Evidence
held sufficient to go to the jury on the issue
of gross negligence as defined by the law of Vermont, in an action
against the owner of an automobile for personal injuries suffered
by one riding in it as his guest who alleged that the accident was
caused by the gross negligence of the owner in driving the vehicle.
P.
312 U. S.
493.
111 F.2d 611 reversed.
Certiorari, 311 U.S. 634, to review the reversal of a judgment
for damages recovered under a Vermont "guest occupant" law.
Jurisdiction of the District Court was founded on diversity of
citizenship.
Page 312 U. S. 493
MR. JUSTICE REED delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner, a citizen of New Hampshire, was injured when the
respondent's car, in which she was a passenger, collided with
another on a country road in Vermont. Diversity of citizenship gave
jurisdiction to the District Court, and petitioner recovered a
verdict under the Vermont guest occupant law, [
Footnote 1] which required her to prove gross
negligence on the part of the respondent. The Circuit Court of
Appeals, however, considering the evidence of gross negligence
insufficient to go to the jury, reversed and dismissed the
complaint. [
Footnote 2] We
granted certiorari, 311 U.S. 634, to examine whether there had been
sufficient compliance with Rule 50(b), Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, to authorize dismissal of the complaint, [
Footnote 3] but our view of the merits makes
it unnecessary to discuss this question.
The result is determined by a consideration of the facts in the
light of the Vermont law. The accident occurred in broad daylight
in the late morning of an August day. If the facts most favorable
to the petitioner were accepted, the jury might have concluded
properly that the defendant's car approached from the south a
covered bridge on a little used country road at a speed of fifteen
miles per hour. Respondent, who was the driver and owner, sat on
the front seat with another. The petitioner and another lady
occupied the rear seat. The bridge spanned Williams Rive,r which,
at that point,
Page 312 U. S. 494
ran eastwardly to join the Connecticut. As another car emerged
from its southern end, the collision happened.
The road along which respondent was driving ran parallel with
the southernly bank of the river for a short distance, and then
turned "abruptly," in a "sharper curve than any on the road," at a
sixty degree angle down a nine percent grade towards the bridge.
Bushes and small trees cut off the view of a car "coming out of the
bridge" until the respondent's car was "probably 30 feet" away.
As respondent's light car came into this curve, he cut in to the
left without slackening speed or blowing a horn and suddenly found
himself face to face with a larger car coming out of the bridge on
its right hand side of the road at two miles per hour. The
collision knocked the heavier car backward several feet and through
a guard rail on the west side of the bridge approach. The road
approaching the bridge "at this blind corner" was sandy, from
fourteen to seventeen feet wide. Respondent testified he had known
the spot "all my life," and knew cars could pass only "at a snail's
pace."
The "Law of the Road" in Vermont is to round curves "as far to
the right . . . as reasonably practicable" [
Footnote 4] and to "signal with bell or horn" "in going
around a curve." [
Footnote
5]
Under these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the
Vermont law requires the submission of the question of gross
negligence to the jury. As a matter of law, it seems quite plain
that a jury might find a driver of a car familiar with the locality
grossly negligent when, with three guests and without a signal, he
rounds a blind, sharp curve at fifteen miles per hour on the wrong
side into a narrow bridge entrance. The accepted Vermont
Page 312 U. S. 495
definition of gross negligence is found in
Shaw v.
Moore: [
Footnote 6]
"Gross negligence is substantially and appreciably higher in
magnitude and more culpable than ordinary negligence. Gross
negligence is equivalent to the failure to exercise even a slight
degree of care. It is materially more want of care than constitutes
simple inadvertence. It is an act or omission respecting legal duty
of an aggravated character, as distinguished from a mere failure to
exercise ordinary care. It is very great negligence, or the absence
of slight diligence, or the want of even scant care. It amounts to
indifference to present legal duty, and to utter forgetfulness of
legal obligations so far as other persons may be affected. It is a
heedless and palpable violation of legal duty respecting the rights
of others. The element of culpability which characterizes all
negligence is, in gross negligence, magnified to a high degree as
compared with that present in ordinary negligence. Gross negligence
is manifestly a smaller amount of watchfulness and circumspection
than the circumstances require of a prudent man. But it falls short
of being such reckless disregard of probable consequences as is
equivalent to a willful and intentional wrong. Ordinary and gross
negligence differ in degree of inattention, while both differ in
kind from willful and intentional conduct which is or ought to be
known to have a tendency to injure."
This has been repeated many times in later cases. [
Footnote 7] The application creates the
difficulties. The latest cases say "each case must be judged
according to its own facts." [
Footnote 8]
Page 312 U. S. 496
Admittedly there are instances among the Vermont cases which
might be logically cited to support a refusal to submit this case.
[
Footnote 9] About as many are
upon the other side. [
Footnote
10] We think the District Court correctly appraised the law and
facts.
We reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals and
affirm that of the District Court.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
Vermont Public Laws (1933) § 5113.
[
Footnote 2]
111 F.2d 611.
[
Footnote 3]
As in
Berry v. United States, ante, p.
312 U. S. 450, the
District Court denied respondent's motion for a directed verdict at
the close of the case. After verdict, however, the respondent did
not make a motion for judgment
n.o.v.
[
Footnote 4]
Vermont Public Laws (1933) § 5110-IX.
[
Footnote 5]
Id., § 5110-XV.
[
Footnote 6]
104 Vt. 529, 531, 532, 162 A. 373, 374.
[
Footnote 7]
Dessereau v. Walker, 105 Vt. 99, 101, 163 A. 632;
Franzoni v. Ravenna, 105 Vt. 64, 163 A. 564;
Hunter v.
Preston, 105 Vt. 327, 338, 166 A. 17.
[
Footnote 8]
Ellison v. Colby, 110 Vt. 431, 8 A.2d 637, 640;
Kelley v. Anthony, 110 Vt. 490, 8 A.2d 641, 642.
[
Footnote 9]
Shaw v. Moore, 104 Vt. 529, 162 A. 373;
Franzoni v.
Ravenna, 105 Vt. 64, 163 A. 564;
Anderson v. Olson,
106 Vt. 70, 169 A. 781;
L'Ecuyer v. Farnsworth, 106 Vt.
180, 170 A. 677;
Garvey v. Michaud, 108 Vt. 226, 184 A.
712;
Kelley v. Anthony, 110 Vt. 490, 8 A.2d 641.
[
Footnote 10]
Dessereau v. Walker, 105 Vt. 99, 163 A. 632;
Farren
v. McMahon, 110 Vt. 55, 1 A.2d 726;
Hunter v.
Preston, 105 Vt. 327, 338, 166 A. 17;
Hall v. Royce,
109 Vt. 99, 106, 192 A. 193;
Ellison v. Colby, 110 Vt.
431, 8 A.2d 637;
Powers v. Lackey, 109 Vt. 505, 1 A.2d
693.