In a suit to set aside orders of the Interstate Commerce
Commission affecting rates on coke,
held:
1. Unnecessary to pass upon the validity of an order cancelling
certain schedules and fixing future maximum rates, which order had
later been supplemented by another of the orders attacked. P.
304 U. S.
59.
2. A construction of an order, adopted by the Commission, and
rendering it valid, is to be accepted rather than another
construction which extends it beyond the Commission's jurisdiction.
P.
304 U. S.
60.
3. Objections to an order that it is not supported by
substantial evidence, disregards ordinary standards for determining
reasonableness of rates, is not supported by necessary findings,
and represents a mere attempt to equalize geographical and
transportation disadvantages, fortune, and opportunities, are
answered in this case by findings of the court below, adequately
supported. P.
304 U. S.
60.
Affirmed.
Page 304 U. S. 59
Appeal from a decree dismissing a bill to set aside orders of
the Interstate Commerce Commission.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellants, nineteen railroads operating within what is known as
Central Territory -- Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan -- by
their bill filed in the District Court Northern District of
Illinois July 22, 1936, challenged the validity of two Interstate
Commerce Commission orders affecting the rate structure on coke
moving into that territory from southern points. Questions in
respect of these rates have often been before the Commission. The
court made findings of fact upon the evidence and dismissed the
bill without opinion.
The first challenged order, dated March 11, 1935, followed an
earlier suspension of certain proposed schedules and an
investigation. It cancelled these schedules and determined what
thereafter would be maximum reasonable rates upon a mileage basis.
Subsequently, the proceedings
Page 304 U. S. 60
having been reopened, this order was modified and reaffirmed. In
the circumstances, we think the court below properly declined to
pass upon its validity.
The second challenged order, April 30, 1936, followed one
entered April 15, 1936, which upon petition and replies reopened
the proceedings for reconsideration on the record as it then stood.
The later order affirmed former findings that the schedules
suspended by the one of March 11, 1935, had not been justified, and
prescribed future maximum rates upon a mileage basis. These were
lower (some ten percent) than those authorized prior to 1935.
Here, counsel specially insist this second order exceeded the
jurisdiction of the Commission, since it undertook to determine
rates concerning which there had been no proper notice or
opportunity for hearing. But this contention rests upon an assumed
construction of the order not obviously correct. The Commission has
not so construed it, nor has that body been asked so to do or for
any further action in respect of it. Another construction brings
the order clearly within the jurisdiction assumed by the
Commission. In the circumstances, appellants cannot prevail on this
point.
Appellants further urge that the order is contrary to the weight
of the evidence, not supported by substantial evidence, disregards
ordinary standards for determining reasonableness of rates, is not
supported by necessary findings, and represents a mere attempt to
equalize geographical and transportation disadvantages, fortune,
and opportunities. The findings by the court below, we think, are
adequately supported by the record. They negative these claims, and
leave no sufficient basis for our interference with the action
there taken.
The challenged judgment must be
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE CARDOZO took no part in the
consideration or decision of this cause.
