1. An announcement of state law by an intermediate state
appellate court, in the absence of a contrary ruling by the highest
state court or of other convincing evidence that the state law is
otherwise, should be followed by federal courts. P.
311 U. S.
188.
2. An intermediate appellate court of California had ruled that,
in that State, a stipulation in a construction contract for
liquidated damages in case of delay in completion was inapplicable
after abandonment of the work. This, apparently, had not been
disapproved, and there was no convincing evidence that the law of
the State was otherwise.
Held, that the ruling should have
been followed by the federal courts, in a case involving the same
questions, in California. P.
311 U. S.
188.
110 F.2d 620 reversed.
Certiorari,
post, p. 631, to review the affirmance of a
Judgment for damages awarded on a cross-complaint, against a
building contractor for delay in completing
Page 311 U. S. 181
a building. Jurisdiction was based on diversity of
citizenship.
Page 311 U. S. 184
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.
Six Companies of California, a contractor, brought this suit
against respondent, Joint Highway District No. 13, to recover the
reasonable value of materials and labor furnished under a contract.
The contractor had undertaken to rescind for alleged breach by
respondent, and had stopped work. Respondent answered alleging
wrongful abandonment of the contract, and, by cross-complaint,
sought damages against the contractor and its sureties.
There was a clause in the contract for liquidated damages in the
amount of $500 a day in case of delay in completion. [
Footnote 1] The District Court found against
the contractor
Page 311 U. S. 185
and its sureties, and, on the cross-complaint, awarded damages
which included $142,000 as liquidated damages for delay. The
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. 110 F.2d 620.
Petitioners contended that, under the law of California the
clause providing for liquidated damages did not apply to delay
which occurred after the abandonment of the work by the contractor.
This contention was overruled. The Circuit Court of Appeals
expressly recognized that its decision in that respect was contrary
to the decision of the District Court of Appeal in California in
the case of
Sinnott v. Schumacher, 45 Cal. App. 46, 187 P.
105. But the Circuit Court of Appeals thought that decision wrong,
and refused to follow it. We granted certiorari limited to the
question whether there was error in that ruling. October 14,
1940.
In
Sinnott v. Schumacher, supra, the suit was brought
to recover the value of labor and materials furnished under a
building contract. After part performance, the contractor gave
notice of rescission and abandoned work because of failure to
receive the first installment of the agreed payment. Defendants
denied that the installment was due, and filed a cross-complaint
against the contractor and his surety asking damages because of the
abandonment of the work. The trial court found against the
plaintiff on his complaint and in favor of the defendants on their
cross-complaint, and entered judgment for damages. The District
Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. The Supreme Court of the
State denied a petition for hearing in that court.
On the appeal to the District Court of Appeal, the
plaintiff-appellant contended that the trial court erred as to the
amount of the damages awarded, basing his contention upon the
clause in the contract which provided for liquidated damages in a
stipulated amount per day
Page 311 U. S. 186
in case of delay in completion. [
Footnote 2] The District Court of Appeal held that the
clause had no application to a case where the contract had been
abandoned without sufficient cause. The court said:
"As to the appellants' contention that the court was in error in
its finding and conclusion as to the amount of damages sustained by
the defendants and cross-complainants by reason of the plaintiff's
unjustified abandonment of work upon said building, and his
failure, neglect, and refusal to complete the same, it may be
stated that this contention is based upon the clause in the
contract which relates to the matter of delay in the time of
completion of said building and which purports to fix a penalty
of
Page 311 U. S. 187
$50 per day for such delay; but this provision of the contract
has no application to a condition wherein the contractor is shown
to have abandoned his contract without sufficient cause, in which
case the right of the defendants to damages as a result of the
plaintiff's breach of said contract could not be affected or
limited by said provision of the contract for a penalty for delay
in the completion of the structure beyond the stipulated time for
such completion. [
Footnote
3]"
Respondent urges that what was said by the District Court of
Appeal in the
Sinnott case with respect to the liquidated
damage clause was a mere dictum. We do not so regard it. This part
of the opinion of the court was its answer to the appellants'
insistence that the judgment on appeal was erroneous because the
liquidated damage clause had been disregarded and damages had been
awarded in excess of the amount for which the contract provided.
