporations ( § 15). A state may maintain a
suit for damages under it,
Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.
S. 159, but the United States may not,
United States
v. Cooper Corp., 312 U. S. 600 --
conclusions derived not from the literal meaning of the words
"person" and "corporation," but from the purpose, the subject
matter, the context and the legislative history of the statute.
There is no suggestion of a purpose to restrain state action in
the Act's legislative history. The sponsor of the bill which was
ultimately enacted as the Sherman Act declared that it prevented
only "business combinations." 21 Cong.Rec. 2562, 2457;
see
also at 2459, 2461. That its purpose was to suppress
combinations to restrain competition and attempts to monopolize by
individuals and corporations abundantly appears from its
legislative history.
See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,
310 U. S. 469,
310 U. S.
492-93 and n. 15;
United States v. Addyston Pipe
& Steel Co., 85 F. 271,
affirmed, 175 U. S. 175 U.S.
211;
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S.
1,
221 U. S.
54-58.
True, a state does not give immunity to those who violate the
Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that
their action is lawful,
Northern Securities Co. v. United
States, 193 U. S. 197,
193 U. S. 332,
193 U. S.
344-47, and we have no question of the state or its
municipality becoming a participant in a private agreement or
combination
Page 317 U. S. 352
by others for restraint of trade,
cf. Union Pacific R. Co.
v. United States, 313 U. S. 450.
Here, the state command to the Commission and to the program
committee of the California Prorate Act is not rendered unlawful by
the Sherman Act, since, in view of the latter's words and history,
it must be taken to be a prohibition of individual, and not state,
action. It is the state which has created the machinery for
establishing the prorate program. Although the organization of a
prorate zone is proposed by producers, and a prorate program,
approved by the Commission, must also be approved by referendum of
producers, it is the state, acting through the Commission, which
adopts the program and which enforces it with penal sanctions in
the execution of a governmental policy. The prerequisite approval
of the program upon referendum by a prescribed number of producers
is not the imposition by them of their will upon the minority by
force of agreement or combination which the Sherman Act prohibits.
The state itself exercises its legislative authority in making the
regulation and in prescribing the conditions of its application.
The required vote on the referendum is one of these conditions.
Compare Currin v. Wallace, 306 U. S.
1,
306 U. S. 16;
Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.
S. 394,
276 U. S. 407;
Wickard v. Filburn, ante p.
317 U. S. 111.
The state, in adopting and enforcing the prorate program, made
no contract or agreement and entered into no conspiracy in
restraint of trade or to establish monopoly, but, as sovereign,
imposed the restraint as an act of government which the Sherman Act
did not undertake to prohibit.
Olsen v. Smith,
195 U. S. 332,
195 U. S.
344-345;
cf. Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 F. 908,
910.
Validity of the Program Under the
Agricultural
Marketing Agreement Act
The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 246,
7 U.S.C. §§ 601
et seq., authorizes the
Secretary
Page 317 U. S. 353
of Agriculture to issue orders limiting the quantity of
specified agricultural products, including fruits, which may be
marketed "in the current of . . . or so as directly to burden,
obstruct, or affect interstate or foreign commerce." Such orders
may allot the amounts which handlers may purchase from any producer
by means which equalize the amount marketed among producers; may
provide for the control and elimination of surpluses and for the
establishment of reserve pools of the regulated produce. §
8c(6). The federal statute differs from the California Prorate Act
in that its sanction falls upon handlers alone, while the state act
(§ 22.5(3)) applies to growers and extends also to handlers so
far as they may unlawfully receive or have in their possession
within the state any commodity subject to a prorate program.
We may assume that the powers conferred upon the Secretary would
extend to the control of surpluses in the raisin industry through a
pooling arrangement such as was promulgated under the California
Prorate Act in the present case.
See United States v. Rock
Royal Co-op., 307 U. S. 533;
Currin v. Wallace, supra. We may assume also that a
stabilization program adopted under the Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act would supersede the state act. But the federal act
becomes effective only if a program is ordered by the Secretary.
