1. Section 3 of the Act of August 24, 1937, providing for a
court of three judges and a direct appeal to this Court, is not
applicable unless the questions raised as to the constitutional
validity of an Act of Congress are substantial. P.
307 U. S.
172.
2. There is no substance in the contention that the Twenty-first
Amendment gives to the States complete and exclusive control over
commerce in intoxicating liquors, unlimited by the commerce clause,
and hence that Congress has no longer authority to control the
importation of these commodities into the United States. P.
307 U. S.
172.
3. A suit challenging the validity of regulations and
administrative action under the Federal Alcohol Administration Act,
but raising no substantial question of constitutional validity as
to the Act itself, is not within § 3 of the Act of August 24,
1937, providing for a three-judge District Court, and direct appeal
to this Court, in cases of attack upon an "Act of Congress" upon
the ground that "such Act or any part thereof is repugnant to the
Constitution of the United States." P.
307 U. S.
173.
4. Lacking jurisdiction to review the merits on an appeal
mistakenly taken under § 3 of the Act of August 24, 1937, this
Court vacates the decree below and remands the case to the District
Court for further proceedings to be taken independently of that
section. P.
307 U. S. 174.
25 F. Supp. 771, decree vacated.
Appeal from a decree of the District Court denying an
application for a preliminary injunction and dismissing the bill in
a suit to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Alcohol
Administration Act and of regulations thereunder.
Page 307 U. S. 172
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, an importer and distributor of alcoholic beverages,
having been denied the right to import its product into the United
States under the label of "blended Scotch whisky" upon the ground
that it was improperly labeled, brought this suit against the
Secretary of the Treasury and other officials to enjoin them from
refusing to release the product from customs custody upon payment
of the required customs duties. Appellant also asked for a
declaratory judgment that the Federal Alcohol Administration Act,
49 Stat. 977, 1965, § 5(e), is unconstitutional and void, and
that Regulations No. 5 promulgated thereunder, and particularly
Sections 21(k), 34(f) and 46(a) of these Regulations, are
unenforceable as against appellant and are without warrant of
statutory authority.
In the view that the question of the Validity of an Act of
Congress was involved and that the suit was within the purview of
Section 3 of the Act of Congress of August 24, 1937, 50 Stat. 751,
the case was heard below by a court of three judges, which denied
an application for preliminary injunction and dismissed the
complaint. 25 F. Supp. 771. From its decree, a direct appeal has
been taken to this Court.
Section 3 of the Act of Congress of August 24, 1937, providing
for a court of three judges and a direct appeal to this Court, is
not applicable unless the questions raised as to the constitutional
validity of an Act of Congress are substantial.
California
Water Service Co. v. Redding, 304 U.
S. 252,
304 U. S.
254-255.
Here, the Federal Alcohol Administration Act was attacked upon
the ground that the Twenty-first Amendment
Page 307 U. S. 173
to the Federal Constitution gives to the States complete and
exclusive control over commerce in intoxicating liquors, unlimited
by the commerce clause, and hence that Congress has no longer
authority to control the importation of these commodities into the
United States. We see no substance in this contention.
The other contentions of appellant assailed the Regulations and
administrative action thereunder, rather than the Act of Congress.
So far as the Federal Alcohol Administration Act itself is
concerned, no substantial question of constitutional validity was
raised.
Section 3 of the Act of Congress of August 24, 1937, while
providing for a procedure analogous to that under § 266 of the
Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 380, creates a distinction which we
think is controlling. Section 266 of the Judicial Code provides for
a court of three judges where an injunction is sought to restrain
the enforcement "of any statute of a State" or "of an order made by
an administrative board or commission acting under and pursuant to
the statutes of such State" upon the ground of unconstitutionality.
The provision in relation to administrative orders was added by an
amendment to the original section. Act of March 4, 1913, 37 Stat.
1013. While that addition has been said to be unnecessary, as such
orders were previously covered (
Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v.
Russell, 261 U. S. 290,
261 U. S.
292), Congress adopted the amendment out of abundant
caution. But with these provisions of § 266 before it,
Congress, in enacting § 3 of the Act of August 24, 1937, did
not refer to "any statute" or to administrative orders, but
confined its requirement to cases of attack upon an "Act of
Congress" upon the ground that "such Act or any part thereof is
repugnant to the Constitution of the United States." This is not an
apt description of administrative regulations or orders. We must
regard the choice of language as deliberate, and as indicating a
limitation deemed to be advisable. It does not appear to have been
the intention of Congress that
Page 307 U. S. 174
direct appeal should lie to this Court when administrative
action, and not the Act of Congress, is assailed.
While we are of the opinion that the Court is without
jurisdiction to review the merits on this appeal, the Court does
have jurisdiction to make such corrective order as may be
appropriate to the enforcement of the limitations which Section 3
imposes, and, in the circumstances disclosed, the appropriate
action is to vacate the decree below and to remand the cause to the
District Court for further proceedings to be taken independently of
§ 3 of the Act of August 24, 1937.
See Gully v. Interstate
Natural Gas Co., 292 U. S. 16;
Oklahoma Gas Co. v. Oklahoma Packing Co., 292 U.
S. 386,
292 U.S.
392.
Decree vacated.