What the court said as to this was a statement of the ground of its
decision. It was a statement of the law of California as applied to
the facts before the court. It is said that there is a difference
between the two cases. That difference appears to be that, in the
instant case, the owner is seeking to apply the liquidated damage
clause in order to recover from the contractor, while, in the
Sinnott case, the contractor was seeking to limit the
damage recoverable against him to the amount agreed upon. But, so
far as the question concerns the applicability of the liquidated
damage clause, the difference would not seem to be material, as, by
the terms of the clause in each case, it appears to be intended to
bind both parties when applicable. The ruling as to the law of
California as
Page 311 U. S. 188
applied by the state court was that the stipulation in the
contract as to the amount of damages in case of delay in completion
was not applicable to delay after the contractor had abandoned the
work. As the Circuit Court of Appeals said, that decision "is
adverse to ours."
The decision in the
Sinnott case was made in 1919. We
have not been referred to any decision of the Supreme Court of
California to the contrary. We thus have an announcement of the
state law by an intermediate appellate court in California in a
ruling which apparently has not been disapproved, and there is no
convincing evidence that the law of the State is otherwise. We have
fully discussed the principle involved in the cases of
West v.
American Telephone and Telegraph Co., post, p.
311 U. S. 223, and
Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, ante, p.
311 U. S. 169, and
further amplification is unnecessary.
See also Rindge Co. v.
Los Angeles County, 262 U. S. 700,
262 U. S. 708;
Tipton v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.,
298 U. S. 141,
298 U. S. 151.
The Circuit Court of Appeals should have followed the decision of
the state court in
Sinnott v. Schumacher with respect to
the inapplicability of the liquidated damage clause in the event of
the abandonment of work under the contract, and its judgment to the
contrary is reversed. The cause is remanded for further proceedings
in conformity with this opinion.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
That clause provided:
"(d) Damages for Delay. -- The Parties hereto expressly
stipulate and agree that time is the essence of this contract. In
case the work is not completed within the time specified in the
contract or within such extensions of the contract time as may be
allowed as herein provided, it is distinctly understood and agreed
that the contractor shall pay the District as agreed, as liquidated
damages and not as a penalty, five hundred dollars ($500.00) for
each and every working day which may elapse between the limiting
date as herein provided and the date of actual completion of the
work, said sum being specifically agreed upon as a measure of the
damage, to the District by reason of delay in the completion of the
work, it being expressly stipulated and agreed that it would be
impracticable to estimate and ascertain the actual damages
sustained by the District under such circumstances, and the
Contractor agrees and consents that the amount of such liquidated
damages so fixed shall be deducted and retained by the District
from any money then due, or thereafter to become due, the
Contractor."
[
Footnote 2]
The clause for liquidated damages in the contract in the
Sinnott case was as follows:
"Should the Contractor fail to complete this contract and the
work provided for within the time set for completion as aforesaid,
due allowance being made for the contingencies provided for herein,
he shall then become liable to the Owner for all loss and damages
which the Owner may suffer on account thereof, in the sum of Ten
Dollars per day, which the Contractor hereby agrees to deduct from
his contract price, for each day that the work shall remain
unfinished beyond such time for completion, and the Owner agrees to
pay to the Contractor a bonus of Ten Dollars ($10) for each day
that the work may be completed before the time aforesaid for the
completion."
"The agreement in this paragraph made for damages is made as
herein set forth for the reason that the actual damage which will
be sustained by the Owner by reason of the Contractor's breach of
the covenant to complete this contract within the time stated is
from the nature of the case impracticable and extremely difficult
to fix, and one of the considerations moving the Owner to enter
into this contract with the Contractor is the agreement of the
Contractor to complete his said contract within the time herein
stated and the liquidated damages herein above stated for his
failure to do so."
The plaintiff's contention under this clause was that the delay
in completion was not more than five days, the damage for which
under the contract would amount to $50.
[
Footnote 3]
Compare Bacigalupi v. Phoenix Building & Const.
Co., 14 Cal. App. 632, 639, 112 P. 892.
See Williston
on Contracts, Rev.Ed., vol. 3, § 785, pp. 2210, 2211.