Section 8c(3) provides that, whenever the Secretary of Agriculture
"has reason to believe" that the issuance of an order will tend to
effectuate the declared policy of the Act with respect to any
commodity, he shall give due notice of an opportunity for a hearing
upon a proposed order, and § 8c(4) provides that, after the
hearing, he shall issue an order if he finds and sets forth in the
order that its issuance will tend to effectuate the declared policy
of the Act with respect to the commodity in question. Since the
Secretary has not given notice of hearing and has not proposed or
promulgated any order regulating raisins, it must be
Page 317 U. S. 354
taken that he has no reason to believe that issuance of an order
will tend to effectuate the policy of the Act.
The Secretary, by § 10(i), is authorized "in order to
effectuate the declared policy" of the Act, and "in order to obtain
uniformity in the formulation, administration, and enforcement of
Federal and State programs relating to the regulation of the
handling of agricultural commodities," to confer and cooperate with
duly constituted authorities of any state. From this and the whole
structure of the Act, it would seem that it contemplates that its
policy may be effectuated by a state program either with or without
the promulgation of a federal program by order of the Secretary.
Cf. United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., supra. It follows
that the adoption of an adequate program by the state may be deemed
by the Secretary a sufficient ground for believing that the
policies of the federal act will be effectuated without the
promulgation of an order.
It is evident, therefore, that the Marketing Act contemplates
the existence of state programs at least until such time as the
Secretary shall establish a federal marketing program, unless the
state program in some way conflicts with the policy of the federal
act. The Act contemplates that each sovereign shall operate "in its
own sphere, but can exert its authority in conformity, rather than
in conflict, with that of the other." H.Rep. No. 1241, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. pp. 22-23; S.Rep. 1011, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 15.
[
Footnote 2] The only suggested
possibility of conflict is between the declared purposes of the two
acts. The object of the federal statute is stated to be the
establishment, by exercise
Page 317 U. S. 355
of the power conferred on the Secretary, of "orderly marketing
conditions for agricultural commodities in interstate commerce"
such as will tend to establish "parity prices" for farm products,
[
Footnote 3] but with the
further purpose that, in the interest of consumers, current
consumptive demand is to be considered and that no action shall be
taken for the purpose of maintaining prices above the parity level.
§ 2.
The declared objective of the California Act is to prevent
excessive supplies of agricultural commodities from "adversely
affecting" the market, and although the statute speaks in terms of
"economic stability" and "agricultural waste", rather than of
price, the evident purpose and effect of the regulation is to
"conserve agricultural wealth of the state" by raising and
maintaining prices, but "without permitting unreasonable profits to
producers." § 10. The only possibility of conflict would seem
to be if a state program were to raise prices beyond the parity
price prescribed by the federal act, a condition which has not
occurred. [
Footnote 4]
Page 317 U. S. 356
That the Secretary has reason to believe that the state act will
tend to effectuate the policies of the federal act so as not to
require the issuance of an order under the latter is evidenced by
the approval given by the Department of Agriculture to the state
program by the loan agreement between the state and the Commodity
Credit Corporation. [
Footnote
5] By § 302 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 52
Stat. 43, 7 U.S.C. § 1302(a), the Commodity Credit Corporation
is authorized "upon the recommendation of the Secretary and with
the approval of the President, to make available loans on
agricultural commodities. . . ." The "amount, terms, and
conditions" of such loans are to be "fixed by the Secretary,
subject to the approval of the Corporation and the President."
Under this authority, the Commodity Credit Corporation made loans
of $5,146,000 to Zone No. 1, secured by a
Page 317 U. S. 357
pledge of 109,000 tons of 1940 crop raisins in the surplus and
stabilization pools. These loans were ultimately liquidated by
sales of 76,000 tons to packers and 33,000 tons to the Federal
Surplus Marketing Administration, an agency of the Department of
Agriculture, [
Footnote 6] for
relief distribution and for export under the Lend-Lease program.
[
Footnote 7] The loans were
conditional upon the adoption by the state of the present seasonal
marketing program. We are informed by the Government, which at our
request filed a brief
amicus curiae, that, under the loan
agreement, prices and sales policies as to the pledged raisins were
to be controlled by a committee appointed by the Secretary, and
that officials of the Department of Agriculture collaborated in
drafting the 1940 state raisin program.
Page 317 U. S. 358
Section 302 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 requires
the Commodity Credit Corporation to make nonrecourse loans to
producers of certain agricultural products at specified percentages
of the parity price, and authorizes loans on any agricultural
commodity. The Government informs us that, in making loans under
the latter authority, § 302 has been construed by the
Department of Agriculture as requiring the loans to be made only in
order to effectuate the policy of federal agricultural legislation.
[
Footnote 8] Section 2 of the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 declares it to be the policy of
Congress to achieve the statutory objectives through loans. The
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 and the Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act of 1937 were both derived from the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 31, and are coordinate parts of a
single plan for raising farm prices to parity levels. The
conditions imposed by the Secretary of Agriculture in the loan
agreement with the State of California, and the collaboration of
federal officials in the drafting of the program, must be taken as
an expression of opinion by the Department of Agriculture that the
state program thus aided by the loan is consistent with the
policies of the Agricultural Adjustment and Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Acts. We find no conflict between the two acts, and no
such occupation of the legislative field by the mere adoption of
the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act, without the issuance of
any order by the Secretary putting it into effect, as would
preclude the effective operation of the state act.
We have no occasion to decide whether the same conclusion would
follow if the state program had not been adopted with the
collaboration of officials of the Department of Agriculture and
aided by loans from the Commodity
Page 317 U. S. 359
Credit Corporation recommended by the Secretary of
Agriculture.
Validity of the Program under the Commerce
Clause
The court below found that approximately 95 percent of the
California raisin crop finds its way into interstate or foreign
commerce. It is not denied that the proration program is so devised
as to compel the delivery by each producer, including appellee, of
over two-thirds of his 1840 raisin crop to the program committee,
and to subject it to the marketing control of the committee. The
program, adopted through the exercise of the legislative power
delegated to state officials, has the force of law. It clothes the
committee with power, and imposes on it the duty to control
marketing of the crop so as to enhance the price or at least to
maintain prices by restraints on competition of producers in the
sale of their crop. The program operates to eliminate competition
of the producers in the terms of sale of the crop, including price.
And since 95 percent of the crop is marketed in interstate
commerce, the program may be taken to have a substantial effect on
the commerce, in placing restrictions on the sale and marketing of
a product to buyers who eventually sell and ship it in interstate
commerce.
The question is thus presented whether, in the absence of
Congressional legislation prohibiting or regulating the
transactions affected by the state program, the restrictions which
it imposes upon the sale within the state of a commodity by its
producer to a processor who contemplates doing, and, in fact, does,
work upon the commodity before packing and shipping it in
interstate commerce, violate the Commerce Clause.
The governments of the states are sovereign within their
territory save only as they are subject to the prohibitions of the
Constitution or as their action in some measure conflicts with
powers delegated to the National Government,
Page 317 U. S. 360
or with Congressional legislation enacted in the exercise of
those powers. This Court has repeatedly held that the grant of
power to Congress by the Commerce Clause did not wholly withdraw
from the states the authority to regulate the commerce with respect
to matters of local concern, on which Congress has not spoken.
Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352,
230 U. S.
399-400;
South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell
Bros., 303 U. S. 177,
303 U. S. 187,
et seq.; California v. Thompson, 313 U.
S. 109,
313 U. S.
113-114 and cases cited;
Duckworth v. Arkansas,
314 U. S. 390.
A fortiori, there are many subjects and transactions of
local concern, not themselves interstate commerce or a part of its
operations, which are within the regulatory and taxing power of the
states, so long as state action serves local ends and does not
discriminate against the commerce, even though the exercise of
those powers may materially affect it. Whether we resort to the
mechanical test sometimes applied by this Court in determining when
interstate commerce begins with respect to a commodity grown or
manufactured within a state and then sold and shipped out of it --
or whether we consider only the power of the state in the absence
of Congressional action to regulate matters of local concern, even
though the regulation affects or in some measure restricts the
commerce -- we think the present regulation is within state
power.
In applying the mechanical test to determine when interstate
commerce begins and ends (
see Federal Compress Co. v.
McLean, 291 U. S. 17,
291 U. S. 21 and
cases cited;
Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U. S.
1 and cases cited) this Court has frequently held that,
for purposes of local taxation or regulation, "manufacture" is not
interstate commerce even though the manufacturing process is of
slight extent.
Crescent Oil Co. v. Mississippi,
257 U. S. 129;
Oliver Iron Co. v. Lord, 262 U. S. 172;
Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.
S. 165;
Hope Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U.
S. 284;
Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co.,
260 U. S. 245;
Champlin
Refining
Page 317 U. S. 361
Co. v. Commission, 286 U. S. 210;
Bayside Fish Co. v. Gentry, 297 U.
S. 422. And such regulations of manufacture have been
sustained where, aimed at matters of local concern, they had the
effect of preventing commerce in the regulated article.
Kidd v.
Pearson, 128 U. S. 1;
Champlin Refining Co. v. Commission, supra; Sligh v.
Kirkwood, 237 U. S. 52;
see Capital City Dairy Co. v. Ohio, 183 U.
S. 238,
183 U. S. 245;
Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Co., 300 U. S.
55,
300 U. S. 77;
cf. Bayside Fish Co. v. Gentry, supra. A state is also
free to license and tax intrastate buying where the purchaser
expects in the usual course of business to resell in interstate
commerce.
Chassaniol v. Greenwood, 291 U.
S. 584. And no case has gone so far as to hold that a
state could not license or otherwise regulate the sale of articles
within the state because the buyer, after processing and packing
them, will, in the normal course of business, sell and ship them in
interstate commerce.
All of these cases proceed on the ground that the taxation or
regulation involved, however drastically it may affect interstate
commerce, is nevertheless not prohibited by the Commerce Clause
where the regulation is imposed before any operation of interstate
commerce occurs. Applying that test, the regulation here controls
the disposition, including the sale and purchase, of raisins before
they are processed and packed preparatory to interstate sale and
shipment. The regulation is thus applied to transactions wholly
intrastate before the raisins are ready for shipment in interstate
commerce.
It is for this reason that the present case is to be
distinguished from
Lemke v. Farmers Grain Co.,
258 U. S. 50, and
Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.
S. 189, on which appellee relies. There, the state
regulation held invalid was of the business of those who purchased
grain within the state for immediate shipment out of it. The Court
was of opinion that the purchase of the wheat for shipment out of
the state without resale or processing was a
Page 317 U. S. 362
part of the interstate commerce.
Compare Chassaniol v.
Greenwood, supra.
This distinction between local regulation of those who are not
engaged in commerce, although the commodity which they produce and
sell to local buyers is ultimately destined for interstate
commerce, and the regulation of those who engage in the commerce by
selling the product interstate, has in general served, and serves
here, as a ready means of distinguishing those local activities
which, under the Commerce Clause, are the appropriate subject of
state regulation despite their effect on interstate commerce. But
courts are not confined to so mechanical a test. When Congress has
not exerted its power under the Commerce Clause, and state
regulation of matters of local concern is so related to interstate
commerce that it also operates as a regulation of that commerce,
the reconciliation of the power thus granted with that reserved to
the state is to be attained by the accommodation of the competing
demands of the state and national interests involved.
See Di
Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U. S. 34,
273 U. S. 44
(
with which compare California v. Thompson, supra);
South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., supra; Milk
Control Board v. Eisenberg Co., 306 U.
S. 346;
Illinois Gas Co. v. Public Service Co.,
314 U. S. 498,
314 U. S.
504-505.
Such regulations by the state are to be sustained not because
they are "indirect", rather than "direct,"
see DiSanto v.
Pennsylvania, supra; cf. Wickard v. Filburn, supra, not
because they control interstate activities in such a manner as only
to affect the commerce, rather than to command its operations. But
they are to be upheld because, upon a consideration of all the
relevant facts and circumstances, it appears that the matter is one
which may appropriately be regulated in the interest of the safety,
health and wellbeing of local communities, and which, because of
its local character, and the practical difficulties involved, may
never be adequately dealt with
Page 317 U. S. 363
by Congress. Because of its local character also there may be
wide scope for local regulation without substantially impairing the
national interest in the regulation of commerce by a single
authority and without materially obstructing the free flow of
commerce, which were the principal objects sought to be secured by
the Commerce Clause.
See Minnesota Rate Cases, supra,
230 U. S.
398-412;
California v. Thompson, supra,
313 U. S. 113.
There may also be, as in the present ease, local regulations whose
effect upon the national commerce is such as not to conflict, but
to coincide, with a policy which Congress has established with
respect to it.
Examination of the evidence in this case and of available data
of the raisin industry in California, of which we may take judicial
notice, leaves no doubt that the evils attending the production and
marketing of raisins in that state present a problem local in
character and urgently demanding state action for the economic
protection of those engaged in one of its important industries.
[
Footnote 9] Between 1914 and
1920, there was a spectacular rise in price of all types of
California grapes, including raisin grapes. The price of raisins
reached its peak, $235 per ton, in 1921, and was followed by large
increase in acreage, with accompanying reduction in price. The
price of raisins in most
Page 317 U. S. 364
years since 1922 has ranged from $40 to $60 per ton, but acreage
continued to increase until 1926, and production reached its peak,
1,433,000 tons of raisin grapes and 290,000 tons of raisins, in
1938. Since 1920, there has been a substantial carry over of 30 to
50% of each year's crop. The result has been that, at least since
1934, the industry, with a large increase in acreage and the
attendant fall in price, has been unable to market its product, and
has been compelled to sell at less than parity prices, and in some
years at prices regarded by students of the industry as less than
the cost of production. [
Footnote 10]
The history of the industry, at least since 1929, is a record of
a continuous search for expedients which would stabilize the
marketing of the raisin crop and maintain a price standard which
would bring fair return to the producers. [
Footnote 11] It is significant of the relation
of the local interest in maintaining this program to the national
interest in interstate commerce that, throughout the period from
1929 until the adoption of the prorate program for
Page 317 U. S. 365
the 1940 raisin crop, the national government has contributed to
these efforts either by its establishment of marketing programs
pursuant to Act of Congress or by aiding programs sponsored by the
state. Local cooperative market stabilization programs for raisins
in 1929 and 1930 were approved by the Federal Farm Board, which
supported them with large loans. [
Footnote 12] In 1934, a marketing agreement for
California raisins was put into effect under § 8(2) of the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, as amended, 48 Stat. 528,
which authorized the Secretary of Agriculture, in order to
effectuate the Act's declared policy of achieving parity prices, to
enter into marketing agreements with processors, producers and
others engaged in handling agricultural commodities "in the current
of or in competition with, or so as to burden, obstruct, or in any
way affect, interstate or foreign commerce." [
Footnote 13]
Page 317 U. S. 366
Raisin Proration Zone No. 1 was organized in the latter part of
1937. No proration program was adopted for the 1937 crop, but loans
of $1,244,000 were made on raisins of that crop by the Commodity
Credit Corporation. [
Footnote
14] In aid of a proration program adopted under the California
Act for the 1938 crop, a substantial part of that crop was pledged
to the Commodity Credit Corporation as security for a loan of
$2,688,000, and was ultimately sold to the Federal Surplus
Commodities Corporation for relief distribution. [
Footnote 15] Substantial purchases of
raisins of the 1939 crop were also made by Federal Surplus
Commodities Corporation, although no proration program was adopted
for that year. [
Footnote 16]
In aid of the 1940 program, as we have already noted, the Commodity
Credit Corporation made loans in excess of $5,000,000, and 33,000
tons of the raisins pledged to it were sold to the Federal Surplus
Marketing Administration. [
Footnote 17]
Page 317 U. S. 367
This history shows clearly enough that the adoption of
legislative measures to prevent the demoralization of the industry
by stabilizing the marketing of the raisin crop is a matter of
state, as well as national, concern, and, in the absence of
inconsistent Congressional action, is a problem whose solution is
peculiarly within the province of the state. In the exercise of its
power, the state has adopted a measure appropriate to the end
sought. The program was not aimed at, nor did it discriminate
against, interstate commerce, although it undoubtedly affected the
commerce by increasing the interstate price of raisins and
curtailing interstate shipments to some undetermined extent. The
effect on the commerce is not greater, and in some instances was
far less, than that which this Court has held not to afford a basis
for denying to the states the right to pursue a legitimate state
end.
Cf. Kidd v. Pearson, supra; Sligh v. Kirkwood, supra;
Champlin Refining Co. v. Commission, supra; South Carolina Highway
Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., supra, and cases cited at p.
303 U. S. 189
and notes 4 and 5;
California v. Thompson, supra,
313 U. S.
113-15, and cases cited.
In comparing the relative weights of the conflicting local and
national interests involved, it is significant that Congress, by
its agricultural legislation, has recognized the distressed
condition of much of the agricultural production of the United
States, and has authorized marketing procedures, substantially like
the California prorate program, for stabilizing the marketing of
agricultural products. Acting under this legislation, the Secretary
of Agriculture has established a large number of market
stabilization programs for agricultural commodities moving in
interstate commerce in various parts of the country, including
seven affecting California crops. [
Footnote 18] All involved attempts
Page 317 U. S. 368
in one way or another to prevent overproduction of agricultural
products and excessive competition in marketing them, with price
stabilization as the ultimate objective. Most if not all had a like
effect in restricting shipments and raising or maintaining prices
of agricultural commodities moving in interstate commerce.
It thus appears that whatever effect the operation of the
California program may have on interstate commerce, it is one which
it has been the policy of Congress to aid and encourage through
federal agencies in conformity to the Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act and § 302 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act.
Nor is the effect on the commerce greater than or substantially
different in kind from that contemplated by the stabilization
programs authorized by federal statutes. As we have seen, the
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act is applicable to raisins only
on the direction of the Secretary of Agriculture, who, instead of
establishing a federal program has, as the statute authorizes,
cooperated in promoting the state program and aided it by
substantial federal loans. Hence, we cannot say that the effect of
the state program on interstate commerce is one which conflicts
with Congressional policy, or is such as to preclude the state from
this exercise of its reserved power to regulate domestic
agricultural production.
We conclude that the California prorate program for the 1940
raisin crop is a regulation of state industry of local concern
which, in all the circumstances of this case which we have
detailed, does not impair national control over the commerce in a
manner or to a degree forbidden by the Constitution.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
Act of June 5, 1933, ch. 754, Statutes of California of 1933, as
amended by chs. 471 and 743, Statutes of 1935; ch. 6, Extra
Session, 1938; chs. 363, 548 and 894, Statutes of 1939, and chs.
603, 1150 and 1186, Statutes of 1941. Its constitutionality under
both Federal and State Constitutions was sustained by the
California Supreme Court in
Agricultural Prorate Commission v.
Superior Court, 5 Cal. 2d 550,
55 P.2d 495.
[
Footnote 2]
See also 79 Cong.Rec. 9470, 11149-50, 11153; Hearings
Before the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry on S. 1807
(March, 1935) 29, 73; Hearings Before the House Committee on
Agriculture (Feb.-March, 1935) 53, 178-9. The Agricultural
Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 was for the most part a reenactment
of certain provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933,
48 Stat. 31, as amended in 1935, 49 Stat. 753. Sec. 10(i) was first
introduced in 1935, and reenacted without change in 1937.
[
Footnote 3]
A "parity" price is one which will
"give agricultural commodities a purchasing power with respect
to articles that farmers buy equivalent to the purchasing power of
agricultural commodities in the base period."
7 U.S.C. § 602(1). The parity price is computed by
multiplying an index of prices paid by farmers for goods used in
farm production and for family living expenses, together with real
estate taxes and interest on farm indebtedness, by the average
price during the base period of the commodity in question.
See Dept. of Agriculture, Parity Prices, What They Are and
How They Are Calculated (1942). The base period for commodities
other than tobacco and potatoes is August 1909-July 1914. However,
by 7 U.S.C. § 608e, the period of August 1919-July 1929 or a
part thereof may be used for any commodity as to which the
Secretary finds and proclaims that adequate statistics for the
1909-1914 period are not available. By proclamation dated June 26,
1942, the Secretary designated the period 1919-1929 as the base
period for raisins. 7 Fed.Reg. 4867.
[
Footnote 4]
The parity price for raisins on June 15, 1942, as published by
the Department of Agriculture was $100.51 per ton. Preliminary
figures show the average price for the 1941-42 crop to be $80.60.
Parity Prices, What They Are and How They Are Computed,
supra, vii. Parity prices for raisins for previous years
are not published. However they may be computed from the base
period price of $105.80 and the indices of prices paid by farmers
published by the Department of Agriculture in the statistical
publications cited
infra, note 9 Such computations for 1933 and subsequent years,
supplied by the Department of Agriculture, indicate that, while the
price received by the farmer for the 1940 crop was $57.60, the
parity price for 1940 was $80.41 and for 1941 was $86.76. They
further indicate that raisin prices have not since 1933 equalled
parity, and that the field prices for all crops prior to that of
1941 have been from $15 to $40 per ton below parity.
[
Footnote 5]
The Commodity Credit Corporation was created by Executive Order
No. 6340, October 16, 1933. It has been continued in existence by
Acts of Congress, 49 Stat. 4; 50 Stat. 5; 53 Stat. 510. By
Reorganization Plan No. I, 53 Stat. 1429, approved by Act of
Congress, 53 Stat. 813, and effective July 1, 1939, the Corporation
was transferred to the Department of Agriculture, to be
"administered in such department under the general direction and
supervision of the Secretary of Agriculture." By Executive Order
No. 8219, Aug. 7, 1939, 4 Fed.Reg. 3565, exclusive voting rights in
its capital stock were vested in the Secretary.
[
Footnote 6]
The Surplus Marketing Administration was created by
Reorganization Plan No. III, 45 Stat. 1232, approved 54 Stat. 231,
effective June 30, 1940, as a consolidation of the Division of
Marketing and Marketing Agreements of the Agricultural Adjustment
Administration, and the Federal Surplus Commodities Corporation.
The Surplus Commodities Corporation was incorporated on October 4,
1933, under the name of the Federal Surplus Relief Corporation. Its
existence as "an agency of the United States under the direction of
the Secretary of Agriculture" was continued by Acts of Congress, 50
Stat. 323; 52 Stat. 38. The members of the Corporation are the
Secretary of Agriculture, the Administrator of the Agricultural
Adjustment Administration, and the Governor of the Farm Credit
Administration.
As successor to the Corporation, the Surplus Marketing
Administration exercises the authority given by § 32 of the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1935, 7 U.S.C. § 612c, to use
30% of annual gross customs receipts to encourage the exportation,
and the domestic consumption by persons in low income groups, of
agricultural commodities, and to reestablish farmers' purchasing
power. As successor to the Division of Markets and Marketing
Agreements, the Administration is charged with the enforcement of
the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937.
[
Footnote 7]
Report of the President of the Commodity Credit Corporation
(1941) 14, 21; Wm. J. Cecil (Zone Agent, Raisin Proration Zone No.
1), The 1940 Raisin Program, 30 Calif.Dept. of Agriculture Bulletin
46.
[
Footnote 8]
See also Report of the President of the Commodity
Credit Corporation (1940) 4, 6.
[
Footnote 9]
The principal statistical sources are U.S. Tariff Commission,
Grapes, Raisins and Wines, Report No. 134, Second Series, issued
pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1332, and the following publications
of the U.S. Department of Agriculture: Yearbook of Agriculture
(published annually until 1936); Agricultural Statistics (published
annually since 1936); Crops and Markets (published quarterly);
Season Average Prices and Value of Production, Principal Crops,
1940 and 1941 (Dec. 18, 1941). For general discussions of the
economic status of the raisin industry,
see Grapes,
Raisins and Wines,
supra; Shear and Gould, Economic Status
of the Grape Industry, University of California, Agricultural
Experiment Station Bulletin No. 429 (1927); Shear and Howe, Factors
Affecting California Raisin Sales and Prices, 19229, Giannini
Foundation of Agricultural Economics, Paper No. 20 (1931).
[
Footnote 10]
Studies made under the auspices of the University of California
indicate that the cost of production of Thompson Seedless raisins,
including the growers' labor, a management charge, depreciation,
and interest on investment, is $49.58 per ton on a farm yielding
two tons per acre, and $72.07 per ton on a farm yielding one ton
per acre. A two-ton yield is described as "good"; a one-ton yield
as "usual." Adams, Farm Management Crop Manual, University of
California Syllabus Series No. 278 (1941) 142-145. Another student
has computed the cost of production at $53.96 for a two-ton per
acre yield, about $65 for a 1.5-ton yield, and $90 for a one-ton
yield. Shultis, Standards of Production, Labor, Material and other
Costs for Selected Crops and Livestock Enterprises, University of
California Extension Service (1938) 13. Field prices for Thompson
Seedless raisins were below $49.50 in 1923, 1928, 1932, and 1938;
since 1922, they have been at $65.00 or higher in only 5 years, and
have only once been as high as $72.00. Grapes, Raisins and Wines,
supra, 149.
For parity prices for raisins,
see supra, note 4
[
Footnote 11]
For discussion of private efforts within the industry prior to
1929 to regulate the marketing of raisins,
see Grapes,
Raisins and Wines,
supra, 153-155.
[
Footnote 12]
See Annual Report of the Federal Farm Board (1930) 18,
73;
id. (1931), 59-61, 91; Grapes, Raisins and Wines,
supra, 62-64; S.W. Shear, The California Grape Control
Plan, Giannini Foundation of Agricultural Economics, Paper No. 22
(1931); Stokdyk and West, The Farm Board (1930) 135-139. Loans of
$4,500,000 in 1929 and $6,755,000 in 1930 were made by the Federal
Farm Board. Shear,
supra, states that the 1930 program,
which provided for the formation of a single marketing agency and
the destruction or diversion to by-products use of surplus raisins,
"was designed by the Federal Farm Board."
The Federal Farm Board was created by § 2 of the
Agricultural Marketing Act of 1929, 46 Stat. 11, which authorized
the Board to make loans to cooperative associations to aid in "the
effective merchandising of agricultural commodities . . ." (§
7) so as to achieve the statutory objective of placing agriculture
on a "basis of economic equality with other industries" (§
1).
[
Footnote 13]
See U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Agricultural Adjustment
in 1934, 202. The marketing program adopted is published by the
Agricultural Adjustment Administration, Department of Agriculture,
as Marketing Agreement Series -- Agreement No. 44, License Series
-- License No. 55. It was in effect from May 29, 1934, to Sept. 14,
1935. The agreement provided for the creation of a control board on
which representatives of packers and growers should have an equal
voice. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture, the
control board could fix minimum prices to be paid growers and
require a percentage of the crop to be delivered to the control
board. 15% of the 1934 crop was required to be delivered to the
board, and prices for that crop were fixed at $60, $65 and $70 per
ton for Muscat, Sultana, and Thompson Seedless raisins,
respectively.
[
Footnote 14]
Report of the President of the Commodity Credit Corporation
(1940) 16. These raisins were ultimately sold to the Federal
Surplus Commodities Corporation for relief distribution.
Ibid. ; Report of the Federal Surplus Commodities
Corporation (1938) 16.
[
Footnote 15]
Report of the President of the Commodity Credit Corporation
(1940) 16; Report of the Associate Administrator of the
Agricultural Adjustment Administration in Charge of the Division of
Marketing and Marketing Agreements, and the President of the
Federal Surplus Commodities Corporation (1939) 52. The federal loan
was conditioned upon the adoption of a state proration program by
which 20% of the crop was delivered into a stabilization pool.
[
Footnote 16]
Cecil, The 1940 Raisin Proration Program,
supra, 48;
Report of the Federal Surplus Commodities Corporation (1940) 6.
[
Footnote 17]
The Commodity Credit Corporation similarly made loans on the
1937, 1938, and 1940 crops of dried prunes, the loans on the 1938
and 1940 crops being in aid of proration programs which were very
similar to those adopted for raisins. Report of the President of
the Commodity Credit Corporation (1940) 15, 21;
id.
(1941), 13-14, 21; Report of the Surplus Marketing Administration
(1941) 33-34.
[
Footnote 18]
Twenty-eight such programs affecting milk, and nineteen
affecting other agricultural commodities, were in effect during the
fiscal year ending June 30, 1941. Report of the Surplus Marketing
Administration (1941) pp. 7, 12. For discussions of the nature and
purpose of these programs,
see the annual reports of the
Agricultural Adjustment Administration; Nourse, Marketing
Agreements under the A.A.A. (1935).